Cabas vs. Vda. De Penaverde

A testator's use of broad, general language in will dispositions and minor omissions in the will's provisions do not negate testamentary capacity, and advanced age, physical infirmity, or sedation for medical procedures do not per se impair soundness of mind where the testator understood the nature of the estate, the proper objects of her bounty, and the character of the testamentary act as required under Article 799 of the Civil Code.

Fidela Y. Vargas was a 94-year-old unmarried resident of Olongapo City, without offspring, who owned an estate valued at approximately PHP 8,000,000.00 consisting of real properties in Sorsogon, bank accounts in various locations, and income from agricultural harvests. Marita S. Cabas was Vargas' longtime assistant who had cared for her for over 20 years without regular monthly salary or stipend. Bernardita Vargas Feranil Vda. De Penaverde was Vargas' first cousin who opposed the probate of the Will. Atty. Juanito Atienza, a notary public, had known Vargas since the 1970s when they practiced law together in Olongapo City and was engaged to draft her will.

Fidela Y. Vargas was a 94-year-old unmarried woman residing at No. 2228 Rizal Ave., EBB, Olongapo City, with no offspring. She owned real properties in Bacon, Casiguran, and Bulan, Sorsogon, bank accounts in Olongapo City and other locations, and derived income from copra and palay harvests from her properties. Marita S. Cabas served as Vargas' assistant and caregiver for over 20 years, during which she did not receive a regular monthly salary or stipend. Atty. Juanito Atienza, a notary public who had known Vargas since the 1970s from their shared legal practice in Olongapo City, was engaged to draft Vargas' will.

On March 5, 2018, while Vargas was confined at the hospital, Atty. Atienza witnessed and notarized a General Power of Attorney that Vargas executed in favor of Cabas. Vargas also instructed Atty. Atienza to draft her last will and to expedite the process. When he inquired about her intended beneficiary, Vargas indicated she wished to leave her estate to Cabas, and when asked if there were additional beneficiaries, she replied "wala na" (none). The following day, March 6, 2018, Atty. Atienza returned to the hospital with the drafted Will. Juana T. Tamayo read the Will's contents aloud to Vargas, who affirmed them by saying "tama" (correct). Atty. Atienza then read the Will aloud to her a second time, and Vargas again affirmed by nodding and saying "tama." When asked whether the document was her Last Will, Vargas responded "oo" (yes). Due to an IV injection in her arm, Vargas was unable to use her right hand and instead placed her thumbmark on the document. The execution was witnessed by Ramoncito Sapinoso, Alvin S. Alabanza, and Tamayo, with photographs taken by Atty. Atienza's employee, Albert Edenias. Atty. Atienza signed the acknowledgment portion and affixed his notarial seal. The Will bequeathed all of Vargas' properties to Cabas and designated Cabas as executor.

Vargas passed away on March 7, 2018. The Will was thereafter deposited with the RTC Office of the Clerk of Court of Olongapo City. On July 6, 2018, Cabas filed a petition for probate before the RTC of Olongapo City, docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 2018-0-32. Bernardita Vargas Feranil Vda. De Penaverde, Vargas' first cousin, filed an opposition. Dr. Cyrus Peralta, Vargas' attending physician, testified that Vargas faced severe physical challenges and was mostly asleep due to severe pain, sedation for a colonoscopy procedure, and extensive medication, but confirmed that each time he visited her, she consistently displayed a sound mind, was fully responsive, and was able to hear, understand, and respond appropriately, though her answers were brief. The RTC and the CA both found substantial compliance with the formalities for will execution but disallowed probate, doubting Vargas' mental capacity based on her advanced age, sedated state, the will's broad language lacking specific property descriptions, the incomplete Item IV and omitted Item V, and the expedited preparation of the Will.

• Testamentary Capacity: Petitioner maintained that the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that Vargas was of sound mind when she executed her Will.
• Age and Health Not Dispositive: Petitioner argued that Vargas' advanced age, medical conditions, and bedridden state do not necessarily imply that she was mentally incapacitated at the time the Will was executed.

• Procedural Bar: Respondent posited that Cabas was seeking re-evaluation of evidence already conducted by the RTC under the pretext of alleging a misapprehension of facts, which is not allowed in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Conclusiveness of Factual Findings: Respondent noted that the CA fully adopted the RTC's factual findings affirming the disallowance of Vargas' will.

• Ground for Disallowance: Whether there was a proper ground to disallow the Will.

• Ground for Disallowance: No. There was no proper ground to disallow the Will. The lower courts erred in concluding that Vargas lacked testamentary capacity, as the evidence established that she satisfied the three-part test under Article 799 of the Civil Code — knowledge of the nature of her estate, the proper objects of her bounty, and the character of her testamentary act.

• Ground for Disallowance: While the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, generally carry conclusive weight, the Court found it necessary to reexamine certain factual issues because the lower courts misinterpreted facts and overlooked details, creating an incongruence between their factual findings and the legal principles applied. Both the RTC and the CA acknowledged substantial compliance with the formalities under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, including that the Will was executed in a language known to Vargas, that she affixed her thumbprint at the end, that the instrumental witnesses and notary public signed, that the Will was read aloud to Vargas twice, and that the pages were numbered using numerical figures rather than letters — a minor formatting error that did not alter the testator's intent. Despite this, both courts disallowed probate based on doubts about Vargas' mental capacity.

The lower courts erred in requiring specific property descriptions in the Will to demonstrate soundness of mind. Nowhere in the law does it state that the testator must include specific details such as property titles, bank branches, or account numbers. The broad language referring to properties "all over the Philippines" reflected a deliberate intent to encompass all properties under a single directive, not a lack of understanding. What the law requires is a general understanding of the nature and scope of the property to be distributed.

As to the proper objects of bounty, the lower courts' speculation that Vargas could not have intended to give her estate to her house help and personal assistant was baseless. Citing Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the motives of the testator cannot be precisely determined by the parties or the courts, and speculation or conjecture is not a valid ground to allow or disallow probate. The conclusion disregarded the possibility that close personal relationships or gratitude for 20 years of service without remuneration could shape one's final wishes.

Regarding sedation, Dr. Peralta confirmed that Vargas was sedated only for less than an hour immediately before the colonoscopy procedure and that she consistently displayed a sound mind during his visits. The fact that Vargas signed a consent form but used her thumbprint on the Will was explained by the IV in her arm, which hindered her ability to write. Under Article 799, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all reasoning faculties or that the mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease. Neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of memory, nor eccentricities are sufficient, singly or jointly, to show testamentary incapacity.

The incomplete Item IV and omitted Item V did not materially affect the testator's intent. Atty. Atienza's testimony showed that Vargas clearly and deliberately identified Cabas as the sole beneficiary, angrily rejecting any other recipient. The Will was read aloud to her twice, and she affirmed it before affixing her thumbmark. The expedited preparation was driven by the testator's own desire to hasten execution. Under Article 800, every person is presumed of sound mind in the absence of proof to the contrary, and the burden rests on the oppositor. Respondent Vda. De Penaverde fell short of satisfying this burden.

• Testamentary Capacity (Soundness of Mind) — Under Article 799 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all reasoning faculties or that the mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury, or other cause. It is sufficient that the testator was able at the time of making the will to know: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of his bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. The Court applied this three-part test and found that Vargas satisfied all three requisites despite her advanced age, physical infirmity, and sedation.

• Presumption of Sound Mind — Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, every person is presumed of sound mind in the absence of proof to the contrary. The burden of proving that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making dispositions rests on the person who opposes the probate of the will. The Court held that respondent failed to discharge this burden.

• Non-Inquiry into Testator's Motives — The motives of the testator cannot be precisely determined by the parties or the courts. Speculation, surmise, or conjecture about the testator's intention is not a valid and legal ground to allow or disallow the probate of a will. The Court applied this doctrine from Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals to reject the lower courts' speculation that Vargas could not have intended to leave her estate to her longtime assistant.

• Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Validity in Probate — A probate court's inquiry is limited to the due execution or extrinsic validity of the will — whether the testator, of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. The probate court cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the estate by the testator.

• Exception to Conclusiveness of Factual Findings — While factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, carry conclusive weight and Rule 45 generally excludes factual re-evaluation, the Supreme Court may reexamine factual issues when some facts are misinterpreted or some details are overlooked, resulting in erroneous conclusions.

• "To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act." — This is the Court's quotation of Article 799 of the Civil Code, articulating the controlling three-part test for testamentary capacity that the lower courts misapplied.

• "But nowhere in the law does it state that the testator must include specific details or precise descriptions of their estate, i.e., property titles, bank branches, or bank account numbers, in the will to demonstrate soundness of mind." — This passage refutes the lower courts' erroneous requirement that the Will's broad language reflected a lack of testamentary capacity, clarifying that general understanding of the estate suffices.

• "The parties cannot correctly guess or surmise the motives of the testator, and neither can the courts. Such surmise, speculation or conjecture is not a valid and legal ground to allow or disallow the probate of the will." — This formulation, drawn from Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, establishes that courts may not substitute their own assumptions about rational testamentary motives for the testator's expressed intent.

• "Neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient, singly or jointly, to show testamentary incapacity." — This passage, rooted in early jurisprudence, establishes that none of these conditions, individually or collectively, automatically negates testamentary capacity.

• Ortega vs. Valmonte, G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005, 514 Phil. 436 — Cited for the principle that the law favors the probate of a will, placing the burden of proof on those who argue against its admission.

• Estate of Cabacungan vs. Laigo, 671 Phil. 132 (2011) — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, carry conclusive weight.

• Orion Savings Bank vs. Shigekane Suzuki, 746 Phil. 971 (2014) — Cited for the exception allowing reexamination of factual issues when facts are misinterpreted or details overlooked.

• Tanchanco vs. Santos, 873 Phil. 371 (2020) — Cited for the principle that the probate court cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will.

• Baltazar vs. Laxa, 685 Phil. 484 (2012) — Cited for the definition of due execution as the testator, of sound mind, freely executing the will in accordance with formalities prescribed by law.

• Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, 180 Phil. 737 (1979) — Cited for the doctrine that the motives of the testator cannot be surmised by the parties or the courts, and that speculation is not a valid ground to allow or disallow probate.

• Bagtas vs. Paguio, 22 Phil. 227 (1912) — Cited for the principle that soundness of mind does not require full possession of all reasoning faculties.

• Torres vs. Lopez, 48 Phil. 772 (1926) — Cited for the principle that old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of memory, appointment of a guardian, or eccentricities are not sufficient, singly or jointly, to show testamentary incapacity.

• Article 799, Civil Code — Defines the standard for testamentary capacity: the testator need not be in full possession of all reasoning faculties; it suffices that the testator knew the nature of the estate, the proper objects of bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. The Court applied this three-part test and found Vargas satisfied all requisites.

• Article 800, Civil Code — Presumes every person of sound mind in the absence of proof to the contrary and places the burden on the oppositor to prove the testator was not of sound mind. The Court held that respondent failed to discharge this burden.

• Articles 805 and 806, Civil Code — Prescribe the formalities for notarial wills: subscription by the testator, attestation by three or more credible witnesses, signing of each page on the left margin, numbering of pages, and acknowledgment before a notary public. Both lower courts found substantial compliance, and the Court affirmed that the use of numerical figures instead of letters for page numbering was a minor formatting error that did not affect the testator's intent.

• Section 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court — Provides that no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless proved and allowed in the proper court, and that such allowance is conclusive as to due execution. The Court cited this to delineate the probate court's inquiry into extrinsic validity.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred.