Calingin vs. Court of Appeals

Decisions of the Office of the President in administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials are final and executory under Section 67 of the Local Government Code of 1991; no motion for reconsideration is allowed by law, and an appeal to the Court of Appeals does not stay execution.

The dispute concerns Gov. Antonio Calingin of Misamis Oriental and the officials of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) who implemented the suspension order issued against him by the Office of the President. The statutory backdrop is the tension between the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act No. 7160), which specially governs the discipline of elective local officials, and the Administrative Code of 1987 (Book VII, Chapter 3), which generally governs administrative agencies. The COMELEC election ban, imposed under COMELEC Resolution No. 3401, prohibits the suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay officials during the election period absent prior written approval of the Commission, and it is against this regulatory backdrop that the validity of the DILG's implementation of the suspension order is assessed.

The Office of the President issued a Resolution dated March 22, 2001 in OP Case No. 00-1-9220 (DILG ADM. Case No. P-16-99), entitled Vice Governor Danilo P. Lagbas, et al. versus Governor Antonio P. Calingin (Misamis Oriental), suspending Gov. Calingin for 90 days. The Resolution had been approved and signed on March 22, 2001 by Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, by authority of the President. On the same date, the Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President filed a request to implement the suspension order, pursuant to the requirements stated in the Resolution.

On April 30, 2001, Undersecretary Eduardo R. Soliman of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, by authority of Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr., issued a Memorandum implementing the Resolution of the Office of the President. The DILG Memorandum bore the authority of the Commission on Elections, which had granted an exemption to the election ban on the movement of any public officer in its Resolution No. 3992 promulgated on April 24, 2001. That exemption was issued pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3401, Section 1(a) of which prohibited, during the election period from January 2, 2001 until July 13, 2001, any public official from making or causing any transfer or detail of any officer or employee in the civil service, or from suspending any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official, except upon prior written approval of the Commission.

On May 3, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed before the Office of the President a Motion for Reconsideration of the suspension Resolution. Four days later, on May 7, 2001, he filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals to prevent the DILG from executing the assailed suspension order. The request for the COMELEC exemption had been accompanied by the Affidavit of Complaint, Affidavit of Controversion, Reply, and Draft Resolution — the documents required by the COMELEC to substantiate such a request.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for prohibition on May 11, 2001, and denied Calingin's motion for reconsideration by Resolution issued on July 1, 2002. Hence, the present appeal by certiorari, in which Calingin asserted that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the execution of the DILG suspension order during the election period was with COMELEC authority, and in finding that the decision of the Office of the President is final and executory under Section 67, Chapter 4, of Republic Act No. 7160.

• Finality Under the Administrative Code: Petitioner contended that decisions of the Office of the President on cases where it has original jurisdiction become final and executory only after the lapse of 15 days from receipt thereof, and that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration suspends the running of that period in accordance with Section 15, Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.
• Limited Scope of Section 67, LGC: Petitioner argued that Section 67, Chapter 4 of the Local Government Code — providing that decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory — applies only to decisions of the Office of the President on administrative cases appealed from the sangguniang panlalawigan, the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities, and the sangguniang bayan of municipalities within the Metro Manila Area, and does not cover decisions on cases where the Office of the President has original jurisdiction, such as those involving a Provincial Governor.
• Invalidity of the COMELEC Exemption: Petitioner claimed that the exemption granted by COMELEC in Resolution No. 3992 was invalid for being based on a mere draft resolution, maintaining that a draft resolution does not operate as a final resolution of a case until the proper resolution is duly signed and promulgated, and that a draft cannot produce any legal effect.

• Finality and Executability of the OP Decision: Whether the decision of the Office of the President was already final and executory.
• Validity of the COMELEC Exemption: Whether the exemption from the election ban in the movement of any public officer granted by COMELEC was valid.

• Finality and Executability of the OP Decision: Yes. Decisions of the Office of the President in disciplinary cases against elective local officials are final and executory under Section 67 of the Local Government Code, which, as the special and later law, prevails over the Administrative Code of 1987; no motion for reconsideration is allowed, and appeal does not stay execution.
• Validity of the COMELEC Exemption: Yes. COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 is valid, the request having been accompanied by the documents required by COMELEC rules and the approval of the OP Resolution having preceded the promulgation of the COMELEC Resolution.

• Finality and Executability of the OP Decision: The case involves a disciplinary action against an elective local official, and the Local Government Code is the law specially intended for such a case; under the principle that where two statutes apply, the one specially intended must prevail, the LGC governs over the Administrative Code, which is of general application. The LGC of 1991 was likewise enacted much later than the Administrative Code of 1987, and all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the later law are repealed or modified accordingly. Although appeal to the Court of Appeals is granted under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, Section 12 of Rule 43, in relation to Section 68 of the LGC, provides for immediate execution pending appeal. Consistent with Lapid vs. Court of Appeals, decisions of the Office of the President under the LGC are immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which they were rendered mandated them to be so. In sum, decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory; no motion for reconsideration is allowed by law, though the parties may appeal to the Court of Appeals, and such appeal does not stay execution. The DILG Secretary may thus validly move for immediate execution.
• Validity of the COMELEC Exemption: The records show that the Resolution in OP Case No. 00-1-9220 was approved and signed on March 22, 2001 by Executive Secretary Renato de Villa by authority of the President, and that the request to implement the suspension order was filed on March 22, 2001 by the Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President pursuant to the requirements stated in the Resolution. The approval therefore preceded the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 on April 24, 2001. COMELEC Resolution No. 3529, applied by analogy and in relation to Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3401, merely requires the request to be in writing, indicating the office and place from which the officer is removed and the reason for the movement, and to be submitted together with the formal complaint executed under oath containing the specific charges and the answer thereto. The request for exemption was accompanied by the Affidavit of Complaint, Affidavit of Controversion, Reply, and Draft Resolution — the pertinent documents required by the COMELEC to substantiate the request. There being a proper basis for the grant of exemption, COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 is valid.

• Lex specialis derogat generali (special law prevails over general law) — Where two statutes apply to a particular case, the statute specially intended for that case must prevail over one of general application. The Court applied this principle in holding that the Local Government Code of 1991, which specially governs disciplinary actions against elective local officials, prevails over the Administrative Code of 1987, which governs administrative agencies generally.
• Repeal or modification by implication of an earlier general law by a later special law — In statutory construction, all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with a later law are repealed or modified accordingly. The Court relied on this rule because the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted much later than the Administrative Code of 1987, and its provisions on finality of decisions of the Office of the President therefore modified the earlier general regime.
• Finality and executability of decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code — Under Section 67, Chapter 4 of Rep. Act No. 7160, decisions of the Office of the President in administrative cases are final and executory. No motion for reconsideration is allowed by law, although the parties may appeal to the Court of Appeals; such appeal does not stay execution. The DILG Secretary may validly move for immediate execution of the decision.
• Immediate execution pending appeal in disciplinary cases against elective local officials — Section 12, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, in relation to Section 68 of the Local Government Code, provides for immediate execution pending appeal; decisions of the Office of the President under the LGC are immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which they were rendered mandated them to be so.
• Validity of COMELEC exemption from the election ban — A COMELEC exemption from the election ban on the movement or suspension of public officers is valid where the request is in writing, indicates the office and place from which the officer is removed and the reason for the movement, and is submitted together with the formal complaint executed under oath containing the specific charges and the answer thereto. The exemption is not invalidated by the fact that the request was accompanied by a Draft Resolution, where the OP Resolution itself had already been approved and signed before the COMELEC Resolution granting the exemption was promulgated.

• "In sum, the decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. No motion for reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the execution of the decision. Thus, the DILG Secretary may validly move for its immediate execution." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the first issue, consolidating the Court's holding on the finality and immediate executability of decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code.
• "Further, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted much later than the Administrative Code of 1987. In statutory construction, all laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the later law are repealed or modified accordingly." — This passage articulates the statutory-construction principle on which the Court resolved the conflict between the two statutes, and is frequently cited for the rule that a later law repeals or modifies an earlier inconsistent one.
• "In Lapid v. Court of Appeals, we held that it is a principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially intended for the said case must prevail." — This passage invokes the lex specialis principle as the controlling rule for preferring the Local Government Code over the Administrative Code in disciplinary actions against elective local officials.
• "There being a proper basis for its grant of exemption, COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 is valid." — This passage states the conclusion on the second issue, upholding the COMELEC exemption from the election ban on the ground that the required documents accompanied the request and the OP Resolution had been approved prior to the COMELEC Resolution's promulgation.

• Lapid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738 — Controlling precedent. Cited for the principle that where two statutes apply to a particular case, the one specially intended for that case must prevail, and for the holding that decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code are immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which they were rendered mandated them to be so.
• Corona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97356, September 30, 1992, 214 SCRA 378 — Cited in support of the rule that a special law prevails over a general law, applied here to prefer the Local Government Code over the Administrative Code.
• Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277 — Cited alongside Corona for the same statutory-construction principle that a special law prevails over a general law.

• Section 67, Chapter 4, Rep. Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Provides that decisions in administrative cases may be appealed to the sangguniang panlalawigan or the Office of the President, as the case may be, and that decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory. The Court applied this provision in holding that the OP Resolution suspending Gov. Calingin was final and executory, and that no motion for reconsideration was allowed by law.
• Section 68, Chapter 4, Rep. Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Provides for execution pending appeal; an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory, and the respondent shall be considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal. The Court relied on this provision, in relation to Section 12, Rule 43, to hold that the DILG Secretary could validly move for immediate execution of the suspension order.
• Section 15, Chapter 3, Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987 — Provides that the decision of an agency shall become final and executory 15 days after receipt of a copy thereof unless an administrative appeal or judicial review has been perfected within that period, and that one motion for reconsideration may be filed which shall suspend the running of the period. This was the provision invoked by petitioner but held inapplicable because the Local Government Code, as the special and later law, governs disciplinary actions against elective local officials.
• Section 1, Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court — Defines the scope of the rule, which applies to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders, or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the President. Cited to acknowledge that an appeal to the Court of Appeals is available, though it does not stay execution.
• Section 12, Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that the appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order, or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. Applied in relation to Section 68 of the LGC to justify immediate execution pending appeal.
• Section 1(a), COMELEC Resolution No. 3401 — Prohibits, during the election period from January 2, 2001 until July 13, 2001, any public official from making or causing any transfer or detail of any officer or employee in the civil service, or from suspending any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official, except upon prior written approval of the Commission. This was the election-ban provision against which the DILG Memorandum's COMELEC authority was measured.
• Section 2, COMELEC Resolution No. 3401 — Prescribes how requests for authority of the Commission are to be filed, requiring that the requests indicate the office and place to which the officer or employee is proposed to be transferred, detailed, or otherwise moved, and the reason for the transfer or detail. The Court applied this provision, in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3529, in assessing the sufficiency of the documents accompanying the request for exemption.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 3529 — Approved an addendum to Section 2 of Resolution No. 3401, requiring that any request for authority to suspend an elective city or barangay officer be submitted in writing to the Commission, together with the formal complaint containing the specific charges, executed under oath, and the answer to said complaint. Applied by analogy in relation to Section 2 of Resolution No. 3401 to validate the request for exemption.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ.