Camid vs. Office of the President

A municipality whose creation by executive order has been judicially declared null and void ab initio cannot attain de facto or de jure status under Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code; only municipalities created by executive order but never judicially annulled benefit from that curative provision, and judicially dissolved municipalities may be revived only through specific legislative enactment.

The Municipality of Andong in Lanao del Sur was created by Executive Order No. 107 issued by President Diosdado Macapagal in 1964, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. In Pelaez vs. Auditor General (1965), the Supreme Court declared thirty-three executive orders creating municipalities in Mindanao — including Executive Order No. 107 — null and void ab initio, ruling that the President lacked the power to create municipalities as this was a legislative function and that Section 68 failed to meet the requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power. Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 later provided that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders, with elective officials holding office at the time of the Code's effectivity, shall henceforth be considered regular municipalities.

Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid represents himself as a current resident of Andong, Lanao del Sur, suing as a private citizen and taxpayer. Andong was created by Executive Order No. 107 issued by President Diosdado Macapagal on October 1, 1964, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. The executive order was among thirty-three similar issuances creating municipalities in Mindanao, all of which were declared null and void ab initio by the Supreme Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General on December 24, 1965, on the ground that the President lacked the power to create municipalities, that power being legislative in character. The dispositive in Pelaez permanently restrained the Auditor General from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the annulled executive orders.

Despite this judicial annulment, Camid alleges that Andong has continued to exist and operate. According to his petition, Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen barangay units with their respective chairmen. From 1964 until 1972, public officials of Andong allegedly served their constituents with minimal resources and honorarium. Since Martial Law in 1972, "Interim Officials" have purportedly continued serving the municipality without public funds, serving "in their own little ways and means." Camid concedes, however, that since 1968 no person has been appointed, elected, or qualified to serve in any elective local government position of Andong.

In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents a Certification from the DENR-CENRO attesting to Andong's total land area, referencing its creation under Executive Order No. 107, and a Certification from the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City pegging Andong's population at 14,059. Both certifications were issued upon Camid's request, expressly stating they were issued "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur." Camid also enumerates governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong.

The petition assails a Certification dated November 21, 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the DILG, which enumerates eighteen municipalities certified as "existing." Notably, these eighteen municipalities are among the thirty-three, along with Andong, whose creations were voided by the Court in Pelaez. Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the DILG for not classifying Andong as a regular existing municipality and for not including it in its records and official database, characterizing such non-classification as unequal treatment. As relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification, direct the DILG to classify Andong as a regular existing municipality, order all public respondents to extend full recognition and support to Andong, direct the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management to release Andong's internal revenue allotments, and recognize Andong's "Interim Local Officials."

The eighteen municipalities listed in the DILG Certification had, subsequent to Pelaez, been reconstituted through specific legislative enactments — including Republic Acts and Presidential Decrees — passed after 1965. Andong, by contrast, has never been the subject of any such curative legislation. The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which apportions legislative districts and enumerates the municipalities composing them, does not list Andong among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur or of any other province. The municipalities of San Andres, Alicia, and Sinacaban — which attained de facto or de jure status in subsequent jurisprudence — are listed in their respective provinces.

• Continued Existence: Camid argued that Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials, a high school, Bureau of Posts, DECS office, and seventeen barangay units, and thus its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation despite the Pelaez annulment.
• Unequal Treatment: Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the DILG for not classifying Andong as a regular existing municipality and for not including it in its records and official database, characterizing such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen municipalities similarly annulled in Pelaez.
• Modification of Pelaez by Supervening Events: Camid insisted that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence, citing the Court's ruling in Municipality of San Narciso vs. Mendez, which affirmed the unique status of San Andres, Quezon as a de facto municipal corporation, and Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code as basis for current recognition.
• Continuing Validity of Executive Order No. 107: Camid maintained the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107, arguing that subsequent laws and jurisprudence had effectively modified the Pelaez ruling.

• Procedural Impropriety: The OSG argued that the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to de novo appreciation of factual questions which the Supreme Court cannot undertake, not being a trier of facts.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and Hierarchy of Courts: The OSG pointed out that Camid's claims should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations.
• Ineffectuality of Relief: The DILG Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or revalidate a municipality, and its annulment would accomplish nothing toward Camid's ultimate cause of recognizing Andong; neither does the Certification expressly refute the claim that Andong still exists.

• Procedural Propriety: Whether the petition is procedurally proper given that it requires de novo factual appreciation and was filed directly with the Supreme Court.
• De Facto Municipal Corporation: Whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously declared void ab initio by the Supreme Court may attain recognition as a de facto municipal corporation.
• Section 442(d) Application: Whether Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 operates to validate or reconstitute a municipality judicially dissolved in Pelaez.

• Procedural Propriety: No. The petition requires factual determinations beyond the Supreme Court's function as it is not a trier of facts, and Camid failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the hierarchy of courts.
• De Facto Municipal Corporation: No. A municipality whose creation was expressly annulled by judicial decree cannot attain de facto status through continued existence in defiance of that decree, as court decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by aggrieved parties.
• Section 442(d) Application: No. Section 442(d) cures defects only in municipalities created by executive order but never judicially annulled; it does not reconstitute judicially dissolved municipalities, which may be revived only through specific legislative enactment.

• Procedural Propriety: The case requires de novo appreciation of factual questions — whether Andong has continuously exercised corporate functions and whether the State acquiesced — which cannot be confirmed by the Supreme Court as it is not a trier of facts. No trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of Camid's factual claims. The petition should have undergone the administrative gauntlet and been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which has the power to make necessary factual determinations. Camid's disregard of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts cannot be countenanced. Moreover, the assailed DILG Certification does not bear authority to create or revalidate a municipality; its annulment would accomplish nothing toward recognizing Andong, and the document does not even expressly refute Andong's existence, rendering the relation of the Certification to Camid's central argument "forlornly strained."

• De Facto Municipal Corporation: The doctrine of de facto municipal corporations requires factual demonstration of continuous exercise of corporate powers with acquiescence by the State. Municipalities like San Andres, Alicia, and Sinacaban attained de facto or de jure status because their executive orders, though resting on the same infirm legal basis as Andong's, were never judicially annulled. Pelaez limited its nullificatory effect to the thirty-three executive orders specifically challenged therein, and the Court could have extended the ruling to invalidate San Andres as well but did not. Andong, however, was among those expressly annulled. To affirm Andong's de facto status despite its judicial dissolution would condone defiance of a valid court order, as court decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by parties aggrieved. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality for four decades are eloquent indicia of non-recognition by the State. The certifications from DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office were issued upon Camid's request "to support the restoration or re-operation" of Andong, conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative. The 1987 Constitution's apportionment ordinance does not list Andong among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, whereas San Andres, Alicia, and Sinacaban are listed in their respective provinces.

• Section 442(d) Application: Section 442(d) requires that municipalities created by executive order must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965; out of obeisance to Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize Andong, depriving it of its share of public funds and refusing to conduct municipal elections. The eighteen municipalities certified by the DILG as existing were reconstituted through subsequent legislation enacted after Pelaez — including Republic Acts and Presidential Decrees — and their legal personality derives from those statutes, not from the original executive orders or Section 442(d). Section 442(d) affirms the legal personalities only of municipalities not judicially annulled; judicially dissolved municipalities remain inexistent unless recreated through specific legislative enactments. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert its constituent barrios back to their original municipalities — Lumbatan, Butig, and Tubaran — which subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur.

• De Facto Municipal Corporation — A municipal corporation may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for a period long enough to afford title by prescription. What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as acquiescence thereto by other instrumentalities of the State. The Court distinguished Andong from municipalities like San Andres, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which attained de facto status because their executive orders were never judicially annulled, whereas Andong's creation was expressly declared void ab initio in Pelaez. The Court identified the factors validated in San Narciso: (1) the validity of the creation had never been challenged for nearly thirty years; (2) no quo warranto suit was filed after Pelaez; and (3) the municipality was later classified, organized as part of a municipal circuit court, and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution's apportionment ordinance.

• Curative Laws — Curative laws, which are retrospective in nature and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. The Court held that Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code operates as a curative law, but only for municipalities created by executive order that were not judicially annulled. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature, and Congress exercised that power when it incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code.

• Nullity ab initio — A declaration of nullity ab initio means the act is void "from the beginning," "at first," "from the inception." Executive Order No. 107 creating Andong was declared null and void ab initio in Pelaez, meaning it never had legal effect. This nullity was never reversed by the Court and was expressly affirmed in Municipality of San Joaquin vs. Siva, Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya.

• "Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for refusing to recognize Andong as a de facto municipal corporation: a judicial declaration of nullity cannot be undone by continued defiance or collective amnesia.

• "Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code—that it does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled." — This passage defines the proper scope of Section 442(d) as a curative provision and distinguishes judicially annulled municipalities from those merely laboring under a legal cloud.

• "The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving 'validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with,' are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights." — This passage, quoted from Municipality of San Narciso vs. Mendez, establishes the constitutional basis for Section 442(d) as a valid curative law and the principle that creation of political subdivisions is a legislative function.

• Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965 (1965) — Controlling precedent; declared Executive Order No. 107 creating Andong and thirty-two other executive orders null and void ab initio, ruling that the President had no power to create municipalities as this was a legislative function and Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code failed to meet the requirements for valid delegation of legislative power.
• Municipality of San Joaquin vs. Siva, 125 Phil. 1004 (1967) — Affirmed Pelaez; declared Executive Order No. 436 creating Lawigan void ab initio, the issue having been squarely settled in Pelaez.
• Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 137 Phil. 358 (1969) — Affirmed Pelaez; refused to recognize Balabagan as a de facto corporation, holding that no de facto corporation exists where there is no other valid statute giving color of authority to its creation, independently of the unconstitutional Administrative Code provision.
• Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya, G.R. No. L-41322, 29 September 1988, 166 SCRA 70 — Affirmed Pelaez; refused to recognize the legal existence of Santo Tomas, created by executive order, holding that since the President has no power to create a municipality, Santo Tomas had no legal personality and could not be a party to any civil action.
• Municipality of San Narciso vs. Mendez, G.R. No. 103702, 6 December 1994, 239 SCRA 11 — Recognized San Andres, Quezon as a de facto municipal corporation; clarified that Pelaez limited its nullificatory effect to the executive orders specifically challenged therein, and applied Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code as a curative law validating municipalities created by executive order but never judicially annulled.
• Municipality of Candijay vs. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 922 (1995) — Followed San Narciso; recognized Alicia, Bohol as a de jure municipality under Section 442(d), the situation being strikingly similar to San Narciso.
• Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz, 333 Phil. 1 (1996) — Followed San Narciso; recognized Sinacaban as a de facto/de jure municipality; provided a summation of the evolution of the rule, identifying the factors that validated creation: long unchallenged existence, absence of quo warranto proceedings, classification as a municipal circuit court, inclusion in the Constitution's legislative district apportionment, and the curative effect of Section 442(d).

• Section 68, Revised Administrative Code — The provision relied upon by President Macapagal to create municipalities by executive order; declared unconstitutional in Pelaez as an invalid delegation of legislative power, failing to enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President and lacking standards sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects.
• Section 442(d), Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) — Provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the] Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." Held to be a valid curative law, but applicable only to municipalities created by executive order that were not judicially annulled; Andong was held not to meet the requisite of having elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the Code's effectivity.
• Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution — Apportions seats of the House of Representatives to different legislative districts and enumerates the municipalities encompassed thereby; Andong is not listed among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur or any other province, while San Andres, Alicia, and Sinacaban are listed in their respective provinces, serving as indicia of State recognition or non-recognition.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.