Caoibes, Jr. vs. Ombudsman

The Office of the Ombudsman must refer criminal complaints against judges or court personnel to the Supreme Court for a determination of whether an administrative aspect is involved, regardless of whether an administrative case is already pending, because the Supreme Court's constitutional power of administrative supervision over the judiciary is exclusive and cannot be intruded upon by another branch of government.

On May 20, 1997, at the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas City, respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres requested that petitioner Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. return a borrowed executive table. Petitioner allegedly responded with an expletive and struck respondent, causing physical injuries and damaging respondent's eyeglasses. The incident was blottered with the Las Piñas Police Station.

• The Altercation: On May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas City, respondent Judge Alumbres requested that petitioner Judge Caoibes return an executive table he had borrowed. When respondent reiterated the request, petitioner allegedly uttered "Tarantado ito ah" and boxed respondent on his right eyebrow and left lower jaw, destroying the right lens of respondent's eyeglasses. Respondent had the incident blottered.
• Criminal and Administrative Charges: On May 23, 1997, respondent filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner for physical injuries, malicious mischief, and assault upon a person in authority. On June 13, 1997, respondent filed an administrative case with the Supreme Court, docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ, praying for petitioner's dismissal on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer.
• Refusal to Refer: Upon receipt of the Ombudsman's order requiring a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court had exclusive authority to determine the culpability of judges. The Ombudsman denied the motion on August 22, 1997, asserting its jurisdiction under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on December 22, 1997, prompting the present petition for certiorari.

• Exclusive Supervisory Authority: Petitioner argued that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the exclusive authority to make a preliminary determination of the culpability of judges, who are under the Court's exclusive supervision and control.
• Referral or Deferral: Petitioner maintained that the Ombudsman should either refer the criminal case to the Supreme Court for preliminary evaluation or await the resolution of the administrative case involving the same parties and subject matter, lest an absurd situation arise where the Ombudsman files criminal charges against a judge who is simultaneously cleared by the Supreme Court.

• Ombudsman Jurisdiction: Respondent Ombudsman argued that the accusations constitute simple criminal charges falling within its constitutional power and duty to investigate and prosecute any illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient act or omission of a public officer, pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770.

• Referral to Supreme Court: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on a criminal complaint against a judge pending the resolution of an administrative case involving the same facts, or refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination of whether an administrative aspect is involved.

• Referral to Supreme Court: Referral to the Supreme Court is mandatory. While the Ombudsman possesses primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770, such jurisdiction is not exclusive but shared or concurrent. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel. Because the Ombudsman cannot unilaterally determine whether a criminal complaint against a judge involves an administrative matter, it is duty-bound to refer all such cases to the Supreme Court for that determination. Allowing the Ombudsman to decide the administrative nature of a complaint against a judge would deprive the Court of its administrative prerogatives, arrogate a power not constitutionally sanctioned, and impinge on judicial independence and the separation of powers.

• Exclusive Administrative Supervision of the Supreme Court — Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Only the Supreme Court can oversee judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws and take proper administrative action against them for violations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power without violating the doctrine of separation of powers. Applied to require the Ombudsman to refer criminal complaints against judges to the Court, preventing the Ombudsman from unilaterally determining whether an administrative matter is involved.
• Primary, Not Exclusive, Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman — The grant of investigatory and prosecutory powers to the Office of the Ombudsman under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 is primary, not exclusive. It constitutes a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged, which must yield to the Supreme Court's exclusive constitutional supervisory powers when the subject of the complaint is a judge or court personnel.

• "The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein."
• "The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence."

• Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 [1993] — Followed as controlling precedent. Established that the Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal complaint against a judge or court employee arising from their administrative duties and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination of whether they acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
• Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993] — Followed. Held that the Ombudsman's power under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 is a shared or concurrent authority, not an exclusive one.

• Section 6, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Vests the Supreme Court with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel. Relied upon as the constitutional basis barring the Ombudsman from independently determining the administrative implications of complaints against judges.
• Section 15(1), Republic Act No. 6770 — Grants the Office of the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer that appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Interpreted as granting primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction, which must yield to the Supreme Court's exclusive administrative supervision over the judiciary.
• Section 16, Republic Act No. 6770 — Provides that the powers of the Office of the Ombudsman apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by public officers during their tenure. Acknowledged by the Court but subordinated to the constitutional mandate of exclusive judicial supervision.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.