Calicdan vs. Cendana

A donation inter vivos executed by one who is not the owner of the property is void, but the deed may still serve as the legal basis for adverse possession; the donee may acquire ownership of unregistered land through extraordinary acquisitive prescription upon uninterrupted adverse possession in the concept of an owner for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

The 760-square-meter unregistered parcel in Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate on November 4, 1941, survived by his wife Fermina and their three children, petitioner Soledad and her brothers Jose and Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan. Under the Spanish Civil Code, the law in force at the time of Sixto's death, the surviving spouse held only a right of usufruct over the estate of the deceased spouse, so that any conveyance by Fermina could transmit no more than that usufructuary right. This statutory backdrop frames the dispute over whether Fermina could validly transfer the land and whether the respondent's long possession of it ripened into ownership.

The controversy centered on a 760-square-meter parcel of unregistered land in Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate on November 4, 1941. Sixto was survived by his wife Fermina and three children — petitioner Soledad Calicdan and her brothers Jose and Benigno — all surnamed Calicdan. Petitioner Soledad was later placed under guardianship, and her affairs were handled by her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo.

On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos conveying the land to respondent Silverio Cendana. Cendana immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around it, and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime in 1949, residing in that house until his death in 1998. He cultivated the land and reaped its fruits, declared the property for taxation purposes, and religiously paid the realty taxes thereon; Guadalupe's father served as his contractor in building the house.

On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages against the respondent. She alleged that the donation was void, that the respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land, and that she merely tolerated his possession of the land and the construction of his house thereon. In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, Cendana set up affirmative defenses: that the land had been donated to him by Fermina in 1947; that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years; and that the complaint was barred by a prior judgment in the special proceedings for the Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan, in which the court had decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of the petitioner's properties.

At trial, the respondent admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge of how Sixto Calicdan had acquired the property, testifying that, to his knowledge and information, Sixto had bought it from a cousin, Flaviano or Felomino Bautista, but conceding that he had no actual personal knowledge of the transaction because he had not yet been born when the purchase supposedly occurred, and that he had seen no document evidencing such a purchase. The trial court found the donation void because Fermina was not the owner of the land, which had been inherited by Sixto from his parents and was therefore not part of the spouses' conjugal property; it held that the respondent, deriving his rights from Fermina, acquired only the right of usufruct. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, found the donation valid and held that petitioner had lost her ownership by prescription.

• Void Donation: Petitioner alleged that the donation inter vivos executed by Fermina in favor of the respondent was void, and that the respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land.
• Mere Tolerance: Petitioner maintained that she merely tolerated the respondent's possession of the land as well as the construction of his house thereon, negating any adverse character in his occupation of the property.

• Valid Donation and Long Possession: Respondent alleged, by way of affirmative defenses, that the land was donated to him by Fermina in 1947 and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years.
• Bar by Prior Judgment: Respondent argued that the complaint was barred by prior judgment in the special proceedings for the Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan, where the court decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of the petitioner's properties.

• Validity of the Donation: Whether the donation inter vivos executed by Fermina in favor of the respondent is valid.
• Loss of Ownership by Prescription: Whether petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription.

• Validity of the Donation: No. The donation is void, Fermina not having been the owner of the land, which was inherited by Sixto from his parents and was not conjugal property; under the Spanish Civil Code, the surviving spouse had only a right of usufruct over the deceased spouse's estate, so the respondent acquired only that usufruct.
• Loss of Ownership by Prescription: Yes. Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, the respondent became the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription, his adverse possession having exceeded the 30-year period required without need of title or of good faith.

• Validity of the Donation: The trial court found the donation void because Fermina was not the owner of the land, which had been inherited by Sixto from his parents and was therefore not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina. Under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse; consequently, the respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina, acquired only the right of usufruct, the sole right the latter could convey. The Court of Appeals' contrary ruling that the donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof. The respondent himself admitted during cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge of whether Sixto had in fact purchased the subject land from Felomino Bautista, his testimony being based on information only because he had not yet been born when the supposed purchase took place. Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge; hearsay evidence — what the witness has heard from others — is inadmissible and without evidentiary weight. The Court of Appeals thus erred in relying on the respondent's bare hearsay testimony as evidence bearing on the donation made by Fermina.
• Loss of Ownership by Prescription: Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, the respondent became the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property, concerned with the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary: ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years, while extraordinary prescription acquires ownership and other real rights over immovable property through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of title or of good faith. Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing was received was the owner and could transmit ownership, while there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Assuming arguendo that ordinary acquisitive prescription was unavailing because it demands possession in good faith and with just title, and no evidence on record proved the respondent's good faith, his adverse possession of the land for more than 45 years nonetheless met the requirements for extraordinary acquisitive prescription. The subject land is unregistered; when the petitioner filed the case on June 29, 1992, the respondent had been in possession for 45 years counted from the donation in 1947, more than the required 30 years of uninterrupted adverse possession without just title and good faith. Such possession was public, adverse, and in the concept of an owner: the respondent fenced the land and built his house in 1949, with Guadalupe's father as his contractor; his act of cultivating and reaping the fruits of the land was manifest and visible to all; and he declared the land for taxation purposes and religiously paid the realty taxes thereon. Together with his actual possession, these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied by him, for although tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, since no one in his right mind would pay taxes for property not in his actual or constructive possession. Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been executed by one who was not the owner of the property donated, may still be used to show the exclusive and adverse character of the respondent's possession, a private document of donation with clear and convincing evidence of possession serving as a basis for a claim of ownership, and a donation ineffective as a transfer of title still being a circumstance that may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession.

• Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription — Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. The possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the respondent, having possessed the unregistered land for 45 years counted from the 1947 donation to the filing of the complaint in 1992, acquired ownership notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation and the absence of proof of good faith.
• Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription — Requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing was received was the owner thereof and could transmit his ownership; there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. The Court assumed arguendo that ordinary prescription was unavailing for lack of evidence of the respondent's good faith, but found extraordinary prescription satisfied.
• Void Donation as Basis for Adverse Possession — A donation that is void because executed by one who is not the owner of the property donated may still be used to show the exclusive and adverse character of the donee's possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, a private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of ownership, and a donation ineffective as a transfer of title is still a circumstance that may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession.
• Tax Declarations as Indicia of Possession — Although tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property, and the voluntary declaration of a property for taxation purposes manifests the declarant's desire to obtain title and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties.
• Hearsay Rule — Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, that is, those derived from his own perception; otherwise, the testimony is hearsay. Hearsay evidence is evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others, and it is inadmissible and without evidentiary weight. The Court applied this rule to reject the respondent's testimony regarding how Sixto acquired the land.

• "Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that respondent has become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription." — This states the ratio decidendi of the decision: the invalidity of the donation did not defeat the respondent's claim, because ownership was acquired independently through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
• "In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years without need of title or of good faith." — This is the canonical formulation of the requisites of extraordinary acquisitive prescription applied by the Court.
• "Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been executed by one who was not the owner of the property donated, may still be used to show the exclusive and adverse character of respondents possession." — This defines the doctrine that a void donation may nonetheless serve as a legal basis for adverse possession.
• "Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession." — This is the frequently cited formulation of the evidentiary weight of tax declarations as proof of possession in the concept of an owner.

• People vs. Guittap, G.R. No. 144621, May 9, 2003 — Cited for the hearsay rule under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, that a witness can testify only to facts known of his own personal knowledge, and that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence; applied to reject the respondent's testimony on how Sixto acquired the land.
• Heirs of Simplicio Santiago vs. Heirs of Mariano Santiago, G.R. No. 151440, June 17, 2003 — Cited for the rule that tax declarations or realty tax payments, though not conclusive evidence of ownership, are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner and constitute at least proof of a claim of title.
• Heirs of Segunda Maningding vs. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 567, 574-575 [1997] — Cited for the rule that even assuming a donation propter nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession, and that a private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of ownership with clear and convincing evidence of possession.
• Pensader vs. Pensader — Cited within the Maningding excerpt for the rule that a verbal donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession is not effective as a transfer of title, but is still a circumstance that may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession.
• Gesmundo vs. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1099, 1107 [1999] — Cited for the definition of prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
• Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 354, 362 [1999] — Cited in connection with the requirement of good faith and just title for ordinary acquisitive prescription.
• Tugade vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120874, July 31, 2003 — Cited for the rule that the Court's jurisdiction in cases brought from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law, the appellate court's findings of fact being deemed conclusive.
• China Airlines, LTD. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129988, July 14, 2003 — Cited for the exceptions to the rule that the Court of Appeals' findings of fact are conclusive, including the exception of conflicting factual findings of the trial and appellate courts, which constrained the Court to review the facts.

• Article 1127, New Civil Code — Defines good faith of the possessor as consisting in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof and could transmit his ownership; cited in the discussion of ordinary acquisitive prescription.
• Article 1129, New Civil Code — Defines just title for purposes of prescription as existing when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right; cited in the discussion of ordinary acquisitive prescription.
• Rule 130, Section 36, Rules of Court — Provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, that is, those derived from his own perception; applied to reject the respondent's hearsay testimony regarding how Sixto Calicdan acquired the land.
• Spanish Civil Code — The law applicable when Sixto Calicdan died in 1941; under it, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse, so that Fermina could convey only the right of usufruct and not ownership.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concurred. Azcuna, J., was on official leave.