Cabrera vs. Ng

A motion for reconsideration that initially violates the three-day notice rule is not treated as pro forma where the adverse party was afforded sufficient time to study and oppose it before the motion was actually heard and resolved. Liberal construction applies when literal non-observance caused no prejudice and did not deprive the court of authority, the purpose of notice having been realized through actual opportunity to be heard.

On February 14, 2004, Felix Ng filed a complaint for sum of money with the Regional Trial Court against Marylou Cabrera and her husband Marionilo Cabrera. Ng alleged that the spouses issued (1) Metrobank Check No. 0244694 dated June 30, 2002 for ₱31,000.00, (2) Metrobank Check No. 0244674 dated August 9, 2002 for ₱38,074.76, and (3) Metrobank Check No. 0244745 dated August 15, 2005 for ₱2,500,000.00, all of which were dishonored upon presentment because the accounts drawn upon were already closed.

The spouses admitted issuing the first two checks and their dishonor, but claimed payment thereof through Ng’s son Richard Ng. They denied issuing the ₱2,500,000.00 check, alleging it was forcibly taken from them by Richard Ng. On August 7, 2007, the RTC ordered the spouses to pay Ng ₱2,569,074.00 plus legal interest from inception until fully paid, ₱50,000.00 moral damages, ₱20,000.00 attorney’s fees, and ₱10,000.00 litigation expenses. A copy of the decision was received by the spouses on August 8, 2007.

Thereafter, on August 14, 2007, the spouses filed a motion for reconsideration set for hearing on August 17, 2007, sending a copy to Ng by registered mail on the same date. The copy was actually received by Ng on August 21, 2007, four days after the scheduled hearing. No hearing occurred on August 17, 2007 because the new acting presiding judge had just assumed office. By notice dated August 28, 2007, the RTC reset the hearing to September 25, 2007. In the interim, on September 20, 2007, Ng filed an opposition asserting the motion was a mere scrap of paper for violation of the three-day notice requirement. The September 25, 2007 hearing did not push through, and by notice dated September 26, 2007, the RTC reset the hearing to October 26, 2007. On that date, the RTC directed the parties to file additional pleadings, after which the motion would be deemed submitted for resolution. On December 19, 2007, the RTC denied the motion, holding the late receipt to be a blatant violation of Section 4, Rule 15 and that the August 7, 2007 Decision had thus become final.

• Actual Hearing and Opportunity to Oppose: Petitioner maintained that no hearing was actually conducted on August 17, 2007 and that the motion was actually heard only on October 26, 2007, after respondent had already filed his opposition, rendering the initial non-compliance moot.
• Resolution on the Merits: Petitioner argued that the RTC should have resolved the motion for reconsideration on its merits rather than denying it on mere technicality, and that denial on that ground constituted grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

• Violation of Three-Day Notice Rule: Respondent countered that the motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper for violating the three-day notice requirement, having been mailed on August 14, 2007 for an August 17, 2007 hearing but received only on August 21, 2007, four days after the set hearing, thereby depriving him of opportunity to oppose.

• Three-Day Notice Requirement and Substantial Compliance: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Order dated December 19, 2007 which denied the motion for reconsideration for failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement despite subsequent resets and filing of an opposition.

• Three-Day Notice Requirement and Substantial Compliance: Yes. The motion was substantially compliant because respondent received it more than two months before actual hearing and filed an opposition, so due process was satisfied and denial on technicality was improper.

• Three-Day Notice Requirement and Substantial Compliance: While Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 mandatorily require service ensuring receipt at least three days before hearing to avoid surprise and allow study of the motion, the requirement is not absolute where its purpose has been realized. Liberal construction under Section 6, Rule 1 permits excuse of literal lapse that caused no prejudice and did not deprive the court of authority. Here, the August 17, 2007 setting never materialized; the RTC twice reset the hearing with due notice to September 25, 2007 and October 26, 2007, when the motion was actually heard. More than two months elapsed between respondent’s receipt on August 21, 2007 and the October 26, 2007 hearing, giving sufficient time to study the motion, and respondent in fact filed an opposition on September 20, 2007. His right to due process thus was not impinged, the test being presence of opportunity to be heard and time to meaningfully oppose.

• Three-day notice requirement in motions — Every written motion required to be heard and its notice of hearing must be served to ensure receipt by the other party at least three days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets a shorter notice. The rule is mandatory as an integral component of procedural due process, intended not for the movant but to avoid surprise to the adverse party and grant sufficient time to study the motion and meet its arguments. Non-compliance generally renders the motion a worthless piece of paper that does not toll the period to appeal, but the rule is not absolute and admits liberal construction where substantial compliance and lack of prejudice are shown.
• Substantial compliance / opportunity to be heard test — Where the adverse party was afforded and exercised the opportunity to be heard through pleadings filed in opposition before the motion was considered and resolved, the purpose of the three-day notice requirement is deemed realized and procedural due process substantially complied with. Postponements with due notice to the parties and actual filing of an opposition cure the initial irregularity, following Preysler, Jr. vs. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, Somera Vda. De Navarro vs. Navarro, and Jehan Shipping Corporation vs. National Food Authority.

• "The purpose of the three-day notice requirement, which was established not for the benefit of the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein." — States the rationale for the mandatory notice rule and why its benefit runs to the adverse party.
• "A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon." — States the general severe consequence of non-compliance before applying the liberal-construction exception.
• "Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard." — Anchors the substantial-compliance exception in due process, shifting focus from literal timeliness to actual hearing.
• "The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based." — Provides the controlling test applied to find the violation cured by resets and opposition.

• Preysler, Jr. vs. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010, 621 SCRA 636 — Followed as authority that the three-day notice rule is not absolute and that liberal construction is proper where lapse in literal observance caused no prejudice.
• Jehan Shipping Corporation vs. National Food Authority, 514 Phil. 166 (2005) — Followed for both the mandatory nature of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 and the exception that substantial compliance exists where the adverse party had opportunity to be heard and filed opposition despite lack of proper notice.
• Somera Vda. De Navarro vs. Navarro — Cited as authority that irregular first notice was substantially compliant where the motion was not considered and resolved until after several postponements duly notified to the parties.
• United Pulp and Paper Co. Inc. vs. Acropolis Central Guaranty Corporation, G.R. No. 171750, January 25, 2012 — Cited for the purpose of the three-day notice requirement to avoid surprise and allow study of the motion.
• Pallada vs. RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. 1, 364 Phil. 81 (1999) — Cited for the rule that a non-compliant motion is a worthless piece of paper the court has no authority to act upon.
• Nuñez vs. GSIS Family Bank, 511 Phil. 735 (2005) — Cited for the rule that defective motions for reconsideration do not toll the running of the period to appeal.

• Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15, Rules of Court — Require every written motion to be set for hearing with notice served to ensure receipt at least three days before hearing, and that the notice specify a hearing date not later than ten days after filing; applied to assess validity of the motion for reconsideration and to frame the general mandatory rule and its good-cause exception.
• Section 6, Rule 1, Rules of Court — Provides for liberal construction of the Rules to secure just, speedy and inexpensive disposition; relied upon to justify excusing literal non-observance that did not prejudice the adverse party.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chairperson), Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, and Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. concurred. No separate concurring opinions adding significant reasoning appear in the text.