Cajipe vs. People of the Philippines

An order dismissing a criminal case for lack of probable cause is a final and appealable order, and the People's remedy is an appeal under Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure — not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Corollarily, the 60-day period for filing a Rule 65 petition on behalf of the People is counted from the public prosecutor's receipt of the order, not from the Office of the Solicitor General's receipt.

Petitioners are officers of the Philippine National Police Highway Patrol Group (HPG), while the other accused in the same case included officers of the PNP Special Action Force (SAF). The charges arose from a police operation in Parañaque City that resulted in the deaths of Alfonso "Jun" S. De Vera and his seven-year-old daughter Lia Allana, the husband and daughter of complainant Lilian I. De Vera. The case proceeded from a complaint for multiple murder filed with the Department of Justice, which conducted the preliminary investigation and thereafter filed the corresponding informations before the Regional Trial Court.

On December 5, 2008, Alfonso "Jun" S. De Vera and his seven-year-old daughter Lia Allana were killed in what the police characterized as a shootout inside a subdivision in Parañaque City. The victims were the husband and daughter of Lilian I. De Vera, who would later file a complaint for multiple murder before the Department of Justice against officers of the Philippine National Police Highway Patrol Group (HPG) and the PNP Special Action Force (SAF), including petitioners P/C Insp. Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C Insp. Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B. Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao, Jr., PO3 Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, PO2 Eduardo G. Blanco, PO2 Edwin Santos, and PO1 Josil Rey I. Lucena.

According to Lilian, at around 9:30 p.m. on December 5, 2008, she called Jun to tell him that she was on her way to Pasay City to meet him and their daughter. She reached Pasay City, but the two did not show up. After an hour, she called their house helper, who assured her that Jun and Lia had already left. She tried calling Jun but received no answer, and when she called the house helper again, she was told that there had been a shootout in their subdivision. Lilian decided to go home, but upon arriving at the subdivision entrance, the police had blocked the area and did not allow civilians to pass through. She then received a call from the house helper informing her that Jun and Lia had been involved in the shootout. A certain Hilario Indiana approached her and advised her to go to the hospital where Lia had been rushed. When she arrived, she learned that Lia had died of a gunshot wound to the head, while Jun was found dead near a passenger jeepney, likewise with a gunshot wound to the head.

Witnesses to the shootout recounted that Jun and Lia were riding in his Isuzu Crosswind van when police officers wearing Regional SAF vests suddenly fired at the van. Jun got out, went to the passenger side, and tried to carry Lia out to safety, as she had already been wounded. The police officers went after Jun, however, and shot him on the head.

On July 28, 2009, Lilian filed her complaint before the DOJ. After preliminary investigation, the DOJ issued a resolution on December 28, 2009 finding probable cause to indict all the police officers involved in the police action for two counts of murder. On March 15, 2010, the DOJ filed the informations before the RTC of Parañaque City in Criminal Cases 10-0280 and 10-0281. The following day, March 16, 2010, petitioner HPG officers filed an omnibus motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a prayer to hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants for their arrest; they also sought the annulment of the DOJ resolution on the ground of violation of their constitutional rights and moved to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute an offense.

On June 16, 2010, the RTC dismissed the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable cause, given that the witnesses made no mention of seeing anyone from the HPG group taking part in the shooting and killing of Jun and his daughter. The RTC instead found that the evidence tended to show that petitioner HPG officers were requested and acted merely as a blocking force in a legitimate police operation, a point Lilian had not refuted. The RTC, however, issued an arrest warrant for the accused SAF officers after finding probable cause against them. Lilian moved for reconsideration of the dismissal order covering petitioner HPG officers, but the RTC denied the motion on September 24, 2010.

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in failing to evaluate the sworn statements of the witnesses on whom the DOJ relied, having based its finding of lack of probable cause primarily on the absence of evidence directly linking the HPG officers to the shooting and on their physical presence at the crime scene. The appellate court pointed to the affidavits of Indiana and Ronald Castillo stating that petitioner HPG officers joined the SAF officers in pursuing and shooting Jun while he was bringing Lia to a safer place, and held that it was for the HPG officers to rebut such testimonies at trial. Also material to the Court's analysis were the crime laboratory report revealing that none of the HPG operatives discharged their firearms during the shootout, the testimony of Indiana that the SAF officers involved carried long firearms (specifically an M16 rifle, an M16 baby armalite, and an M14), and two National Police Commission certifications dated January 14 and 19, 2010 stating that the petitioner HPG officers had not been issued long firearms from 2007 up to 2010.

• Wrong Remedy: Petitioner HPG officers maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the OSG's petition for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that the RTC's order of dismissal was a final and appealable order for which an appeal under Rule 122 was the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
• Prescription of the Rule 65 Petition: Petitioner HPG officers pointed out that, assuming the propriety of a special civil action of certiorari against the RTC's order of dismissal, the People had sixty days from receipt of such order within which to file the action, and that the People filed its petition 112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque, clearly beyond the 60-day period allowed.
• Absence of Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner HPG officers argued that the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge in holding that no probable cause existed against them and in dismissing the criminal charge.

• Reckoning of the Period from Notice to the OSG: The OSG contended that the reckoning point for the 60-day period should be counted from the date the Department of Justice or the court gave it notice of the order of dismissal, invoking the holding in Bautista vs. Cuneta-Pangilinan that the OSG alone has the authority to represent the People before the Court of Appeals.
• Existence of Probable Cause: The OSG relied on the affidavits of Hilario Indiana and Ronald V. Castillo in claiming that probable cause exists against petitioner HPG officers, on the theory that the HPG officers joined the SAF officers in pursuing and shooting Jun.

• Remedy from the Order of Dismissal: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the OSG's petition for certiorari under Rule 65, given that the RTC's order of dismissal is a final and appealable order.
• Reckoning of the Prescriptive Period: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in counting the prescriptive period for filing a Rule 65 petition from the time of receipt of the court order by the OSG rather than by the city prosecutor's office.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion and Probable Cause: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge in holding that no probable cause exists against petitioner HPG officers and in dismissing the criminal charge against them.

• Remedy from the Order of Dismissal: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in entertaining the Rule 65 petition, the RTC's order of dismissal being a final and appealable order for which appeal under Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure was the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
• Reckoning of the Prescriptive Period: Yes. The 60-day period is counted from the public prosecutor's receipt of the order, not the OSG's; the petition, filed 112 days from the city prosecutor's receipt, was filed out of time and the dismissal order was thus beyond appellate review.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion and Probable Cause: Yes. The RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion; the prosecution evidence failed to establish probable cause against petitioner HPG officers, and the dismissal of the charge and the withdrawal of the warrants of arrest were warranted.

• Remedy from the Order of Dismissal: Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judge "may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause," and the RTC judge was therefore within his powers in dismissing the case against petitioner HPG officers. The Court of Appeals should have denied the People's petition for certiorari, since Section 1 of Rule 65 makes that action available only when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Section 1, Rule 122 of the same rules provides that an appeal may be taken in a criminal action from a judgment or final order, such as the RTC's order dismissing the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable cause. The order is final because it disposes of the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further to do with respect to the case against petitioner HPG officers. The Court had made a similar pronouncement in Santos vs. Orda, Jr. While the People may refile the case if new evidence adduced in another preliminary investigation will support the filing of a new information, that is a separate matter. The Court of Appeals clearly erred in not denying the petition for being a wrong remedy.

• Reckoning of the Prescriptive Period: The OSG's position that the reckoning point should be the date the Department of Justice or the court gave it notice of the order of dismissal, as supposedly held in Bautista vs. Cuneta-Pangilinan, was rejected as unfair. There is no reason for the RTC to serve a copy of its judgments or final orders upon the OSG, since the OSG does not enter its appearance in criminal cases before it. In cases of permissible appeals from a final order in a criminal action, the public prosecutor who appears as counsel for the People, and on whom a copy of the final order is served, may file a notice of appeal within the appropriate time, since the notice is addressed to the RTC and not to the Court of Appeals; only the Office of the Solicitor General may pursue the appeal before the Court of Appeals by filing the required appellant's brief or by withdrawing the same. In special civil actions such as that taken by the OSG before the Court of Appeals, the public prosecutor's duty, if he believes that a matter should be brought by special civil action before an appellate court, is to promptly communicate the facts and his recommendation to the OSG, advising it of the last day for filing such an action. There is no reason the OSG cannot file the petition, since the People is given sixty days from notice to the public prosecutor within which to file such an action before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Because the OSG filed its petition for certiorari on behalf of the People 112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque, the petition was filed out of time, and the order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate review.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion and Probable Cause: Although a purely academic exercise in view of the foregoing rulings, the Court examined the merit of the RTC's order of dismissal because it clashed with the findings of the DOJ investigating prosecutors. The OSG relied on the affidavits of Indiana and Ronald V. Castillo. In his sworn statement before the police on December 9, 2008, Indiana stated that the man he saw shoot Jun was an RSAF officer, identified by his assault vest bearing a name at the back and accompanied by another RSAF officer who also wore such a vest; the RSAF officer then took the child and brought her to their white vehicle. Castillo, on the other hand, did not see the act of shooting but confirmed that two police officers gave chase and fired at the fleeing vehicle, then turned back to announce to their companions that they had killed the driver of the get-away car. It was clear from Indiana's testimony that the man he saw shoot Jun was an RSAF officer, identified by his assault vest and accompanied by another RSAF officer who also wore such a vest. The HPG men belonged to another unit, and there was no claim that they wore another unit's vest. More telling, the crime laboratory report revealed that none of the HPG operatives discharged their firearms during the shootout. It did not help the prosecution's case that, per Indiana's testimony, the SAF police officers involved in the shootout carried long firearms, specifically an M16 rifle, an M16 baby armalite, and an M14, while the National Police Commission issued two certifications dated January 14 and 19, 2010 to the effect that the petitioner HPG officers had not been issued long firearms from 2007 up to 2010. Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. Measured against this standard, the prosecution evidence failed to establish probable cause against petitioner HPG officers.

• Final and Appealable Order; Remedy of Appeal in Criminal Actions — An order dismissing a criminal case for lack of probable cause, issued under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, is a final order because it disposes of the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further to do with respect to the accused. Being final, it is appealable under Section 1, Rule 122, and the People's remedy is an ordinary appeal — not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which lies only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in entertaining the OSG's Rule 65 petition assailing the RTC's dismissal order, since appeal was the correct remedy.
• Probable Cause for Filing a Criminal Information — Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information consists of such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The Court applied this standard to the affidavits and physical evidence and concluded that the prosecution evidence failed to establish probable cause against the HPG officers, given that the eyewitness identified an RSAF officer as the shooter, the crime laboratory report showed no HPG operative discharged a firearm, and NAPOLCOM certifications showed no long firearms were issued to the HPG officers from 2007 to 2010.
• Reckoning of the 60-Day Period for a Rule 65 Petition by the People — Where a special civil action is brought on behalf of the People, the 60-day period is counted from the public prosecutor's receipt of the assailed order, not from the Office of the Solicitor General's receipt, since the RTC serves copies of its judgments and final orders on the public prosecutor who appears as counsel for the People, and the OSG does not enter its appearance in criminal cases before the trial court. The public prosecutor's duty, if he believes a special civil action should be brought, is to promptly communicate the facts and his recommendation to the OSG and to advise it of the last day for filing. Because the OSG filed its petition 112 days from the city prosecutor's receipt of the dismissal order, the petition was filed out of time.

• "It is a final order since it disposes of the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further to do with respect to the case against petitioner HPG officers." — This passage supplies the ratio for the first issue, establishing that the RTC's dismissal order is final and therefore appealable under Rule 122 rather than assailable by certiorari under Rule 65.
• "Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People 112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque, the petition was filed out of time. The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate review." — This states the Court's disposition of the second issue, fixing the reckoning of the 60-day period at the public prosecutor's receipt and holding that the dismissal order had already become final and unassailable.
• "Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." — This is the canonical formulation of probable cause applied by the Court in evaluating whether the prosecution evidence sufficed against the HPG officers.
• "The prosecution evidence fails to establish probable cause against petitioner HPG officers." — This is the Court's conclusion on the third issue, resting on the eyewitness identification of an RSAF officer as the shooter, the crime laboratory report, and the NAPOLCOM certifications.

• Santos vs. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 189402, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 375 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that an order dismissing a criminal case for lack of probable cause is a final and appealable order, supporting the Court's holding that the Court of Appeals should have denied the Rule 65 petition as a wrong remedy.
• Bautista vs. Cuneta-Pangilinan, G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 521 — Invoked by the OSG for the proposition that it alone has the authority to represent the People before the Court of Appeals; the Court declined to apply the proposition to shift the reckoning of the 60-day period to the OSG's receipt, calling such a position unfair.
• Bernardo vs. Tan, G.R. No. 185491, July 11, 2012, 676 SCRA 288 — Cited as the source of the definition of probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information, which the Court applied in assessing the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence against the HPG officers.

• Section 6, Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that the judge "may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." The Court relied on this provision to hold that the RTC judge was within his powers in dismissing the case against petitioner HPG officers.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Makes certiorari available only when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." The Court applied this to hold that the People's Rule 65 petition was improper because appeal was available.
• Section 1, Rule 122, Rules of Court — Provides that an appeal may be taken in a criminal action from a judgment or final order. The Court applied this to characterize the RTC's dismissal order as final and appealable, thereby rendering the Rule 65 petition a wrong remedy.

• Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson)
• Diosdado M. Peralta
• Jose Catral Mendoza
• Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen