Candao vs. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan

In malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the failure of an accountable public officer to have the funds duly forthcoming upon demand by a duly authorized officer constitutes prima facie evidence of misappropriation, and conspiracy may be inferred from the co-signing of checks that made the illegal withdrawals possible. Conviction may rest on sufficient proof that the accountable officer received public funds, did not have them upon demand, and could not satisfactorily explain their absence; direct evidence of personal misappropriation is unnecessary.

Petitioners were officials of the Office of the Regional Governor, Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao: Zacaria A. Candao as Regional Governor, Abas A. Candao as Executive Secretary, and Israel B. Haron as Disbursing Officer II. Their positions made them accountable public officers under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, and the ARMM Organic Act, which subjected ARMM expenditures and revenues to COA audit and required the Regional Governor’s approval for disbursements. The case concerns the audit and criminal prosecution of illegal withdrawals from ORG-ARMM funds.

On August 5, 1993, Chairman Pascasio S. Banaria of the Commission on Audit constituted a team of auditors from the central office to conduct an Expanded Special Audit of the Office of the Regional Governor, Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao. State Auditors Heidi L. Mendoza, as Team Leader, and Jaime Roxas, as Member, were directed to conduct the audit under the supervision of Jaime P. Naranjo, State Auditor V. From August 24 to September 1, 1993, the expanded audit examined the financial transactions and operations of ORG-ARMM for the period July 1992 to March 1993.

Special Audit Office Report No. 93-25 disclosed illegal withdrawals from the depository accounts of the agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of petitioner Israel B. Haron, Disbursing Officer II, without the required disbursement vouchers. The audit covered 52 checks drawn against PNB Account No. 370-3208, with a total of ₱11,118,570.64, and Account No. 844061 of the Treasurer of the Philippines, with a total of ₱9,927,000.00, for a grand total of ₱21,045,570.64. The checks were signed by various combinations of Haron, Abas A. Candao, Zacaria A. Candao, and Pandical M. Santiago. In a letter dated September 10, 1993, Chairman Banaria demanded that Haron produce and restitute to the ARMM-Regional Treasurer the full amount of ₱21,045,570.64 and submit an explanation within seventy-two hours together with the official receipt issued by the ARMM Regional Treasurer.

On April 17, 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, filed criminal cases for malversation of public funds against Zacaria A. Candao, Israel B. Haron, Abas A. Candao, and Pandical M. Santiago. The informations alleged that Haron, a low-ranking public officer and Disbursing Officer of ORG-ARMM, in connivance and conspiracy with Abas Candao or Zacaria Candao, while in the performance of official functions, took advantage of their positions and, with gross abuse of confidence, withdrew amounts from the depository accounts through checks payable to Haron without the required disbursement voucher, and thereafter misappropriated and converted the amounts to their personal use and benefit. All accused pleaded not guilty; Santiago died and the case against him was dismissed.

The prosecution’s lone witness, COA State Auditor IV Heidi L. Mendoza, testified that the expanded audit disclosed illegal withdrawals involving 52 checks issued without required disbursement vouchers. The Report of Checks Issued by the Deputized Disbursing Officer showed that the checks had no assigned voucher numbers. The audit team demanded the original RCIDDO for December 1992, February and March 1993, but ORG-ARMM did not submit it. COA also demanded the original disbursement vouchers and complete supporting documents. ORG-ARMM’s Finance and Budget Management Services claimed the vouchers had been submitted to COA Resident Auditor Rosalinda Gagwis under transmittal letters dated March 4 and March 30, 1993, but Gagwis denied receiving them and issued a certification to that effect. Chairman Banaria then demanded restitution within seventy-two hours. Mendoza explained that she was on maternity leave when the interim report was submitted, and that she and Jaime B. Roxas executed a Joint Affidavit dated May 17, 1996 regarding the audit. Haron submitted copies of disbursement vouchers to the COA receiving clerk beyond the seventy-two-hour deadline. On cross-examination, Mendoza stated that no entry conference or exit conference was held during the expanded audit because of threats to the audit team’s security.

For the defense, Nick Luz Aduana, former Finance Director of ORG-ARMM, testified that the disbursement vouchers passed through his office and that the original vouchers had been submitted to the COA Special Audit Office. He described the cash advance procedure and maintained that ORG-ARMM had never received a notice of disallowance, including for “peace and order campaign” disbursements. He admitted that the only supporting document for the checks and vouchers was the authority to cash advance and that he did not know the breakdown of expenses. Rosalinda G. Gagwis, former COA Resident Auditor of ORG-ARMM, testified that she refused bundles of vouchers because she was no longer Auditor-in-Charge after the separation of COA Region XII personnel and COA-ARMM. She clarified that her earlier certification did not mean the vouchers were “not existing,” and that her office had issued notices of suspension but no notice of disallowance. Brigida C. Fontanilla, Chief Accountant of ORG-ARMM, testified on the Journal of Analysis and Obligations and the recording of transactions; she transmitted the original 1992 JAO to the Ombudsman Investigator, and it was never returned. Bartolome M. Corpus, former Chief of the Management Division of the Finance and Budget Management Services, testified that the subject transactions passed through his office and that transmittal letters dated March 4 and March 30, 1993 were prepared, but Gagwis refused to accept the vouchers. He later found original vouchers in his filing cabinet and handed them to Haron. He confirmed that the purpose stated in the cash advance vouchers was “peace and order campaign” and that supporting documents would come only after issuance of the check.

The Sandiganbayan found no merit in petitioners’ claim that the subject checks were covered by existing disbursement vouchers belatedly submitted and received by the COA Central Office on October 29, 1993. It ruled that had the vouchers existed at the time of the withdrawals from December 29, 1992 to March 30, 1993, Haron could have readily produced them when required by the special audit team on August 24, 1993. It did not credit Corpus’s testimony in view of Gagwis’s August 27, 1993 Certification that she had not received the vouchers mentioned in the transmittal letters. The Sandiganbayan also noted that petitioners presented no proof that the cash advances for “peace and order campaign” were spent for public purposes; the alleged vouchers did not indicate the nature of the expenses and had no supporting documents, and were unnumbered and undated in violation of COA circulars. The JAO did not indicate the particular disbursement voucher corresponding to each of the 52 checks. The Sandiganbayan further found that ORG-ARMM was notified of the expanded audit at its commencement and was requested to submit the needed disbursement vouchers, and that Haron’s failure to account for the funds when demanded gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated them.

• Due Process and Variance: Petitioners argued that the Sandiganbayan convicted them despite proof that disbursement vouchers existed, except that the COA refused to accept and examine them; they maintained that they were denied due process when convicted for offenses not covered by the informations, which allegedly charged only the absence or non-existence of vouchers.
• COA’s Primary Jurisdiction Over Vouchers: Petitioners contended that the Sandiganbayan could not validly assess the legality of the disbursement vouchers because that duty pertains to the COA, which refused and failed to examine them; had the COA evaluated the vouchers, the result would likely have been acquittal.
• Equipoise Rule: Petitioners argued that the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the equipoise rule, which, if applied, would have resulted in acquittal.
• Conspiracy: Petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao argued that the charge of conspiracy, their only link to the offenses, was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Ministerial Act and Lack of Knowledge: Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao maintained that their only participation was the ministerial act of signing the checks; the checks had passed through processing by finance and accounting personnel, so they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of their subordinates’ acts, and they could not have conspired because conspiracy requires knowledge of the purpose for which the crime was committed.
• Irregularity of Expanded Audit: Petitioners raised the regularity, completeness, and objectivity of the expanded audit, asserting that they were not notified of the audit and were not given an entry conference or exit conference, thus denying them the opportunity to defend.

• Malversation Elements and Prima Facie Presumption: Whether the prosecution established all the elements of malversation of public funds and the prima facie presumption of misappropriation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Due Process and Variance: Whether petitioners were denied due process because the informations allegedly charged only the absence or non-existence of disbursement vouchers while the Sandiganbayan assessed the belatedly submitted vouchers as irregular or illegal.
• Equipoise Rule: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the equipoise rule.
• Conspiracy and Accountability: Whether conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt as to Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao, and whether their co-signing of the checks and claimed lack of knowledge absolved them from liability.
• Regularity of Expanded Audit: Whether the expanded audit was irregular, incomplete, or violative of due process due to the absence of an entry conference and exit conference.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan was correct.

• Malversation Elements and Prima Facie Presumption: Yes. All elements of malversation were satisfactorily established, and Haron’s failure to account for the illegally withdrawn amounts upon COA demand gave rise to the prima facie presumption of misappropriation under Article 217.
• Due Process and Variance: No. The Sandiganbayan found the disbursement vouchers inexistent at the time of issuance and audit; the belated submission did not cure the absence, and conviction under Article 217 did not deny due process.
• Equipoise Rule: No. The equipoise rule applies only where the evidence is in equipoise or the inculpatory facts are capable of two explanations, one innocent and one guilty; the prosecution proved Haron’s failure to account for the funds upon demand.
• Conspiracy and Accountability: Yes. Conspiracy was established because Zacaria and Abas co-signed the checks that made the illegal withdrawals possible; as accountable public officers, they were liable with Haron, and their claimed lack of knowledge did not absolve them.
• Regularity of Expanded Audit: No. ORG-ARMM was notified of the expanded audit at its commencement and was requested to submit the needed vouchers; no denial of due process was shown, and the absence of entry and exit conferences did not invalidate the audit.
• Penalty: Modified. The maximum penalty was reduced to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal medium for each count, with the minimum at ten years and one day of prision mayor maximum, plus restitution of ₱21,045,570.64.

• Malversation Elements and Prima Facie Presumption: Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the offender be a public officer; that he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the funds or property were public and for which he was accountable; and that he appropriated, took, misappropriated, or consented, or through abandonment or negligence permitted another to take them. The prosecution established that Haron was a public officer and accountable Disbursing Officer, that Zacaria and Abas were accountable public officers, that the funds were public ORG-ARMM funds, and that illegal withdrawals were made through checks without required disbursement vouchers. Haron failed to account for the ₱21,045,570.64 upon demand by the COA, and petitioners did not rebut the legal presumption that they misappropriated and used the funds for personal benefit. Under Article 217, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property upon demand by a duly authorized officer is prima facie evidence that he put the missing funds to personal uses. In malversation, sufficient proof that the accountable officer received public funds, did not have them upon demand, and could not satisfactorily explain their absence suffices for conviction; direct evidence of personal misappropriation is hardly necessary.

• Due Process and Variance: Petitioners asserted that the informations alleged only the absence or non-existence of vouchers, while the Sandiganbayan assessed the submitted vouchers as illegal or irregular. The Sandiganbayan, however, categorically ruled that the disbursement vouchers were inexistent at the time of issuance of the subject checks and the expanded special audit. Haron could not produce the vouchers upon COA demand in August 1993; Gagwis certified that she had not received the vouchers mentioned in the March 4 and March 30, 1993 transmittal letters; the RCIDDO showed checks issued with Haron as payee but no disbursement voucher numbers; Corpus testified that he found the supposed vouchers in his office filing cabinet in May 1993 despite the transmittal letters; and the original vouchers belatedly submitted to the COA central office in late October 1993 were undated and unnumbered with no supporting documents as required by COA Circular No. 78-79. The special audit team could not have examined the defense vouchers because the only indication of actual receipt by the COA was on October 23, 1993, long after the expanded audit was completed and beyond the 72-hour deadline in the September 10, 1993 demand letter. The vouchers also lacked supporting documents required by COA Circular No. 92-389. The JAO did not indicate the particular disbursement voucher corresponding to each of the 52 checks, and it is separate and distinct from the Report of Checks Issued. Sections 405 and 430 of the Government Auditing and Accounting Manual require that the disbursement voucher be used for all money claims and that the voucher number be indicated on the voucher and every supporting document. Thus, no due process violation attended the conviction.

• Equipoise Rule: Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The rule applies if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, such that the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty. Such was not the situation because the prosecution proved by adequate evidence that Haron failed to account for funds under his custody and control upon demand, specifically the ₱21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn. In malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer received public funds, did not have them upon demand, and could not satisfactorily explain their absence; direct evidence of personal misappropriation is hardly necessary.

• Conspiracy and Accountability: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Zacaria and Abas were co-signatories in the checks issued without the required disbursement vouchers; their signatures, as authorized officials, made possible the illegal withdrawals and embezzlement of ₱21,045,570.64. Zacaria, as Regional Governor, was under Section 102(1) of the Government Auditing Code immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to his agency. Both Zacaria and Abas were accountable public officers within the meaning of Article 217; no checks could be prepared and no payment effected without their signatures on a disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. Under Sections 104 and 105 of the Government Auditing Code, they were charged with the duty of diligently supervising their subordinates to prevent loss of government funds and were liable for any unlawful application of government funds resulting from negligence. Even if they invoked lack of knowledge of the criminal design, they remained liable as co-principals in malversation, assuming the misappropriation was due to negligence rather than intentional. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence; the dolo or culpa present is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction is proper, unless the mode alleged in the indictment is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime that due process was denied; no such prejudice was shown.

• Regularity of Expanded Audit: The records showed that ORG-ARMM was duly notified of the expanded audit at its commencement and was requested through the COA Resident Auditor to submit the needed disbursement vouchers. An earlier main audit had already been conducted, during which State Auditor Mendoza experienced threats against her security and had to be recalled from her assignment. By the time the expanded audit was conducted in August 1993 upon the directive of the COA Chairman, petitioners, especially Haron, should have ensured that the records of disbursements and financial transactions, including January to March 1993, were in order and available for audit examination. Even if no entry conference was held, there was no showing that petitioners were denied due process in the conduct of the expanded audit; they simply refused or failed to heed COA’s request for production of disbursement vouchers and ignored the formal demand of COA Chairman Banaria for restitution, submitting compliance only after the special audit team had submitted its report.

• Penalty: Under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the amount involved exceeds ₱22,000.00, in addition to a fine equal to the funds malversed. Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the crime charged, the maximum imposable penalty shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua, or eighteen years, eight months, and one day to twenty years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, one degree lower from the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium, or ten years and one day to seventeen years and four months. The Sandiganbayan’s penalty was therefore modified insofar as the maximum penalty is concerned and reduced to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal medium for each count.

• Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217, Revised Penal Code — The elements are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) the funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) he appropriated, took, misappropriated, or consented, or through abandonment or negligence permitted another person to take them. The Court applied all elements to Haron, Zacaria, and Abas.
• Prima Facie Presumption of Misappropriation — The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. Conviction requires sufficient proof that the accountable officer received public funds, did not have them upon demand, and could not satisfactorily explain their absence; direct evidence of personal misappropriation is hardly necessary. The presumption arose from Haron’s failure to account for ₱21,045,570.64 upon COA demand.
• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. The Court applied this to Zacaria and Abas, whose co-signatures made the illegal withdrawals possible.
• Accountability of Agency Head and Accountable Officers — Under Section 102(1) of the Government Auditing Code, the head of any agency is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to his agency. Under Sections 104 and 105, he must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising accountable officers under his control to prevent loss of government funds or property, and every officer accountable for government funds is liable for all losses resulting from unlawful deposit, use, or application and for losses attributable to negligence. The Court applied these provisions to Zacaria and Abas.
• Malversation by Dolo or Culpa — Malversation may be committed intentionally or by negligence; the dolo or culpa present is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction is proper, unless the mode alleged in the indictment is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime that due process was denied. The Court applied this to reject the lack-of-knowledge defense.
• Equipoise Rule — Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The rule applies if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt. The Court did not apply it because the prosecution proved Haron’s failure to account for the funds upon demand.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law in Malversation — For malversation involving an amount exceeding ₱22,000.00, the penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, plus a fine equal to the funds malversed. With no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the maximum is within the medium period of reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua; the minimum is one degree lower. The Court applied this to reduce the maximum penalty to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal medium per count.

• "The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses." — This is the statutory presumption under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that the Court relied on to sustain the conviction after Haron failed to account for the withdrawn funds upon COA demand.
• "In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary in malversation cases." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the sufficiency of evidence in malversation and explains why the absence of direct proof of personal misappropriation did not preclude conviction.
• "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of conspiracy, applied to Zacaria and Abas because their co-signatures enabled the illegal withdrawals.
• "Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper." — Quoted from Cabello vs. Sandiganbayan, this passage supports the holding that conviction for malversation may stand even if the information charged intentional malversation but the evidence showed negligence.

• Cabello vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 93885, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 94 — Cited for the rule that malversation may be committed intentionally or by negligence; the dolo or culpa is only a modality, and conviction is proper even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, unless due process is denied.
• Bernardino vs. People, G.R. Nos. 170453 and 170518, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 237, 252 — Cited for the equipoise rule: where evidence is in equipoise or doubt exists on which side the evidence preponderates, the party with the burden of proof loses; the rule applies when inculpatory facts are capable of two explanations, one innocent and one guilty.
• Dado vs. People, 440 Phil. 521, 537 (2002) — Cited within Bernardino vs. People for the equipoise rule.
• Davalos, Sr. vs. People, G.R. No. 145229, April 24, 2006, 488 SCRA 85, 92 — Cited for the rule that in malversation, sufficient proof is that the accountable officer received public funds, did not have them upon demand, and could not satisfactorily explain their absence; direct evidence of personal misappropriation is hardly necessary.
• Sarigumba vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 154239-41, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 533, 554 — Cited within Davalos, Sr. vs. People for the same rule on sufficiency of evidence in malversation.
• People vs. Pajaro, G.R. Nos. 167860-65, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 572, 586 — Cited for the doctrine on conspiracy: it may be inferred from conduct before, during, and after the crime, and the act of one is the act of all.
• People vs. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2003, 400 SCRA 229, 238-239 — Cited within People vs. Pajaro for the conspiracy doctrine.
• Cabarlo vs. People, G.R. No. 172274, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 236, 246 — Cited in the Court’s penalty discussion applying Article 217 and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Article 217, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Defines malversation of public funds or property, enumerates its elements and penalties, and provides that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property upon demand by a duly authorized officer is prima facie evidence that he has put the missing funds or property to personal uses. The Court applied it to sustain the conviction.
• Article 217, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Provides that if the amount involved exceeds ₱22,000.00, the penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, plus a fine equal to the funds malversed. The Court applied it to modify the penalty.
• Article 70, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Provides the three-fold rule for service of sentences. The Court ordered that petitioners be entitled to its benefit.
• Section 102(1), Government Auditing Code of the Philippines — Provides that the head of any agency is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to his agency. The Court applied it to Zacaria A. Candao as Regional Governor.
• Sections 104 and 105, Government Auditing Code of the Philippines — Require the head of agency to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising accountable officers and make accountable officers liable for losses from unlawful deposit, use, or application of funds and for losses attributable to negligence. The Court applied them to Zacaria and Abas.
• Section 24(e), Article VII, R.A. No. 6734 (Organic Act for ARMM) — Provides that no funds or resources shall be disbursed unless duly approved by the Regional Governor or his duly authorized representative; retained under R.A. No. 9054. The Court cited it to show the approval requirement for disbursements.
• Article IX, Section 2, R.A. No. 6734 — Subjects the financial accounts of the expenditures and revenues of the ARMM to audit by the COA. The Court cited it to reject any exemption from audit.
• Article IV, Section 3(d) and (j), R.A. No. 9054 — Provides that the ARMM remains subject to national laws and policies on fiscal matters and general auditing. The Court cited it to reinforce COA audit authority.
• COA Circular No. 78-79 (April 5, 1978) — Requires disbursement vouchers to be dated and numbered with supporting documents. The Court cited it in finding the belatedly submitted vouchers irregular.
• COA Circular No. 92-389 (November 3, 1992) — Requires supporting documents for disbursement vouchers. The Court cited it in rejecting the belatedly submitted vouchers.
• Sections 405 and 430, Government Auditing and Accounting Manual — Provide that the disbursement voucher shall be used by all government entities for all money claims and that the voucher number shall be indicated on the voucher and on every supporting document. The Court cited these to show that the JAO did not prove the existence of the vouchers.
• Rule 45 — Governs the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners. The Court resolved the petition under this Rule.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum penalty one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty. The Court used it to modify the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan.

Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice and Chairperson), Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno. The text notes that Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro recused herself and Justice Sereno was designated as an additional member.