Calderon-Bargas vs. RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 162

The filing of a complaint with the fiscal's office interrupts the one-year prescriptive period for libel under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, and a criminal case may be dismissed with prejudice where the prosecution unreasonably fails to prosecute, violating the accused's right to speedy trial, even though denial of speedy trial is not a ground for a motion to quash.

Raul Locsin was the editor and publisher of Business Day, while Leticia Locsin and Salvador Lacson were its managing editor and columnist, respectively. Bennett Ll. Thelmo was the person allegedly defamed in Lacson's column. Adelina Calderon-Bargas was the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal connected with the criminal proceedings. Libel is subject to a one-year prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, with Article 91 governing computation and interruption.

On 7 April 1987, Salvador Lacson published in Business Day an article entitled "Insurance Monopoly," which allegedly contained defamatory statements against Bennett Ll. Thelmo and maliciously tried to make it appear that Thelmo was a grafter and bribe-giver. On 10 April 1987, Thelmo filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, and the case was assigned to Assistant Prosecutor Celestino Simon, Jr. for preliminary investigation. On 8 February 1988, the prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of three separate criminal cases for libel against the three private respondents. On 23 May 1988, the corresponding informations were filed and assigned to the RTC.

On 18 October 1988, Salvador Lacson filed a motion to quash on the ground of prescription. The then trial fiscal, Simon, Jr., was furnished a copy of the motion. On 19 October 1988, the motion was set for hearing, and the public prosecutor was given 15 days within which to file an opposition. The prosecution asked for several extensions of time to submit its comment or opposition but failed to comply.

More than two years lapsed before the RTC resolved the motion. The private prosecutor for petitioner-complainant explained that the failure to file comment on the motion to quash was due to the fact that no copy of the motion was furnished petitioner-complainant Thelmo; a copy was given only to the public prosecutor who originally handled the case; and the RTC could have resolved the motion even without the prosecution's comment and could have declared that the prosecution had waived the right to file comment. The RTC rejected this explanation, finding that the trial fiscal, Simon, Jr., had been furnished a copy of the motion; that notice to the fiscal, who had direct control and supervision of the case, was notice to the private prosecutor; and that the private prosecutor had the burden to follow up the status of the case.

In its assailed order, the RTC observed that the cases had been pending for four years since the filing of the informations in 1988, that the preliminary investigation took more than one year to terminate, and that it waited for two years for the prosecution's comment on the motion to quash but to no avail. The prosecution failed to file comment despite service on the trial fiscal and the RTC's order, despite several extensions, and more than two years lapsed before the RTC resolved the motion.

• Notice of Motion to Quash: The private prosecutor for petitioner-complainant argued that the failure to file comment on the motion to quash was due to the fact that no copy of the motion was furnished petitioner-complainant Thelmo, and that a copy was given only to the public prosecutor who originally handled the case.
• Waiver and Court's Authority: The private prosecutor argued that the RTC could have resolved the motion even without the prosecution's comment and could have declared that the prosecution had waived the right to file comment.

• Prescription: Respondent Salvador Lacson filed a motion to quash on the ground of prescription.
• Lack of Interest: The private respondents opposed petitioner-complainant's motion for reconsideration, arguing that the prosecution's failure to file comment on the motion despite due notice and order of the RTC was tantamount to lack of interest on the part of the fiscal to prosecute the offense charged.

• Prescription: Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the libel cases had prescribed despite the filing of the affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
• Speedy Trial: Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the informations on the ground of violation of the private respondents' right to speedy trial.
• Propriety of Motion to Quash: Whether a motion to quash is the proper remedy for a denial of the right to speedy trial.

• Prescription: No. The filing of the affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on 10 April 1987 interrupted the one-year prescriptive period under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, so the informations filed in May 1988 were not barred.
• Speedy Trial: Yes. The prosecution failed to prosecute the cases for an unreasonable length of time, violating the private respondents' right to speedy trial; dismissal was proper.
• Propriety of Motion to Quash: No. Denial of the right to speedy trial is not a ground for a motion to quash under Section 3, Rule 117; the proper remedy is a motion to dismiss, though the cases were properly dismissable.

• Prescription: Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code sets a one-year prescriptive period for libel. Article 91 provides that the period of prescription commences from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The alleged libelous article was published on 7 April 1987, and the affidavit-complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on 10 April 1987, three days after publication. Under Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the filing of a complaint in the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. The running of the prescriptive period was therefore interrupted on 10 April 1987, and the RTC's ruling that the libel had prescribed when the informations were filed in May 1988 was wrong.
• Speedy Trial: Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure gives the accused the right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial. A denial of this right entitles the accused to dismissal upon filing the appropriate motion, and the dismissal operates as an acquittal. The SC cited People vs. Quizada for the rule that double jeopardy attaches even if the motion to dismiss is made by the accused when the ground is insufficiency of the evidence or when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to speedy trial. Bermisa vs. Court of Appeals held that the right is denied where the vacillation and procrastination of prosecuting officers force the accused to wait many months or years for trial, while Domingo vs. Minister of National Defense held that non-observance of the constitutional mandate can result in the loss of the right of the government to prosecute and that dismissal on that ground amounts to an acquittal. Here, the motion to quash was filed on 18 October 1988, and the public prosecutor was given 15 days to file an opposition. The prosecution asked for several extensions but never filed its comment. More than two years lapsed before the RTC resolved the motion. The fiscal, who under Section 5, Rule 110 is responsible for the direction and control of the cases, failed in that task. Notice to the fiscal is notice to the private prosecutor, and it was enough that the trial fiscal was furnished a copy of the motion and ordered to comment. The prosecution's failure to file comment for more than two years was an unreasonable delay, and the dismissal of the cases on the ground of violation of the right to speedy trial was proper.
• Propriety of Motion to Quash: Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lists the grounds for a motion to quash, and denial of the right to speedy trial is not one of them. The proper remedy for that denial is a motion to dismiss. The RTC's grant of the motion to quash was therefore not strictly proper, but the cases were properly dismissable on the ground of the prosecution's failure to prosecute, which denied the private respondents their right to speedy trial.

• Interruption of Prescription by Filing Complaint with Fiscal's Office — Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and a complaint filed in the fiscal's office interrupts the period. The SC applied this to hold that the libel charge had not prescribed because the affidavit-complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on 10 April 1987, three days after the 7 April 1987 publication.
• Right to Speedy Trial and Dismissal for Unreasonable Delay — A denial of the accused's right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial entitles the accused to dismissal upon filing the appropriate motion, and the dismissal operates as an acquittal. The SC applied this where the prosecution failed to file comment on the motion to quash for more than two years despite several extensions and the RTC's order, finding unreasonable delay.
• Double Jeopardy from Dismissal for Speedy Trial Violation — Double jeopardy attaches even if the motion to dismiss is made by the accused when the ground is insufficiency of the evidence or when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to speedy trial. The SC cited Quizada and Domingo in support of the dismissal as an acquittal.
• Motion to Quash vs. Motion to Dismiss for Speedy Trial Violation — Denial of the right to speedy trial is not a ground for a motion to quash under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure; the proper remedy is a motion to dismiss. The SC applied this by holding that the RTC's quashal was not strictly proper, but the cases were properly dismissable on the ground of failure to prosecute.
• Notice to Fiscal as Notice to Private Prosecutor — Notice to the fiscal, who has direct control and supervision of the criminal case, is notice to the private prosecutor; no law requires that counsel for the private complainant be furnished a copy of a motion to quash as a matter of course. The SC applied this to reject the private prosecutor's excuse that Thelmo was not furnished a copy of the motion to quash.
• Prosecution's Duty of Direction and Control — Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the fiscal is responsible for the direction and control of criminal cases. The SC applied this to fault the fiscal for failing to file the required comment and for the unreasonable delay in prosecution.

• "the filing of a complaint in the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription." — The SC applied Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code to hold that the libel charge had not prescribed because the affidavit-complaint was filed with the prosecutor three days after publication.
• "There are only two occasions when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismiss the case is made by the accused himself. The first is when the ground is insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution, and the second is when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to a speedy trial." — The SC cited this rule to explain that dismissal for unreasonable delay operates as an acquittal.
• "the motion to quash the informations was not strictly the proper remedy, because a denial of the right to speedy trial is not one of the grounds (Sec. 3 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure) upon which a motion to quash a complaint or information may be grounded." — The SC held that the proper remedy for denial of the right to speedy trial is a motion to dismiss, though the cases were properly dismissable.
• "it is enough that the trial fiscal was furnished a copy of the motion to quash and the prosecution ordered to comment thereon." — The SC rejected the private prosecutor's excuse that Thelmo was not furnished a copy of the motion to quash.

• Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45674, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 538 — Controlling precedent; held that the filing of a complaint in the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription.
• People vs. Quizada, G.R. Nos. 61079-81, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 516 — Cited for the rule that double jeopardy attaches when proceedings are unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to speedy trial.
• Bermisa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-32506, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 136 — Cited for the rule that the right to speedy trial is denied where the vacillation and procrastination of prosecuting officers force the accused to wait many months or years for trial.
• Domingo vs. Minister of National Defense, G.R. No. 55212, September 2, 1983, En Banc, 124 SCRA 529 — Cited for the rule that non-observance of the right to speedy trial can result in the loss of the right to prosecute and that dismissal on that ground amounts to an acquittal.
• People vs. Baladjay, G.R. Nos. L-26915-18, March 30, 1982, 113 SCRA 284 — Cited in footnote as supporting authority on the right to speedy trial and dismissal.
• Esmena vs. Pogoy, G.R. No. 54110, February 20, 1981, 102 SCRA 861 — Cited in footnote as supporting authority on the right to speedy trial and dismissal.

• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides the one-year prescriptive period for libel; the RTC invoked it, and the SC considered it in the prescription analysis.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the period of prescription commences from discovery and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information; the SC applied it to hold that the affidavit-complaint filed with the prosecutor on 10 April 1987 interrupted the period.
• Section 1(h), Rule 115, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Grants the accused the right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial; the SC applied it to hold that the prosecution's unreasonable delay entitled the private respondents to dismissal.
• Section 3, Rule 117, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Lists the grounds for a motion to quash; the SC applied it to hold that denial of the right to speedy trial is not a ground for a motion to quash.
• Section 5, Rule 110, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Makes the fiscal responsible for the direction and control of criminal cases; the SC applied it to fault the fiscal for failing to prosecute.
• Section 3, Rule 17, Rules of Court — Provides for dismissal of a civil action for failure to prosecute or comply with court orders; the SC cited it by analogy in discussing dismissal for failure to prosecute.