Capila y Yruma vs. People of the Philippines

A spontaneous statement made by a declarant immediately after a startling occurrence, identifying a participant while still under the excitement of the event and before any opportunity to fabricate, is admissible as part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court even if the declarant does not testify. The right to cross-examination is not impinged because the exception rests on the trustworthiness of spontaneous utterances. Further, an accused’s unexplained flight, failure to rebut inculpatory evidence, and silence when faced with accusations may be taken as admissions against him under Section 32, Rule 130, and may corroborate a conviction based on res gestae evidence.

On the evening of August 9, 1993, two Pilipinas Bank employees, Ariel Arellano and Lani Imperio, were inside the Meralco Collection Office on J.P. Rizal Street, Makati City, gathering cash collections from Meralco’s 27 field collectors. They had placed ₱1,292,991.12 in a padlocked duffel bag and were awaiting the bank’s armored vehicle. Petitioner Pepito Capila and Dimas dela Cruz, both employed by Lanting Security and Watchman Agency, served as regular security guards at the office. Before the armored car arrived, two armed men entered, struck Dela Cruz on the nape with a handgun, ordered the bank employees to lie face down, seized the duffel bag, and also took three .38 caliber revolvers belonging to the agency, including the service firearm issued to Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz thereafter named petitioner as one of the robbers and reported the crime to the Makati police and the security agency.

• The Robbery: On the night of August 9, 1993, Ariel Arellano and Lani Imperio, employees of Pilipinas Bank, were at the Meralco Collection Office in Makati City consolidating cash collections totaling ₱1,292,991.12. They placed the money in a padlocked duffel bag and waited for the bank’s armored car. Security guard Dimas dela Cruz was posted at the office; petitioner Pepito Capila, also a security guard of Lanting Security and Watchman Agency, was assigned to the same premises. Before the armored vehicle arrived, two armed men entered, struck Dela Cruz on the nape, ordered Arellano and Imperio to lie face down, and took the duffel bag and three .38 caliber revolvers owned by the security agency, including Dela Cruz’s service firearm. The perpetrators then fled.

• Immediate Identification: Right after the robbers left, Dela Cruz told Arellano that petitioner was one of the perpetrators. Dela Cruz also promptly called the Makati police, the Meralco Security Division, and Lanting Security and Watchman Agency to report the incident. Investigating officer SPO4 Romualdo Maximo arrived within ten minutes and questioned the occupants. Dela Cruz, still visibly shocked, identified petitioner as one of the robbers. Edgardo Irigayen, the agency’s intelligence officer, separately received the same report from Dela Cruz. Arellano and Imperio could not identify the robbers because they had been ordered to lie down.

• Flight and Apprehension: Shortly after the incident, petitioner fled to his hometown in Palapag, Northern Samar. Lanting Security and Watchman Agency requested police assistance to locate him. Police operatives, aided by the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit, arrested petitioner, his brother Bonifacio Capila, and Deogenio Caparoso in Northern Samar without warrants.

• Discovery of Partial Loot and Admission: Upon arrest, police recovered ₱5,000.00 from petitioner, which was believed to be part of the stolen money. SPO4 Maximo interrogated petitioner, who allegedly admitted participating in the robbery, stated that his share was ₱45,000.00, and identified Dela Cruz as the mastermind. Petitioner thereafter did not present any evidence at trial and waived his right to testify.

• Hearsay and Denial of Cross-Examination: Petitioner contended that the statement of Dimas dela Cruz identifying him as one of the robbers, related in court through the testimony of SPO4 Maximo, was inadmissible hearsay. He argued that because Dela Cruz never took the witness stand and was not subjected to cross‑examination, his conviction rested on untested evidence in violation of due process.

• Misapplication of Res Gestae: Petitioner maintained that the requisites of the res gestae exception were not satisfied and that the trial court and Court of Appeals erroneously invoked the rule to circumvent the hearsay prohibition.

• Res Gestae Applicable: The People, through the Solicitor General, argued that Dela Cruz’s statement was made immediately after the robbery while he was still under the excitement and stress of the startling occurrence, without any opportunity to fabricate. It met all the requisites of res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court and was thus admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even absent the declarant’s court testimony.

• Flight and Silence as Inculpatory: Respondent further stressed that petitioner’s flight to Samar, his failure to rebut the prosecution’s evidence, and his silence when confronted with the accusation all constituted circumstantial evidence and admissions confirming guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Res Gestae Admissibility: Whether Dela Cruz’s out-of-court statement identifying petitioner as one of the robbers, testified to by SPO4 Maximo, was properly admitted under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule despite Dela Cruz’s absence as a witness.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution’s evidence, consisting of the res gestae declaration, petitioner’s flight, his possession of part of the loot, and his failure to testify, sufficed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Res Gestae Admissibility: Dela Cruz’s declaration was properly admitted as part of the res gestae. The requisites under Section 42, Rule 130 were fully met: (1) the robbery constituted an undeniably startling occurrence; (2) Dela Cruz’s statements to Arellano and to SPO4 Maximo were made immediately after the incident, while he was still under the shock of the event and before he had any time to contrive a false narrative; and (3) the statements directly concerned the identity of one of the perpetrators and the circumstances of the robbery. The spontaneity of the declaration rendered it inherently trustworthy, as the utterance was “the event speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking for himself.” Because the statement met the res gestae test, its admission did not violate petitioner’s right to confrontation; the declarant’s non-appearance at trial is immaterial where the exception applies. Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of Appeals was directly in point: a res gestae statement, even when the declarant did not testify, is not hearsay and may be received through a witness who heard it.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The res gestae identification, taken together with other established circumstances, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner fled to a distant province immediately after the crime, a classic indication of guilt. When arrested, he was found in possession of ₱5,000.00, part of the stolen money. He chose not to testify and did not rebut the damaging evidence against him; this silence, in the face of an accusation that naturally called for a denial if untrue, was an implied admission under Section 32, Rule 130. The cumulative effect of these pieces of evidence left no room for reasonable doubt.

• Res Gestae (Section 42, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court): A statement made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, with respect to the circumstances thereof, is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Three requisites must concur: (1) the principal act must be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement must have been spontaneous, made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and uttered during the occurrence or immediately or shortly subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The rationale lies in human experience: under the stress of nervous excitement produced by a shocking event, a person’s spontaneous utterance is regarded as a sincere and trustworthy product of immediate sensory impressions, free from deliberate reflection or fabrication. Here, the robbery was a startling occurrence; Dela Cruz’s remarks were made within minutes, before the shock dissipated and before any opportunity to fabricate; and they directly pertained to the identity of the robber.

• Admission by Silence (Section 32, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court): An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing of a party who does or says nothing, when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when it is proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him. Petitioner’s failure to refute the accusations leveled against him by the prosecution witnesses, particularly when he waived his right to present evidence, rendered his silence admissible as an implied admission of guilt.

• Flight as Indication of Guilt: Flight from the place of the crime, particularly when unexplained, is a circumstance strongly indicative of consciousness of guilt and may be considered as corroborative evidence of criminal responsibility.

• “Res gestae is a Latin phrase which literally means ‘things done.’ As an exception to the hearsay rule, it refers to those exclamations and statements by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as spontaneous reactions or utterances inspired by the excitement of the occasion, and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and fabricate a false statement.”

• “The reason for the rule is human experience. It has been shown that under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, the state of nervous excitement which occurs in a spectator may produce a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions produced by the external shock. … The spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking for himself.”

• Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 53401, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 5 — Applied as controlling precedent. The case held that a spontaneous exclamation made immediately after an accident, even when the declarant was not presented as a witness, fell within the res gestae rule and was admissible as an exception to the hearsay prohibition. This reasoning was adopted wholesale to uphold the admission of Dela Cruz’s statement through SPO4 Maximo.

• People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 74740, August 28, 1992, 213 SCRA 70 — Cited for the definition of res gestae and its theoretical foundation: spontaneous utterances made under the stress of a startling occurrence are considered trustworthy because they spring from immediate sensory perception rather than reflective fabrication.

• People v. Queliza, G.R. No. 124135, September 15, 1997, 279 SCRA 145 — Cited as authority for the three requisites necessary to admit a declaration as part of the res gestae.

• Section 42, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court — The res gestae provision. Applied to admit Dela Cruz’s spontaneous post-robbery identification of petitioner; all three requisites were found present, thus the declaration was exempted from the hearsay rule.

• Section 32, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court — Admission by silence. Applied because petitioner, upon hearing the inculpatory testimony of prosecution witnesses, failed to offer any countervailing explanation; his silence in circumstances that naturally called for a denial was taken as an implied admission.

• Articles 293 and 294(5), Revised Penal Code — The definition and penalty for robbery. Petitioner was convicted under these provisions and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term.

Puno (Chairperson), Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concurred.

None. The decision was unaninous.