Calderon vs. Carale

Congress may not, by statute, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments for presidential appointments to offices not enumerated in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Such a legislative requirement unconstitutionally amends the specific and limited grant of confirmation power to the CA and infringes on the President's appointing power as delineated by the Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution, in Section 16 of Article VII, delineates the President's appointing power and specifies which appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (CA). In 1989, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6715, which amended the Labor Code. Its Section 13 provided that the Chairman and Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) "shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments." President Corazon C. Aquino subsequently appointed the respondents as NLRC Chairman and Commissioners without submitting their nominations to the CA for confirmation. Petitioner Peter John D. Calderon filed a petition for prohibition, challenging the validity of these appointments for non-compliance with the confirmation requirement of R.A. 6715.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition seeking to nullify the permanent appointments of the respondent NLRC Chairman and Commissioners for having been made without submission to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, as allegedly required by R.A. 6715.
• The Legislative Enactment: Republic Act No. 6715, approved in March 1989, amended Article 215 of the Labor Code. The new provision stated: "The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments."
• The Appointments: Pursuant to R.A. 6715, President Aquino appointed the respondents as Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC. The appointments were permanent and did not undergo CA confirmation.
• Petitioner's Core Claim: Petitioner argued that the appointments were invalid for failing to comply with the mandatory confirmation requirement of R.A. 6715, a law carrying the presumption of constitutionality.
• Respondents' Defense: The Solicitor General, representing respondents, contended that R.A. 6715's confirmation requirement was itself unconstitutional, as it transgressed the explicit and limited list of offices subject to CA confirmation under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, as previously interpreted by the Court.

• Statutory Mandate and Presumption of Constitutionality: Petitioner argued that R.A. 6715 must be complied with, as it enjoys a strong presumption of validity. The law is not an encroachment on executive power because Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers in the President alone or, by implication, subject such appointments to CA confirmation.
• Distinguishing Prior Precedent: Petitioner maintained that the rulings in Sarmiento III v. Mison and Bautista v. Salonga were not decisive, as those cases did not involve a situation where Congress had passed a specific law requiring confirmation for a particular set of appointees.

• Constitutional Transgression: The Solicitor General countered that R.A. 6715's confirmation requirement unconstitutionally expanded the CA's power of confirmation beyond the exhaustive list provided in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII.
• Framers' Intent and Prior Jurisprudence: Respondent argued that the 1987 Constitution deliberately narrowed the scope of CA confirmation compared to the 1935 Constitution. The Court's rulings in Mison and Bautista had definitively settled that confirmation is required only for the officers enumerated in the first sentence of Section 16, and that officers appointed under the second sentence (like the NLRC officials) are expressly excluded from that requirement.
• Separation of Powers: It was contended that allowing Congress to legislatively add to the list of offices requiring CA confirmation would usurp the judicial function of interpreting the Constitution and upset the separation of powers.

• Constitutionality of Legislative Expansion: Whether Congress may, by law (R.A. 6715), require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments for appointments to the National Labor Relations Commission, which are not among those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

• Constitutionality of Legislative Expansion: The provision in R.A. 6715 requiring CA confirmation for NLRC appointments is unconstitutional. The Court adhered to its established interpretation from Mison and Bautista that Section 16, Article VII provides an exclusive list of offices subject to CA confirmation. The NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall under the second sentence of Section 16 as officers "whom [the President] may be authorized by law to appoint," and thus do not require confirmation. To the extent R.A. 6715 imposes a confirmation requirement, it impermissibly amends the Constitution by adding to the list in the first sentence and by imposing a condition on appointments the Constitution entrusts solely to the President. The legislature cannot, through statutory enactment, alter the meaning of a constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted it.

• Exclusive Enumeration Doctrine for CA Confirmation — Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm presidential appointments is limited to the specific officers enumerated in the first sentence of that provision. This list is exclusive. Congress cannot, by ordinary legislation, expand this list to include other officers, such as the heads of bureaus or officers appointed under the second sentence of the same section. The Court applied this doctrine to invalidate the confirmation requirement for NLRC appointments imposed by R.A. 6715.
• Separation of Powers in Constitutional Interpretation — The power to interpret the Constitution is vested in the judiciary. Once the Supreme Court has placed a judicial interpretation upon a constitutional provision, that interpretation becomes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed. The legislature cannot enact a law that effectively reverses or modifies that judicial interpretation, as doing so would usurp a judicial function and cause instability in the legal system.

• "The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of members of Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicial or legislative but constitutional." — This passage underscores the Court's view that dissatisfaction with the constitutional design must be addressed through constitutional amendment, not through legislative or judicial action that alters the text's meaning.
• "If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertained its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions." — This excerpt from the Endencia case, cited by the Court, articulates the core separation-of-powers rationale for prohibiting legislative overruling of judicial constitutional interpretation.

• Sarmiento III v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987 (156 SCRA 549) — Controlling precedent. The Court established the foundational interpretation of Section 16, Article VII, categorizing presidential appointees into four groups and ruling that only the first group (enumerated in the first sentence) requires CA confirmation.
• Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989 (172 SCRA 160) — Followed and applied the Mison doctrine. The Court held that the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, not being in the first-sentence group, did not require CA confirmation.
• Endencia and Jugo v. David, G.R. Nos. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953 (93 Phil. 699) — Cited for the principle that the legislature cannot usurp the judicial function of interpreting the law or the Constitution, particularly after the courts have rendered an interpretation.

• Section 16, Article VII, 1987 Constitution — The central constitutional provision. It grants the President the appointing power and specifies that only certain enumerated officers (heads of executive departments, ambassadors, etc., and officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution) require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The Court held that this enumeration is exclusive.
• Article 215, Labor Code (as amended by Section 13, R.A. 6715) — The statutory provision declared unconstitutional. It required that the appointment of the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners be "subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments."

Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justice Irene R. Cortes, Justice Edgardo L. Paras, Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino (Ponente), Justice Leo D. Medialdea, Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Justice Davide, Jr., Justice Jose C. Romero, Jr., Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, Justice Jorge S. Imperial, Justice Jose A.R. Melo, Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, and Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino. Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento took no part.

• Justice Isagani A. Cruz — Dissented based on his earlier dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison. He believed the majority interpretation was erroneous and should be re-examined rather than perpetuated merely on the basis of judicial precedent. He maintained that the framers could not have intended the restrictive interpretation adopted by the Court.