Calleja vs. Court of Appeals

A Municipal Attorney duly appointed in accordance with Section 3, paragraph 3(a) of Republic Act 2264 is the legal officer of the municipality and may appear in court as counsel for the municipality or for any municipal officer who is a party in his official capacity; his signature on a notice of appeal, without the accompanying signature or conformity of the Provincial Fiscal, validly perfects the appeal. The provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on provincial fiscal representation are modified as to municipalities that have duly appointed Municipal Attorneys.

The Municipal Council of Iriga, Camarines Sur, approved Resolution No. 36, series of 1961, creating the office of Municipal Attorney for the Municipality of Iriga pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 3(a) of Republic Act 2264, the Local Autonomy Act, which took effect on June 19, 1959. That provision authorized municipal councils to create a legal division or office headed by an attorney-at-law appointed by the mayor with the approval of the council, known as the municipal attorney, who shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to him by the council. Resolution No. 36 designated the Municipal Attorney as the chief legal adviser of the municipality and provided that he shall represent the municipality in all cases wherein the municipality, or any officer thereof in his official capacity, is a party. Atty. Silvestre Felix was the duly appointed Municipal Attorney of Iriga under these issuances.

Mariano Calleja was one of nineteen civil service eligible employees of the Municipality of Iriga, Camarines Sur, who were separated from the service when their positions were abolished by the municipal council for lack of funds. Believing that their removal was without just cause, Calleja, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other dismissed employees, filed an action for mandamus before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 5077, against the Municipality of Iriga, the Members of the Municipal Council, and the Municipal Treasurer, praying for reinstatement and payment of back salaries. During the trial, the respondent municipality and its officials, who were sued in their official capacities, were represented by the Provincial Fiscal of the Province of Camarines Sur, collaborated by Atty. Silvestre Felix, the Municipal Attorney of the Municipality of Iriga.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of the dismissed employees and the payment of their back salaries. A copy of the decision was furnished the Provincial Fiscal, who received it on March 8, 1963. The Provincial Fiscal did not file a notice of appeal. On March 23, 1963, the last day for perfecting the appeal, Municipal Atty. Felix, in behalf of the Municipality of Iriga and the other respondents in the case, filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond. The respondent municipal officials also signed the notice of appeal, with the statement "With our authority and consent:" appearing over their signatures.

Before the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed a motion objecting to the approval of the appeal by the lower court upon the ground that the notice of appeal was not signed by the Provincial Fiscal, who alone could legally represent the Municipality of Iriga and its officers, and that because the appeal was signed only by Atty. Felix as Municipal Attorney, the appeal was not perfected and should not be given due course. On April 17, 1963, the trial court issued an order overruling petitioner's objection and, finding that the notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed within the reglementary period, gave due course to the appeal. On April 25, 1963, petitioner filed a motion to set aside the April 17, 1963 order, to which motion Municipal Atty. Felix filed an objection that was approved by the Provincial Fiscal. After the denial of petitioner's motion, the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 33081-R, entitled "Mariano Calleja vs. Municipality of Iriga, et al."

On January 1, 1964, petitioner, through counsel, filed in the Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal in CA-G.R. No. 33081-R, reiterating the same grounds he had adduced in objecting to the approval of the appeal in the lower court. The motion was again opposed by Atty. Felix, with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal. On January 29, 1964, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, by way of appeal from the Court of Appeals order of January 29, 1964.

The trial court found that the notice of appeal and the appeal bond had been filed within the reglementary period, and it was on that factual finding that it gave due course to the appeal notwithstanding petitioner's objection premised on the identity of the signing counsel. The controversy thus turned on the legal effect of the Municipal Attorney's signature on the notice of appeal, not on any dispute over the timeliness of its filing.

• Provincial Fiscal as Sole Legal Representative: Petitioner contended that the only official who can legally represent the respondent municipality and its officers sued in their official capacities is the Provincial Fiscal, as provided in Sections 1681 and 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code.
• No Repeal or Modification by Republic Act 2264: Petitioner maintained that Republic Act 2264 had not repealed or modified the cited provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
• Ultra Vires Resolution: Petitioner argued that because the Provincial Fiscal is the officer empowered to appear for the respondents, the resolution of the Municipal Council of Iriga authorizing Municipal Atty. Felix to represent the municipality in all cases wherein the municipality or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party was ultra vires.
• Subordination to the Provincial Fiscal: Petitioner contended that even granting that the Municipal Attorney may be allowed to appear in the case, his appearance should be with the consent, control, and under the direction of the Provincial Fiscal.
• Failure to Perfect the Appeal: Petitioner took the stand that because the Provincial Fiscal did not appeal the decision of the Court of First Instance and did not sign the notice of appeal along with Municipal Atty. Felix, the notice of appeal had not been perfected, so that the appeal was not properly brought to the Court of Appeals and should be dismissed pursuant to Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

• Authority of the Municipal Attorney: Whether Atty. Silvestre Felix, in his capacity as Municipal Attorney for the Municipality of Iriga, who appeared in collaboration with the Provincial Fiscal as counsel for the respondent municipality and its officials in Civil Case No. 5077 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, had the authority under the law to sign the notice of appeal in said case without the accompanying signature or conformity of the Provincial Fiscal.
• Validity of the Appeal and Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the appeal in CA-G.R. No. 33081-R.

• Authority of the Municipal Attorney: Yes. A Municipal Attorney duly appointed in accordance with Section 3, paragraph 3(a) of Republic Act 2264 is the legal officer of the municipality and may appear in court as counsel for the municipality or any municipal officer sued in his official capacity, the cited provisions of the Revised Administrative Code having been modified as to such municipalities.
• Validity of the Appeal and Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Yes. The notice of appeal signed by Municipal Atty. Felix alone, without the accompanying signature of the Provincial Fiscal, was valid and produced the legal effect of properly bringing the appeal to the Court of Appeals, which had jurisdiction to entertain it.

• Authority of the Municipal Attorney: Section 1681 of the Revised Administrative Code makes the Provincial Fiscal the law officer of the province, charged consistently with other provisions of law to represent the Government of the Philippines and its officers and branches in all civil actions and special proceedings, and Section 1683 provides that the Provincial Fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in the cases specified therein or unless disqualified. Section 3, paragraph 3(a) of Republic Act 2264, the Local Autonomy Act, separately authorizes municipal councils to create a legal division or office headed by an attorney-at-law known as the municipal attorney, who shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to him by the council. Both laws share the common object of providing a legal officer or counsel for the municipality. Harmonizing these seemingly conflicting provisions pursuant to the well-accepted rule of statutory construction, the rational interpretation is that both the Provincial Fiscal and the Municipal Attorney can act as the legal officer and/or counsel of the municipality. This interpretation implements the purpose for which Republic Act 2264 was enacted — to increase the powers of, and give more autonomy to, the local government. To sustain petitioner's stand would render useless and of no practical effect the provision empowering the municipal council to create the office of Municipal Attorney "who shall act as legal counsel of the municipality," since the work of a legal counsel necessarily carries with it the duty of appearing in court in behalf of the municipality. The enactment of Republic Act 2264 thus had the effect of modifying Sections 1681, 1682 and 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code insofar as those sections may be applied to municipalities that have duly appointed Municipal Attorneys. The absence of a proviso in Section 3, paragraph 3(a) of Republic Act 2264 specifically stating that the Municipal Attorney shall represent the municipality in court is of no consequence, because the Municipal Attorney is a municipal officer whose duties must be devoted to the interests of the municipality. Accordingly, Municipal Atty. Felix had authority under the law to sign the notice of appeal as counsel for the respondents in Civil Case No. 5077.
• Validity of the Appeal and Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Because the Municipal Attorney was legally authorized to sign the notice of appeal, the notice he signed — even if signed by him alone, unaccompanied by the Provincial Fiscal — was valid and produced the legal effect of bringing the appeal from the decision in Civil Case No. 5077 properly to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals therefore had jurisdiction to entertain that appeal, and it committed no error when it denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the appeal of the respondent Municipality of Iriga and the municipal officials in CA-G.R. No. 33081-R.

• Authority of the Municipal Attorney under the Local Autonomy Act — A Municipal Attorney duly appointed in accordance with Section 3, paragraph 3(a) of Republic Act 2264 is the legal officer of the municipality and, as such, may appear in court as counsel for the municipality or for any municipal officer who is a party in a case in his official capacity. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine to uphold the validity of a notice of appeal signed by the Municipal Attorney alone, without the signature or conformity of the Provincial Fiscal, holding that the appeal was thereby perfected and that the Court of Appeals properly acquired jurisdiction.
• Implied Modification of Prior Statutes by the Local Autonomy Act — Republic Act 2264 had the effect of modifying Sections 1681, 1682 and 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code insofar as those sections may be applied to municipalities that have duly appointed Municipal Attorneys. The doctrine rests on the rule that seemingly conflicting provisions of law should be harmonized pursuant to the well-accepted rule of statutory construction, and on the principle that a later enactment will be construed to have modified an earlier one where the later law would otherwise be rendered useless and of no practical effect.
• Statutes Conferring Local Autonomy Liberally Construed — The interpretation that both the Provincial Fiscal and the Municipal Attorney can act as the legal officer and/or counsel of the municipality is an implementation of the purpose for which Republic Act 2264 was enacted, that is, to increase the powers of, and give more autonomy to, the local government. A construction that would nullify the power of the municipal council to create the office of Municipal Attorney "who shall act as legal counsel of the municipality" must be rejected, because the work of a legal counsel necessarily carries with it the duty of appearing in court in behalf of the municipality.
• Municipal Attorney as Municipal Officer — The Municipal Attorney is a municipal officer, and it is understood that his duties must be devoted to the interests of the municipality. No specific statutory proviso that he shall represent the municipality in court is necessary, because that authority inheres in the office of legal counsel of the municipality.

• "Harmonizing, then, these seemingly conflicting provisions, as We should do pursuant to well accepted rule of statutory construction, the rational interpretation that must be arrived at is that both officials, i.e., the Provincial Fiscal and the Municipal Attorney, can act as the legal officer and/or counsel of the municipality." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case: the Court reconciled the Revised Administrative Code provisions on provincial fiscal representation with Section 3, paragraph 3(a) of Republic Act 2264 by holding that both officers may serve as legal counsel of the municipality.
• "The enactment of Republic Act 2264 had the effect of modifying the provisions of Sections 1681, 1682 and 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code insofar as said sections may be applied to municipalities that have duly appointed Municipal Attorneys." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the implied modification wrought by the Local Autonomy Act, and it is the proposition for which the case is most often cited.
• "We declare, therefore, that the Municipal Attorney of a municipality, duly appointed in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 2264, is the legal officer of the municipality, and as such legal officer he may appear in court as counsel for the municipality or any municipal officer who is a party in a case in his official capacity." — This passage announces the operative rule on the authority of the Municipal Attorney to appear in court, which the Court then applied to validate the notice of appeal signed by Municipal Atty. Felix.
• "To sustain the stand of the petitioner in the instant case is to render useless and of no practical effect that provision of Republic Act 2264 which empowers the municipal council to create the office of Municipal Attorney 'who shall act as legal counsel of the municipality.'" — This passage articulates the interpretive principle that a construction nullifying a statutory grant must be avoided, and ties the ruling to the policy of local autonomy underlying Republic Act 2264.

• Municipality of Bocaue, et al. vs. Manotok, et al., G.R. No. L-6528, May 25, 1953 — Distinguished. The case was invoked by petitioner but held inapplicable because what was in issue there was the power of the municipality to employ private counsel instead of availing of the services of the Provincial Fiscal, and the facts took place before the enactment of Republic Act 2264 on June 19, 1959, when municipalities were not yet empowered to create the office of Municipal Attorney.
• Enriquez vs. Jimenez, G.R. No. L-12617, April 29, 1960 — Distinguished on the same ground. Like Bocaue, the case involved the power of the municipality to employ private counsel rather than the authority of a duly appointed Municipal Attorney, and its facts antedated the enactment of Republic Act 2264.

• Section 3, paragraph 3(a), Republic Act 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) — Authorizes municipal councils of municipalities and regularly organized municipal districts to create a legal division or office headed by an attorney-at-law appointed by the mayor with the approval of the council, known as the municipal attorney, who shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to him by the council. The Court relied on this provision as the source of the Municipal Attorney's authority to appear in court and to sign the notice of appeal on behalf of the municipality and its officials.
• Sections 1681 and 1683, Revised Administrative Code — Section 1681 makes the Provincial Fiscal the law officer of the province and requires him, consistently with other provisions of law, to represent the Government of the Philippines and the officers and branches thereof in all civil actions and special proceedings; Section 1683 provides that the Provincial Fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in the cases specified therein or unless disqualified. The Court held these provisions modified by Republic Act 2264 insofar as they apply to municipalities that have duly appointed Municipal Attorneys.
• Section 1682, Revised Administrative Code — Provides that the Provincial Fiscal is also the legal adviser of the province and provincial subdivisions. The Court included this provision among those modified by Republic Act 2264 as to municipalities with duly appointed Municipal Attorneys.
• Section 1, paragraph (b), Rule 50, Rules of Court — Invoked by petitioner as the ground for dismissal of the appeal on the theory that the notice of appeal had not been perfected. The Court rejected the premise of the invocation because the notice of appeal signed by the Municipal Attorney was valid and perfected the appeal.

Reyes, J.B.L.; Makalintal; Bengzon, J.P.; Sanchez; Angeles; and Fernando, JJ., concurred. Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, and Castro, JJ., took no part.