Calme vs. Court of Appeals

For offenses committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage, and the exact location where the crime was actually committed is immaterial so long as it is undisputed that the offense occurred while the vessel was in transit.

Petitioner Wenefredo Calme and four other persons were accused of murdering Edgardo Bernal by allegedly throwing him overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland passenger ship owned and operated by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City on the night of 12 May 1991. The case concerns the proper venue and jurisdiction for criminal offenses committed on board a vessel during its voyage, governed by Section 14(c) (formerly Section 15(c)), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, and the relationship of that provision to the earlier Act No. 400.

Petitioner Wenefredo Calme and four other persons were charged with murder for the killing of Edgardo Bernal, allegedly by throwing him overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland cargo-passenger vessel owned and operated by William Lines, Inc. The alleged offense took place on the night of 12 May 1991 while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City. An information for murder was filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Oroquieta City.

Petitioner challenged the Oroquieta RTC's jurisdiction over the offense through a motion to quash, contending that the proper venue should be determined under the general rule on venue in Section 15(a) (now Section 14(a)), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, because the exact location where the crime occurred was known. According to the Marine Protest filed by the vessel's master, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was at longitude 123 degrees 47.1 minutes East and latitude 9 degrees 2.3 minutes North — approximately 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island — when he was informed by the officer on duty that a passenger had jumped overboard. Petitioner thus claimed that Siquijor was the proper venue.

The motion to quash was denied by Judge Celso Conol of RTC, Branch 12, Oroquieta City. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition, which was dismissed in the decision dated 10 December 1993. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the resolution dated 14 July 1994. Petitioner then filed the present petition for review, raising as the sole issue whether the Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

• Applicable Venue Provision: Petitioner argued that the general rule under Section 15(a) (now Section 14(a)), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court should govern, not Section 15(c) (now Section 14(c)), because the exact location where the alleged crime occurred was known, placing the proper venue in Siquijor based on the Marine Protest filed by the vessel's captain.
• Reckoning Point Under Section 15(c): Petitioner alternatively contended that even if Section 15(c) applied, Oroquieta City would still be excluded as a proper venue because, relying on Act No. 400, the reckoning point should be the first port of entry or the municipalities and territories through which the vessel passed after the discovery or commission of the crime.

• Applicable Venue Rule: Whether Section 14(c) (formerly Section 15(c)), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, governing offenses committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, applies to determine the proper venue and jurisdiction, or whether the general rule under Section 14(a) governs because the exact location of the crime was known.
• Reckoning Point for Venue: Whether, under Section 14(c), the reckoning point for determining venue is the first port of entry or the municipalities and territories through which the vessel passed after the commission or discovery of the crime, as petitioner argued based on Act No. 400.

• Applicable Venue Rule: Yes. Section 14(c), Rule 110 applies because the offense was committed while the vessel was in transit; the exact location where the crime was actually committed is immaterial so long as it is undisputed that the offense occurred during the voyage.
• Reckoning Point for Venue: No. The reckoning point under Section 14(c) is the first port of entry or any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during the voyage, without any qualification as to whether the passage occurred before or after the commission or discovery of the crime. Act No. 400's restrictive language was not carried into the present rule.

• Applicable Venue Rule: The Marine Protest merely stated that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain was informed of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the murder took place in the same area. In any event, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial because it is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was in transit. "In transit" means "on the way or passage; while passing from one person or place to another; in the course of transportation." The applicable provision is therefore Section 14(c), Rule 110, which provides that where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to generally accepted principles of international law. Oroquieta City, as the place of departure, falls within the municipalities through which the vessel passed during the voyage.

• Reckoning Point for Venue: Petitioner's reliance on Act No. 400 is erroneous. Under Act No. 400, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Court of First Instance of any province into which the vessel shall come after the commission of the crime. The present rule, however, vests jurisdiction in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage, without any qualification as to timing. The restrictive language of Act No. 400 — limiting venue to provinces where the vessel came after the commission of the crime — was not carried into Section 14(c). Because the words of Section 14(c) are clear and unambiguous, there is no reason to resort to Act No. 400 to determine its meaning; the provision must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation, pursuant to established principles of statutory construction.

• Venue for Crimes Committed on Board a Vessel in Transit — Under Section 14(c) (formerly Section 15(c)), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to generally accepted principles of international law. The rule contains no qualification as to whether the vessel's passage through a given municipality must have occurred before or after the commission or discovery of the crime. The exact location where the offense was committed is immaterial provided it is undisputed that the crime occurred while the vessel was in transit.

• Statutory Construction — Literal Interpretation of Clear Rules — Where the language of a law or rule is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined from the language employed, given its literal meaning, and applied without attempted interpretation. There is no basis to rely on a prior statute (Act No. 400) to construe a present rule (Section 14(c), Rule 110) whose language is plain and unambiguous, particularly where the restrictive language of the prior statute was not carried into the present rule.

• "In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was in transit." — This passage establishes the ratio decidendi that the exact location of the offense is irrelevant for venue purposes once it is established that the crime occurred during the voyage, thereby triggering Section 14(c), Rule 110.

• "The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to rely on Act 400 in determining its true meaning, regardless of whether said Act was indeed the moving spirit behind it." — This passage articulates the Court's refusal to import the restrictive timing qualification of Act No. 400 into the present rule, applying the doctrine of literal interpretation of clear statutory language.

• Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA 701 — Cited for the principle that where the provisions of a law or rule are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and given literal meaning without attempted interpretation.
• Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561 — Cited alongside Globe Mackay for the same principle of statutory construction.

• Section 14(c) (formerly Section 15(c)), Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to generally accepted principles of international law. The Court held this provision applicable and dispositive, Oroquieta City being a municipality through which the vessel passed during the voyage as the place of departure.
• Section 14(a) (formerly Section 15(a)), Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court — The general venue rule providing that criminal actions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. The Court held this provision inapplicable because the offense occurred while the vessel was in transit.
• Act No. 400 — An earlier statute vesting jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance of any province into which the vessel shall come after the commission of the crime. The Court held that the restrictive language of this Act was not carried into the present Section 14(c), Rule 110, and that reliance on it was erroneous.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concurred.