Bureau of Customs (BOC) vs. Hon. Paulino Q. Gallegos

A Rule 65 petition that directly resorts to the Supreme Court without a prior motion for reconsideration and without special, extraordinary, or compelling reasons is procedurally infirm and dismissible; on the merits, a government procurement cancellation is not a justifiable exercise of the Section 41(c) reservation clause where it rests only on the head of agency's intent to review the project and bare assertions, and a writ of preliminary injunction may issue to protect the highest bidder's ostensible right under R.A. No. 9184 and its IRR.

The Bureau of Customs, through the Department of Budget and Management-Procurement Service, undertook the PNSW 2 project, an information technology project intended to integrate the BOC's existing Electronic to Mobile Customs System and PNSW 1 into a single system for fully electronic, paperless, man-contact-free customs processing. The project traced its origins to the ASEAN Single Window Protocol signed by ASEAN member-countries, including the Philippines, and was funded under the General Appropriations Act for CY 2010 and CY 2012. The procurement was governed by R.A. No. 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act, whose Section 41(c) reservation clause permits the head of the procuring entity to reject bids or not award a contract only for justifiable and reasonable grounds defined in the IRR. The private respondent Joint Venture of Omniprime Marketing, Inc. and Intrasoft International, Inc. participated in the procurement, while R.A. No. 8975 generally bars lower courts from issuing temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in infrastructure projects.

On December 20, 2006, the Association of Southeast Asian Nation member-countries, including the Philippines, signed the Protocol to Establish and Implement the ASEAN Single Window, under which they agreed to develop and implement their National Single Windows based on international standards and best practices. Phase One of the Philippines' NSW project started in 2009 and was completed in October 2010. Thereafter, Phase Two of the PNSW with Enhanced Customs Processing System project was undertaken. The project was dubbed the Selection of System Integrator for Design, Implementation, Operation and Maintenance of Integrated Enhanced Customs Processing System and National Single Window for the Government of the Philippines: Component I: Design, Implementation, Operation and Maintenance of Enhanced Customs Processing System for the Bureau of Customs; and Component II: Development and Operationalization of PNSW 2 Project for the Government of the Philippines for the Bureau of Customs, Public Bidding No. 14-082. It was an information technology project aimed at integrating the existing Electronic to Mobile Customs System and the PNSW 1 into a single system that would serve all existing functionalities under the BOC's current electronic or mobile transaction system, to achieve fully electronic, paperless, man-contact-free processing of customs transactions, allow traders a single submission of data and information, and allow the BOC a single and synchronous processing of data and information and a single decision-making point for customs release and clearance of cargo. The total approved budget for the contract was ₱650 Million, funded by appropriations in the General Appropriations Act for CY 2010 and CY 2012.

Utilizing those funds, petitioner BOC, through its procuring entity petitioner DBM-PS, issued on October 15, 2014 a Request for Expression of Interest inviting prospective bidders or consultants in the eligibility screening and to be shortlisted for the competitive bidding of the PNSW 2 project. Among the bidders that submitted eligibility documents were the Joint Venture of Omniprime Marketing, Inc. and Intrasoft International, Inc., as private respondent, and E-Konek & ILS & FS JV, whose biggest shareholder was petitioner BOC Commissioner Alberto D. Lina. The announcement of the shortlist of eligible consultants and of the Highest Rated Bid was delayed, due among others to the interview of private respondent's Project Team Members requested by former Deputy Commissioner Primo Aguas, which was neither required by law nor regulation. After evaluation and determination of shortlisted bidders, the DBM-PS Bids and Awards Committee issued on April 13, 2015 a Notice of Highest Rated Bid and an Invitation to Negotiate to private respondent as the highest bidder. On April 17, 2015, private respondent's financial proposal and contract negotiation commenced. On April 23, 2015, Commissioner Lina was appointed as BOC Commissioner.

On May 6, 2015, Commissioner Lina wrote a letter to petitioner DBM-PS Executive Director Jose Tomas C. Syquia requesting the discontinuance of the procurement process of the PNSW 2 project, in line with Section 41(c) of R.A. No. 9184, which grants the head of the procuring agency the right to reject bids for justifiable and reasonable grounds where the award of the contract will not redound to the benefit of the government. Acting upon Commissioner Lina's letter, Director Syquia issued on May 7, 2015 a Notice of Cancellation aborting the bidding process. Private respondent, through a letter dated May 22, 2015, moved for reconsideration of the Notice of Cancellation, but the same was denied in petitioner BOC's Resolution dated July 31, 2015. This prompted private respondent to file a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction before the RTC against petitioners. The petition prayed that judgment be rendered annulling the decision of Director Syquia embodied in his Notice of Cancellation, made pursuant to Commissioner Lina's May 6, 2015 Letter, and commanding petitioners to refrain from cancelling and instead continue the last remaining process of the competitive bidding, namely the signing of the contract and issuance of the Notice to Proceed. Private respondent likewise prayed that the RTC restrain petitioners from withholding or reducing the appropriation, or returning the appropriation for the project to the Bureau of Treasury, so as not to render ineffectual any judgment that may be issued.

In its Order dated July 28, 2015, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order in favor of private respondent. On August 24, 2015, the RTC issued the assailed Omnibus Order denying petitioners' Motion to Dismiss and granting private respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The Omnibus Order enjoined petitioners from implementing Commissioner Lina's May 6, 2015 Letter and Director Syquia's May 7, 2015 Cancellation Notice; enjoined petitioners from initiating any other procurement, sourcing of funds, or conducting any other procurement to replace or upgrade the present customs system subject matter of the bid; ordered petitioners to continue with the remaining procurement process of signing the contract and to issue the Notice to Proceed to private respondent; ordered private respondent to post an injunctive writ bond in cash in the amount of ₱500,000.00; and ordered petitioners to file their Comment. On August 26, 2015, the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC found that the project was classified as consulting services and not an infrastructure project under R.A. No. 8975, and that the prohibition under that law did not apply.

• Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioners maintained that since the petition raises purely questions of law, their failure to file a motion for reconsideration is not fatal.
• R.A. No. 8975 / Infrastructure Project: Petitioners insisted that R.A. No. 8975 applies to the PNSW 2 procurement, which would prohibit the RTC from issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the Omnibus Order and the writ of preliminary injunction, effectively enjoining the cancellation and ordering continuation of the procurement.

• Inapplicability of R.A. No. 8975: Private respondent pointed out that the nature of the procurement subject of the competitive bidding is a consulting service contract for the PNSW 2 project, which is beyond the contemplation of R.A. No. 8975.
• Annulment of Cancellation: Private respondent sought annulment of Director Syquia's Notice of Cancellation and Commissioner Lina's May 6, 2015 Letter, and asked that petitioners be commanded to continue the remaining procurement process, specifically the signing of the contract and issuance of the Notice to Proceed.
• Preservation of Appropriation: Private respondent prayed that petitioners be restrained from withholding or reducing the appropriation, or returning it to the Bureau of Treasury, so as not to render ineffectual any judgment that may be issued.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the August 24, 2015 Omnibus Order and the writ of preliminary injunction.
• Procedural Infirmity — Motion for Reconsideration: Whether petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration before filing the Rule 65 petition is excused by their claim that the petition raises purely questions of law.
• Procedural Infirmity — Hierarchy of Courts: Whether petitioners' direct resort to the Supreme Court, disregarding the hierarchy of courts, is justified.
• Applicability of R.A. No. 8975: Whether R.A. No. 8975 prohibits the RTC from issuing the injunctive writ in the PNSW 2 procurement.
• Requisites for Preliminary Injunction: Whether private respondent established the requisites for a writ of preliminary injunction.
• Validity of Cancellation: Whether the cancellation of the PNSW 2 bidding was supported by justifiable and reasonable grounds under Section 41(c) of R.A. No. 9184 and Section 41.1 of its IRR.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion; its issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was not capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic.
• Procedural Infirmity — Motion for Reconsideration: Yes. Certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires a prior motion for reconsideration, and petitioners failed to show sufficient justification for dispensing with it.
• Procedural Infirmity — Hierarchy of Courts: Yes. Direct resort to the Supreme Court disregarded the hierarchy of courts; concurrent jurisdiction does not give unrestricted freedom of choice of forum, and no special, extraordinary, or compelling reason was shown.
• Applicability of R.A. No. 8975: No. R.A. No. 8975 does not apply because the PNSW 2 procurement is not an infrastructure project as defined therein; it is an information technology consulting service contract.
• Requisites for Preliminary Injunction: Yes. Private respondent, as declared highest bidder, had an ostensible right under R.A. No. 9184 and its IRR; that right was violated by the cancellation; and urgent necessity existed to preserve the status quo.
• Validity of Cancellation: No. The cancellation was not supported by justifiable and reasonable grounds under Section 41(c) of R.A. No. 9184 and Section 41.1 of its IRR; mere intent to review and bare statements were insufficient.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Certiorari under Rule 65 requires grave abuse of discretion—an exercise of power arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform it or to act in contemplation of law. Petitioners failed to show this. The RTC had original jurisdiction under Section 21 of BP 129 to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction. R.A. No. 8975 did not apply. The writ of preliminary injunction was based on established requisites and was not arrived at capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, or despotically. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to respondent Judge.

• Motion for Reconsideration: Certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is the tangible representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct itself. The plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision, which in this case was the RTC's Omnibus Order. Its purpose is to enable the court or agency to rectify its mistakes without the intervention of a higher court. To dispense with the requirement, there must be a concrete, compelling, and valid reason. Petitioners claimed that the petition raises purely questions of law, but except for this bare allegation, they failed to show sufficient justification. Petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, but this does not give petitioners unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. Direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed only when there are special, extraordinary, or compelling reasons. No such reason was shown. The hierarchy of courts is enforced to free the Supreme Court from unnecessary, frivolous, and impertinent cases and to afford it time for more fundamental and essential tasks under the Constitution. Absent any special, important, or compelling reason, the direct filing of the petition warranted dismissal.

• Applicability of R.A. No. 8975: The authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction, which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. Under Section 21 of BP 129, the RTC had original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction enforceable in any part of its respective region. R.A. No. 8975 does not apply because the procurement of PNSW 2 is not an infrastructure project as defined under that law. An infrastructure project includes the civil works component of information technology projects, but not the non-civil works component, which is treated as an acquisition of goods or consulting services. The project involved a consulting service contract for the PNSW 2 project, including design, implementation, operation, maintenance, and consulting services. The Request for Expression of Interest classified the project as consulting services governed by R.A. No. 9184 and its IRR. Thus, the prohibition under R.A. No. 8975 did not apply.

• Requisites for Preliminary Injunction: Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction may be granted when the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, when the commission, continuance, or nonperformance of the act complained of during litigation would probably work injustice, or when a party is doing, threatening, or attempting to do an act probably in violation of the applicant's rights and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. The purpose is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury before claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated, and its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. Medina vs. Greenfield Dev't. Corp. reiterated the requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; and (3) an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. A clear showing of the right is necessary, but its existence need not be conclusively established; an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for is sufficient. Private respondent, as the declared highest bidder, had a right under R.A. No. 9184 and its IRR to be awarded the contract upon the BAC's determination of its compliance with and responsiveness to the terms and conditions in the Bidding Documents. Section 38, Article XI of R.A. No. 9184 provides that the procurement process from the opening of bids up to the award of contract shall not exceed three months, and if no action on the contract is taken by the head of the procuring entity or authorized representative within the specified periods, the contract shall be deemed approved. More than three months had elapsed since the opening of the bids, yet DBM-PS, represented by Director Syquia, failed to observe the parameters of the law and allowed Commissioner Lina of the BOC to exercise the discretion of canceling the bidding process. Due to DBM-PS inaction, the contract should have been deemed approved upon the lapse of the three-month period. Private respondent's right was violated by the May 7, 2015 Notice of Cancellation prompted by Commissioner Lina's May 6, 2015 Letter. Urgent necessity existed to preserve the status quo because the unjustified cancellation would put to naught private respondent's considerable resources, time, and efforts in hurdling the rigorous requirements in the Bidding Documents; the PNSW 2 project had long been overdue; and the country had been lagging behind in its commitment to the ASEAN under the ASEAN Single Window Agreement. Further delay by arbitrarily canceling the procurement would create a deleterious effect on international relations with other ASEAN members.

• Validity of Cancellation: Section 41(c), Article XI of R.A. No. 9184 allows the head of the procuring entity to reject any and all bids, declare a failure of bidding, or not award the contract for any justifiable and reasonable ground where the award of the contract will not redound to the benefit of the government as defined in the IRR. Section 41.1 of the IRR defines justifiable grounds as follows: (i) if the physical and economic conditions have significantly changed so as to render the project no longer economically, financially, or technically feasible as determined by the head of the procuring entity; (ii) if the project is no longer necessary as determined by the head of the procuring entity; or (iii) if the source of funds for the project has been withheld or reduced through no fault of the procuring entity. Commissioner Lina's May 6, 2015 Letter based his discretion to abandon the procurement simply because he intended to conduct a thorough review of its details, such as its terms of reference and specifications. This was hardly a justifiable ground for abandoning the bidding. Director Syquia's May 7, 2015 Notice of Cancellation contained no proof, except for his bare statement, that the project was no longer economically, financially, or technically feasible. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. The records showed that the PNSW 2 project was thoroughly conceived, carefully studied, and extensively evaluated prior to the decision to initiate competitive bidding. Director Syquia admitted that DBM-PS and the BOC had spent more than three years bidding, rebidding, and redoing the project. There was no indication that the conditions surrounding the procurement changed with the appointment of Commissioner Lina, who as head of the BOC was fully aware of the country's commitment to ASEAN and the need to improve the BOC's efficiency. First United Constructors Corp. vs. Poro Point Mgm't. Corp., et al. and Urbanes, Jr. vs. Local Water Utilities Administration established that courts generally cannot direct government agencies entrusted with the function to accept or reject bids and award contracts, and that a bidder has no cause to complain, unless the government agency used its discretion as a shield to a fraudulent award, or unfairness or injustice is shown, or it gravely abused or exceeded its jurisdiction. This case fell under the exception. Neither Commissioner Lina nor Director Syquia justified the cancellation in accordance with Section 41.1 of the IRR. SM Land, Inc. vs. Bases Conversion Dev't. Authority, et al. held that the reservation clause under Section 41(c) cannot be read in isolation from the circumstances surrounding the case and cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. The tenor of Commissioner Lina's May 6, 2015 Letter and Director Syquia's May 7, 2015 Notice of Cancellation was devoid of any proof or explanation that would warrant cancellation. This arbitrary act caused unfairness and injustice upon private respondent and could not be countenanced.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion means an exercise of power arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform it or to act in contemplation of law. The Court found no such abuse in the RTC's issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
• Motion for Reconsideration as a Condition Precedent to Certiorari — Certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires a prior motion for reconsideration, which gives the lower court or agency an opportunity to correct itself without intervention of a higher court. Petitioners' bare claim that the petition raised purely questions of law did not excuse compliance.
• Hierarchy of Courts — Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue certain writs, direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed only for special, extraordinary, or compelling reasons. The doctrine frees the Supreme Court from unnecessary, frivolous, and impertinent cases.
• Reservation Clause in Government Procurement — Under Section 41(c) of R.A. No. 9184, the head of the procuring entity may reject bids or not award a contract only for justifiable and reasonable grounds where the award will not redound to the benefit of the government as defined in the IRR. Section 41.1 of the IRR limits those grounds to significant changes rendering the project no longer economically, financially, or technically feasible; the project no longer being necessary; or the source of funds being withheld or reduced through no fault of the procuring entity. The reservation clause cannot be read in isolation from the circumstances.
• Requisites of Preliminary Injunction — Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and Medina vs. Greenfield Dev't. Corp., the requisites are: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; and (3) an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. A clear showing of the right is necessary, but its existence need not be conclusively established; an ostensible right to the final relief is sufficient.
• R.A. No. 8975 and Infrastructure Projects — R.A. No. 8975 prohibits lower courts from issuing temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in infrastructure projects. The term infrastructure project is limited to the civil works component of information technology projects; the non-civil works component is treated as acquisition of goods or consulting services. The PNSW 2 procurement was a consulting service contract and thus outside R.A. No. 8975.
• Deemed Approved Contract under Section 38, R.A. No. 9184 — The procurement process from the opening of bids up to the award of contract shall not exceed three months. If no action on the contract is taken by the head of the procuring entity or authorized representative within the specified periods, the contract shall be deemed approved. More than three months had elapsed, so the contract should have been deemed approved.
• Judicial Non-interference in Bidding — Courts generally cannot direct government agencies entrusted with the function to accept or reject bids and award contracts, and a bidder has no cause to complain. The exception is when the government agency used its discretion as a shield to a fraudulent award, or unfairness or injustice is shown, or it gravely abused or exceeded its jurisdiction. The cancellation in this case fell under the exception.

• "For certiorari to lie, it must be shown that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, or more specifically, that he exercised his power arbitrarily or despotically when he issued the omnibus order and the WPI, by reason of passion or personal hostility; and such exercise was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform it or to act in contemplation of law." — States the controlling standard for grave abuse of discretion in a Rule 65 petition.
• "In Medina v. Greenfield Dev't. Corp., the Court reiterated the following requisites to be entitled to an injunctive writ. viz: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage." — Sets out the canonical requisites for a writ of preliminary injunction.
• "The cancellation of an ongoing public bidding is not reasonable if it will cause unfairness or injustice to the bidder concerned or if it is attended by arbitrariness, fraudulent acts or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government agencies entrusted with that function." — Articulates the exception to judicial non-interference in government bidding and supports the finding that the cancellation was invalid.
• "A perusal of the May 6, 2015 Letter indicates that Commissioner Lina based his discretion to abandon the procurement of the PNSW 2 project simply because he intends "to conduct a thorough review of its details" such as its terms of reference, and specifications, among others. This is hardly a justifiable ground in abandoning the bidding for the said project." — Applies the Section 41(c) reservation clause and explains why the cancellation lacked a justifiable ground.

• Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Philtranco Workers Union-Association of Genuine Labor Organizations (PWU-AGLO), 728 Phil. 99, 144 (2014) — Cited for the rule that certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires a motion for reconsideration.
• Metro Transit Organization, Inc. vs. CA, 440 Phil. 743, 753 (2002) — Cited for the purpose of a motion for reconsideration: to enable the court or agency to rectify its mistakes without intervention of a higher court.
• Jiao, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., 686 Phil. 171, 182 (2012) — Cited for the principle that petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary.
• Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Hon. Melicor, 495 Phil. 422, 431-432 (2005) — Cited for the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and the rule that concurrent jurisdiction does not give unrestricted freedom of choice of forum.
• Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. vs. Judge Triel, 750 Phil. 57, 68 (2015) — Cited for the rule that direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed only for special, extraordinary, or compelling reasons.
• Banez, Jr. vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 693 Phil. 399, 412 (2012) — Cited for the purpose of the hierarchy of courts: to free the Supreme Court from unnecessary, frivolous, and impertinent cases.
• Valencia vs. Sandiganbayan, 477 Phil. 103, 119 (2004) — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.
• The City of Manila, et al. vs. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo, et al., 726 Phil. 9, 23 (2014) — Cited for the rule that original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law.
• Medina vs. Greenfield Dev't. Corp., 485 Phil. 533, 542 (2004) — Cited for the requisites of a writ of preliminary injunction.
• First United Constructors Corp. vs. Poro Point Mgm't. Corp., et al., 596 Phil. 334 (2009) — Cited for the general rule that courts cannot interfere with the government's discretion to accept or reject bids, except where the discretion is used as a shield for fraudulent award, unfairness or injustice, or grave abuse of discretion.
• Urbanes, Jr. vs. Local Water Utilities Administration, 531 Phil. 447 (2006) — Cited for the rule that a losing bidder has no cause to complain or right to dispute the government's choice to reject bids unless unfairness or injustice is shown.
• SM Land, Inc. vs. Bases Conversion Dev't. Authority, et al., 741 Phil. 269 (2014) — Cited for the rule that the reservation clause under Section 41(c) of R.A. No. 9184 cannot be read in isolation from the circumstances surrounding the case.
• ECE Realty and Development Inc. vs. Mandap, 742 Phil. 164, 171 (2014) — Cited for the rule that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.
• Sps. Aldover vs. CA, et al., 718 Phil. 205, 231 (2013) — Cited for the rule that evidence submitted for purposes of issuing a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete; only a sampling is needed.
• DFA vs. Falcon — Cited by the RTC for the rule that the term infrastructure project is limited to the civil works component of information technology projects, while the non-civil works component is treated as acquisition of goods or consulting services. Citation not provided in the text.

• Section 41(c), R.A. No. 9184 — The reservation clause allows the head of the agency to reject any and all bids, declare a failure of bidding, or not award the contract for any justifiable and reasonable ground where the award of the contract will not redound to the benefit of the government as defined in the IRR. Commissioner Lina invoked this provision, but the Court found no justifiable ground for cancellation.
• Section 41.1, R.A. No. 9184 IRR — Defines the justifiable grounds for the reservation clause: (i) physical and economic conditions have significantly changed so as to render the project no longer economically, financially, or technically feasible; (ii) the project is no longer necessary; or (iii) the source of funds has been withheld or reduced through no fault of the procuring entity. None of these grounds was shown.
• Section 38, Article XI, R.A. No. 9184 — Provides that the procurement process from the opening of bids up to the award of contract shall not exceed three months, and if no action on the contract is taken by the head of the procuring entity or authorized representative within the specified periods, the contract shall be deemed approved. More than three months had elapsed, so the contract should have been deemed approved.
• Section 21, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 — Confers on the Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction enforceable in any part of their respective regions. This supported the RTC's authority to issue the injunctive writ.
• Section 3, Rule 58, Rules of Court — Sets the grounds for issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Court applied these grounds in finding that private respondent was entitled to the writ.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides for the remedy of certiorari and requires that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The plain and adequate remedy includes a motion for reconsideration, which petitioners failed to file.
• R.A. No. 8975 — Prohibits lower courts from issuing temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in infrastructure projects. The Court held that it did not apply because the PNSW 2 procurement was a consulting service contract, not an infrastructure project.

• Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chairperson)
• Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
• Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
• Justice Francis H. Jardeleza