Canet vs. Decena

A municipal mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit for the operation of a cockpit absent a municipal ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing such operation, the power to license and regulate cockpits being exclusively vested in the local legislative body under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Petitioner Rolando N. Canet sought to establish, operate, and maintain a cockpit in Sitio Cabaya, San Roque, Bula, Camarines Sur. Respondent Mayor Julieta A. Decena is the municipal mayor of Bula, Camarines Sur, the official tasked with issuing business permits within the municipality. The regulatory framework governing the licensing of cockpits is found in Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160), which vests in the Sangguniang Bayan — the municipal legislative body — the authority to "authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks." This statutory allocation of power requires a municipal ordinance before the executive branch may issue the corresponding permit.

On July 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur, passed Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, authorizing petitioner Rolando N. Canet to establish, operate, and maintain a cockpit in Sitio Cabaya, San Roque, Bula, Camarines Sur. Subsequently, the Sangguniang Bayan enacted Ordinance No. 001, Series of 1999, entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl Activities in the Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur and Providing Penalties for any Violation to the Provisions Thereof." Upon transmittal to respondent Mayor Julieta A. Decena, it was noted that the ordinance lacked rules and regulations on cockfighting and other related game-fowl activities, as well as a separability clause. The ordinance was returned to the Sangguniang Bayan, which thereafter passed Resolution No. 078, Series of 1999, resolving to withdraw, set aside, and shelf indefinitely Ordinance No. 001, Series of 1999.

Relying on Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, petitioner filed an application for a mayor's permit to establish, operate, and maintain a cockpit in the same location. Respondent Mayor denied the application on the ground, among others, that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the authority to license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits and to regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in the Sangguniang Bayan. She therefore could not issue the permit absent an ordinance passed by that body authorizing the same.

On July 26, 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for mandamus and damages with application for preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent Mayor with the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch XXXI, docketed as Special Civil Action No. P-84-99. The trial court denied the Mayor's motion to dismiss and issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on February 1, 2000, ordering the Mayor to approve and issue the mayor's permit. Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57797. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, annulled the RTC resolution and writ, and made permanent its own preliminary injunction. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present petition for review.

• Reliance on Sangguniang Bayan Resolution: Petitioner invoked Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, wherein the Sangguniang Bayan authorized him to operate a cockpit, arguing that this resolution sufficed as basis for the issuance of a mayor's permit.
• Reliance on General Tax Ordinances: Petitioner cited Municipal Tax Ordinances Nos. 01, Series of 1989, and 05, Series of 1993, which generally provide for the issuance of a mayor's permit for the operation of businesses, contending that these ordinances could serve as the legislative basis for the permit.

• Absence of Enabling Ordinance: Respondent argued that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the authority to license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits is vested in the Sangguniang Bayan, and since no ordinance authorizing such operation was in force — Ordinance No. 001, Series of 1999 having been withdrawn — she could not issue the mayor's permit.

• Mandamus — Existence of Duty: Whether respondent, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can be compelled to issue the necessary business permit to petitioner absent a municipal ordinance which would empower her to do so.
• Statutory Construction — Scope of General Ordinances: Whether general business permit ordinances may be construed to authorize the issuance of a cockpit permit despite the absence of a specific ordinance on cockpits.

• Mandamus — Existence of Duty: No. The authority to license cockpits is vested exclusively in the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code of 1991; absent an ordinance, the mayor has no duty to issue the permit, and mandamus will not lie.
• Statutory Construction — Scope of General Ordinances: No. General tax ordinances containing provisions for the issuance of business permits cannot be extended by interpretation to cover cockpits, which require specific legislative authorization under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

• Mandamus — Existence of Duty: Petitioner admitted that no ordinance in Bula, Camarines Sur authorized the grant of a mayor's permit to operate and maintain a cockpit. Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, merely authorized petitioner to establish, operate, and maintain a cockpit but could not be implemented absent an ordinance allowing the operation. Ordinance No. 001, Series of 1999, which provided for the collection of application filing fees, ocular inspection fees, mayor's permit fees, and other charges for the operation of cockpits, had been withdrawn by the Sangguniang Bayan. Compelling the mayor to issue the permit would violate the explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and constitute an undue encroachment on the mayor's administrative prerogatives. Mandamus lies only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, and here the mayor had no duty to perform absent the requisite ordinance.

• Statutory Construction — Scope of General Ordinances: Municipal Tax Ordinances Nos. 01, Series of 1989, and 05, Series of 1993, contained general provisions for the issuance of business permits but did not prescribe the reasonable fees to be paid for the operation of cockpits and other game-fowl activities. To read into these general ordinances objects neither specifically mentioned nor enumerated would violate the principle that where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not be extended to others by interpretation or construction. This principle is embodied in the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius — the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others — and expressium facit cessare tacitum — what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Even if a legislative gap existed, courts could not supply the omission by judicial fiat, as courts may not enlarge the scope of a statute or insert what they think the legislature would have supplied. Furthermore, cockfighting, though authorized by law, remains a form of gambling, and statutes authorizing gambling activities must be strictly construed, with every reasonable doubt resolved to limit rather than expand the powers claimed.

• Expressio unius est exclusio alterius — The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. Applied here to hold that general business permit ordinances could not be extended to cover cockpits, which require specific legislative authorization; the Sangguniang Bayan's specific enumeration of regulated activities in its ordinances could not be expanded by interpretation to include cockpits when no such provision existed.
• Expressium facit cessare tacitum — What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Cited as a corollary to expressio unius est exclusio alterius in holding that the legislative body would not have made specific enumerations if it intended not to restrict meaning and confine terms to those expressly mentioned.
• Strict construction of gambling statutes — A statute authorizing a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed, and every reasonable doubt resolved so as to limit rather than expand the powers and rights claimed. Applied because cockfighting, though authorized by law, remains a form of gambling essentially antagonistic to national productivity and self-reliance.
• Judicial non-supply of legislative omissions — Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or include situations not provided nor intended by lawmakers; an omission at the time of enactment cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may recommend inclusion. Applied to reject the proposition that the absence of a cockpit ordinance could be remedied by judicial construction of general tax ordinances.

• "to compel respondent to issue the mayor's permit would not only be a violation of the explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would also be an undue encroachment on respondent's administrative prerogatives." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a permit absent an enabling ordinance, as doing so would violate the statutory allocation of licensing authority to the Sangguniang Bayan and encroach on executive discretion.

• "where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters." — This formulation of the expressio unius doctrine was applied to reject petitioner's reliance on general business permit ordinances, establishing the rule that specific legislative authorization is required for activities like cockpit operation.

• "a statute which authorizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed, and every reasonable doubt resolved so as to limit rather than expand the powers and rights claimed by franchise holders under its authority." — This passage states the strict construction rule for gambling statutes, applied to cockfighting to reinforce the conclusion that the absence of a specific ordinance precludes the issuance of a permit.

• Hongkong & Shanghai Bank vs. Peters, 16 Phil. 824 [1910] — Cited for the proposition that where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not be extended to other matters by interpretation or construction; followed in applying the expressio unius doctrine.
• City Government of San Pablo, Laguna vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 127708, 305 SCRA 353 [1999] — Cited as authority for the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius; followed.
• Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 103533, 300 SCRA 181 [1998] — Cited for the rule that statutes authorizing gambling activities should be strictly construed; followed in applying strict construction to cockfighting regulation.
• Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 119786, 295 SCRA 721 [1998] — Cited for the principle that a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat; followed.

• Section 447(a)(3)(v), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Vests in the Sangguniang Bayan the authority to "authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks," provided that existing rights are not prejudiced. Applied as the controlling provision establishing that the power to license cockpits resides in the municipal legislative body, not the mayor, and that absent an ordinance enacted pursuant to this authority, the mayor cannot be compelled to issue a permit.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.