Cabral vs. Puno

An order sustaining a motion to quash on the ground of prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense and, once final, cannot be set aside by the trial court; a motion for reconsideration filed only by the private prosecutor does not interrupt the period for appeal because the prosecution is under the direction and control of the Fiscal. An offended party who files a civil action arising from the same alleged forged document against the same defendant loses the right to intervene in the criminal case.

Lot No. 378-C and a deed of sale dated August 14, 1948 were at the center of the controversy between petitioner Eugenio Cabral and private respondent Silvino San Diego. Cabral was the accused in the resulting falsification charge, while San Diego was the offended party. The legal backdrop included Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which makes prescription a ground for total extinction of criminal liability, and the Rules of Court, under which an order sustaining a motion to quash on prescription bars another prosecution for the same offense.

On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on September 24, 1974 with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Baliwag Branch, accusing petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of Falsification of Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel of land. The deed of sale of Lot No. 378-C was notarized on August 14, 1948 and registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on August 26, 1948; as a consequence, the original certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title was issued. Since then, Cabral had publicly and continuously possessed the property and exercised acts of ownership thereon, facts apparently admitted in the letter of San Diego’s lawyer to Cabral on September 17, 1953.

Before arraignment, Cabral moved to quash the Information on the ground of prescription. After hearing the motion, Judge Juan F. Echiverri, in a Resolution dated March 25, 1975, granted the motion to quash and dismissed the Information on the ground of prescription. The order of dismissal was predicated upon the court’s finding that the factual averments contained in the motion to quash were supported by the evidence.

The private prosecutor, who was not present during the hearing of the motion to quash, filed a motion dated April 8, 1975 for reconsideration of the Resolution. Cabral opposed the motion on the ground that San Diego could no longer intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action in April 1974 against the same accused based on the same factual averments contained in the criminal Information. Acting on the motion for reconsideration, respondent Judge Benigno M. Puno ordered on May 12, 1975 that the Fiscal make known his position to the court. In compliance, the Fiscal submitted his comment dated May 19, 1975, expressing the view that the crime had not prescribed because Silvino San Diego stated that he only discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and that, in the interest of justice, arraignment and trial were proper to ventilate the respective evidence of both parties.

Two days later, on May 21, 1975, respondent Judge set aside the Resolution of March 25, 1975 and reinstated the Information. Cabral moved for reconsideration on the grounds that (a) the judgment of acquittal became final immediately upon promulgation and could not be recalled for correction or amendment, and (b) by instituting Civil Case No. 120-V-74, San Diego lost his right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. The motion was denied, as was the second motion for reconsideration, hence the petition raising the issue of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside its Resolution of March 25, 1975.

The record further showed that prior to the filing of the criminal case on September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations that San Diego’s signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre with the Bulacan Court of First Instance, docketed as Civil Case No. 120-V-74, for the recovery of the same property and damages. At the time the order of dismissal was issued, there was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged forged document filed by the offended party against the same defendant. The Court also noted that San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered on August 26, 1948.

• Prescription and Finality: Petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground of prescription, citing that the deed of sale was notarized on August 14, 1948, registered on August 26, 1948, the original certificate of title was cancelled, and he had publicly and continuously possessed the property; he argued that the order granting the motion to quash had become final and could not be recalled.
• Lack of Right to Intervene: Petitioner maintained that private respondent San Diego could no longer intervene in the criminal case because he had filed a civil action in April 1974 against the same accused based on the same factual averments.
• Finality of Acquittal: Petitioner argued that the judgment of acquittal became final immediately upon promulgation and could not be recalled for correction or amendment.
• Jurisdiction: Petitioner raised the issue of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside its Resolution of March 25, 1975.

• Non-Prescription: Respondent Provincial Fiscal expressed the view that the crime had not prescribed because Silvino San Diego stated that he only discovered the crime sometime in October 1970.
• Trial on the Merits: Respondent Provincial Fiscal argued that, in the interest of justice, arraignment and trial were proper to ventilate the respective evidence of both parties and to determine once and for all the direction and thrust of the evidence.

• Finality and Jurisdiction: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside its Resolution of March 25, 1975, dismissing the Information on the ground of prescription, after the Resolution had become final and executory.
• Effect of Private Prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecutor interrupted the period for appeal or prevented the dismissal from becoming final.
• Right of Offended Party to Intervene: Whether the offended party had the right to intervene in the criminal case, or to seek reconsideration or appeal from the order of dismissal, after filing a civil action based on the same alleged forged document against the same defendant.

• Finality and Jurisdiction: No. The trial court had no jurisdiction to set aside its final and executory Resolution of March 25, 1975; an order sustaining a motion to quash on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
• Effect of Private Prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration: No. The private prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the period for appeal; only the Fiscal, who had direction and control of the prosecution, could file such a motion or appeal.
• Right of Offended Party to Intervene: No. The offended party lost the right to intervene in the criminal case because he had a pending civil action arising from the same alleged forged document against the same defendant.

• Finality and Jurisdiction: The Rules of Court provide that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code makes prescription a ground for total extinction of criminal liability. Cabral was charged with falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2), which carries prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00; under Article 90, the crime prescribes in ten years. San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the deed was registered on August 26, 1948. The dismissal order of March 25, 1975 became final because the Fiscal did not seek reconsideration or appeal within fifteen days from receipt on March 31, 1975; when the Fiscal moved to reinstate on May 21, 1975, about two months later, the order had long been final. Under Pangan vs. Pasicolan, a trial court that set aside its own order dismissing a criminal case nine months later acted without jurisdiction because the first order had become final and executory. Under People vs. Sanchez, a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, and no court, not even the Supreme Court, can modify it even if erroneous.
• Effect of Private Prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration: Although the offended party, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration within the fifteen-day period, that filing did not stop the running of the period for appeal. The offended party did not have legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf. Prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only a motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal. The right of the offended party to appeal was recognized under the old Code of Criminal Procedure, but under Section 4, Rule 110, the prosecution is under the direction and control of the Fiscal without the limitation imposed by Section 107 of General Order No. 58; the right of the offended party to appeal from an order of dismissal is no longer recognized.
• Right of Offended Party to Intervene: Prior to the filing of the criminal case on September 24, 1974, spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations that San Diego’s signature on the August 14, 1948 deed was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre with the Bulacan Court of First Instance, docketed as Civil Case No. 120-V-74, for recovery of the same property and damages. Because at the time the order of dismissal was issued there was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged forged document filed by the offended party against the same defendant, the offended party had no right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case and consequently could not ask for reconsideration of the order of dismissal or appeal from it.

• Finality of an Order Quashing a Criminal Information on Prescription — An order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. Once the order becomes final, the trial court loses jurisdiction to set it aside, and any subsequent order reviving the Information is void. Applied: the March 25, 1975 dismissal became final because the Fiscal did not appeal or move for reconsideration within fifteen days.
• Prescription as Total Extinction of Criminal Liability — Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, prescription of the crime is a ground for total extinction of criminal liability. Applied: the falsification charge under Article 172(1)(2) prescribed in ten years under Article 90, and San Diego had actual or constructive notice of the alleged forgery after registration in 1948.
• Direction and Control of Prosecution by the Fiscal — Under Section 4, Rule 110, criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal. The private prosecutor or offended party does not have legal personality to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the prosecution; only the Fiscal’s motion or appeal can interrupt the period for appeal. Applied: the private prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration did not prevent the dismissal from becoming final.
• Loss of Right to Intervene by Offended Party with Pending Civil Action — An offended party who files a civil action arising out of the same alleged forged document against the same defendant loses the right to intervene in the criminal prosecution and cannot seek reconsideration or appeal from an order of dismissal. Applied: San Diego and his spouse had a pending civil action, Civil Case No. 120-V-74, for recovery of the same property and damages.

• "The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense." — States the controlling rule that made the dismissal a bar and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to revive the Information.
• "While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf." — Explains why the private prosecutor’s motion did not prevent finality and why only the Fiscal could interrupt the appeal period.
• "It appearing, therefore, from the record that at the time the order of dismissal was issued there was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged forged document filed by the offended party against the same defendant, the offended party has no right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case,, and consequently cannot ask for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal, or appeal from said order." — States the basis for denying the offended party the right to intervene and seek reconsideration or appeal.
• "a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, ... Under the circumstances, the sentence having become final, no court, not even this high Tribunal, can modify it even if erroneous ..." — Quoted from People vs. Sanchez and applied to affirm that the final dismissal could not be modified.

• Pangan vs. Pasicolan, 103 Phil. 1143 — Controlling precedent; the trial court set aside its own order dismissing a criminal case nine months later, and the Supreme Court held the subsequent order null and void for want of jurisdiction because the first order had become final and executory.
• People vs. Sanchez, 101 Phil. 745, 748 — Cited for the rule that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, and that a final sentence cannot be modified even if erroneous.
• People vs. Velez, 77 Phil. 1026 — Cited in support of the rule that the offended party has no right to intervene or appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case.
• People vs. Capistrano, 90 Phil. 823 — Cited with People vs. Velez in support of the ruling that the offended party cannot intervene in the criminal prosecution.

• Article 89, Revised Penal Code — Provides that prescription of the crime is a ground for total extinction of criminal liability; applied to treat the dismissal on prescription as extinguishing the criminal action.
• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the falsification charge under Article 172(1) and (2) prescribes in ten years; applied in the Court’s discussion of prescription.
• Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2), Revised Penal Code — Defines the falsification offense charged, with penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00.
• Sections 2(f) and 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court — Provide that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; applied to bar revival of the Information.
• Section 4, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal; applied to hold that the private prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the period for appeal.
• Section 107, General Order No. 58 — The old rule subjecting the direction of the prosecution to the right of the injured person to appeal from a decision denying a legal right; the Court noted this limitation is no longer recognized under the new Rules.

Fernando, C.J.; Barredo (Chairman); Aquino; and Concepcion, Jr., JJ.