Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals

The Court held that an action for unlawful detainer lies against a possessor by tolerance who refuses to vacate upon demand, because such tolerance implies a temporary right of possession that terminates upon the owner's demand. The Court further ruled that a general guardian has the authority to institute ejectment suits to provide for the ward's maintenance, and that the ward's death does not extinguish the ejectment action but necessitates the substitution of heirs.

Carmen Cañiza, a 94-year-old spinster declared incompetent in 1989, owned a house and lot in Quezon City. The spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada had been residing in the property since the 1960s with Cañiza's permission, rent-free. Cañiza's appointed general guardian, Amparo Evangelista, demanded that the Estradas vacate the premises to generate funds for Cañiza's medical and maintenance expenses. The Estradas refused, invoking a holographic will executed by Cañiza bequeathing the property to them.

• Incompetence and Guardianship: On November 20, 1989, Carmen Cañiza was declared incompetent. Amparo Evangelista was appointed general guardian over her person and estate.
• Possession by Tolerance: The Estradas occupied Cañiza's house temporarily and rent-free out of Cañiza's kindness.
• Demand to Vacate: Due to Cañiza's failing health and need for funds, Evangelista, as guardian, made several oral and written demands for the Estradas to vacate. The Estradas ignored the demands.
• The Holographic Will: The Estradas claimed that Cañiza had executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988, bequeathing the property to them, and thus they should not be ejected.
• Death of the Ward: During the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, Carmen Cañiza died on March 19, 1994. The Estradas moved to dismiss the petition, arguing Evangelista lost legal personality.

• Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the proper remedy was an accion publiciana rather than an accion interdictal (unlawful detainer).
• Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in giving weight to a mere photocopy of an alleged holographic will, which was irrelevant to the issue of possession.

• Respondents argued that unlawful detainer did not lie because their possession was not by virtue of any express or implied contract that had expired or terminated, relying on a literal construction of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• Respondents insisted that the holographic will bequeathing the property to them signified Cañiza's intention that they remain in possession, thereby legally incapacitating the guardian from evicting them.
• Respondents contended that Cañiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, stripping Evangelista of the authority to represent Cañiza in the appeal.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the judicial guardian retained the legal personality to continue representing the deceased ward in the appeal.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether an action for unlawful detainer is the appropriate remedy to recover possession from occupants who entered by tolerance.
  • Whether the judicial guardian had the authority to institute the ejectment action on behalf of the ward.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that the ejectment action survived Cañiza's death. While the relationship of guardian and ward terminates upon the latter's death, Section 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires the substitution of the deceased party by the legal representative or heirs. Accordingly, Evangelista could be substituted by Cañiza's heirs.
• Substantive: The Court held that unlawful detainer is the proper remedy. Possession by tolerance creates an implied promise to vacate upon demand; refusal to do so constitutes unlawful withholding of possession. The Court rejected the respondents' restrictive reading of Section 1, Rule 70, clarifying that the absence of a prior contract does not preclude an ejectment suit when possession originated from tolerance. Furthermore, the holographic will did not confer a present right of possession, as a will is ambulatory and ownership cannot transfer until probate. Finally, the Court held that Evangelista, as general guardian with authority to take possession of the ward's properties, acted within her mandate under Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court to secure the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward.

• Possession by tolerance in unlawful detainer — A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand. Failure to do so makes a summary action for ejectment the proper remedy.
• Ambulatory nature of wills — A will is essentially ambulatory and may be changed or revoked at any time prior to the testator's death. Prior to probate, a devisee cannot assert ownership or the right of possession based on an unprobated will; any such assertion is premature and inefficacious.
• Guardian's duty to maintain the ward — A general guardian has full authority to take possession of and manage the ward's properties. Instituting an ejectment suit to generate funds for the ward's support, maintenance, and medical treatment is a discharge of the guardian's duty under Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court.
• Survival of ejectment actions — An ejectment case survives the death of a party. The death of the plaintiff does not extinguish the action but necessitates the substitution of the legal representative or heirs pursuant to Section 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

• "Cañiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the house to Cañiza upon demand."
• "Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Cañiza had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly probated."

• Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372 (1994) — Cited for the principle that the nature of an action and the court's jurisdiction are determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought, and that alleging unlawful withholding of possession suffices for unlawful detainer.
• Yu vs. de Lara, 6 SCRA 785 (1962); Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136 (1972) — Cited as controlling authority establishing that a person occupying property by tolerance is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, making ejectment the proper remedy.
• Vda. de Salazar vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 305 (1995) — Cited for the proposition that an ejectment case survives the death of a party.

• Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court — Governs unlawful detainer. The Court interpreted this provision not to require a prior express or implied contract for possession when the entry was by tolerance, rejecting a literal construction that would bar the action.
• Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court — Mandates that a guardian manage the estate frugally and apply income to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward. The Court applied this to uphold the guardian's authority to file the ejectment suit to secure funds for the ward's needs.
• Section 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court — Provides for the substitution of a deceased party. The Court applied this rule to hold that the ward's death did not extinguish the action but required the substitution of heirs.
• Article 828, Civil Code — Provides that a will is ambulatory. The Court relied on this to hold that the holographic will conferred no present right of possession to the respondents.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ.