Cabrera vs. Philippine Statistics Authority

Venue in civil cases is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived; a court cannot motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of improper venue absent a timely objection by the defendant. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.

Petitioner Sasha M. Cabrera is an individual whose birth was reported through the Office of the Consul General of the Philippine Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, while respondent Philippine Statistics Authority (formerly National Statistics Office) maintains civil registry records and has a field office in Davao City. The Office of the Solicitor General represents the government respondents. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court governs the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, and Section 1 thereof directs a verified petition to the Court of First Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

Petitioner Sasha M. Cabrera alleged that she was born on July 20, 1989 at Zuba Estate, Lahad Datu Sabah, Malaysia. Because their house was distant from the Philippine Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, her mother reported her birth only on August 27, 2008. The National Statistics Office in Manila, now the Philippine Statistics Authority, received her first Report of Birth on January 29, 2009 and recorded it under Registry Number 2009-4580024.

Petitioner subsequently discovered that her date of birth had been wrongfully entered as July 20, 1980. Instead of correcting the error with the Philippine Embassy, her mother registered her birth for the second time. Thus, petitioner had a second Report of Birth recorded in March 2010 under Registry Number 2010-4580208.

Because she had two Reports of Birth, petitioner encountered difficulties in securing official documents, prompting her to file a petition for cancellation of her first Report of Birth before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 17, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11,850-12. After due proceedings, with publication and jurisdictional requirements complied with and with the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General and a representative from the PSA, the RTC-Br. 17 granted the petition in a Decision dated November 19, 2012 and ordered the cancellation of petitioner's first Report of Birth. The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order dated February 27, 2013. The OSG appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in a Decision dated February 11, 2016 granted the appeal upon a finding that since petitioner's birth was already validly registered, it could no longer be the subject of a second registration, and that because petitioner sought the correction of her year of birth, a substantial change, the proper recourse was a petition for correction of entry to correct her first Report of Birth under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration from the CA decision, petitioner re-filed the present petition to correct her year of birth from July 20, 1980 to July 20, 1989 in her first Report of Birth and to cancel her second Report of Birth under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which was raffled to RTC-Br. 14. The RTC-Br. 14 motu proprio dismissed the petition on the ground of improper venue, and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

• Venue as Procedural: Petitioner argued that venue is procedural and not substantive; it only becomes jurisdictional in criminal cases.
• Waiver of Venue: Petitioner maintained that improper venue is not equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, as the parties may waive venue.
• Improper Motu Proprio Dismissal: Petitioner insisted that until respondents object to venue being improperly laid in a motion to dismiss, it was error for the RTC-Br. 14 to motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which can only be done in cases covered by the rules on summary procedure.

• Venue as Procedural: Respondent OSG concurred that venue is merely procedural and may be fixed by the Rules of Court, while jurisdiction is conferred only by law.
• Convenience and Rule 108 Venue: Respondent OSG submitted that venue is fixed for the convenience of the parties and their witnesses; for cases involving birth certificates recorded through the Office of the Consul General, Section 1, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court does not limit the venue of the action to Quezon City only, where the PSA's head office is located.
• No Motu Proprio Dismissal: Respondent OSG pointed out that even assuming venue had been improperly laid, courts may not motu proprio dismiss the same.

• Improper Venue: Whether the RTC-Br. 14 erred in dismissing the re-filed petition on the ground of improper venue.

• Improper Venue: Yes. The RTC-Br. 14 erred in motu proprio dismissing the re-filed petition on the ground of improper venue. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived; a court cannot motu proprio dismiss a civil case on that ground absent a timely objection.

• Improper Venue: Venue is the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought. In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A party's objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. When the venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case. The rules on venue are intended to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts; they arrange for the convenient and effective transaction of business in the courts and do not relate to the court's power, authority, or jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court noted that when petitioner filed her first petition before RTC-Br. 17, she had already pleaded exemption from complying with the rule on venue by filing in her place of domicile, Davao City, she being a mere student who had no means to engage a lawyer to file it on her behalf. The OSG registered no objection to such venue; RTC-Br. 17 proceeded to hear the petition and rendered a decision on the merits, which was subsequently reversed by the CA. During the entire course of the proceedings from which the present petition stemmed, venue was never raised as an issue. It was therefore erroneous for RTC-Br. 14 to motu proprio dismiss the re-filed petition on the ground of improper venue. Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules on venue, and as it was established that Davao City is the residence of petitioner, and as further pointed out by the OSG, PSA has a field office located at Ango Building, Cabaguio Avenue, Davao City, Davao City is the most convenient venue for the parties. RTC-Br. 14 should have taken cognizance of and heard petitioner's re-filed petition in order to promote, not defeat, the ends of justice. Moreover, it was error for RTC-Br. 14 to dismiss the re-filed petition motu proprio. It is well-settled that courts may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. Without any objection at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is deemed waived. In Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. vs. Nolasco, the Court explained that dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is not the appropriate course of action, particularly as venue may be waived expressly or impliedly; where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case. In sum, RTC-Br. 14 erred in motu proprio dismissing petitioner's re-filed petition on the ground of improper venue; the same must be reinstated and remanded to RTC-Br. 14 for further proceedings.

• Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived — In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law, not a matter of jurisdiction. A party's objection to venue must be raised at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. The Court applied this rule in holding that RTC-Br. 14 erred in treating improper venue as a jurisdictional defect and dismissing the petition on that ground.
• Courts may not motu proprio dismiss on the ground of improper venue — Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid; the trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object by motu proprio dismissing the case. The Court applied this doctrine in reversing RTC-Br. 14's motu proprio dismissal.
• Convenience as the raison d'etre of venue rules — The rules on venue are intended to provide convenience to the parties rather than restrict their access to the courts; they arrange for the convenient and effective transaction of business in the courts and do not relate to the court's power, authority, or jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court applied this principle in finding that Davao City was the most convenient venue because it was petitioner's residence and the PSA had a field office there.

• "Venue is the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought. In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A patty's objections to venue must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, the objection shall be deemed waived. When the venue of a civil action is improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case." — This passage states the core rule on venue as procedural, waivable, and not a ground for motu proprio dismissal.
• "Furthermore, the rules on venue are intended to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts. It simply arranges for the convenient and effective transaction of business in the courts and do not relate to their power, authority, or jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action." — This passage explains the rationale behind venue rules and distinguishes venue from jurisdiction.
• "Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." — This passage, quoted from Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. vs. Nolasco, articulates the prohibition against motu proprio dismissal for improper venue.
• "In sum, the RTC-Br. 14 erred in motu proprio dismissing petitioner's re-fi1ed petition on the ground of improper venue. Accordingly, the same must be reinstated, and thereafter, remanded to the RTC-Br. 14 for further proceedings." — This passage summarizes the Court's disposition and the reason for reinstating and remanding the case.

• Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. vs. Nolasco, 799 Phil. 598 (2016) — Cited for the rule that dismissing a complaint on the ground of improper venue is not the appropriate course of action, that venue may be waived expressly or impliedly, and that the trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to improper venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
• Anama vs. Citibank, N.A., G.R. No. 192048, December 13, 2017 — Cited for the principle that venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived.
• Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. vs. Pineda, Jr., G.R. No. 227147, July 30, 2018, citing Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Royal Perry Services, Inc., 805 Phil. 13, 30-31 (2017), further citing City of Lapu-Lapu vs. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, 748 Phil. 473, 523 (2014) — Cited for the rule that when venue is improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case.
• Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Tensuan, G.R. No. 104649, February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA 413, 417 — Cited for the principle that rules on venue are intended to provide convenience to the parties rather than restrict their access to the courts, and do not relate to the court's power, authority, or jurisdiction over the subject matter.
• San Miguel Corporation vs. Monasterio, 499 Phil. 702, 709 (2005) — Cited for the principle that convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules on venue.

• Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court — Any person interested in any act, event, order, or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto with the Court of First Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. RTC-Br. 14 cited this provision to dismiss the petition for improper venue; the Supreme Court held the dismissal improper because venue is procedural and may be waived, and no respondent objected.
• Section 4, Rule 4, Rules of Court — The decision's quotation of Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. vs. Nolasco refers to Section 4 of Rule 4 as the provision governing a timely challenge to venue in a motion to dismiss; failure to challenge venue timely waives the objection.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concurred. Caguioa, J., was on official leave.