Camsol vs. Seventh Division of the Sandiganbayan

An inordinate and unexplained delay of approximately six years from the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman to the filing of the Information with the Sandiganbayan violates the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases and warrants dismissal of the criminal case.

Petitioners were former officials of the Municipality of Buguias, Benguet — the municipal mayor, municipal treasurer, municipal accountant, and municipal agricultural officer — who were charged in connection with the Fertilizer Fund Scam. The case concerns the right to speedy disposition of cases under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which applies before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies, including the Office of the Ombudsman during preliminary investigation and the Sandiganbayan during prosecution.

• Original Filing: Office of the Ombudsman — A Complaint was filed on 01 July 2011 by the Task Force Abono of the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioners, former officials of the Municipality of Buguias, Benguet.
• Preliminary Investigation: Office of the Ombudsman — Resolution dated 10 November 2015 found probable cause to indict petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
• Information Filed: Sandiganbayan — An Information dated 05 January 2018 was filed on 20 April 2018.
• Motion to Dismiss: Sandiganbayan — Petitioners filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion to Defer Arraignment and Pre-trial and to Dismiss dated 02 July 2018 based on inordinate delay; the Sandiganbayan required the prosecution to comment and reset arraignment and pre-trial to 21 September 2018.
• Lower Court Decision: Sandiganbayan Seventh Division, 17 September 2018 — denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases and that the delay was not inordinate and unjustified, and set arraignment and pre-trial on 21 September 2018.
• Motion for Reconsideration: Sandiganbayan Seventh Division, 11 October 2018 — denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
• SC Action: Supreme Court, First Division, July 06, 2022 — granted the petition and ordered dismissal of the criminal case.

In 2004, the Municipality of Buguias, Benguet received P1,050,000.00, represented by then Mayor Apolinario T. Camsol. An undated purchase request for the procurement of certain fungicides and insecticides in the total amount of P1,049,992.00 was prepared by Camsol and Municipal Agricultural Officer Asano E. Aban. Thereafter, Municipal Treasurer Anecita C. Suyat and Camsol conducted a personal canvass for the insecticides and fungicides. Canvass sheets were sent to three suppliers, including PMB Agro Goods and Services (PMB Agro), which submitted their respective quotations; PMB Agro submitted the lowest prices. Camsol then issued an undated and unnumbered purchase order in favor of PMB Agro. Despite the lack of a delivery receipt, an undated and unnumbered inspection and acceptance report signed by Suyat attesting the delivery of the insecticides and fungicides was issued. Payment was released to PMB Agro after petitioners affixed their signatures on the disbursement voucher.

On 23 June 2006, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued Notice of Disallowance No. 06-01 disallowing in audit the amount of P1,049,992.00 because the purchase was made through personal canvass and, considering the amount involved, should have been made through competitive bidding. The COA also noted that there was no documentary evidence to show that prior to the purchase of the farm supplies, consultations and/or meetings with the farmer beneficiaries were conducted to obtain the consensus of the farmers on what products to purchase.

On 01 July 2011, the Task Force Abono of the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint against petitioners, former officials of the Municipality of Buguias, Benguet, charging them with violations of Section 3(b), (e), and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code in connection with the so-called Fertilizer Fund Scam. After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated 10 November 2015 finding probable cause to indict petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. On 20 April 2018, an Information dated 05 January 2018 was filed with the Sandiganbayan.

The arraignment and pre-trial were set on 31 July 2018. Petitioners filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion to Defer Arraignment and Pre-trial and to Dismiss dated 02 July 2018 based on inordinate delay. Despite objection to the deferment, the prosecution was required to file its comment and/or opposition to the motion. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan, in its Order dated 31 July 2018, cancelled and reset the arraignment and pre-trial to 21 September 2018 and deemed the incident submitted for resolution.

Petitioners argued that inordinate delay attended the filing of the complaint and preliminary investigation that led to the filing of the Information, in violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases. Specifically, they averred that from the COA’s Notice of Disallowance issued on 23 June 2006, it took more than four years to file the complaint; that in a decision dated 10 November 2015, the Office of the Ombudsman found petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and prejudicial to the interest of the service; and that seven years had lapsed from the time the complaint was lodged with the Office of the Ombudsman to the filing of the Information with the Sandiganbayan on 20 April 2018. The prosecution countered that the motion to dismiss was anchored only on the length of delay and failed to consider the three other factors, namely: the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice against the defendant; it prayed that the motion be denied for lack of merit and for being pro forma.

The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss in its Minute Resolution dated 17 September 2018 and denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in its Minute Resolution dated 11 October 2018. Petitioners then filed the present petition.

• Inordinate Delay: Petitioners argued that inordinate delay attended the filing of the complaint and preliminary investigation leading to the Information, violating their right to speedy disposition of cases; they cited more than four years from the 23 June 2006 COA Notice of Disallowance to the complaint and seven years from the complaint to the 20 April 2018 Information.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners sought annulment of the Sandiganbayan’s Minute Resolutions on the ground that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in failing to uphold their right to speedy disposition of cases given the prosecution’s failure to explain the delay of approximately six years.

• Procedural Propriety: The prosecution claimed that the petition was infirm because the denial of a motion to quash/dismiss is merely interlocutory and not subject to appeal; it maintained that a petition for certiorari or mandamus under Rule 65 is not proper because there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to petitioners.
• Three-Factor Test: The prosecution countered that the motion to dismiss was anchored only on the length of delay and failed to consider the three other factors: the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice against the defendant; it prayed that the motion be denied for lack of merit and for being pro forma.
• Justification for Delay: The prosecution justified the delay by claiming that the Fertilizer Fund Scam was complex, involving a staggering amount of P728 Million spread over the entire country, many individuals, agencies, and voluminous documents, and that the Complaint charged six crimes with different elements and underwent multiple levels of review; it asserted that the time spent was reasonable and that the usual procedure was observed.

• Procedural Propriety: Whether a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to challenge the Sandiganbayan’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on the right to speedy disposition of cases.
• Timely Assertion: Whether petitioners timely invoked their right to speedy disposition of cases when they raised it in a motion to dismiss prior to arraignment.
• Speedy Disposition: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in failing to uphold petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases considering the prosecution’s failure to explain the delay of approximately six years.

• Procedural Propriety: Yes. The denial of a motion to dismiss may be questioned in a petition for certiorari where tainted with grave abuse of discretion, and mandamus lies to compel dismissal for violation of the right to speedy disposition, as recognized in Cagang and Angchangco.
• Timely Assertion: Yes. Filing a motion to dismiss prior to arraignment sufficiently shows that the right was timely raised; petitioners did not sleep on their rights.
• Speedy Disposition: Yes. The delay of approximately six years and nine months from the 01 July 2011 complaint to the 20 April 2018 Information, or more than five years and eleven months from Camsol’s last pleading, was unreasonable; the prosecution failed to justify it, so the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not dismissing.

• Procedural Propriety: The SC held that the prosecution misapprehended Cagang. While denial of a motion to quash/dismiss is ordinarily interlocutory, a party may question it in a petition for certiorari if the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari is appropriate where the lower court issued the order with grave abuse of discretion and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The SC also cited Angchangco, where mandamus was recognized to compel the Ombudsman to dismiss a case for violation of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, amounting to gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. Because the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to dismiss after the right was violated, the petition was proper.
• Timely Assertion: The SC held that petitioners timely raised the issue. Filing a motion to quash/dismiss prior to arraignment is sufficient. Under Javier, respondents in preliminary investigation have no duty to follow up on prosecution; Coscolluela remains good law. The Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure prohibit motions to dismiss except on lack of jurisdiction, so respondents have no legitimate avenue to assert the right at the preliminary investigation level. It would be unreasonable to treat non-follow-up as acquiescence. Petitioners filed the motion to dismiss at the earliest possible time before arraignment, showing they did not sleep on their rights.
• Speedy Disposition: The SC applied Section 16, Article III. Under Cagang, the right to speedy disposition differs from speedy trial and may be invoked before any tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial, once the accused may be prejudiced. A case is deemed initiated upon filing of the formal complaint prior to preliminary investigation; the fact-finding period is excluded. Courts determine the burden: if the right is invoked within the periods, the defense has the burden; if the delay is beyond the period, the prosecution must prove it followed the prescribed procedure, complexity and volume made the delay inevitable, and no prejudice was suffered. The SC found a delay of approximately six years and nine months from the 01 July 2011 complaint to the 20 April 2018 Information; even from Camsol’s last pleading received on 03 May 2012, the delay was more than five years and eleven months. This was beyond the Rules of Court and even AO 1, Series of 2020. The burden shifted to the prosecution. The prosecution failed to justify the delay: it merely claimed that the Fertilizer Fund Scam was complex, involved P728 Million, many individuals, agencies, and voluminous documents, and six crimes with multiple review levels, but offered no proof or specifics for this case. Javier held that a mere claim of countless/voluminous documents without proof is insufficient. Martinez held that there was no allegation that petitioners conspired with those involved in the Fertilizer Fund Scam. Binay showed specific reasons for complexity, such as ten charges and thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents. Complexity must be decided case-by-case. Clogged dockets and a steady stream of cases are not talismanic; their effects must be proved. As to prejudice, Martinez stated that actual prejudice results from a long delay in an uncomplicated case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, and dismissal was warranted.

• Right to speedy disposition of cases — Under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, all persons have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. It differs from the right to speedy trial: the latter is invoked only in criminal prosecutions against courts of law, while the former may be invoked before any tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial, once the accused may already be prejudiced. The SC applied it to the Ombudsman’s preliminary investigation and the Sandiganbayan prosecution and found a violation.
• Cagang guidelines on speedy disposition — The SC in Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division laid down the following:
  • The right to speedy disposition is different from the right to speedy trial; it may be invoked before any tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial, once the accused may be prejudiced.
  • A case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to preliminary investigation; the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods, and delays beyond the period are taken against the prosecution; fact-finding investigations before the formal complaint are excluded.
  • Courts must determine the burden: if the right is invoked within the given periods, the defense has the burden to prove malice or political motivation and lack of evidence and that it did not contribute to delay; if the delay is beyond the period, the prosecution must prove it followed the prescribed procedure, complexity and volume made the delay inevitable, and no prejudice to the accused.
  • The length of delay is never mechanical; courts consider the entire context, including the amount of evidence and complexity of issues. Exceptions are malicious prosecution and waiver.
  • The right must be timely raised; otherwise, it is waived.
  • Burden-shifting in speedy disposition claims — Once the delay exceeds the applicable period and the right is invoked, the burden shifts to the prosecution to justify the delay by proving (a) it followed the prescribed procedure, (b) the complexity of the issues and volume of evidence made the delay inevitable, and (c) no prejudice was suffered by the accused. The SC applied this because the delay exceeded the Rules of Court and even AO 1, Series of 2020; the prosecution failed to discharge the burden.
  • Timely invocation of the right — The right to speedy disposition must be timely raised; filing a motion to dismiss or quash prior to arraignment is sufficient. Respondents in preliminary investigation have no duty to follow up on the prosecution, and the Ombudsman’s Rules prohibit motions to dismiss except for lack of jurisdiction, so non-follow-up is not acquiescence. The SC applied this to petitioners’ motion to dismiss before arraignment.
  • Complexity as justification for delay — Mere invocation of the gravity and notoriety of an overarching illegal scheme, or a blanket claim that the case is complex, does not justify delay. The prosecution must show specific reasons and proof of complexity in the particular case, and complexity is decided case-by-case. The SC applied this to reject the prosecution’s Fertilizer Fund Scam justification.
  • Grave abuse of discretion exception to interlocutory order rule — While denial of a motion to quash/dismiss is ordinarily interlocutory, it may be questioned in a petition for certiorari if tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The SC applied this to allow the petition.
  • Mandamus to compel dismissal for speedy disposition violation — Mandamus lies where the Ombudsman’s failure to dismiss amounts to gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. The SC cited Angchangco.
  • Inordinate delay as ground for dismissal — An inordinate and unexplained delay from complaint with the Ombudsman to Information with the Sandiganbayan violates the right to speedy disposition and warrants dismissal of the criminal case. The SC applied this to dismiss Criminal Case No. SB-18-CRM-0293.

• “The inordinate and unexplained delay of approximately six years from the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman to the filing of the Information with the Sandiganbayan amounts to a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases and warrants the dismissal of this case.” — The SC states the core ruling at the outset.
• “If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.” — From the Cagang guidelines, establishing the burden-shifting rule applied against the prosecution.
• “The complexity of this case was not sufficiently demonstrated by the prosecution. Mere invocation of the gravity and notoriety of the overarching illegal scheme or activity upon which a specific case relates, will not suffice as justifications for the delay in its resolution.” — The SC rejects the prosecution’s blanket Fertilizer Fund Scam justification.
• “As in this case, petitioners raised at the earliest possible time, the issue of inordinate delay when they filed a motion to dismiss the case with the Sandiganbayan prior to their arraignment.” — The SC holds that the right was timely invoked.

• Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, 837 Phil. 815 (2018) — Controlling precedent; laid down the guidelines on speedy disposition and recognized certiorari as an exception to the interlocutory-order rule.
• Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, 335 Phil. 766 (1997) — Recognized mandamus to compel the Ombudsman to dismiss a case for violation of the right to speedy disposition.
• Alarilla vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. Nos. 236177-210, 03 February 2021 — Cited for Office of the Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2020, which set preliminary investigation periods.
• Catamco vs. Sandiganbayan Sixth Division, G.R. Nos. 243560-62 & 243261-63, 28 July 2020 — Applied Cagang; cited as confirming that complexity should be decided case-by-case.
• Javier vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 237997, 10 June 2020 — Applied Cagang; held that before AO 1, Series of 2020, the Rules of Court applied suppletorily; mere claim of voluminous documents and clogged dockets did not justify delay; timely assertion through motion to quash.
• Martinez III vs. People, G.R. No. 232574, 01 October 2019 — Applied Cagang; held that no allegation of conspiracy with those involved in the Fertilizer Fund Scam meant the blanket scam justification did not explain the delay; discussed prejudice.
• Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, 374 Phil. 413 (1999) — Cited for specific reasons showing complexity, such as ten charges and examination of thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents.
• Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan — Cited in Javier for the rule that respondents in preliminary investigation have no duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case.

• Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to a speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies; the SC applied it to the Ombudsman’s preliminary investigation and the Sandiganbayan prosecution and found a violation.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs certiorari and mandamus; the SC applied it to allow the petition despite the denial of the motion to dismiss being interlocutory, because the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion and mandamus was recognized in Angchangco.
• Section 3, Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that the investigating prosecutor has ten days after the investigation to determine whether there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial; applied suppletorily because there was no specific Ombudsman period before AO 1, Series of 2020, and the delay was way beyond it.
• Section 8, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2020 (Office of the Ombudsman) — Sets preliminary investigation periods of twelve months for simple cases and twenty-four months for complex cases, extendable by written authority for justifiable reasons by not more than one year; even if retroactively applied, the delay exceeded the period.
• Section 3(b), (e), and (g), Republic Act No. 3019; Article 315, paragraph 1(b), Revised Penal Code — The complaint charged these offenses in connection with the Fertilizer Fund Scam; the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and the Information charged that provision. The SC dismissed the case on speedy disposition without reaching the merits.