Canlas vs. Tubil

The jurisdiction of the municipal trial court over an unlawful detainer case is determined by the allegations in the complaint, not by the evidence ultimately proved; where the complaint sufficiently alleges possession by tolerance, demand to vacate, and filing within one year from last demand, the MTC acquires jurisdiction even if the evidence fails to establish tolerance.

Respondent Iluminada Tubil, as owner and co-heir of a residential lot in Guagua, Pampanga covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 11199, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners Rodolfo "Rudy" Canlas, Victoria Canlas, Felicidad Canlas, and spouses Pablo and Charito Canlas, who are her relatives and had constructed houses on the subject property. The dispute centers on whether the action is one for unlawful detainer cognizable by the MTC or an accion publiciana within the original jurisdiction of the RTC, a distinction governed by the nature of possession alleged and the period of dispossession.

On June 9, 2004, respondent Iluminada Tubil filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 2, against petitioners Rodolfo "Rudy" Canlas, Victoria Canlas, Felicidad Canlas, and spouses Pablo and Charito Canlas. Respondent alleged that she was the owner, together with the other heirs of her late husband Nicolas Tubil, of a 332-square-meter residential lot in San Juan, Betis, Guagua, Pampanga, identified as Cadastral Lot No. 2420 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 11199. The land had been declared for taxation purposes in her name, and she had been paying the taxes thereon. Petitioners, who are respondent's relatives, had erected houses on the land, and their stay was by mere tolerance of respondent and her co-heirs. Respondent and her co-heirs wished to use the land fruitfully and made verbal demands for petitioners to vacate, but petitioners ignored the plea. A lawyer's demand letter to vacate was sent on January 12, 2004, but despite receipt, petitioners failed and refused to vacate. The matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation, but no settlement was reached, and a certification to file action was issued.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the case was not prosecuted in the name of the real parties in interest. The MTC denied the motion on September 14, 2004, finding the grounds to be evidentiary in nature. Petitioners then filed their answer, denying the allegations and claiming that together with their predecessors-in-interest, they had been in open, continuous, adverse, public, and uninterrupted possession of the land for more than 60 years. They asserted that respondent's title, issued pursuant to Free Patent No. 03540, was dubious and spurious, and that respondent's cause of action was actually for an accion publiciana, which is beyond the MTC's jurisdiction.

On October 23, 2006, the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer because respondent failed to show that petitioners' possession was by mere tolerance. Respondent appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the MTC judgment in toto on April 11, 2007. The RTC found that the length of dispossession — almost 36 years — placed the cause of action beyond unlawful detainer and into the realm of accion publiciana. Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied on June 8, 2007. Respondent then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC decision on June 12, 2008, and ordered the RTC to decide the case on the merits pursuant to Section 8, paragraph 2 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on September 1, 2008.

• Jurisdiction of the RTC: Petitioners argued that the RTC does not have original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and therefore cannot validly decide the case on the merits as ordered by the Court of Appeals pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
• Change of Theory on Jurisdiction: Petitioners shifted their position from their earlier motion to dismiss — where they claimed the RTC had jurisdiction — to asserting in the petition that the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the subject matter since the dispossession lasted only five months from respondent's last demand to the filing of the complaint.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the MTC or the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, i.e., whether the complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer cognizable by the MTC or for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.
• Application of Section 8, Rule 40: Whether Section 8, paragraph 2 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which directs the RTC to decide a case on the merits when the lower court tried it without jurisdiction, applies in this case.

• Jurisdiction: Yes. The MTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The allegations in the complaint — ownership, possession by tolerance, demand to vacate, and filing within one year from last demand — sufficiently constitute a cause of action for unlawful detainer, conferring jurisdiction on the MTC.
• Application of Section 8, Rule 40: No. Section 8, paragraph 2 of Rule 40 finds no application because the MTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the case; thus, the RTC was not mandated to decide the case on the merits.

• Jurisdiction: The nature of an action and the court having jurisdiction are determined by the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint must show enough on its face to confer jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. A complaint for unlawful detainer must allege: (1) initial possession by contract with or tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) possession becoming illegal upon notice of termination; (3) defendant remaining in possession and depriving plaintiff of enjoyment; and (4) filing within one year from last demand. Respondent's complaint satisfied all four: she alleged ownership through OCT No. 11199, tax declarations, and payment of taxes; that petitioners' entry and house construction were tolerated because they are relatives; that a demand letter was sent on January 12, 2004; and that the complaint was filed on June 9, 2004, well within the one-year period. The RTC's finding that dispossession lasted almost 36 years, making the action one for accion publiciana, lacked legal and factual basis because the one-year period for unlawful detainer is counted from the date of the last demand to vacate, not from the date of initial entry. The ruling in Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals — requiring jurisdictional facts such as how and when entry was made — was distinguished, as that case involved a complaint that did not characterize entry as legal or illegal and raised tolerance only as an afterthought in subsequent pleadings. Here, tolerance was specifically alleged in the complaint itself. The requirement to allege when and how entry was made applies only when the timeliness of filing is at issue, not when the MTC's jurisdiction is assailed as being one for accion publiciana. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations, not the evidence; even if the facts proved at trial do not support the cause of action alleged, the court retains jurisdiction and may dismiss for insufficiency of evidence — which is exactly what the MTC did.

• Application of Section 8, Rule 40: Because the MTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case, the situation contemplated by Section 8, paragraph 2 of Rule 40 — where the lower court tried the case without jurisdiction over the subject matter and the RTC on appeal has original jurisdiction — does not obtain. The provision is inapplicable, and the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the RTC to decide the case on the merits.

• Jurisdiction determined by allegations in the complaint — What determines the nature of the action and the court which has jurisdiction are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment proceedings, which are summary in nature, the complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. The court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter as long as the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer, even if the facts proved during trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court may dismiss for insufficiency of evidence.

• Elements of unlawful detainer — A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand to vacate, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

• Possession by tolerance — Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.

• Distinction between unlawful detainer and accion publiciana — Unlawful detainer is a summary action to recover physical possession, filed in the MTC within one year from the date of last demand. Accion publiciana is a plenary action to recover the right of possession, filed in the RTC when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. The one-year prescriptive period in unlawful detainer is counted from the date of the last demand to vacate, not from the date of initial entry.

• Change of theory — As a rule, a change of theory on appeal is not allowed. However, when the factual bases of the new theory would not require presentation of further evidence by the adverse party to properly meet the issue, the Court may give due course to the petition.

• "Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint." — This passage states the controlling principle for determining jurisdiction in ejectment cases: jurisdiction is conferred by the complaint's allegations, not by the evidence ultimately presented.

• "It is settled that as long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court - after acquiring jurisdiction - may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence." — This formulation distinguishes jurisdiction-acquiring allegations from evidentiary sufficiency, explaining why the MTC's dismissal for failure to prove tolerance was proper even though it had jurisdiction.

• "The requirement that the complaint should aver jurisdictional facts, like when and how entry on the land was made by the defendants, applies only when at issue is the timeliness of the filing of the complaint before the MTC and not when the jurisdiction of the MTC is assailed as being one for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC." — This passage clarifies the limited applicability of the Sarmiento rule and distinguishes situations where timeliness is contested from those where the very classification of the action is disputed.

• Cabrera vs. Getaruela, G.R. No. 164213, April 21, 2009 — Cited as the source of the four-element test for a sufficient unlawful detainer complaint: initial possession by tolerance or contract, possession becoming illegal upon notice, continued possession depriving plaintiff of enjoyment, and filing within one year from last demand. Applied directly to hold that respondent's complaint satisfied all elements.

• Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995 — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. Distinguished by the Supreme Court: in Sarmiento, the complaint did not characterize entry as legal or illegal, and tolerance was raised only as an afterthought in subsequent pleadings, unlike here where tolerance was specifically alleged in the complaint.

• Javelosa vs. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 331 (1996) — Cited for the principle that the requirement to allege when and how entry was made applies only when timeliness of filing is at issue, not when the MTC's jurisdiction is assailed as being one for accion publiciana. Applied to show that the RTC's reliance on the 36-year dispossession period was misplaced.

• Habagat Grill vs. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603 (2005) — Cited for the principle that jurisdiction acquired through sufficient allegations in the complaint is retained even if the evidence fails to support the cause of action, in which case the court may dismiss for insufficiency of evidence.

• Heirs of Rafael Magpily vs. De Jesus, G.R. No. 167748, November 8, 2005 — Cited for the rule that possession by tolerance is lawful but becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate and refusal to comply.

• Section 8, paragraph 2, Rule 40, Rules of Court — Provides that if a case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case on the merits. Held inapplicable because the MTC properly had jurisdiction.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Allows a plaintiff to bring an action for unlawful detainer in the proper inferior court within one year after unlawful withholding of possession, counted from the date of the last demand. Applied to confirm that respondent's filing on June 9, 2004 was within one year of the January 24, 2004 demand.

Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, and Diosdado M. Peralta.