Calayag vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.

A judge may be compelled to inhibit from a case when clear and convincing evidence shows bias and prejudice, or when the judge’s evidentiary lapses, demeaning remarks, and continued acts after a higher court’s recusal order demonstrate evident partiality; an order issued in defiance of that recusal directive is null and void for grave abuse of discretion.

Celerna Calayag and other petitioners are survivors of victims of the ill-fated M/V Princess of the Stars, which sank on June 20, 2008. The underlying litigation consisted of 71 consolidated civil damages cases against Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (now known as Philippine Span Asia Carrier Corporation) and its owners, officers, ship captain, and ship master, pending before Judge Daniel C. Villanueva of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila. The controversy concerns the disqualification and inhibition of judges under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and the extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65.

Celerna Calayag and the other petitioners are survivors of the victims of the M/V Princess of the Stars, which sank on June 20, 2008. They filed 71 consolidated civil damages cases against Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (now known as Philippine Span Asia Carrier Corporation) and its owners, officers, ship captain, and ship master. The cases were assigned to Judge Daniel C. Villanueva, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila.

During the trial, Sulpicio and its co-defendants came to suspect that Judge Villanueva was exhibiting bias in favor of petitioners. They filed separate motions for his inhibition, citing specific charges: he allowed witness Sosan Lisbo to testify on actual damages even though the Complaint contained no claim for such damages; he allowed the presentation of a mere photocopy of a circular relating to the PISA minutes meeting of shipowners despite a timely objection based on the Judicial Affidavit Rule’s requirement that originals be attached, and declared that the Best Evidence Rule had no application before his court; he admitted opinion testimony from an ordinary witness during the April 11, 2014 hearing over objection that the questions in Celerna Calayag’s judicial affidavit were speculative as to the number of years her missing relative would have lived; he showed manifest partiality by actively participating during cross-examination, questioning the credibility of petitioners’ witness and making objections for petitioners, and by disallowing cross-examination to test the witness’s credibility, allegedly saying “don’t use that test of credibility here in Branch 49”; he prejudged the case by referring to Sulpicio’s alleged “notoriety” in light of past maritime mishaps; and he showed hostility toward Sulpicio’s counsel by referring to Atty. Dante Vargas as a mere “saling-pusa.” Petitioners opposed the motions.

On September 2, 2014, Judge Villanueva denied the motions for inhibition. He reasoned that the perceived errors and his use of the words “saling pusa” and/or “kibitzer” against the counsel of Sulpicio’s co-defendants were taken out of context, and that his rulings were simply meant to prevent delay. He opined that the many instances when counsel for the movants questioned his actuations were a deliberate attempt to obfuscate the issues, and that their numerous objections amounted to clear nitpicking. Sulpicio sought reconsideration, but its motion was denied.

Sulpicio then initiated certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals, alleging that Judge Villanueva committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recuse himself. In its petition dated November 6, 2014, Sulpicio was no longer joined by its co-defendants. On September 18, 2015, while the petition before the CA was pending, Judge Villanueva handed down his Decision ordering Sulpicio and its co-defendants, jointly and severally, to pay damages to petitioners. Sulpicio filed its notice of appeal. On September 21, 2015, three days after the RTC decision, the CA promulgated its assailed decision granting the petition for certiorari and directing Judge Villanueva to recuse himself. The CA faulted the presiding judge for allowing an ordinary witness to provide testimony of his own opinion in violation of the Judicial Affidavit Rule; this, coupled with his remarks in open court, cast doubt on his impartiality.

Petitioners filed a Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation. Sulpicio, for its part, sought to have Judge Villanueva cited for contempt for proceeding with the hearing and deciding the main case while certiorari proceedings in the CA were ongoing, and prayed for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent execution of the RTC Decision dated September 18, 2015. On December 18, 2015, the CA issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration as moot and academic, explaining that the decision on the merits by Judge Villanueva rendered the inhibition proceedings moot. The CA saw no reason to cite Judge Villanueva for contempt because he had no reason not to proceed with the case and decide it on its merits while certiorari proceedings were pending; the remedy of Sulpicio was to appeal the judgment on the merits and incorporate therein the improprieties committed during trial. The CA also found no need for a TRO or injunction because it had already ordered Judge Villanueva to cease from further performing acts relative to the civil cases, and it ordered him anew to recuse himself and forward the records to the Executive Judge for re-raffle.

Despite the CA’s orders, Judge Villanueva, on May 11, 2016, granted petitioners’ motion for execution pending appeal. The records showed that Executive Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra had directed him on January 12, 2016 to transmit the records of the case for re-raffle, but he failed to heed this directive. In resolving the motion for execution pending appeal, Judge Villanueva opined that while he was “not prepared to state at this time that whatever appeal that may be made by Sulpicio and co-defendants should automatically be characterized as frivolous and manifestly dilatory yet it would seem that a party that has no evidence on record could hardly expect to prevail in the appellate courts.” The Supreme Court subsequently issued a TRO dated June 22, 2016 to stay the implementation of the writ of execution pending appeal insofar as the grant of actual damages was concerned.

• Procedural Defects in Sulpicio’s CA Petition: Petitioners contended that the CA erred in not dismissing Sulpicio’s petition for certiorari because it failed to attach the pertinent transcripts of stenographic notes of the hearings before the trial court and petitioners’ comment on the motion for inhibition, in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
• Voluntary Inhibition under Rule 137: Petitioners questioned the CA decision overturning Judge Villanueva’s prerogative not to voluntarily inhibit from the case, arguing that it violated Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
• No Sufficient Grounds for Inhibition: Petitioners maintained that the CA ruling ordering Judge Villanueva’s inhibition was not warranted because his acts and remarks were merely manifestations of displeasure with the acts of the defendants’ lawyers, which he characterized as dilatory schemes.
• “Saling-Pusa” Remark: Petitioners claimed that Judge Villanueva’s use of the words “saling pusa” and/or “kibitzer” regarding the counsel of Sulpicio’s co-defendants was deliberately taken out of context by Sulpicio to unduly disrupt a valid judicial proceeding; they believed he made the comments because he did not want Sulpicio’s counsel to take up the time of its co-defendants’ counsel in cross-examination.
• Judicial Affidavit Ruling: Petitioners argued that Judge Villanueva merely allowed the witness to confirm her allegations in her complaint when the CA found that he violated the rule on judicial affidavits.
• Mootness of Reconsideration: Petitioners contended that their motion for reconsideration was not rendered moot and academic by Judge Villanueva’s order granting execution pending appeal because his participation in the said motion was crucial.

• Partiality Finding: Sulpicio defended the correctness of the CA’s finding of partiality.
• Procedural Defect in Petitioners’ Rule 45 Petition: Sulpicio contended that the Court should dismiss the petition because petitioners did not attach a certified true copy or legible duplicate copies of the assailed September 21, 2015 Decision of the CA to their petition before the Court.
• Material Dates: Sulpicio added that a perusal of the “Statement of Material Dates” of the petition showed that petitioners never mentioned the date when they received a copy of the said CA decision.
• TSNs Before the CA: Sulpicio argued that its inhibition petition before the CA quoted relevant portions of the TSNs showing Judge Villanueva’s bias and prejudice, and that these quoted portions were also found in the Motion for Inhibition filed before the trial court, a certified true copy of which was appended as Annex “E” to the CA petition; thus, the failure to attach the TSNs was not fatal.

• Procedural Defects in Sulpicio’s CA Petition: Whether the CA erred in not dismissing Sulpicio’s petition for certiorari for failure to attach the pertinent TSNs and petitioners’ comment on the motion for inhibition, in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
• Procedural Defects in Petitioners’ Rule 45 Petition: Whether petitioners’ Rule 45 petition should be dismissed for failure to attach certified true copies of the assailed CA Decision and for omission of the date of receipt of the CA Decision in the Statement of Material Dates.
• Inhibition of Judge Villanueva: Whether there were sufficient grounds for the CA to order the inhibition of Judge Villanueva from the civil cases filed against Sulpicio.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Whether the May 11, 2016 Order of Judge Villanueva granting execution pending appeal should be annulled for having been issued after the CA ordered his recusal.

• Procedural Defects in Sulpicio’s CA Petition: No. The CA did not err in not dismissing Sulpicio’s certiorari petition; the Rules do not specify all documents that must be attached, and Sulpicio quoted the relevant TSN portions in its inhibition petition and attached the certified motion for inhibition. Dismissals on technical grounds are abhorred.
• Procedural Defects in Petitioners’ Rule 45 Petition: No. Petitioners’ failure to attach certified true copies and omission of material dates was excused; they later submitted certified true copies of the CA Decision and Resolution, and the Court allowed the petition based on their explanation.
• Inhibition of Judge Villanueva: Yes. Sufficient grounds existed for the CA to order Judge Villanueva’s inhibition; his evidentiary lapses, demeaning remarks, and defiance of the CA’s recusal order showed bias and partiality under the exception to the general rule.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Yes. The May 11, 2016 Order granting execution pending appeal was null and void for grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction because it was issued after the CA had ordered Judge Villanueva to recuse himself.

• Procedural Defects in Sulpicio’s CA Petition: The Court reviewed the requirements under Section 1, Rule 65 and Section 3, Rule 46, which require a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject of the petition and copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. Citing Air Philippines Corporation vs. Zamora, the Court explained that the exact nature of the pleadings and parts of the case record that must accompany a petition is not specified, leaving much discretion to the appellate court. Only relevant and pertinent documents must be attached; a document need not be appended if its contents are found in another attached document; and a petition lacking an essential pleading may still be given due course if the petitioner later submits the documents or if the higher interest of justice requires. Sulpicio’s inhibition petition quoted relevant TSN portions showing bias, and those portions were also in the Motion for Inhibition, a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex “E.” Thus, the CA did not err in not dismissing the petition. The Court also reiterated, citing Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, that dismissals based on technical grounds are abhorred and that rules of procedure should not override substantial justice.
• Procedural Defects in Petitioners’ Rule 45 Petition: The Court found no merit in Sulpicio’s claim that petitioners’ Rule 45 petition should be dismissed for failure to attach certified true copies of the CA Decision and for omitting material dates. The Court allowed the petition based on petitioners’ explanation that they had not officially received a copy of the CA Decision from the CA, that their resident public attorney chanced upon a copy attached to Sulpicio’s Manifestation, that they filed motions for reconsideration, and that they received the CA Resolution on January 4, 2015 and filed the petition within the 15-day period. The same liberality was accorded because petitioners eventually submitted certified true copies of the September 21, 2015 Decision and December 18, 2015 Resolution. The fundamental purpose of the attachment rule is to enable appellate courts to judiciously and expeditiously resolve controversies, and these requirements were met.
• Inhibition of Judge Villanueva: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court governs disqualification and inhibition. It has two aspects: compulsory disqualification under the first paragraph and voluntary inhibition under the second paragraph. Compulsory disqualification assumes a judge cannot actively or impartially sit for the stated reasons, based on the precept that no judge should preside in a case in which he or she is not wholly independent, disinterested, or impartial. Voluntary inhibition involves the judge’s sound discretion and is a matter of conscience addressed to the judge’s sense of fairness and justice; the judge is in a better position to determine inhibition, but the decision must be based on a rational and logical assessment of the circumstances. Inhibition must be for just and valid causes. Generally, mere imputation of bias, partiality, and prejudgment will not suffice absent clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor. Disqualification cannot be based on mere speculations and surmises or on the adverse nature of the judge’s rulings toward the movant. Bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial or extrinsic source; a judge must inhibit only if it is shown that the judge’s evident leaning toward a party would result in a disposition on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from participating in the case. The option to choose whether to handle a case is counterbalanced by the sworn duty to administer justice without fear of repression. However, an exception exists: when the consistency and regularity with which a judge issued the assailed directives give rise, not to a fanciful suggestion or superficial impression of partiality, but to clear and convincing proof of bias and prejudice, the judge may be directed to inhibit. Citing Peralta vs. Judge George E. Omelio, the Court stated that a presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of litigants, hold himself above reproach and suspicion, and at the first sign of lack of faith and trust, whether well grounded or not, has no other alternative but to inhibit himself. In this case, the exception applied. Despite timely objections, Judge Villanueva allowed petitioners to introduce a mere photocopy of a document containing a summary of a witness’s testimony, declared it an “authentic document,” and disregarded an elementary rule of evidence. He also allowed petitioners’ witness to give an opinion on how long her husband could have lived, despite objections, in violation of Sections 48 and 50 of the Rules on Evidence; even if the opinion might tend to prove Sulpicio’s liability, arriving at the amount of liability based on an ordinary witness’s testimony smacked of wanton disregard of procedural rules. He also denigrated and belittled the counsel for the co-defendants by calling him a mere “kibitzer” or “saling-pusa”; the remark was uncalled for, publicly humiliated counsel, and bared a state of mind of a partial trial judge. Ordinarily, these matters even taken together would not constitute a solid ground for inhibition, and his remarks could have been uttered in the excitement of the moment. Such lapses, however, coupled with his acting on the case after he was ordered by the CA to recuse himself, brought to fore his tendentious mind. The most telling manifestation of partiality was his May 11, 2016 Order granting petitioners’ motion for execution pending appeal despite receiving categorical orders from the CA to recuse himself. The records also showed that despite being directed by Executive Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra on January 12, 2016 to transmit the records for re-raffle, he failed to heed the directive. In resolving the motion, he opined that while he was not prepared to state that any appeal by Sulpicio and co-defendants should automatically be characterized as frivolous and manifestly dilatory, it would seem that a party with no evidence on record could hardly expect to prevail in the appellate courts. By his acts and statements, he confirmed his evident predisposition. Although judicial courtesy is not mandatory, under the circumstances he should have been more circumspect and recused himself to remove doubt on his neutrality. While Section 7, Rule 65 provides that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari does not stay proceedings in the lower court absent a TRO or preliminary injunction, the Court in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park vs. Court of Appeals explained that upon learning of the petition, the appellate court should have refrained from ruling because its jurisdiction was necessarily limited; due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have prompted it to wait for final determination. Thus, while Judge Villanueva had not yet received the CA decision when he handed down his decision on the civil cases, he should not have entertained the subsequent motion for execution pending appeal after receiving the September 21, 2015 CA Decision and December 18, 2015 Resolution ordering his inhibition. Petitioners cannot argue that no TRO or writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the CA enjoining him; just as a lower court should readily comply with provisional orders of a higher court, it should with more reason respect and comply with a higher court’s final disposition on the merits. Considering his actions during trial and his overzealousness to have his decision executed despite clear directive from the CA, Sulpicio’s right to have an impartial judge was clearly violated. The CA ruling ordering Judge Villanueva to recuse himself was affirmed.
• Execution Pending Appeal: The May 11, 2016 Order of Judge Villanueva granting petitioners’ motion for execution pending appeal was clearly issued with grave abuse of discretion and should be annulled. To let it stand would sanction and reward disrespect of a higher tribunal. Judges should avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. In insulating the Bench from unwarranted criticism and preserving a democratic way of life, judges must be above suspicion. The duty of judges is not only to administer justice but also to conduct themselves in a manner that avoids any suspicion of irregularity, arising from their duty to promote confidence in the judicial system. Occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice, judges must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon them; any act that would give the appearance of impropriety becomes, of itself, reprehensible.

• Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges under Section 1, Rule 137 — The rule has two aspects: compulsory disqualification, where a judge cannot sit for the grounds in the first paragraph (pecuniary interest, relationship, prior participation, etc.), and voluntary inhibition, where a judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, disqualify himself for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned. Compulsory disqualification rests on the precept that no judge should preside in a case in which he or she is not wholly independent, disinterested, or impartial. Voluntary inhibition is a matter of conscience addressed to the judge’s sense of fairness and justice, but the decision must be based on a rational and logical assessment of the circumstances. In this case, the Court applied the voluntary inhibition aspect and upheld the CA’s order directing Judge Villanueva to recuse himself.
• Clear and Convincing Evidence Requirement for Inhibition; Extra-Judicial or Extrinsic Source Rule — Generally, mere imputation of bias, partiality, and prejudgment will not suffice absent clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor. Disqualification cannot be based on mere speculations and surmises or on the adverse nature of the judge’s rulings toward the movant. Bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial or extrinsic source; a judge must inhibit only if it is shown that the judge’s evident leaning toward a party would result in a disposition on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from participating in the case. The Court applied this general rule but found the exception present.
• Exception to the Clear and Convincing Evidence Requirement — When the consistency and regularity with which a judge issued the assailed directives give rise, not to a fanciful suggestion or superficial impression of partiality, but to clear and convincing proof of bias and prejudice, the judge may be directed to inhibit himself. The Court found the exception applicable because Judge Villanueva’s evidentiary lapses, demeaning remarks toward counsel, and act of granting execution pending appeal after the CA ordered his recusal demonstrated evident partiality.
• Judicial Courtesy and Respect for Higher Court’s Recusal Order — Although judicial courtesy is not mandatory, and Section 7, Rule 65 provides that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari does not stay proceedings in the lower court absent a TRO or preliminary injunction, a lower court should respect and comply with a higher court’s final disposition on the merits. In Eternal Gardens Memorial Park vs. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should prompt a lower court to wait for final determination. Here, Judge Villanueva should have recused himself after receiving the CA’s September 21, 2015 Decision and December 18, 2015 Resolution ordering his inhibition, and his May 11, 2016 Order granting execution pending appeal was null and void for grave abuse of discretion.
• Appearance of Impropriety — Judges should avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. In insulating the Bench from unwarranted criticism and preserving a democratic way of life, judges must be above suspicion. Their duty is not only to administer justice but also to conduct themselves in a manner that avoids any suspicion of irregularity, arising from their duty to promote confidence in the judicial system. The Court applied this doctrine in condemning Judge Villanueva’s conduct and annulling his order.
• Liberal Application of Procedural Rules; Dismissals on Technical Grounds Abhorred — Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, requires strict observance of requirements, including attachment of a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject of the petition and copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. However, the exact nature of the pleadings and parts of the case record that must accompany a petition is not specified, leaving much discretion to the appellate court. Only relevant and pertinent documents must be attached; a document need not be appended if its contents are found in another attached document; and a petition lacking an essential pleading may still be given due course if the petitioner later submits the documents or if the higher interest of justice requires. Dismissals based on technical grounds are abhorred, and rules of procedure should not override substantial justice. The Court applied this liberality to both Sulpicio’s failure to attach TSNs before the CA and petitioners’ failure to attach certified true copies and material dates before the Supreme Court.

• "Generally, the mere imputation of bias, partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor." — States the general rule on judicial inhibition: mere allegations of bias are insufficient, and clear and convincing evidence is required to overcome the presumption of judicial impartiality.
• "In fact, this Court has, on several instances, ruled that to warrant the judge's inhibition from the case, bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial or extrinsic source." — Defines the extra-judicial or extrinsic source requirement, which the Court used to distinguish ordinary adverse rulings from disqualifying bias.
• "Ordinarily, the foregoing, even taken together, would not constitute a solid ground for the inhibition of a trial judge. His remarks could have been uttered in the excitement of the moment. Such lapses, however, when coupled with his acting on the case after he was ordered by the CA to recuse himself, brought to fore his tendentious mind." — Articulates the ratio decidendi for finding sufficient grounds for inhibition: the evidentiary lapses and remarks became disqualifying when combined with the judge’s continued action after the CA ordered his recusal.
• "Clearly issued with grave abuse of discretion, the May 11, 2016 Order of Judge Villanueva granting petitioners' motion of execution pending appeal should be annulled. To let it be is to sanction and reward disrespect of a higher tribunal." — States the Court’s conclusion that the execution pending appeal order was null and void and explains the policy against rewarding a lower court’s defiance of a higher tribunal.

• Air Philippines Corporation vs. Zamora, 529 Phil. 718 (2006) — Cited for the requirements for a petition for certiorari and the discretionary nature of attaching essential pleadings; the Court used its guideposts to excuse Sulpicio’s failure to attach TSNs before the CA.
• Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 587 (2000) — Cited for the rule that dismissals based on technical grounds are abhorred and that rules of procedure should not override substantial justice; applied to excuse procedural lapses.
• Peralta vs. Judge George E. Omelio, 720 Phil. 60 (2013) — Cited for the principle that a presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of litigants, hold himself above reproach and suspicion, and at the first sign of lack of faith and trust, inhibit himself; used to support the CA’s recusal order.
• Eternal Gardens Memorial Park vs. Court of Appeals, 247 Phil. 387 (1988) — Cited for the rule that a lower court should refrain from ruling on a case upon learning of a petition for certiorari questioning its resolutions, due to respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations; applied to Judge Villanueva’s act of granting execution pending appeal after the CA ordered his recusal.
• Perez vs. Suller, 320 Phil. 1 (1995) — Cited for the rationale of compulsory disqualification: no judge should preside in a case in which he or she is not wholly independent, disinterested, or impartial, to preserve people’s faith and confidence in the courts.
• Ty vs. Banco Filipino Savings Bank, 467 Phil. 290 (2004) — Cited for the exception to the general rule: when the consistency and regularity of a judge’s assailed directives give clear and convincing proof of bias and prejudice, the judge may be directed to inhibit himself.

• Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court — Provides for disqualification of judges. The first paragraph covers compulsory disqualification; the second paragraph allows a judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, to disqualify himself for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned. The Court applied this provision in analyzing whether Judge Villanueva should have inhibited himself.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Requires that a petition for certiorari be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. The Court cited this in resolving the procedural issue on Sulpicio’s CA petition.
• Section 3, Rule 46, Rules of Court — Governs the contents and filing of a petition and states that failure to comply with the requirements shall be sufficient ground for dismissal. The Court applied it in excusing the parties’ attachment lapses.
• Section 7, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings in the lower court in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO. The Court acknowledged this general rule but held that Judge Villanueva should still have respected the CA’s final disposition ordering his recusal.
• Sections 48 and 50, Rules on Evidence — Section 48 states the general rule that the opinion of a witness is not admissible except as indicated; Section 50 allows opinion of ordinary witnesses only on specified matters. The Court cited these provisions in finding that Judge Villanueva improperly allowed an ordinary witness to give an opinion on how long her husband could have lived.
• Judicial Affidavit Rule — As cited in the decision, it requires the originals of documents to be attached to the judicial affidavit. The CA faulted Judge Villanueva for allowing an ordinary witness to provide opinion testimony in violation of this rule, and Sulpicio complained that he allowed a mere photocopy despite the rule.

Justices Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen concurred.