Buot vs. Dujali

The heirs of a decedent are not precluded from instituting administration proceedings even if the estate has no debts, provided they have good and compelling reasons for not resorting to an ordinary action for partition. However, where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. The "good reason exception" depends on the circumstances of each case, and allegations that do not actually prevent the filing of an ordinary action for partition are insufficient to warrant judicial administration.

Petitioner Jesusa Dujali Buot and respondent Roque Rasay Dujali both claimed to be heirs of the deceased Gregorio Dujali, who died intestate. Buot alleged that she was Gregorio's child with his first wife Sitjar Escalona, while Dujali claimed to be Gregorio's son with his mother Yolanda Rasay. The parties disputed Buot's filiation and her status as a legal heir. The estate included multiple properties, some of which had been the subject of an Amended Extrajudicial Settlement dated July 4, 2001, which included both Buot and Dujali as Gregorio's heirs.

Jesusa Dujali Buot filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Panabo City, a petition for letters of administration of the estate of the deceased Gregorio Dujali, who died intestate. In her petition, Buot alleged that she was a surviving heir along with Roque Dujali, Constancia Dujali-Tiongson, Concepcion Dujali-Satiembre, Marilou Sales-Dujali, Marietonete Dujali, Georgeton Dujali, Jr., and Geomar Dujali. She annexed a list of Gregorio's properties that were allegedly publicly known, and claimed that since Gregorio's death there had been no effort to settle his estate. Buot alleged that Dujali continued to manage and control the properties to the exclusion of all other heirs, and that Dujali, for no justifiable reason, denied her request to settle the estate. She asked that an administrator be appointed to preserve the estate, a final inventory of the properties be made, the heirs be established, and the net estate be distributed among the legal heirs in accordance with law.

Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss, arguing that Buot had no legal capacity to institute the proceedings. He asserted that despite Buot's claim that she was Gregorio's child with his first wife Sitjar Escalona, she failed to attach any document, such as a certificate of live birth or a marriage certificate, to prove her filiation. Dujali attached a certificate of marriage between Gregorio and his mother Yolanda Rasay, which also indicated that Gregorio had never been previously married to a certain Sitjar Escalona. Buot filed her comment, arguing that under the Rules of Court, only ultimate facts should be included in an initiatory pleading, and that the marriage certificate and certificate of live birth demanded by Dujali were evidentiary matters for trial. To answer Dujali's allegations, Buot attached a copy of the necrological services program where she was listed as one of Gregorio's heirs, a certification from the municipal mayor that she is Gregorio's child, and a copy of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement dated July 4, 2001, which included both Buot and Dujali as Gregorio's heirs. Notably, this Amended Extrajudicial Settlement pertained to parcels of land not included in the list of properties annexed in Buot's petition.

On May 3, 2011, the RTC denied Dujali's motion to dismiss, agreeing with Buot that the issues raised were evidentiary matters that should be addressed during trial. Dujali filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that under the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence, a party's lack of legal capacity to sue should be raised in a motion to dismiss. He also took issue with the existence of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement, arguing that when an estate has no debts, recourse to administration proceedings is allowed only when there are good and compelling reasons, and where an action for partition is possible, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding.

The RTC, in its Order dated September 19, 2011, granted Dujali's motion for reconsideration. It held that under the law, there are only two exceptions to the requirement that the settlement of a deceased's estate should be judicially administered: extrajudicial settlement and summary settlement of an estate of small value. According to the RTC, administration had been barred by the fact that Gregorio's estate had already been settled extrajudicially as evidenced by the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. It also noted that Gregorio had no creditors since Buot failed to allege it in her petition. Since recourse to judicial administration of an estate that has no debt is allowed only when there are good reasons for not resorting to extrajudicial settlement or action for partition, the RTC dismissed Buot's petition. Buot filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its Order dated December 8, 2011, holding that not only was Buot's motion a second motion for reconsideration prohibited under the Rules, but there was also no sufficient reason to reverse its earlier dismissal.

Buot filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the RTC's Orders on pure questions of law. She argued that her motion for reconsideration was not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration, since Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court prohibits a second motion for reconsideration filed by the same party, and her motion was her first. She also argued that the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover all of Gregorio's properties, and that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for administration if they do not, for good reason, wish to pursue an ordinary action for partition. She claimed good reasons justifying her recourse to administration proceedings: (1) the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover the entire estate; (2) there has been no effort to partition the property; (3) Dujali seeks to challenge her status as an heir; (4) other heirs have been deprived of the properties of the estate; and (5) other heirs, particularly Constancia Dujali and Marilou Dujali, have already manifested that they are amenable to the appointment of an administrator.

In his comment, Dujali argued that Buot is not an interested person allowed to file a petition for administration of the estate, since public documents such as Buot's certificate of live birth and the certificate of marriage between Gregorio and Yolanda Rasay reveal otherwise. He attached documents that appear to show that there has been an extrajudicial settlement of some of the properties of the estate and that Buot has already received her share from the proceeds of the sale of these properties by the true heirs. He explained that Buot was only allowed to participate in the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement by Gregorio's legitimate heirs out of humanitarian considerations, not because she is a true heir. In her reply, Buot contended that the issue of whether she is a person interested in the estate is a matter that should be raised during the trial by the RTC of her petition for administration.

• Procedural Error — Second Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner argued that her motion for reconsideration was not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration, since Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court prohibits a second motion for reconsideration filed by the same party, and her motion was her first; the earlier motion for reconsideration was filed by Dujali.
• Incomplete Extrajudicial Settlement: Petitioner argued that the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover all of Gregorio's properties, and thus did not bar administration proceedings.
• Good Reasons for Administration: Petitioner maintained that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for administration if they do not, for good reason, wish to pursue an ordinary action for partition, citing: (1) the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover the entire estate; (2) there has been no effort to partition the property; (3) Dujali seeks to challenge her status as an heir; (4) other heirs have been deprived of the properties of the estate; and (5) other heirs have manifested amenability to the appointment of an administrator.
• Filiation as Evidentiary Matter: Petitioner contended that the issue of whether she is a person interested in the estate is a matter that should be raised during the trial by the RTC of her petition for administration.

• Lack of Legal Capacity: Respondent argued that Buot is not an interested person allowed to file a petition for administration of the estate, since public documents such as Buot's certificate of live birth and the certificate of marriage between Gregorio and Yolanda Rasay reveal that she is not a true heir.
• Prior Extrajudicial Settlement and Receipt of Share: Respondent argued that there has been an extrajudicial settlement of some of the properties of the estate and that Buot has already received her share from the proceeds of the sale of these properties by the true heirs.
• Humanitarian Consideration: Respondent explained that Buot was only allowed to participate in the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement by Gregorio's legitimate heirs out of humanitarian considerations, not because she is a true heir.
• No Good and Compelling Reason: Respondent argued that all these circumstances clearly indicate that there is no good and compelling reason to grant Buot's petition for administration.

• Procedural Issue — Second Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the RTC correctly held that Buot's motion for reconsideration was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration under Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court.
• Propriety of Dismissal — Administration vs. Partition: Whether the RTC properly dismissed the petition for administration on the ground that there has already been an extrajudicial settlement of certain properties of the estate and that the proper remedy is an ordinary action for partition.

• Procedural Issue — Second Motion for Reconsideration: No. The RTC erred in finding that Buot's motion for reconsideration was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. Section 2 of Rule 52 prohibits a second motion for reconsideration filed by the same party involving the same judgment or final resolution; Buot's motion was her first challenging the Order dismissing her petition.
• Propriety of Dismissal — Administration vs. Partition: Yes. The RTC properly ordered the dismissal of Buot's petition for administration. The reasons proffered by Buot do not constitute good and compelling reasons to warrant the submission of Gregorio's estate to administration proceedings, since none of her allegations actually prevent the filing of an ordinary action for partition.

• Procedural Issue — Second Motion for Reconsideration: Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." The Court reviewed the motions filed by the parties before the RTC and ruled that the RTC erred in its finding. When Buot filed her petition for administration, Dujali filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss. When the RTC denied his motion to dismiss, Dujali filed a motion for reconsideration, which led to the RTC's issuance of the Order of September 19, 2011 granting Dujali's motion and dismissing Buot's petition. It was only at this point that Buot filed, for the first time, a motion seeking reconsideration of the Order which declared the dismissal of her petition. The provision is clear and leaves no room for interpretation: what it prohibits is a second motion for reconsideration filed by the same party involving the same judgment or final resolution. Buot's motion was only her first, so the RTC clearly erred in denying her motion on that ground.

• Propriety of Dismissal — Administration vs. Partition: When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration proceedings under Rule 73, Section 1 and Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. There are, however, several exceptions. Section 1 of Rule 74 provides that if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves without judicial administration, either extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds, or through an ordinary action for partition in case of disagreement. However, Section 1 of Rule 74 does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition. Citing Rodriguez, et al. vs. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez, the Court noted that Section 1 is not mandatory or compulsory, as may be gleaned from the use of the word "may" rather than "shall." Since such proceedings are always "long," "costly," "superfluous and unnecessary," resort to judicial administration of cases falling under Section 1, Rule 74 has become the exception rather than the rule. Cases subsequent to Rodriguez emphasized that "[w]here partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons." In Pereira vs. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that what constitutes good reason depends on the circumstances of each case. The Court refused to allow administration proceedings where the only reason for seeking the appointment of an administrator was so that one heir can take possession of the estate from the other heir, holding that this was not a compelling reason, and that "the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event."

Applying these principles, the Court reviewed the reasons Buot proffered to warrant the grant of her petition for letters of administration and ruled that these do not suffice. That the extrajudicial settlement did not cover Gregorio's entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of the estate. Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and whether an extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the entire estate may be considered valid do not automatically create a compelling reason to order the administration of the estate. Parties seeking to challenge an extrajudicial settlement of estate possess sufficient remedies under the law and procedural rules. As to Buot's other allegations — that there has been no effort to partition the estate; that Dujali challenges her status as an heir; that other heirs have been deprived of the estate; and that these heirs are amenable to the appointment of an administrator — none of these allegations actually prevent the filing of an ordinary action for partition. If it is indeed true that there has been no effort to partition Gregorio's entire estate, the filing of an action for partition before the proper court will leave his heirs with no choice but to proceed. An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot's entitlement to participate in the proceedings as an heir, citing Butiong vs. Plazo. Not only would it allow for the full ventilation of the issues as to the properties that ought to be included in the partition and the true heirs entitled to receive their portions of the estate, it is also the appropriate forum to litigate questions of fact that may be necessary to ascertain if partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.

• Good Reason Exception under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court — Section 1 of Rule 74 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. The provision is not mandatory or compulsory, as may be gleaned from the use of the word "may" rather than "shall." However, where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. What constitutes good reason depends on the circumstances of each case. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine and found that none of Buot's allegations actually prevented the filing of an ordinary action for partition, and thus the dismissal of the petition for administration was proper.

• Prohibition on Second Motion for Reconsideration — Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court prohibits a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution filed by the same party. The provision is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. In this case, the RTC erred in denying Buot's motion for reconsideration on this ground, since her motion was her first challenging the Order dismissing her petition; the earlier motion for reconsideration was filed by Dujali.

• "Section 2 of Rule 52 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. What it prohibits is a second motion for reconsideration filed by the same party involving the same judgment or final resolution. In the present case, Buot's motion for reconsideration was only her first motion challenging the Order dismissing her petition for administration of Gregorio's estate. The RTC clearly erred in denying her motion on the ground that it is a second motion for reconsideration prohibited under the Rules." — This passage states the Court's ruling on the procedural issue, defining the scope of the prohibition on second motions for reconsideration under Rule 52, Section 2.

• "Cases subsequent to Rodriguez emphasized that '[w]here partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.'" — This passage articulates the controlling standard for when judicial administration may be ordered despite the possibility of partition, and is the doctrinal basis for the Court's affirmance of the dismissal.

• "We have reviewed the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant of her petition for letters of administration and rule that these do not suffice to warrant the submission of Gregorio's estate to administration proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover Gregorio's entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of the estate." — This passage applies the "good and compelling reasons" standard to the facts, explaining why the petitioner's allegations were insufficient to warrant judicial administration.

• Rodriguez, et al. vs. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez, 92 Phil. 273 (1952) — Controlling precedent establishing that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not preclude heirs from instituting administration proceedings even if the estate has no debts, provided they have good reasons for not resorting to an ordinary action for partition; the provision is not mandatory or compulsory given the use of the word "may."
• Pereira vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81147, June 20, 1989, 174 SCRA 154 — Followed; explains what the "good reason exception" means, holding that what constitutes good reason depends on the circumstances of each case, and that administration proceedings were not warranted where the only reason was to allow one heir to take possession of the estate from another.
• Butiong vs. Plazo, G.R. No. 187524, August 5, 2015, 765 SCRA 227 — Cited for the proposition that an action for partition is the proper venue to ascertain a claimant's entitlement to participate in the proceedings as an heir.

• Section 1, Rule 74, Rules of Court — Provides for extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs when the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age; the Court applied this provision to determine that the estate had been partially settled extrajudicially and that the heirs' remedy lay in an ordinary action for partition absent good and compelling reasons for administration.
• Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court — Prohibits a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party; the Court applied this provision to find that the RTC erred in characterizing Buot's motion as a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.
• Section 1, Rule 73, Rules of Court — Provides that when a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration proceedings; cited as the general rule subject to exceptions.
• Section 6, Rule 78, Rules of Court — Cited together with Rule 73, Section 1 as the general basis for judicial administration of an intestate decedent's estate.

Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, J., Del Castillo, J., and Tijam, J., concurred in the decision.