Cabang vs. Basay

A family home cannot be constituted on property owned by another, and a final and executory judgment must be executed strictly according to its terms without varying it on a belated family-home claim. Petitioners' houses stood on respondents' titled lot, so exemption from execution did not attach.

Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot No. 7777, Ts-222 in Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2,768 issued March 9, 1966 pursuant to Decree No. N-64, but he and his heirs never occupied or possessed it. On June 16, 1987, respondents bought the property from Odong's heirs for P8,000.00, resulting in cancellation of OCT No. 0-2,768 and issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22,048 on August 6, 1987 in respondents' names, and respondents likewise did not occupy it. Petitioners, on the other hand, had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel since 1956 as awardees in the cadastral proceedings of Lot No. 7778, claiming Lot No. 7778 in the belief that the area they occupied was Lot No. 7778.

When the Municipality of Molave relocated the townsite lots in 1992 after a large portion of Lot No. 7778 was used as a public road and discrepancies emerged, it was discovered that petitioners were actually occupying Lot No. 7777. Because of that discovery, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of property on June 23, 1992. According to the record summarized by the CA, the RTC on July 19, 1996 dismissed the case on laches, but the CA on December 23, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207 reversed and declared respondents entitled to possession subject to petitioners' rights under Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548, remanding the records for further proceedings, and the SC's denial of petitioners' G.R. No. 139601 on October 18, 1999 became final on February 15, 2000.

Upon remand, the RTC commissioned the Municipal Assessor of Molave to value the improvements, and the Commissioner's Report listed three residential buildings with a total appraised value of P49,566.50, comprising Virginia Cabang's building at P21,580.65, Jovencio Capuno's building at P18,663.75, and Amelito Mata's building at P5,658.10 plus toilet at P1,500.00 and plants and trees at P2,164.00. Thereafter, upon petitioners' verbal request, the RTC ordered the survey tied to BLLM No. 34, and Geodetic Engineer Diosdado L. de Guzman submitted a March 2002 report finding Virginia Cabang occupying Lot 7777-A with 303 square meters and part of Lot 7778-A with 76 square meters with three houses of light materials, and Bernardo Mendez occupying Lot 7777-B with 236 square meters and Lot 7778-B with 243 square meters with a concrete house, with an existing road traversing Lot 7778-C with 116 square meters. During the May 10, 2002 hearing respondents' offer of P21,000.00 for the improvements was rejected by petitioners while the RTC expressed difficulty ordering execution because the houses might be a family home, and after respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion for Execution on June 18, 2002 seeking removal or demolition, the RTC denied execution on September 6, 2002 on family-home ground.

• Family Home Exemption: Petitioners argued that the property in controversy is a duly constituted family home which is not subject to execution, so the CA erred in reversing the RTC judgment denying execution.

• Execution of Final Judgment: Whether the RTC could refuse execution of the final CA judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207 on the ground that petitioners' improvements were a family home.
• Family Home Exemption: Whether petitioners' residential houses on Lot No. 7777 constitute an exempt family home when the land is owned by respondents.

• Execution of Final Judgment: No. Once the CA judgment declaring respondents entitled to possession became final and executory, issuance of the writ became the RTC's ministerial duty and the writ must conform strictly to the judgment without variation.
• Family Home Exemption: No. The houses are not an exempt family home because the land on which they stand is owned by respondents and ownership had long become final, while petitioners stay only by tolerance.

• Execution of Final Judgment: The SC reasoned that the remand was solely to enforce the final CA judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207 by determining petitioners' rights under Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 and rendering judgment thereon in accordance with the evidence and that decision. A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified even to correct errors of fact or law, except for clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice, and void judgments, and execution issues as a matter of right as the issuing court's ministerial duty. A writ must adhere to every essential particular of the judgment and any order going beyond or varying its tenor is a nullity, otherwise due process is violated. Raising the family-home theory only at execution, when from inception the improvements were known to be residential houses, varied the final judgment and raised a new theory barred because theories not brought before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
• Family Home Exemption: The SC reasoned that under Article 153 of the Family Code a family home is deemed constituted from occupation as family residence without need of judicial or extrajudicial constitution, and is generally exempt from execution under Rule 39, Section 13(a) if duly constituted. Constitution requires ownership, as the home must be part of absolute community or conjugal partnership property, exclusive property of either spouse with consent, or property of the unmarried head of family, and cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. Petitioners failed that requisite because the land is owned by respondents as settled with finality in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207, leaving petitioners' stay as mere tolerance. The SC added the issue is factual and it is not a trier of facts, with no exception justifying reweighing, and the claim was a ploy to forestall enforcement of a final decision whose execution is the life of the law.

• Finality of judgment and ministerial execution — A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified in any respect except for clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice, and void judgments; once final, the winning party is entitled to execution as a matter of right and issuance is ministerial. The SC applied it to compel execution of the 1998 CA possession judgment that became final in 2000 despite the RTC's family-home objection.
• Conformity of writ to judgment — A writ of execution must adhere to every essential particular of the judgment and conform to its tenor; if different from, beyond, or varying the judgment, it is a nullity pro tanto. The SC applied it to hold the RTC's refusal to execute went beyond its tasked enforcement of rights under Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548.
• Bar on new theories on appeal — Points of law, theories and issues not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it is unfair to the adverse party deprived of presenting counter-evidence. The SC applied it to reject the belated family-home claim raised only at execution.
• Family home constitution and ownership requisite — A family home is deemed constituted from occupation as family residence without judicial or extrajudicial act and is exempt from execution if duly constituted, but it must be established on (a) absolute community property, or (b) conjugal partnership property, or (c) exclusive property of either spouse with consent, or if by an unmarried head of family only on his or her own property, never on co-owned or another's property. The SC applied it to deny exemption because petitioners' houses stood on respondents' titled Lot No. 7777.
• SC not a trier of facts — Questions of fact cannot be raised in appeal via certiorari and the SC does not reweigh evidence unless findings are totally devoid of support or clearly erroneous, subject to eleven recognized exceptions. The SC applied it to decline revisiting whether the houses were a family home.

• "A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land." — States the immutability rule that barred the RTC from refusing execution on a new family-home ground.
• "The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law." — Quotes Article 153 to define when constitution occurs and the scope of exemption invoked by petitioners.
• "The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other." — States the ownership requisite that petitioners failed because the lot belonged to respondents.

• Biglang-awa vs. Philippine Trust Company, G.R. No. 158998, March 28, 2008 — Cited for the rule that a final and executory judgment may no longer be modified even to correct errors of fact or law.
• Kelley, Jr. vs. Planters Products, Inc., G.R. No. 172263, July 9, 2008 — Followed for the rule that a family home must be part of absolute community, conjugal, exclusive spousal property with consent, or unmarried head's own property.
• Patricio vs. Dario III, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006 — Cited for the definition that the family home is the dwelling where husband and wife or unmarried head reside including the land, constituted jointly.
• Manacop vs. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 735 (1997) — Followed for the rule that no judicial or extrajudicial constitution is needed because occupation as family residence suffices.
• Aluad vs. Aluad, G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008 — Cited for the bar against raising points of law and theories not brought before the trial court for the first time on appeal.

• Article 448, Civil Code — Gives the landowner where building in good faith stands the right to appropriate the works after indemnity under Articles 546 and 548 or oblige the builder to pay for the land, applied as the governing framework of the final CA judgment remanded for determination.
• Article 546, Civil Code — Provides refund of necessary expenses to every possessor and useful expenses to good-faith possessor with retention, applied as part of petitioners' builder's rights to be fixed on remand.
• Article 547, Civil Code — Allows good-faith possessor to remove useful improvements removable without damage unless the recovering party refunds, applied as part of the remanded builder's rights.
• Article 548, Civil Code — Denies refund for luxury expenses but allows removal of ornaments without injury, applied as part of the remanded builder's rights.
• Article 153, Family Code — Deems the family home constituted upon occupation as family residence and exempts it from execution while beneficiaries reside, subject to value limits of P300,000.00 urban and P200,000.00 rural, applied to test petitioners' exemption claim.
• Article 156, Family Code — Limits establishment to community, conjugal, or exclusive spousal property with consent, applied through case law to require ownership by the constituting family.
• Rule 39, Section 13(a), Rules of Court — Exempts the family home from execution if duly constituted, invoked by petitioners but held inapplicable for lack of ownership.