Campanano vs. Datuin

Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes acts of planting evidence and the like that tend directly to cause false prosecutions, not the malicious prosecution or instigation of criminal charges in court.

Seishin International Corporation, represented by its president-petitioner David B. Campanano, Jr., previously filed an Estafa complaint against respondent Jose Antonio A. Datuin in Pasig City, resulting in a final conviction. Subsequently claiming to have discovered a cash voucher proving he had already paid for the subject roadrollers, respondent filed a complaint for Incriminating Innocent Persons against petitioner and a certain Yasunobu Hirota in Quezon City, alleging that the prior Estafa complaint and supporting testimony were false, unfounded, and malicious.

• The Estafa Conviction: Seishin International Corporation, represented by petitioner, filed a complaint for Estafa against respondent. Respondent was convicted by the RTC of Pasig City on May 3, 1999. Respondent's appeals to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court were dismissed, and the conviction became final and executory on October 24, 2003.
• The Newly Discovered Evidence: In July 2003, respondent vacated his office and found a cash voucher dated June 28, 1993, indicating his cash payment of P200,000 for two roadrollers purchased from Seishin International Corporation. Respondent claimed he had forgotten about the full payment during the trial because he could not find the voucher at that time.
• The Incriminating Innocent Person Complaint: Relying on the newly discovered cash voucher, respondent filed a complaint-affidavit for Incriminating Innocent Persons under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code before the Quezon City Prosecutor against petitioner and Hirota. Respondent alleged that the Estafa complaint and petitioner's supporting testimony were false, unfounded, and malicious because they imputed a crime that respondent did not commit.
• The Prosecutorial Dismissals: The Quezon City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the Estafa case and the testimony were made in Pasig City, and finding no basis to indict the respondents given the final Estafa conviction. The DOJ affirmed the dismissal, finding no error by the prosecutor. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the DOJ and remanded the case for further investigation, ruling that the Quezon City Prosecutor acquired jurisdiction because petitioner's counter-affidavit was executed in Quezon City.

• Jurisdictional Error: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the execution of petitioner's counter-affidavit in Quezon City was determinative of the Quezon City Prosecutor's jurisdiction, rather than the allegations in respondent's complaint-affidavit.
• Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DOJ's dismissal constituted an abuse of discretion, arguing that the complaint-affidavit does not appear meritorious.

• Jurisdiction Acquired: Respondent argued that the Quezon City Prosecutor acquired jurisdiction over the offense because petitioner executed his counter-affidavit in Quezon City.
• Meritorious Complaint: Respondent contended that the complaint was meritorious because the newly discovered cash voucher proved that the prior Estafa charge and testimony were false, unfounded, and malicious, thereby establishing probable cause for Incriminating Innocent Persons.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Quezon City Prosecutor acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for Incriminating Innocent Persons based on the execution of the counter-affidavit in Quezon City.
• Incriminating Innocent Persons: Whether the allegations in the complaint-affidavit constitute probable cause for the crime of Incriminating Innocent Persons under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information regarding where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. The complaint-affidavit did not allege that the crime or any of its essential ingredients was committed in Quezon City; the only reference to Quezon City was respondent's residence. The execution of a counter-affidavit in Quezon City does not confer jurisdiction upon the Quezon City Prosecutor.
• Incriminating Innocent Persons: The allegations do not make out a clear probable cause for the crime under Article 363. Article 363 does not contemplate malicious prosecution or the instigation of a criminal charge in court; it refers to acts of planting evidence and the like which tend directly to cause false prosecutions. Filing a criminal complaint and testifying falsely in support thereof do not constitute incriminatory machination, particularly because Article 363 expressly excludes perjury as a means of committing the crime. Furthermore, respondent's final Estafa conviction bars the filing of a criminal case for false testimony against petitioner.

• Venue as an Essential Element of Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases — In criminal cases, venue is an essential element of jurisdiction, determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. The criminal action must be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred, to avoid inconvenience to the accused in securing witnesses and evidence.
• Incriminating Innocent Persons (Article 363, Revised Penal Code) — The crime penalizes any person who, by any act not constituting perjury, directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime. The gravamen of the offense is performing an act which "tends directly" to cause a false imputation. It does not punish malicious prosecution or the imputation itself made before a judicial or administrative officer. The crime refers solely to acts of planting evidence and the like which do not in themselves constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to cause them. The elements are: (1) the offender performs an act; (2) by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime; and (3) such act does not constitute perjury.

• "Article 363 does not, however, contemplate the idea of malicious prosecution – someone prosecuting or instigating a criminal charge in court. It refers 'to the acts of PLANTING evidence and the like, which do not in themselves constitute false prosecution but tend directly to cause false prosecutions.'"
• "It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element of jurisdiction; and that the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information."

• People v. Rivera, 59 Phil. 236 (1933) — Followed. Distinguished Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code from Article 326 of the old Codigo Penal, limiting the application of Article 363 to acts of "planting" evidence and the like, not false accusations made before judicial officers.
• Ventura v. Bernabe, 38 SCRA 587 (1971) — Followed. Ruled that filing a criminal complaint without justifiable cause and testifying falsely as a prosecution witness do not constitute incriminatory machination under Article 363, as the article expressly excludes perjury.
• Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958) — Cited. Defined Article 363 as referring to acts of planting evidence.
• Fukuzume v. People; Nocum v. Tan; Agustin v. Pamintuan — Cited. Reaffirmed the doctrine that venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases.

• Article 363, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes "[a]ny person who, by any act not constituting perjury, shall directly incriminate or impute to an innocent person the commission of a crime." Applied to clarify that the provision excludes malicious prosecution and perjury, applying only to acts like planting evidence that tend directly to cause false prosecutions.
• Section 15(a), Rule 110, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Provides that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. Applied to determine that the Quezon City Prosecutor lacked jurisdiction because the complaint-affidavit failed to allege that the offense or any of its essential ingredients occurred in Quezon City.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Antonio T. Carpio, Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.