Busuego vs. Court of Appeals

A defendant's voluntary appearance in court, effected by filing motions for extension of time or other pleadings that do not specifically and solely object to the court's jurisdiction over the person, constitutes a waiver of the necessity of formal service of summons and confers jurisdiction over the defendant. The filing of such motions through counsel, without promptly repudiating the counsel's authority, binds the defendant even if the initial service of summons was defective.

Bernardo Busuego, the registered owner of a parcel of land with a three-unit apartment house at No. 260-A Bonifacio Avenue, Bo. Jesus de la Pena, Marikina, Rizal, sought to recover possession of the property from the Lazaro family and Vivencio Lopez, who had been occupying the apartment units for over a year without paying rentals. The defendants—Ernesto Lazaro and his sons Jose and Romeo, together with Vivencio Lopez—were immediate neighbors residing in adjacent units of the same apartment house and were members of the same family. The dispute arose in the context of an ejectment action filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, where the procedural rules on service of summons and voluntary appearance under the Revised Rules of Court governed the acquisition of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants.

On 20 January 1974, Bernardo Busuego commenced an action before the Court of First Instance of Pasig against Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro, Ernesto Lazaro, and Vivencio Lopez to recover possession of a parcel of land and a three-unit apartment house standing thereon, situated at No. 260-A Bonifacio Avenue, Bo. Jesus de la Pena, Marikina, Rizal. Busuego alleged that he was the registered owner of the property, that the defendants had been occupying the apartment units for more than a year without paying rentals, and that despite repeated demands they had refused to pay or vacate. The defendants were members of the same family—Ernesto Lazaro being the father of Jose and Romeo—and all resided in adjacent units of the same apartment house.

Summons was issued in the name of all four defendants and, per the sheriff's return dated 31 January 1974, was personally served at the address given in the complaint "through Dr. Ernesto Lazaro personally." The sheriff's return did not specify any prior efforts to serve the other defendants personally or the lack of success of such efforts before resorting to this mode of service.

On 13 February 1974, the defendants, through Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr., filed a motion for a fifteen-day extension to file an answer, stating that Atty. Roldan's services had been formally secured only the other day and that he needed sufficient time to study the case. The lower court granted this motion on 6 March 1974. On 28 February 1974, before the first extension was resolved, the defendants through Atty. Roldan sought a second extension of ten days, explaining that Atty. Roldan had not yet conferred with all four defendants, which was necessary before any responsive pleading could be filed. This second motion was granted on 14 March 1974. Notwithstanding the extensions, no answer was ever filed.

Upon motion of Busuego, the lower court declared the defendants in default on 20 May 1974. The plaintiff's evidence was thereafter received, and on 26 August 1974 the trial court rendered judgment ordering each defendant to pay monthly rentals (₱200.00 each, except Vivencio Lopez at ₱100.00) from 24 January 1973 until vacation of the premises, to vacate and restore possession to Busuego, and to pay ₱500.00 each as attorney's fees plus litigation expenses and costs. Nearly two years later, on 12 July 1976, Busuego filed an ex parte motion for execution, which was granted on 18 August 1976.

On 3 September 1976, Romeo Lazaro, "on his own behalf and on behalf of other defendants," filed a motion to hold execution in abeyance, praying for humanitarian reasons for a thirty-day extension to vacate the premises so the five families, mostly with little children, could find alternative residence. The lower court granted this on 18 September 1976. On 28 September 1976, the defendants through Atty. Roldan filed a motion for reconsideration of the default judgment and/or to dissolve the writ of execution, solely on the ground that neither the defendants nor their counsel had ever been furnished a copy of the judgment. The motion was verified by Romeo Lazaro on behalf of all defendants. The lower court denied the motion on 11 October 1976, finding it purely dilatory.

On 3 November 1976, the defendants, through new counsel Atty. Oliver Lozano, filed an omnibus motion seeking to lift the order of default, a second motion for reconsideration, and to quash the writ of execution, alleging for the first time that their failure to answer was due to lack of notice. The lower court denied this on 27 December 1976, holding that Romeo Lazaro's motion for extension of time to vacate, filed on behalf of all defendants, was equivalent to a waiver of service of summons. A third motion for reconsideration filed on 10 January 1977, asserting lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, was likewise denied. The defendants then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, contending that all orders, judgment, and writs were void for want of jurisdiction over their persons. The Court of Appeals, on 13 July 1978, dismissed the petition as to Ernesto Lazaro but granted it as to Romeo, Jose, and Vivencio, declaring null and void the order of default, judgment by default, order of execution, writ of execution, and related orders in Civil Case No. 18860.

• Waiver by Voluntary Appearance: Petitioner contended that the defendants could not pretend absence of proper notice after they, through counsel, had filed two motions for extension of time to answer, thereby voluntarily appearing and submitting to the trial court's jurisdiction.
• Invalidity of Substituted Service Not Dispositive: Petitioner maintained that even assuming the initial service of summons was defective, jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants was acquired through their voluntary appearance and series of filings before the trial court without objection to jurisdiction.

• Invalid Service of Summons: Respondents asserted that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons because the sheriff effected substituted service without complying with the requirement to specify prior efforts at personal service, rendering all subsequent orders and the judgment void.
• No Voluntary Appearance During Trial: Respondents argued that only voluntary appearance during trial is equivalent to waiver of service, and that the motion for extension of time to vacate filed by Romeo Lazaro after trial and after rendition of judgment was not equivalent to waiver of summons.
• Lack of Authority of Counsel and Co-Defendant: Respondents submitted joint affidavits asserting that they had not authorized Atty. Roldan nor Romeo Lazaro to file any pleading on their behalf, and that Romeo Lazaro had no authority to file the motion of 3 September 1976 seeking humanitarian extension of time to vacate.

• Validity of Service of Summons: Whether there was a valid service of summons upon the persons of respondents Romeo Lazaro, Jose Lazaro, and Vivencio Lopez.
• Voluntary Appearance: Whether jurisdiction over the persons of respondents Romeo Lazaro, Jose Lazaro, and Vivencio Lopez was acquired by their voluntary appearance through Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr. and their co-respondent Romeo Lazaro.

• Validity of Service of Summons: No. Substituted service was invalid as to Romeo, Jose, and Vivencio because the sheriff's return failed to specify the efforts made to serve them personally and the failure of such efforts, as required before resorting to substituted service under the Revised Rules of Court.
• Voluntary Appearance: Yes. By filing motions for extension of time to answer and other pleadings without specifically and solely objecting to the court's jurisdiction, the defendants voluntarily appeared and submitted to the trial court's authority, thereby waiving the defect in service of summons.

• Validity of Service of Summons: Under Section 8, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, substituted service may be resorted to only where the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time. The sheriff's return, which stated that the summons was served "through Dr. Ernesto Lazaro personally," failed to specify what prior efforts had been exerted to serve the other defendants personally and why such efforts failed. Citing Keister vs. Navarro, the Court reiterated that the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed, and this statement must appear in the proof of service. Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service, strict compliance is required. The appellate court's finding that no valid service was effected upon Romeo, Jose, and Vivencio was therefore upheld. However, as to Ernesto Lazaro, who was personally served, jurisdiction was validly acquired.

• Voluntary Appearance: Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant may be acquired not only by service of summons but also by the defendant's voluntary appearance and submission to the court's authority, voluntary appearance being equivalent to service of summons under Section 23, Rule 14. Drawing on Flores vs. Zurbito (1918), the Court explained that an appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the court's jurisdiction over the person, constitutes submission to that jurisdiction; a motion objecting to jurisdiction must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting, and if it seeks any other relief, the defendant thereby submits to the court's authority. The defendants appeared before the trial court on multiple occasions without raising any objection to the improper service of summons: first, through Atty. Roldan, by filing two successive motions for extension of time to answer; second, through co-defendant Romeo Lazaro, by filing a motion for extension of time to vacate the premises on humanitarian grounds; and third, through Atty. Roldan, by moving for reconsideration of the default judgment and dissolution of the writ of execution. By any one or more of these acts, and certainly by the whole series, the defendants effectively waived the initial lack of jurisdiction and submitted to the trial court's authority. The respondents' argument that only voluntary appearance during trial constitutes waiver was rejected; Soriano vs. Palacio established that filing a motion for reconsideration after judgment likewise constitutes submission to jurisdiction. The respondents' late-executed affidavits disclaiming authority of Atty. Roldan and Romeo Lazaro were given no credence, being transparent afterthoughts devised to conform with the "no voluntary appearance" posture of subsequent counsel. An attorney appearing in a case is presumed to be authorized by his client, and where the client has knowledge that he is being represented and takes no prompt measure to repudiate the assumed authority, he is bound. The security and finality of judicial proceedings require that the evasions of unsuccessful litigants and their counsel be firmly rejected.

• Voluntary Appearance as Waiver of Service of Summons — Voluntary appearance by a defendant in court, effected by filing pleadings or motions that do not specifically and solely object to the court's jurisdiction over the person, is equivalent to service of summons and constitutes a waiver of the necessity of formal notice. An appearance may be made by filing a motion, plea, or answer; if the motion is for any purpose other than to object to jurisdiction over the person, the defendant submits to the court's jurisdiction. The objection to jurisdiction must be the sole and separate purpose of the appearance; seeking any other affirmative relief constitutes voluntary submission.

• Requirements of Substituted Service of Summons — Substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court may be resorted to only where personal service cannot be effected within a reasonable time. The sheriff's return must specify the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service, strict compliance with this requirement is essential; failure to detail prior efforts renders the substituted service invalid.

• Presumption of Authority of Counsel — An attorney who appears in a case is presumed to be authorized by the client he represents. Where the client has knowledge that he is being represented by counsel in a particular litigation and takes no prompt measure to repudiate the assumed authority, the client is bound by the counsel's acts. The security and finality of judicial proceedings require that this presumption be firmly upheld against belated disclaimers by unsuccessful litigants.

• "A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person." — This passage, quoting Flores vs. Zurbito (37 Phil. 746, 1918), articulates the canonical formulation of the doctrine of voluntary appearance and remains the foundational statement of the principle that any appearance seeking relief other than a jurisdictional objection constitutes submission to the court's authority.

• "[T]he impossibility of prompt service in person should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed This statement should be made in the proof of service." — Quoting Keister vs. Navarro (77 SCRA 209, 1977), this passage defines the requisite contents of a sheriff's return when substituted service is availed of, emphasizing that substituted service, being in derogation of the usual method, demands strict specification of failed personal-service efforts.

• "The security and finality of judicial proceedings are matters of insistent public policy and require that the evasions and tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants and their counsel be firmly rejected and not permitted to overcome the presumption of authority on the part of an attorney." — This statement underscores the policy basis for the presumption of counsel's authority and the Court's refusal to give credence to belated affidavits disclaiming authorization, ensuring that litigants cannot evade the consequences of their procedural choices through after-the-fact repudiation.

• Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746 (1918) — Controlling authority on the doctrine of voluntary appearance. The Court adopted its formulation that any appearance without explicitly objecting to jurisdiction over the person constitutes submission to the court's authority, and that a motion objecting to jurisdiction must be for the sole and separate purpose of such objection.
• Keister vs. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209 (1977) — Followed on the requirements for valid substituted service. The Court relied on its holding that the sheriff's return must state the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts before resorting to substituted service.
• Soriano vs. Palacio, 12 SCRA 447 (1965) — Followed on the point that voluntary appearance may occur after judgment. The Court cited its holding that filing a motion for reconsideration after judgment constitutes submission to the court's jurisdiction, rejecting the respondents' argument that only appearance during trial amounts to waiver.
• Tan Lua vs. O'Brien, 55 Phil. 53 (1930) — Followed on the presumption of counsel's authority and the binding effect on a client who knowingly permits representation without repudiating it promptly.

• Section 7, Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court — Governs personal service of summons, requiring that a copy be served by handing it to the defendant in person or tendering it if he refuses to receive it. Cited as the primary or usual method of service.
• Section 8, Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court — Governs substituted service, allowing service by leaving copies at the defendant's dwelling house or office with a person of suitable age and discretion, but only if the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time. Applied to find the sheriff's return deficient for failure to specify prior personal-service efforts.
• Section 23, Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that voluntary appearance by the defendant is equivalent to service of summons. Applied as the textual basis for holding that the defendants' filings constituted voluntary appearance and waiver of the necessity of formal service.
• Section 20, Rule 27, Revised Rules of Court — Establishes the presumption that an attorney appearing in a case is authorized by his client. Applied to uphold the binding effect of Atty. Roldan's filings on the defendants despite their belated disclaimers of authority.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Gancayco, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred.