Calderon vs. Roxas and Court of Appeals

Orders granting, denying, or modifying support pendente lite are interlocutory and not appealable; the proper remedy against such orders is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 if rendered with grave abuse of discretion. The interlocutory character persists even if arrearages have accrued, because the order remains an incident to the main action and does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.

Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and Jose Antonio F. Roxas married on December 4, 1985 and had four children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an amended complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. While the main case was pending, the trial court granted petitioner’s application for support pendente lite, ordering private respondent to pay a fixed monthly amount for the children plus a share of school expenses. That support order, and subsequent orders, were challenged and eventually reinstated by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 139337. Years later, the trial court issued the assailed orders reducing support and denying petitioner’s claims for additional support and arrearages. Petitioner sought to appeal those incidental orders separately from the final decision in the nullity case.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioner filed an amended complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. During the pendency of the case, she applied for and obtained an order for support pendente lite.

• The 1998 Support Pendente Lite Order: On May 19, 1998, the RTC ordered private respondent to contribute ₱42,292.50 per month for the children’s support effective May 1, 1998, plus 50% of school tuition fees and a 50% share in expenses for books and supplies. The order was provisionally reinstated by the Supreme Court in an earlier case (G.R. No. 139337) after having been set aside on procedural grounds.

• Motions to Modify Support: On February 11, 2003, private respondent moved to reduce the monthly support, asserting that his salary as a city councilor was only ₱20,800 and that he had been faithfully meeting the children’s needs. Petitioner opposed the reduction and filed her own motions seeking spousal support, an increase in the children’s monthly support, and recovery of support‑in‑arrears from the time the original order became effective.

• The Assailed RTC Orders: After hearing, the trial court issued an Order on March 7, 2005, granting the reduction and denying petitioner’s motions. The court relied on findings that: the eldest child was a Sangguniang Kabataan chairman with a monthly salary; the children stayed with respondent on weekends; respondent had no income beyond his councilor’s salary and benefits; he presented voluminous receipts, checks, and testimony proving substantial compliance with his support obligation; both spouses were medical doctors and petitioner failed to prove she was not gainfully employed; petitioner was unrebuttedly already in the United States; and her claim for arrearages was unsubstantiated while respondent had over‑paid in other aspects. Petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration was denied on May 4, 2005.

• Final Decision on the Main Case: On May 16, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring the marriage void, awarding custody of the minor children to petitioner, dissolving the community or conjugal property, and ordering respondent to pay child support of ₱30,000 per month plus school‑related expenses. That Decision became final, no appeal having been taken by any party.

• Appeal to the Court of Appeals: Petitioner appealed only the March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 Orders, arguing that the portion dealing with support‑in‑arrears had ceased to be provisional and had become a final order because the accrued amounts were already due and demandable. The CA dismissed the appeal, holding that the orders were interlocutory and that granting the appeal would disturb the final and executory Decision of May 16, 2005.

• Final Character of the Arrearages Ruling: Petitioner argued that while the prospective modification of support and denial of spousal support might be interlocutory, the trial court’s adjudication of support‑in‑arrears and her prayer for reimbursement under the May 19, 1998 Order were final in nature. She maintained that once the accrued amounts became due and demandable, the orders directing payment ceased to be provisional and constituted a final disposition of a particular matter, thereby becoming appealable under Rule 41.

• Error in Dismissing the Appeal: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error—amounting to grave abuse of discretion—when it dismissed the appeal outright instead of deciding it on the merits, because the assailed orders had partially disposed of a severable monetary claim with finality.

• Interlocutory Nature of the Orders: Private respondent maintained that the March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 Orders were interlocutory, as they merely resolved an incidental motion for support pendente lite during the pendency of the main action for nullity of marriage, and did not completely dispose of the case or any distinct stage thereof. Consequently, the orders were not subject to an ordinary appeal, and the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal.

• Appealability: Whether the RTC Orders dated March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005—granting a reduction of support pendente lite and denying claims for spousal support, increase of support, and support‑in‑arrears—are interlocutory orders not subject to an ordinary appeal, or final orders appealable under Rule 41.

• Appealability: The assailed orders are interlocutory and cannot be appealed. An order is final when it completely disposes of the case, leaving nothing more for the court to do; it is interlocutory when it decides some incidental point or matter but does not terminate the proceedings. The March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 Orders resolved provisional motions for support pendente lite while the main action for nullity of marriage remained pending; they did not adjudicate the merits of the nullity case or finally determine the parties’ substantive rights. The provisional nature of support pendente lite—a temporary measure ancillary to the principal action—was not altered by the existence of arrearages, because the obligation may be enforced through contempt and the order itself remained subject to modification as the action progressed. Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order; the exclusive remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 if the order is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Because petitioner resorted to an ordinary appeal rather than the proper remedy, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal.

• Distinction between final and interlocutory orders — A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of the case, leaving nothing more to be done by the court, such as an adjudication on the merits declaring categorically the rights and obligations of the parties. An interlocutory order does not finally dispose of the case; it resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to adjudicate the merits. The Court relied on this distinction to classify the support pendente lite orders as interlocutory.

• Provisional nature of support pendente lite — Support pendente lite is a provisional remedy that is ancillary to the main action. It is a temporary measure available during the pendency of the case to preserve the rights of the parties and is dependent upon the outcome of the principal action. Its interlocutory character is not affected by the accrual of arrearages or noncompliance, which may be addressed through contempt or other enforcement mechanisms, but does not convert the order into a final adjudication.

• Remedy against interlocutory orders — As expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an interlocutory order is not appealable. The proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, provided the order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. An ordinary appeal taken from an interlocutory order must be dismissed.

• “The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.” — The Court adopted this formulation to elucidate why the assailed support orders, resolving an incident during the pendency of the nullity suit, were not final.

• “Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action.” — This passage, taken from Florenz D. Regalado’s Remedial Law Compendium, anchored the Court’s conclusion that support pendente lite orders are inherently interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a separate appeal.

• Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L‑60036, January 27, 1987, 147 SCRA 334 — Followed as the controlling source of the distinction between final and interlocutory orders; the Court reproduced its detailed definition to resolve the nature of the assailed orders.

• United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Ros, G.R. No. 171532, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 334, citing Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576‑99, December 13, 2004 — Cited for the definition of “interlocutory” as a matter intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit.

• Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 152375, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 152 — Used to further illustrate the definition of a final judgment or order that completely disposes of the action.

• Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139337, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 207 — The earlier Supreme Court decision that reinstated the support pendente lite orders and allowed the trial court to proceed with Civil Case No. 97‑0608.

• Section 1, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Enumerates the subjects of appeal and expressly excludes interlocutory orders from the scope of an ordinary appeal. The Court applied this provision in concluding that the petitioner’s appeal was impermissible and was correctly dismissed.

• Rule 61, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, which may be applied for at the commencement of the action or at any time prior to judgment. The rule underscores the provisional, interim nature of the relief.

• A.M. No. 02‑11‑12‑SC (Rule on Provisional Orders) — Promulgated on March 4, 2003, it provides for the issuance of provisional orders — including spousal support, child support, and related incidents — during the pendency of cases for declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage, and legal separation. The rule further confirms that such orders are interlocutory.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chairperson), Justice Teresita J. Leonardo‑De Castro, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, and Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes concurred.

None.