Burguete vs. Mayor

The mere filing of a criminal complaint or information for serious slander against an elective municipal mayor is not a sufficient ground for suspension, because serious slander, like libel, does not necessarily involve moral turpitude.

Pablo Burguete was the municipal mayor of Badajoz, Romblon, elected in November 1951; Jovencio Q. Mayor was the provincial governor of Romblon, and Esteban B. Montesa was the vice-mayor who acted as municipal mayor. Section 2188 of the Administrative Code formed part of the statutory backdrop, and the Court noted that no administrative investigation by the provincial board had been conducted under it.

Pablo Burguete was the municipal mayor of Badajoz, Romblon, elected to that position in November 1951. Jovencio Q. Mayor was the provincial governor of Romblon, while Esteban B. Montesa was the vice-mayor who would act as municipal mayor. On August 21, 1952, a criminal complaint for serious slander was filed against Burguete in the justice of the peace court of Badajoz. The case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Romblon on October 7, 1952.

On November 13, 1952, Governor Mayor suspended Burguete as mayor. The suspension rested on the ground that a criminal case against him was pending and on the "standing policy of the Administration to the place under suspension any elective official against whom a criminal action involving moral turpitude is pending adjudication before the competent court." The Governor directed Esteban B. Montesa, the vice-mayor, to act as mayor.

Burguete then filed in the Supreme Court a petition for mandamus and quo warranto against Mayor and Montesa. The serious slander case remained pending in the Court of First Instance. Burguete had filed a motion to quash, but it was denied. The case could not be tried on the merits because the witnesses for the prosecution did not appear.

No administrative investigation by the provincial board had been conducted under Section 2188 of the Administrative Code. The serious slander case remained pending, and the charge was treated in the decision as another form of libel.

• Ground for Suspension: Respondent Governor suspended petitioner on the ground that a criminal case against him was pending and that it was the standing policy of the Administration to place under suspension any elective official against whom a criminal action involving moral turpitude was pending adjudication before the competent court.

• Sufficiency of Pending Criminal Case: Whether the mere filing of a criminal complaint or information for serious slander against a municipal mayor is a sufficient ground for his suspension.
• Moral Turpitude: Whether serious slander necessarily involves moral turpitude, such that a pending charge therefor justifies suspension under the Administration's standing policy.
• Legality of Suspension: Whether the suspension of petitioner as municipal mayor was illegal and unjustified.

• Sufficiency of Pending Criminal Case: No. The mere filing of an information for libel against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for suspension; serious slander is another form of libel.
• Moral Turpitude: No. Libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, and serious slander, being another form of libel, does not necessarily involve it either.
• Legality of Suspension: Illegal and unjustified. The suspension was declared illegal, and the governor was ordered to reinstate petitioner and oust the acting mayor.

• Sufficiency of Pending Criminal Case: The Court found the questions not new and relied on Lacson vs. Roque, where it was held that the mere filing of an information for libel against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for dispensing him. The same rule applied to serious slander because it is another form of libel. The Court also reasoned that allowing suspension on mere filing would create an easy expedient: a criminal complaint or information could be filed against a municipal mayor for the purpose of suspending him, and the suspension would last almost indefinitely until the criminal case terminated by conviction or acquittal. Thus, the suspension was illegal and unjustified.
• Moral Turpitude: Libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Because serious slander is another form of libel, it likewise does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. The pending serious slander case therefore could not justify suspension under the Administration's standing policy. The Court also noted that no administrative investigation by the provincial board had been conducted under Section 2188 of the Administrative Code.
• Legality of Suspension: The suspension of petitioner was illegal and unjustified. The Court ordered respondent Jovencio Q. Mayor to reinstate Pablo Burguete in his office as municipal mayor of Badajoz, Romblon, and to oust respondent Esteban B. Montesa as such officer, with costs against the respondents.

• Mere Filing of Criminal Case Not Ground for Suspension — A pending criminal complaint or information for libel against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for suspension. The same rule applies to serious slander, which is another form of libel. Suspension on that basis is illegal and unjustified.
• Libel/Serious Slander and Moral Turpitude — Libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude; because serious slander is another form of libel, it likewise does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. A charge of serious slander cannot, by itself, justify suspension under a policy requiring a criminal action involving moral turpitude.
• Easy Expedient Rationale — Suspension based merely on the filing of a criminal complaint or information would allow an easy expedient to suspend a municipal mayor, with the suspension lasting almost indefinitely until the criminal case is terminated by conviction or acquittal. This policy consideration supports the rule against suspension on mere filing.

• "There it was held that the mere filing of an information for libel against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for dispensing him. The same may be said with regard to serious slander, which is another form of libel. Libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the Court extended the Lacson vs. Roque rule from libel to serious slander and held that neither necessarily involves moral turpitude.
• "Furthermore, it would be an easy expedient to file a criminal complaint or information against a municipal mayor for the purpose of suspending him, and the suspension would last almost indefinitely, according to the time that would elapse before the criminal case is finally terminated by conviction or acquittal." — This passage supplies the policy rationale against allowing suspension on the mere filing of a criminal charge.
• "Our conclusion is that the suspension of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified." — This is the Court's direct holding on the validity of the suspension.
• "In view of the foregoing, the respondent Jovencio Q. Mayor is ordered to reinstate Pablo Burguete in his office as municipal mayor of Badajoz, Romblon, and to oust the respondent Esteban B. Montesa, as such officer, with costs against the respondents." — This is the dispositive portion of the decision.

• Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz. 93 (92 Phil. 456) — The Court relied on this prior decision, which held that the mere filing of an information for libel against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for dispensing him. The Court applied the same principle to serious slander as another form of libel.

• Section 2188, Administrative Code — The Court noted that no administrative investigation by the provincial board had been conducted under this provision. The provision appears in the factual recital of the decision.

Paras, C.J.; Pablo, J.; Bengzon, J.; Montemayor, J.; Reyes, J.; Bautista Angelo, J.; Labrador, J.; Concepcion, J.