Cabadar vs. People

An accused’s motion to dismiss grounded on denial of the right to speedy trial does not automatically constitute a demurrer to evidence even if it contains passing remarks on the inadequacy of the prosecution’s evidence. The true nature of the pleading is determined by (1) the allegations made in good faith, (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed, and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it. A demurrer to evidence requires that the prosecution has rested its case; where the formal offer of exhibits has not yet been acted upon and the prosecution has not yet formally rested, a motion filed at that juncture cannot be deemed a demurrer.

On June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Cabador was charged with murder, allegedly committed in conspiracy with others, for the killing of Atty. Jun N. Valerio. Cabador was arrested in November 2001 and remained detained at the Quezon City jail throughout the proceedings. Trial commenced after his arraignment on January 8, 2002. Over the next five years, the prosecution presented only five witnesses. The proceedings were marked by numerous postponements attributable to the prosecution’s failure to secure the attendance of its witnesses or the public prosecutor’s absence.

• The Criminal Charge: Petitioner Antonio Cabador was charged with the murder of Atty. Jun N. Valerio, alleged to have been committed in conspiracy with others. He was arrested in November 2001 and detained continuously at the Quezon City jail.
• Protracted Trial: After arraignment on January 8, 2002, trial proceeded intermittently for over five years. The prosecution presented only five witnesses. The record showed numerous postponements, many due to the absence of the public prosecutor or the prosecution’s failure to ensure the presence of its witnesses.
• Termination of Prosecution’s Presentation: On February 13, 2006, the RTC declared the prosecution’s presentation of evidence terminated and ordered the prosecution to make a written formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days. The prosecution subsequently requested and obtained three extensions of time, with the final extension expiring on July 28, 2006.
• Motion to Dismiss: On August 1, 2006, Cabador filed a motion to dismiss. The motion extensively recounted the delays, postponements, and extensions, identified the failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer despite three extensions as a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and pointed out that absent a formal offer, the court had no evidence to consider. It also contained a brief statement that the prosecution witnesses had no knowledge of his alleged participation in the crime and that the charge had “no leg to stand on.”
• Prosecution’s Formal Offer: The prosecution had, unknown to Cabador, filed a last-minute formal offer of evidence on the same date, August 1, 2006. At that point, the trial court had not yet ruled on the admissibility of the offered exhibits nor given Cabador the opportunity to object, and the prosecution had not formally rested its case.
• RTC Order: The RTC treated the motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. Since no prior leave of court had been secured, the court declared that Cabador had waived the right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision with respect to him.

• Nature of the Motion: Petitioner Cabador maintained that his pleading was a motion to dismiss grounded on the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He argued that the motion’s primary thrust was the unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delay in the proceedings, and that the passing remarks about the insufficiency of evidence were mere conclusions highlighting the prosecution’s inaction.
• Prematurity of a Demurrer: Cabador contended that a demurrer to evidence under Section 23, Rule 119 presupposes that the prosecution has already rested its case. Since the prosecution’s formal offer had just been filed and had not yet been acted upon, and the defense had not been given the opportunity to object to the exhibits, the prosecution could not be deemed to have rested; hence, no valid demurrer could yet be interposed.

• Demurrer to Evidence: The People of the Philippines, represented by the public prosecutor, effectively argued that Cabador’s motion to dismiss was a demurrer to evidence because it asserted that the prosecution had presented no admissible evidence and that the charge lacked factual basis. Such assertions, it was implied, constituted an attack on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence, warranting treatment as a demurrer.
• Waiver of Right to Present Defense: Since the motion was a demurrer to evidence filed without prior leave of court, the RTC correctly applied the second paragraph of Section 23, Rule 119, and declared that Cabador had waived the right to adduce evidence in his defense and submitted the case for judgment on the prosecution’s evidence alone.

• Nature of the Motion: Whether the RTC correctly treated petitioner Cabador’s August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, thereby resulting in a waiver of his right to present evidence and the submission of the case for decision.

• Nature of the Motion: The RTC’s characterization of the motion as a demurrer to evidence was erroneous. Applying the three-part test in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections — namely, (1) the good-faith allegations of the pleading, (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it was filed, and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it — the motion was properly a motion to dismiss grounded on the denial of the right to speedy trial. The overwhelming bulk of the motion’s allegations detailed the protracted delays, repeated postponements attributable to the prosecution, and the prosecution’s failure to file a formal offer despite several extensions. The specific invocation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial confirmed that the primary objective was to terminate the proceeding due to oppressive delay. The few isolated statements that the court had “no evidence to consider” and that witnesses lacked knowledge of petitioner’s participation were mere conclusions that did not dissect any particular testimony or documentary exhibit and merely underscored the barrenness of the record after five years of trial. A demurrer to evidence, by contrast, presupposes an examination of the prosecution’s evidence to demonstrate its insufficiency on the elements of the crime. Cabador’s motion performed no such analysis. Moreover, a demurrer to evidence under Section 23, Rule 119 requires that the prosecution has already rested its case. Here, at the time Cabador filed his motion on August 1, 2006, the prosecution had only that same day submitted its formal offer of exhibits; the defense had not yet been afforded the opportunity to object, the trial court had not yet ruled on the offer, and thus the prosecution had not rested. The motion could not, therefore, have been intended as a demurrer to evidence. Consequently, no waiver of the right to present evidence attached, and the RTC’s order deeming the case submitted for decision was invalid.

• Enojas Test for Distinguishing a Demurrer to Evidence from a Motion to Dismiss — To determine whether a pleading filed by the accused after the prosecution’s presentation of evidence is a demurrer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the court must consider: (1) the allegations in the pleading made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it. A pleading that predominantly recites delay in the proceedings and invokes the right to a speedy trial is a motion to dismiss, not a demurrer, even if it contains cursory remarks on the insufficiency of evidence.
• Demurrer to Evidence Requires the Prosecution to Have Rested — Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a demurrer to evidence may be filed only “[a]fter the prosecution rests its case.” Where the prosecution has just submitted its formal offer but the court has not yet ruled on its admissibility, and the defense has not yet been given the opportunity to object, the prosecution has not rested; consequently, no valid demurrer may be interposed at that stage.
• Denial of the Right to Speedy Trial as Ground for Dismissal — A motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated. Denial of this right is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolong the trial.

• “To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.” — This passage illustrates the error in isolating a few lines of a pleading while ignoring its dominant character and overall context.
• “Caution must, however, be exercised in view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the accused to present evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the crime charged, and the gravity of the penalty involved.” — This underscores the narrow and careful construction that courts must apply before treating an accused’s motion as a demurrer to evidence with its attendant waiver.

• Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 347 Phil. 510 (1997) — Established the three-part test for determining whether a pleading is a demurrer to evidence or a motion to dismiss. Applied as the controlling framework.
• People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 688 — Cited for the principle that a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused’s right to speedy trial.
• Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 496 (1996) — Cited for the definition of denial of the right to speedy trial as involving unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delay without the accused’s fault or unjustified postponements unreasonably prolonging trial.
• Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 502 — Cited for the rule that when a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the prosecution’s evidence.
• Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., G.R. No. 143338, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 117 — Cited to reinforce the caution that must attend the application of the demurrer remedy due to its serious consequences.

• Section 23, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Defines the demurrer to evidence and provides the consequences of filing it with or without leave of court. Applied to determine that the remedy requires the prosecution to have rested its case and that a filing without leave of court results in waiver of the right to present evidence.
• Section 34, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that the court shall consider no evidence that has not been formally offered. Referred to by petitioner in his motion as basis for arguing that no evidence existed against him.
• Article III, Section 16, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the accused to a speedy trial. Served as the constitutional foundation for the motion to dismiss.

Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing), Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Acting Chairperson), Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.