Caballero vs. Commission on Elections

Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 does not automatically restore or reestablish a candidate's domicile or residence in the Philippines for purposes of the residency requirement for local elective office. The candidate must still prove that he reestablished his domicile of choice in the locality where he seeks election, and the length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, not retroacting to the time of his birth. A declaration in a Certificate of Candidacy of compliance with the one-year residency requirement when the candidate actually failed to meet it constitutes material misrepresentation warranting cancellation of the COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner was a natural-born Filipino who later worked abroad, established residence in Canada, and acquired Canadian citizenship. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, which allows natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship through naturalization in a foreign country to reacquire or retain Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225 requires those seeking elective public office to meet the qualifications required by the Constitution and existing laws, including the residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code (RA No. 7160), which mandates that a candidate for local elective office must be a resident of the locality where he intends to be elected for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private respondent filed a Petition to deny due course to or cancel petitioner's certificate of candidacy, alleging that petitioner made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-resident thereof.

During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was not properly served with a copy of the petition, as it was served by registered mail rather than personally at his address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He nevertheless received a copy of the petition during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private respondent's substantial allegations.

Petitioner argued that prior to filing his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012, and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to RA No. 9225. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012, to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. He claimed that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen, as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his family, and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacations while working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.

On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he was a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to the election, and ordered the cancellation of his COC. The First Division found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 by taking his Oath of Allegiance and validly renouncing his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. The COMELEC held that petitioner's naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes, and that he failed to prove that he reestablished his domicile there.

Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013, and the election returns showed that petitioner won over private respondent. Private respondent filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation, but on May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes. On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, and on May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation. On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the May 3, 2013 Resolution, praying for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes in favor of petitioner were stray votes, the declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation, and the proclamation of private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor. On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution, and private respondent took his Oath of Office on December 20, 2013.

• Procedural Non-Compliance: Petitioner argued that private respondent violated Section 4, paragraphs (1) and (4), Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, when the petition was not personally served on him and no affidavit was attached stating the reason for resorting to registered mail as a mode of service; thus, the petition should have been denied outright.
• No Abandonment of Domicile: Petitioner argued that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile, as he was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes, studied and worked there for a couple of years, paid his community tax certificate, was a registered voter, exercised his right of suffrage, and built his house therein; his frequent visits to Uyugan during vacations from work abroad meant his domicile had not been lost.
• Substantial Compliance with Residency: Petitioner argued that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate is not strictly on the period of residence but on the candidate's acquaintance with his constituents' vital needs; his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election constituted substantial compliance with the law.

• Material Misrepresentation: Private respondent filed the petition to deny due course to or cancel petitioner's COC on the ground that petitioner made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-resident thereof.
• Execution of the Resolution: Private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the May 3, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the En Banc, praying for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes in favor of petitioner were stray votes, the declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation, and the proclamation of private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor.

• Procedural Compliance: Whether the COMELEC En Banc gravely erred in disregarding the procedural rules under COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 when it entertained private respondent's petition despite the failure to personally serve a copy thereof on petitioner and to attach an affidavit explaining the use of registered mail.
• Abandonment of Domicile: Whether petitioner abandoned his Philippine domicile when he worked in several foreign countries and became a Canadian citizen.
• Substantial Compliance with Residency: Whether petitioner's reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship and his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to the election constituted substantial compliance with the one-year residency requirement.

• Procedural Compliance: No. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction, and the COMELEC may suspend its own rules in the interest of justice. The issue of petitioner's residency pertains to his qualification and eligibility to run for public office, which is imbued with public interest, justifying the COMELEC's suspension of its rules.
• Abandonment of Domicile: Yes. Petitioner effectively abandoned his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes when he became a Canadian citizen, as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. His frequent visits to Uyugan during vacations cannot be considered a waiver of such abandonment.
• Substantial Compliance with Residency: No. Petitioner's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He failed to prove that he reestablished his domicile of choice in Uyugan for at least one year immediately preceding the election, and his nine-month stay was not substantial compliance with the law.

• Procedural Compliance: The Court held that while private respondent failed to comply with the requirements of personal service and the affidavit explaining the use of registered mail, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Under Section 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Commission may suspend its rules in the interest of justice and to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. The Court cited Hayudini vs. COMELEC, which sustained the COMELEC's liberal treatment of a petition despite non-compliance with procedural rules, holding that election contests are imbued with public interest and that the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes. The Court adopted the COMELEC's ratiocination that petitioner was given a copy of the petition during the conference, was accorded the opportunity to rebut all allegations, and even filed a Memorandum containing his defenses, so he was never deprived of due process.

• Abandonment of Domicile: The Court defined "residence" in election law as synonymous with "domicile" or legal residence — "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)." A domicile of origin is acquired at birth and continues until abandoned by acquisition of a new domicile of choice. Citing Coquilla vs. COMELEC, the Court ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Since permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan during vacations could not be considered a waiver of such abandonment.

• Substantial Compliance with Residency: The Court cited Japzon vs. COMELEC for the rule that reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 has no automatic impact or effect on residence or domicile. The candidate merely has the option to again establish his domicile in the Philippines, and the length of his residence shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, not retroacting to the time of his birth. The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence that he reestablished his residence in Uyugan within one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. The period from September 13, 2012 (when he reacquired his Filipino citizenship) to May 12, 2013 was less than the one-year residency required by law. The Court rejected petitioner's argument of substantial compliance, citing Aquino vs. Commission on Elections that "not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself." The Court concluded that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC, which is a ground for cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the false representation pertained to a material matter — his qualification for elective office — and consisted of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would render him ineligible.

• Residence as Domicile in Election Law — The term "residence" in election law is understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence — "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)." The Court applied this doctrine to determine that petitioner's domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes was abandoned when he established a domicile of choice in Canada.

• Abandonment of Domicile of Origin by Naturalization — Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Since permanent resident status in a foreign country is required for the acquisition of that country's citizenship, the naturalized citizen effectively abandons his Philippine domicile and transfers his domicile of choice to the foreign country. Frequent visits to the Philippines during vacations cannot be considered a waiver of such abandonment.

• Reacquisition of Citizenship Does Not Automatically Restore Domicile — Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 has no automatic impact or effect on residence or domicile. The candidate merely has the option to again establish his domicile in the Philippines, and the length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, not retroacting to the time of his birth. The candidate must prove that he reestablished his domicile of choice in the locality where he seeks election.

• Material Misrepresentation in Certificate of Candidacy — To justify the cancellation of a COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the false representation must pertain to a material matter — the qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code. Aside from materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

• Liberal Construction of COMELEC Rules of Procedure — The COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction, and the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules in the interest of justice and to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. Election contests are imbued with public interest, and the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired.

• "The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence." — This passage establishes the doctrinal separation between citizenship and residency under RA No. 9225, which is central to the Court's reasoning that reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically restore domicile.

• "Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth." — This quotation from Japzon v. COMELEC articulates the controlling rule that reacquisition of citizenship merely creates an option to reestablish domicile, and the residency period is counted from the time the candidate makes the locality his domicile of choice.

• "A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself." — This quotation from Aquino v. Commission on Elections supports the Court's rejection of petitioner's substantial compliance argument, emphasizing that the will of the voters cannot substitute for a legal qualification requirement.

• Hayudini vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014 — Controlling precedent on the liberal construction of COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the COMELEC's power to suspend its rules in the interest of justice, particularly in election contests imbued with public interest.
• Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections, 443 Phil. 861 (2002) — Followed for the rule that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines, and for the definition of "residence" as synonymous with "domicile" in election law.
• Japzon vs. Commission on Elections, 596 Phil. 354 (2009) — Followed for the rule that reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 has no automatic impact or effect on residence or domicile, and that the candidate must prove reestablishment of domicile of choice.
• Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 467 (1995) — Followed for the principle that the will of the voters cannot substitute for a qualification requirement mandated by law, rejecting the argument of substantial compliance with residency requirements.
• Salcedo II vs. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377 (1999) — Cited for the rule that false representation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code must pertain to a material matter affecting the substantive rights of a candidate.
• Villafuerte vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014 — Cited for the rule that material representation under Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as requisite residency, age, citizenship, or other legal qualifications under the Local Government Code.

• Section 39, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Provides the qualifications for elective local officials, including the requirement that a candidate be a resident of the locality where he intends to be elected for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election. The Court applied this provision to determine that petitioner failed to meet the one-year residency requirement.
• Section 5(2), Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003) — Requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws, and to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. The Court held that petitioner complied with this provision but still failed the residency requirement.
• Section 74, Omnibus Election Code — Governs the contents of a certificate of candidacy, requiring the candidate to state that he is eligible for the office and that the facts stated therein are true. The Court applied this provision to determine that petitioner's declaration of one-year residency was a material representation.
• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Governs petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein is false. The Court applied this provision to uphold the cancellation of petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation of his residency.
• Section 4, Rule 1, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Allows the COMELEC to suspend its rules in the interest of justice and to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. The Court applied this provision to sustain the COMELEC's liberal treatment of private respondent's petition despite procedural non-compliance.
• Section 4, Rule 23, COMELEC Rules of Procedure (as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523) — Requires personal service of the petition on the respondent before filing, or an affidavit stating the reason for resorting to registered mail. The Court acknowledged private respondent's non-compliance but held that the COMELEC validly suspended its rules.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and Perez, JJ., concurred. Brion and Leonen, JJ., filed separate concurring opinions. Jardeleza, J., took no part due to prior OSG action. Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., were on official leave. Reyes, J., was on leave.

• Justice Brion (Separate Concurring Opinion) — Concurred with the dismissal of the petition but added that the loss and acquisition of residence involve the determination of intent, and that Canadian citizenship laws, while not controlling, may serve as supporting guides in determining petitioner's intent. Justice Brion emphasized that permanent residency is a requirement for Canadian naturalization, which indicates petitioner's intent to abandon his domicile of origin. He also noted that petitioner could have secured a Returning Former Filipino Visa under Commonwealth Act No. 613 to establish permanent residency in the Philippines prior to reacquiring his citizenship, but the records contained no evidence of such visa.

• Justice Leonen (Concurring Opinion) — Concurred in the result and joined Justice Brion's opinion that citizenship and residency are separate and distinct requirements for qualification for local elective office. Justice Leonen emphasized that domicile is a matter of intention and that naturalization has no automatic effect on domicile. He manifested a reservation about the reference to and application of the Canadian Citizenship Law, noting that foreign laws do not prove themselves and must be alleged and proved, and that respondent never referred to or alleged the Canadian Citizenship Law in support of his cause.