Calalang vs. Williams

A statute that delegates to administrative officials only the authority to ascertain facts and circumstances upon which the law's application depends—and not to determine what the law shall be—does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power; and regulations promulgated under such authority in the exercise of police power to promote public safety and welfare are constitutional, even if they restrict personal liberty, property, and business.

Maximo Calalang was a private citizen and taxpayer of Manila. The respondents were officials of the Commonwealth government: A. D. Williams as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, Vicente Fragante as Director of Public Works, Sergio Bayan as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Eulogio Rodriguez as Mayor of the City of Manila, and Juan Dominguez as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. Commonwealth Act No. 548, enacted by the National Assembly, authorized the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations regulating traffic on national roads and to temporarily close such roads to traffic whenever conditions made such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The Act reflected the legislature's policy of promoting safe transit and avoiding obstructions on roads designated as national roads.

On July 17, 1940, the National Traffic Commission adopted a resolution recommending to the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street (from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street) from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m., and along Rizal Avenue (from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street) from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the proposed measure pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 548.

On August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works endorsed the recommendation to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications approved the recommendation that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to animal-drawn vehicles between the specified points and during the specified hours for one year from the opening of the Colgante Bridge. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police enforced the regulations thus adopted.

As a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles were barred from passing through and picking up passengers in the designated areas, to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and taxpayer of Manila, brought a petition for a writ of prohibition before the Supreme Court to enjoin the respondents from enforcing the regulations.

• Undue Delegation of Legislative Power: Petitioner contended that Commonwealth Act No. 548, by authorizing the Director of Public Works (with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications) to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of traffic on national roads, constituted an undue delegation of legislative power.
• Interference with Liberty and Business: Petitioner further contended that the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act constituted an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.
• Violation of Social Justice: Petitioner finally averred that the rules and regulations complained of infringed upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

• Delegation of Legislative Power: Whether Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power by authorizing the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads.
• Police Power and Personal Liberty: Whether the traffic regulations promulgated pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business, personal liberty, and freedom of locomotion.
• Social Justice: Whether the traffic regulations infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice.

• Delegation of Legislative Power: No. The authority conferred by Commonwealth Act No. 548 was not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy already laid down by the National Assembly, constituting permissible subordinate legislation rather than an undue delegation of lawmaking power.
• Police Power and Personal Liberty: No. The regulations were a valid exercise of the state's police power, enacted to promote safe transit and relieve traffic congestion; individual rights of liberty, property, and business are subordinate to public welfare.
• Social Justice: No. Social justice is the promotion of the welfare of all the people and the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium, not a mistaken sympathy toward any given group; the regulations served the greatest good for the greatest number.

• Delegation of Legislative Power: The distinction between delegating the power to make the law and conferring authority to execute it is controlling. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 laid down a definite legislative policy: "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on" national roads and to close them temporarily "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The authority conferred on the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not to determine what the law shall be, but merely to ascertain the facts and circumstances upon which the law's application depends. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a road should be closed, in view of road or traffic conditions and the requirements of public convenience, is an administrative function that cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. Citing Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro and Locke's Appeal, the Court affirmed that the legislature may make a law to delegate the power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law's action depends, and that the growing complexity of modern life has necessitated the adoption of subordinate legislation within certain limits.

• Police Power and Personal Liberty: Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state, aimed at promoting safe transit and relieving traffic congestion—a menace to public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the enactment, and the state may interfere with personal liberty, property, and business to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. The rights of the individual are subordinated to this fundamental aim. Liberty should not prevail over authority, lest society fall into anarchy, nor should authority prevail over liberty, lest the individual fall into slavery; the citizen must achieve the required balance through education and personal discipline. The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances, and a business lawful today may, because of changed circumstances, become a menace to public health and welfare and be required to yield to the public good.

• Social Justice: Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice may be approximated. It means the promotion of the welfare of all the people and the adoption of measures to insure economic stability of all competent elements of society through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium. Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among diverse units of society and the protection equally extended to all groups, consistent with the paramount objective of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons and bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. The promotion of social justice is not achieved through a mistaken sympathy toward any given group, but through measures legally justifiable under the principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

• Permissible Delegation of Legislative Power (Subordinate Legislation) — The legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law, but it can make a law delegating the power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes its own action depend. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law (which involves discretion as to what the law shall be) and conferring authority or discretion as to the law's execution. The former is prohibited; the latter is permissible. In this case, Commonwealth Act No. 548 laid down a definite legislative policy and merely conferred on administrative officials the duty of ascertaining the facts and circumstances upon which the law's application depends.

• Police Power and the Subordination of Individual Rights — The state, in the exercise of police power to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, property, and business. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. The rights of the individual are subordinated to this fundamental aim. The scope of police power expands as civilization advances; a business lawful today may become a menace to public welfare and be required to yield to the public good.

• Concept of Social Justice — Social justice is the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State, the promotion of the welfare of all the people, and the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium among the members of the community. It is achieved through measures legally justifiable or extra-constitutionally through the principle of salus populi est suprema lex. It must be founded on the recognition of interdependence among diverse units of society and the equal protection of all groups, consistent with the objective of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.

• "The delegated power, if at all, therefore is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the delegation issue, drawing the controlling distinction between making law and executing law, and is frequently cited in Philippine jurisprudence on subordinate legislation.

• "Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery." — This passage frames the Court's philosophical balancing of liberty and authority within the police power analysis, and is one of the most quoted passages in Philippine constitutional law.

• "Social justice is 'neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,' but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated." — This passage provides the canonical definition of social justice in Philippine jurisprudence, distinguishing it from competing ideologies and anchoring it in the principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

• Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 — Followed. Cited for the distinction between delegating power to make the law and conferring authority to execute it, quoting the Ohio case of Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County and Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard.
• U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
• People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440 — Followed. Cited for the observation that advancing civilization brings within the police power of the state matters not previously so considered.
• People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077 (June 12, 1939) — Followed. Cited for the principle that the separation of powers doctrine has adapted to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to subordinate legislation.
• Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065 (June 26, 1940) — Followed. Cited alongside Rosenthal and Osmeña for the same principle of subordinate legislation.
• Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that the legislature may make a law to delegate the power to determine facts or states of things upon which the law's action depends.
• Field vs. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 — Followed. Cited in support of the Locke's Appeal principle.
• Dobbins vs. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that police power is a continuing right and a business lawful today may become a menace to public welfare.

• Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 548 — Authorized the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads and to temporarily close such roads to traffic whenever conditions made such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The Court found that this provision laid down a definite legislative policy and merely delegated administrative execution, not lawmaking power.
• Constitutional Precept on Social Justice — Petitioner invoked the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The Court interpreted social justice as the promotion of the welfare of all the people and the maintenance of economic and social equilibrium, not as a basis for favoring any particular group.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, and Horrilleno, JJ., concurred.