Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

A dismissal of a criminal case, even if denominated "provisional," is final and operates as an acquittal barring refiling under double jeopardy if the accused did not expressly consent to the dismissal and the dismissal was based on the prosecution's lack of interest and denial of the accused's right to a speedy trial. The accused's consent to a provisional dismissal must be express, leaving no doubt as to his conformity; it cannot be presumed or implied from silence or failure to object.

The petitioner, Joel B. Caes, was charged in two separate informations before the Court of First Instance of Rizal with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana. The cases were consolidated, and the petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the government prosecutor and must always be under his control, a principle that governs the conduct of the proceedings from filing through dismissal or revival.

On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel B. Caes was charged in two separate informations with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The cases were consolidated on December 10, 1981. Arraignment was originally scheduled on January 11, 1982, but was postponed. On August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

Trial was scheduled for October 13, 1982, but was reset upon agreement of the parties. On November 15, 1982, the trial was again postponed for reasons that do not appear in the record. On December 20, 1982, the trial was postponed because the prosecution witnesses were absent. On January 19, 1983, the third resetting was canceled, with no reason appearing in the record. On February 21, 1983, no trial could be held because the witnesses were absent. On March 21, 1983, the trial was reset once more, again because the prosecution witnesses were absent. On April 19, 1983, the trial had not yet started and was reset because the prosecution witnesses were again absent. On June 3, 1983, a sheriff's return informed the trial court that the prosecution witnesses, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado, had been personally served with subpoenas to appear at the hearing scheduled on June 6, 1983. On June 6, 1983, the trial was again postponed because there was no trial fiscal. On July 12, 1983, trial was reset for lack of material time. On September 6, 1983, the trial was once more reset by agreement of the parties. On October 19, 1983, the trial was reset to November 14, 1983.

On November 14, 1983, the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the case because its witnesses had not appeared. On the same date, Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio issued an order provisionally dismissing the cases, with costs de oficio, noting the failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear on several scheduled hearings "which is an indication of lack of interest," and stating the dismissal was made upon motion of the trial fiscal and with the conformity of the accused. On January 9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay (who had been promoted) and Sgt. Lustado, who alleged they could not attend the November 14, 1983 hearing for lack of notice. A copy of the motion was furnished the City Fiscal of Caloocan City but not the petitioner. On May 18, 1984, the respondent judge granted the motion for revival, noting that no opposition had been filed by either the Fiscal or the defense, and set the cases for hearing on June 13, 1984. A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner on June 7, 1984, was denied on October 9, 1984, and the revived cases were set for hearing on November 19, 1984.

The petitioner questioned the judge's order on certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the petition to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit on May 20, 1986, and reconsideration was denied on June 17, 1986. Caes then came to the Supreme Court again. The petitioner was never actually tried until the cases were dismissed on November 14, 1983, following eleven postponements of the scheduled hearings, mostly because the prosecution was not prepared. The accused was never absent at these aborted hearings and was prepared to be tried, but either the witnesses against him were not present, the prosecutor himself was absent, or the court lacked material time.

• Invalidity of the Motion to Revive: Petitioner argued that the motion to revive the cases was invalid because it was not filed by the proper party, the prosecution witnesses having no personality to move for revival, and because no copy was served on the petitioner.
• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner argued that the revival of the cases would place him in double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights, contending that the dismissal was final notwithstanding its "provisional" description and that he had not consented to the dismissal.

• No Double Jeopardy: The public respondent argued that double jeopardy had not attached because the case was only provisionally dismissed and it was with the conformity of the accused.

• Personality to File Motion for Revival: Whether the motion to revive the cases was valid when filed by the prosecution witnesses, who were not parties to the case, and without notice to the petitioner.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the revival of the cases against the petitioner placed him in double jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was denominated "provisional" and allegedly made with his conformity.

• Personality to File Motion for Revival: No. The motion for revival filed by the prosecution witnesses was invalid because witnesses have no personality to move for the dismissal or revival of a criminal case; the prosecution must be conducted under the control of the government prosecutor. The mere fact that the prosecutor was furnished a copy and did not object was insufficient, especially since the petitioner was not notified.
• Double Jeopardy: Yes. The dismissal, though denominated "provisional," was final and operated as an acquittal because the petitioner was denied his right to a speedy trial and there was no proof that he expressly consented to the dismissal. The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy barred the revival of the cases.

• Personality to File Motion for Revival: The prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the government prosecutor and must always be under his control, even when a private prosecutor assists him. The witnesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecutor in the handling of the case. Although they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personality to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action; their only function is to testify. The motion for revival filed by the prosecution witnesses, who never even testified, should have been summarily dismissed by the trial judge. The prosecutor should have initiated the motion himself if he thought it proper; the presumption that he approved of the motion is not enough, especially since the case involves the liberty of a person who had a right at least to be notified of the move to prosecute him again. The fact that the petitioner was not informed made the irregularity even more serious, and the motion was granted ex parte and without hearing.

• Double Jeopardy: To constitute double jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. The first three requisites were present. A case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused; such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. However, a dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made without the express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object; it must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity. Otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case. The circumstance that the dismissal was described as "provisional" did not change its nature. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal of the accused on the merits. There was no proof that Caes expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal; implied consent is not enough, neither may it be lightly inferred from the presumption of regularity, for the case deals with the alleged waiver of a constitutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the accused. The case was not much different from Conde vs. Rivera, where the accused was made to "dance attendance on courts" and subjected to no less than eight unjustified postponements extending over a year. Here, the petitioner was arraigned on August 31, 1982, but was never actually tried until the cases were dismissed on November 14, 1983, following eleven postponements, mostly because the prosecution was not prepared. Under these circumstances, Caes could have himself moved for the dismissal of the cases on the ground of the denial of his right to a speedy trial, consistent with People vs. Cloribel, where the dismissal was held to be an acquittal entered upon the defendants' insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the date of trial.

• Double Jeopardy — The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey," prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. The requisites are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In this case, all requisites were present, and the dismissal, though denominated "provisional," was final because the accused did not expressly consent to it.
• Express Consent to Provisional Dismissal — A dismissal of a criminal case is provisional only if made on motion of the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused. The consent must be express, leaving no doubt as to the defendant's conformity; it cannot be presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object. Otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final, with prejudice to the refiling of the case. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the petitioner's alleged conformity to the "provisional" dismissal was not established, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
• Right to Speedy Trial — Where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, the accused is entitled to relief. A dismissal based on the denial of the right to a speedy trial is in effect a failure to prosecute and operates as an acquittal. The Court applied this doctrine, noting that the petitioner was never actually tried for over a year following eleven postponements, mostly due to the prosecution's unpreparedness, and that the dismissal based on "lack of interest" was final and operated as an acquittal on the merits.
• Control of Criminal Prosecution — The prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the government prosecutor and must always be under his control, even if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist him. The witnesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecutor in the handling of the case; they have no personality to move for its dismissal or revival as they are not parties thereto. Their only function is to testify. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the motion for revival filed by the prosecution witnesses was invalid.

• "It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the government prosecutor and must always be under his control." — This passage establishes the foundational principle that criminal prosecution is exclusively under the government prosecutor's control, which the Court applied to invalidate the motion for revival filed by the prosecution witnesses.
• "But a dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made without the express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object. As we have held in a number of cases, such consent must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the express consent requirement for a provisional dismissal, which is central to the Court's double jeopardy analysis.
• "The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against the petitioner was described by the trial judge as 'provisional' did not change the nature of that dismissal. As it was based on the 'lack of interest' of the prosecutor and the consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal of the accused on the merits." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the designation of a dismissal as "provisional" does not control its legal effect when the dismissal is based on prosecutorial neglect and the accused did not expressly consent.
• "We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief ..." — This passage, quoted from Conde v. Rivera, articulates the doctrine on the right to a speedy trial that the Court applied to the petitioner's circumstances.

• People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 — Cited as controlling precedent for the requisites of double jeopardy and the rule that a case may be dismissed provisionally on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused.
• Mendoza vs. Almeda Lopez, 64 Phil. 820 — Cited in the long line of cases establishing the requisites for double jeopardy.
• People vs. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 — Cited in the long line of cases establishing the requisites for double jeopardy and for the proposition that a dismissal without the accused's express consent bars refiling.
• Pendatum vs. Aragon, 93 Phil. 799 — Cited for the rule that consent to a provisional dismissal must be express and cannot be presumed or implied.
• People vs. Hinaut, 105 Phil. 304 — Cited for the rule that consent to a provisional dismissal must be express.
• Solis vs. Agloro, 64 SCRA 370 — Cited for the rule that consent to a provisional dismissal must be express.
• People vs. City of Silay, 74 SCRA 248 — Cited as an example of a dismissal on demurrer to evidence having the effect of a judgment on the merits and operating as an acquittal, which is not appealable even if erroneous.
• Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650 — Cited as still valid doctrine for the right to a speedy trial, where the prosecution was dismissed because the accused was subjected to unjustified postponements extending over a year.
• People vs. Cloribel, 11 SCRA 805 — Cited for the holding that a dismissal entered upon the defendants' insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear was not truly a dismissal but an acquittal.
• Herrero vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 489 — Cited for the principle that the prosecution of a criminal case remains under the control of the government prosecutor even when a private prosecutor assists him.

• Rule 110, Section 5, paragraph 1, Rules of Court — Provides that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the government prosecutor and must always be under his control. The Court applied this provision to hold that the prosecution witnesses had no personality to file the motion for revival.
• Constitutional Right Against Double Jeopardy, Bill of Rights — Prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. The Court applied this provision to bar the revival of the cases against the petitioner, as the dismissal operated as an acquittal.
• Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial, Bill of Rights — Guarantees the accused the right to a speedy trial. The Court applied this provision to hold that the petitioner was denied this right due to the eleven postponements and the prosecution's lack of interest, making the dismissal final and operating as an acquittal.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred.