Callo vs. Morente

A petition for a writ of amparo is confined to extralegal killings and enforced or involuntary disappearances or threats thereof; it does not lie to secure the release of an alien detained by the Bureau of Immigration under a Summary Deportation Order and pending a criminal case, absent proof of the elements of enforced disappearance, and it may not be filed by a person who fails to comply with the exclusive and successive standing requirements under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

Danielle Tan Parker is a detainee at the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of Immigration in Bicutan, Taguig City. Lorie Marie Tomas Callo filed a petition for a writ of amparo on Parker’s behalf. The writ of amparo is governed by A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, which provides a remedy for violations or threats to the right to life, liberty, and security and covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof; enforced disappearance is defined by Republic Act No. 9851. The Bureau of Immigration’s authority to detain and deport aliens is governed by the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.

Danielle Tan Parker held Philippine Passport No. XX5678508 issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs on March 5, 2010 and valid until March 4, 2015. On January 15, 2013, Parker was charged for deportation for being an undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien, in violation of Section 3 7 (a)(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, in relation to Rule XVI, Office Memorandum No. ADD-01-004. The charge alleged that Danielle Nopuente was a fugitive from justice in the United States of America with an outstanding arrest warrant issued against her.

Subsequently, on January 24, 2013, a Summary Deportation Order was issued against Danielle Nopuente, also known as Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker, upon verification that she arrived in the Philippines on March 23, 2011 under the Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of one year. Parker was not in the list of approved applications of the Department of Foreign Affairs for dual citizenship, and her American passport had been revoked by the United States Department of State. She was thus considered an undocumented, undesirable, and overstaying alien, in violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

On June 5, 2014, pursuant to the Summary Deportation Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration, Parker was arrested in Tagaytay City on the premise that Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker are one and the same person. She was then taken to the Immigration Detention Facility in Bicutan, Taguig City. She remained detained because the deportation was not carried out due to the fact that Parker was charged with falsification and use of falsified documents before Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City.

On March 23, 2017, Callo filed the present petition for a writ of amparo with a prayer for interim reliefs for Parker’s immediate release from detention. Callo argued that Parker was a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus had no reason to be detained by the Bureau of Immigration. Callo did not allege her relationship to Parker. In support of Parker’s identity, a Certificate of Live Birth purportedly showing that Parker was born in the Philippines on March 21, 1975 of Filipino parents was presented, but it was registered only on January 4, 2010. A Certification dated June 20, 2015 issued by the Office of Consular Affairs of the Department of Foreign Affairs stated that there was “no available data” regarding any record or information from 1990 onwards of Philippine Passport No. XX5678508. Callo alleged facts only from 2005, and the only period thoroughly discussed about Parker was from 2010 to 2011; no proof was presented as to who Parker was or what she had been doing before 2011.

• Natural-born Citizenship and Identity: Callo argued that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus there is no reason for her to be detained by the Bureau of Immigration; Callo also contended that there is no cause to detain Parker because Parker, a natural-born Filipino citizen, is a different person from Danielle Nopuente, the person against whom the Summary Deportation Order was issued.
• Threat to Life in Detention: Callo alleged that Parker’s life is endangered in the Immigration Detention Facility because of threats against her by her co-detainees and the living conditions of the facility which pose health problems for Parker.
• Relief Sought: Callo sought the issuance of the writ of amparo and the interim reliefs available under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC for Parker’s immediate release.

• Validity of Detention: Respondent Bureau of Immigration maintained that the Summary Deportation Order had become final and executory and served as the legal authority to detain Parker.
• Pending Criminal Case: Respondent Bureau of Immigration argued that Parker could not be released or deported without the final disposition of her pending criminal case in Davao City; the pending criminal case prevented deportation.

• Writ of Amparo — Coverage: Whether the right to life, liberty, and security of Danielle Tan Parker is violated or threatened by respondents to warrant issuance of the writ of amparo and award of interim reliefs.
• Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance: Whether the facts establish enforced or involuntary disappearance, or threats thereof, as defined under Republic Act No. 9851 and A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC.
• Identity and Citizenship: Whether Callo proved that Danielle Tan Parker is a different person from Danielle Nopuente, the subject of the Summary Deportation Order.
• Threat to Life in Detention: Whether allegations that Parker’s life is endangered in the Immigration Detention Facility due to threats from co-detainees and living conditions support issuance of the writ of amparo.
• Legal Standing: Whether Callo had legal standing to file the petition for a writ of amparo absent allegation or proof of her relationship to Parker and of the absence of immediate family or relatives.

• Writ of Amparo — Coverage: No. The writ covers only extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof; Parker’s immigration detention does not fall within such coverage.
• Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance: No. The third and fourth elements are absent because the detention is acknowledged and justified by the Summary Deportation Order and the pending criminal case.
• Identity and Citizenship: No. Callo failed to prove Parker and Nopuente are different persons; the Department of Foreign Affairs certification and the late birth registration undermine the claim.
• Threat to Life in Detention: No. Even if proven, threats from co-detainees and poor living conditions do not meet the requirements for amparo.
• Legal Standing: No. Callo did not allege or prove her relationship to Parker or the absence of immediate family or relatives, and the exclusive and successive order under Section 2 was not followed.

• Writ of Amparo — Coverage: Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides that the petition for a writ of amparo is available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity, but the writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Enforced disappearance is defined under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 9851. The Court found no enforced or involuntary disappearance or threat thereof. Although there was a detention carried out by the State through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and fourth elements were absent. The detention was acknowledged and justified by the Summary Deportation Order and the pending criminal case. Thus, the writ did not lie.
• Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance: The elements of enforced disappearance under Republic Act No. 9851 are: (a) an arrest, detention, abduction, or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and (d) intention for such refusal to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. The Court found that the third and fourth elements were not present. There was no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or refusal to give information on Parker’s whereabouts because Callo admitted Parker was detained in the Immigration Detention Facility, the Bureau of Immigration did not deny this, and it had produced Parker’s body before the Regional Trial Court in the habeas corpus proceedings. There was also no intention to remove Parker from the protection of the law for a prolonged period because the Bureau of Immigration explained that Parker had a pending criminal case in Davao City, which prevented deportation. The Court emphasized that for issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person’s life is endangered; it is not even sufficient to allege and prove that a person has disappeared. The required quantum of proof must show that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of, the government or a political organization, and that there was a refusal to acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing person. Parker had not disappeared; her detention was sufficiently justified by the Summary Deportation Order and the pending criminal case.
• Identity and Citizenship: Callo failed to prove that Danielle Tan Parker and Danielle Nopuente are two different persons. The Court gave weight to the Department of Foreign Affairs certification that there was no available data on Passport No. XX5678508, which was the Philippine passport used by Parker. The Certificate of Live Birth purportedly showing Parker was born in the Philippines on March 21, 1975 of Filipino parents was registered only on January 4, 2010, and no explanation was given for the almost 35-year delay. Callo alleged facts only from 2005, and the only period thoroughly discussed about Parker was from 2010 to 2011. To prove that Parker and Nopuente were different persons, Parker’s life and existence should have been alleged and proven since birth. No proof was presented as to who Parker was or what she had been doing before 2011. Thus, Callo failed to sufficiently prove that Parker was a different person from Danielle Nopuente.
• Threat to Life in Detention: Even if proven, allegations that Parker’s life was endangered by threats from co-detainees and poor living conditions in the Immigration Detention Facility would not support the issuance of a writ of amparo. The writ is an extraordinary remedy meant to balance the government’s awesome power and to curtail human rights abuses; it covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof as specifically defined under Republic Act No. 9851. The circumstances alleged by Callo did not meet the requirements for the issuance of the writ. The Court also held that a petition for the writ of amparo is not the proper action to resolve issues concerning the condition of the Immigration Detention Facility and the treatment of Parker in said detention center.
• Legal Standing: Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides an exclusive and successive order for who may file the petition: (a) the aggrieved party; (b) any member of the immediate family, namely the spouse, children, and parents of the aggrieved party; (c) any ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; and (d) any concerned citizen, organization, association, or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. In Boac vs. Cadapan, the Court emphasized that this exclusive and successive order must be followed to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo. While any person may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, the order of priority for the writ of amparo must be strictly followed. In this case, Callo did not allege or prove that Parker had no immediate family members or any ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. No allegation was made on Parker’s familial relationship; only her whereabouts from 2011 were alleged and discussed. Therefore, based on the order of priority, Callo had no legal standing to file the petition. Given that there was no basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo, the interim reliefs sought were also denied.

• Writ of Amparo — Coverage — Under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the writ is a remedy for any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity, but it covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, that is, without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. The Court applied this to deny the petition because Parker’s immigration detention was not an extralegal killing or enforced disappearance.
• Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance — Elements — Under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 9851, enforced or involuntary disappearance means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period. The Court enumerated four elements: (a) an arrest, detention, abduction, or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and (d) intention for such refusal to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. The third and fourth elements were absent because the Bureau of Immigration acknowledged Parker’s detention and explained the pending criminal case.
• Amparo — Quantum of Proof — For issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person’s life is endangered or that a person has disappeared; it must be shown by the required quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of, the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing person. The Court found Parker had not disappeared and her detention was justified.
• Amparo — Standing and Order of Priority — Section 2 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC prescribes an exclusive and successive order: (a) the aggrieved party; (b) any member of the immediate family, namely the spouse, children, and parents of the aggrieved party; (c) any ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of the preceding; and (d) any concerned citizen, organization, association, or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. The order must be strictly followed to prevent indiscriminate and groundless amparo petitions. Callo did not allege or prove her relationship to Parker or the absence of immediate family or relatives, so she lacked standing.
• Amparo — Not a Remedy for Conditions of Detention — A petition for the writ of amparo is not the proper action to resolve issues concerning the condition of a detention facility or the treatment of a detainee. The Court declined to address Callo’s allegations about the Immigration Detention Facility and Parker’s treatment because they did not meet the requirements for amparo.
• Habeas Corpus vs. Amparo — Standing — While any person may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of the aggrieved party, the order of priority for filing a petition for the writ of amparo must be strictly followed. The Court distinguished the two remedies in denying Callo’s amparo petition for lack of standing.

• "The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof." — This states the coverage of the writ under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and is the basis for denying the petition because Parker’s immigration detention was not among the covered acts.
• "Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary disappearance, or any threats thereof, that would warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo. For the issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is even not sufficient to allege and prove that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the required quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing persons." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the quantum of proof and the elements required for amparo based on enforced disappearance.
• "Thus, while "any person" may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a petition for the writ of amparo, the order of priority on who can file the petition should be strictly followed. In this case, there was no allegation nor proof that Parker had no immediate family members or any ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity." — This passage states the standing rule and its application, explaining why Callo lacked legal standing to file the amparo petition.
• "Given that there is no basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo, the interim reliefs sought for are also denied. Moreover, we see no need to address the other issues raised by Callo in this petition, specifically, the condition of the Immigration Detention Facility and the treatment of Parker in said detention center. A petition for the writ of amparo is not the proper action to resolve such issues." — This passage confirms the denial of interim reliefs and limits the scope of amparo, excluding detention-condition and treatment issues.

• Lozada, Jr. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 686 Phil. 536 (2012) — Cited for the rule that the writ of amparo covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
• Mamba vs. Bueno, G.R. No. 191416, 7 February 2017 — Cited for the definitions of extralegal killings and enforced disappearance.
• Navia vs. Pardico, 688 Phil. 266 (2012) — Cited for the clarification that with Republic Act No. 9851, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is anchored on the statutory definition of enforced or involuntary disappearance, and for the elements of enforced disappearance.
• Boac vs. Cadapan, 665 Phil. 84, 107-108 (2011) — Cited for the exclusive and successive order of who may file a petition for a writ of amparo and for the ruling that failure to allege the absence of immediate family or relatives precludes standing.
• Spouses Santiago vs. Tulfo, 772 Phil. 203 (2015) — Cited for the characterization of the writ of amparo as an extraordinary remedy meant to balance the government’s awesome power and curtail human rights abuses.

• Section 1, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo) — Provides that the petition is available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity, and that the writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Applied to deny the petition because Parker’s detention did not fall within this coverage.
• Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 9851 — Defines enforced or involuntary disappearance as the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period. Applied to find that the third and fourth elements were absent.
• Section 2, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC — Prescribes the order of priority for filing a petition for a writ of amparo. Applied to hold that Callo lacked legal standing.
• Section 3 7 (a)(7), Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, in relation to Rule XVI, Office Memorandum No. ADD-01-004 — Basis for charging Parker with deportation as an undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien. Applied as the ground for the Summary Deportation Order and her detention.

• Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (on official leave)
• Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
• Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
• Diosdado M. Peralta
• Lucas P. Bersamin
• Mariano C. Del Castillo
• Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (on official business)
• Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
• Francis H. Jardeleza
• Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
• Samuel R. Martires
• Noel Gimenez Tijam (on official leave)
• Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
• Alexander G. Gesmundo (on official business)