Bunyi vs. Factor

In forcible entry cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants, and the one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. Possession de facto, not possession de jure, is the only issue in a forcible entry case, and this rule holds regardless of the character of a party's possession, provided that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

Respondent Fe S. Factor is one of the co-owners of an 18-hectare piece of land located in Almanza, Las Piñas City, with ownership originating from her paternal grandparents, Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor, who had been in actual, continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession and occupation of the land even before 1906. The children of Constantino and Maura filed a Petition for Original Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title on December 9, 1975, which was granted on December 8, 1994, declaring them as co-owners. The siblings thereafter sold seven hectares of the property, with the agreement that respondent's father, Enrique Factor, would have as his share the portion known as the Factor compound, where he caused the construction of several houses including the subject rest house.

Respondent Fe S. Factor is a co-owner of an 18-hectare piece of land in Almanza, Las Piñas City, with ownership originating from her paternal grandparents, Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor, who had been in actual, continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession of the land even before 1906. On December 9, 1975, the children of Constantino and Maura filed a Petition for Original Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title for Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Psu-253567 before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 71. On December 8, 1994, the trial court granted the petition in LRC Case No. N-9049 and declared the children as co-owners of the property. The children thereafter sold seven hectares of the Factor family property during the same year, with the agreement that Enrique Factor, respondent's father, would have as his share the portion located in Antioch Street, Pilar Executive Village, Almanza I, Las Piñas City, known as the Factor compound. Enrique caused the construction of several houses in the compound, including the subject property, a rest house where members of the Factor family stayed during get-togethers and visits.

Petitioners Precy Bunyi and her mother, Mila Bunyi, were tenants in one of the houses inside the compound, particularly in No. 8 Antioch St., since 1999. When Enrique Factor died on August 7, 1993, the administration of the Factor compound, including the subject rest house and other residential houses for lease, was transferred and entrusted to Enrique's eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao. Gloria, together with her husband Ruben Labao and their son Reggie F. Labao, lived in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila but visited and sometimes stayed in the rest house because Gloria collected the rentals of the residential houses and oversaw the Factor compound. When Gloria died on January 15, 2001, the administration and management of the Factor compound passed on to respondent Fe S. Factor as co-owner of the property. As an act of goodwill and compassion, considering that Ruben Labao was sickly and had no means of income, respondent allowed him to stay at the rest house for brief, transient and intermittent visits as a guest of the Factor family.

On May 31, 2002, Ruben Labao married petitioner Precy Bunyi. On November 10, 2002, Ruben Labao died. At about this time, respondent discovered that petitioners forcibly opened the doors of the rest house and stole all the personal properties owned by the Factor family and then occupied the premises. Respondent alleged that petitioners unlawfully deprived her and the Factor family of the subject property's lawful use and possession. Respondent also added that when she tried to enter the rest house on December 1, 2002, an unidentified person who claimed to have been authorized by petitioners to occupy the premises, barred, threatened and chased her with a jungle bolo. Thus, on September 12, 2003, respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioners.

Petitioners, for their part, questioned Fe's claim of ownership of the subject property and the alleged prior ownership of her father Enrique Factor. They asserted that the subject property was owned by Ruben Labao, and that petitioner Precy with her husband moved into the subject property, while petitioner Mila Bunyi, mother of Precy, remained in No. 8 Antioch St. The MeTC ruled in favor of Fe S. Factor, ordering petitioners to vacate the premises, pay monthly rental of ₱2,000.00 from December 1, 2002, and pay attorney's fees of ₱10,000.00. Petitioners appealed to the RTC, which affirmed in toto, and then to the Court of Appeals, which also denied the petition.

• Force, Threat, Intimidation and Stealth: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the RTC decision that force, threat, intimidation and stealth had been committed by petitioners in occupying the subject residential house.
• Better Right of Possession: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it misappreciated the fact that respondent has a better right of physical and material possession of the subject property, insisting that petitioner Precy has a better right of possession since she inherited the subject property as the surviving spouse and sole heir of Ruben Labao, who owned the property before his death.
• Monthly Rental Award: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in affirming the RTC's finding holding petitioners liable to pay the monthly rental of ₱2,000.00 from December 1, 2002 up to the time they finally vacate the premises.

• Prior Possession: Respondent hinged her claim of possession on the fact that her predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the property as early as 1975, and that she, as co-owner and heir, had the right to the possession of the property as one of the attributes of ownership.

• Sufficiency of Evidence on Force: Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred in law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the RTC decision that force, threat, intimidation and stealth had been committed by the petitioners in occupying the subject residential house.
• Better Right of Physical Possession: Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred when it misappreciated the fact that the respondent has a better right of physical and material possession of the subject property.
• Monthly Rental Award: Whether the Court of Appeals seriously erred in affirming the RTC's finding holding petitioners liable to pay the monthly rental of ₱2,000.00 from December 1, 2002 up to the time they finally vacate the premises.

• Sufficiency of Evidence on Force: No. The resolution of this issue requires an inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence presented below, which the Supreme Court will not do, consistent with the repeated holding that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of the RTC were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and none of the exceptions to the binding effect of lower courts' factual findings is present.
• Better Right of Physical Possession: Yes, respondent has the better right of physical possession. In ejectment cases, the only issue is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property, independent of any claim of ownership, and the one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. Respondent successfully proved prior possession through her predecessors-in-interest, while petitioners failed to prove prior possession.
• Monthly Rental Award: No. The award of rentals must be deleted because there is no evidence on record to support the MeTC's award of rent; the reasonable amount of any rent could not be determined by mere judicial notice but by supporting evidence. The award of attorney's fees must also be deleted because the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award.

• Sufficiency of Evidence on Force: The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in the instant petition. The cited findings of the RTC were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, it is not necessary that the respondent must demonstrate that the taking was done with force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war; the act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom. The presence of an unidentified man forbidding respondent from entering the subject property constitutes force contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• Better Right of Physical Possession: In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. The one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. Possession de facto is the physical possession of real property, and possession de facto and not possession de jure is the only issue in a forcible entry case. For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right, including juridical acts such as donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory information titles. While petitioners claimed that respondent never physically occupied the subject property, they failed to prove that they had prior possession. On record, petitioner Precy Bunyi admitted that Gloria Factor-Labao and Ruben Labao, as spouses, resided in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila and used the subject property whenever they visited the same. The marriage certificate of Ruben and petitioner Precy revealed that at the time of their marriage, Ruben was residing at 123 A. Lake St., San Juan, Metro Manila, and even Ruben's death certificate showed that his place of death and residence was at #4 Labao St., Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila. Considering that her husband was never a resident of the subject property, petitioner Precy failed to explain convincingly how she was able to move in with Ruben Labao in the subject property during their marriage. On the other hand, it was established that respondent's grandparents had been the occupants and in possession of the lands in the concept of owners for more than thirty years prior to 1975, and the RTC in its Decision dated December 8, 1994 in LRC Case No. N-9049 confirmed the rights of respondent's predecessors over the subject property. Respondent's right to the property was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their father's death, and as heir, respondent had the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. After the death of Enrique Factor, it was his eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao, who took over the administration of the subject property, and as a consequence of co-ownership, soon after the death of Gloria, respondent, as one of the surviving co-owners, may be subrogated to the rights of the deceased co-owner, which includes the right to the administration and management of the subject property. Even assuming that respondent was never a resident of the subject property, she could legally continue possessing the property; visiting the property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession, and the fact of her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of possession of the subject property. The Court stressed, however, that its determination of ownership in the instant case is not final; it is only a provisional determination for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of possession and would not bar or prejudice a separate action involving the quieting of title.
• Monthly Rental Award: While the courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property, they could not simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. The reasonable amount of any rent could not be determined by mere judicial notice but by supporting evidence. In the instant case, there is no evidence on record to support the MeTC's award of rent. On the matter of attorney's fees, it is a well-settled rule that where attorney's fees are granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award. Nothing in the body of both decisions of RTC and MeTC explicitly stated the reasons for the award of attorney's fees.

• Possession de facto as the sole issue in forcible entry — In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. The one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party's possession, provided that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that respondent, who traced her possession to her predecessors-in-interest who had always been in possession of the subject property, had the better right of possession over petitioners, who failed to prove prior possession.
• Possession by juridical acts — Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Possession can be acquired by juridical acts, which are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, such as donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory information titles. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that respondent, as heir and co-owner, had the right to possession of the property as one of the attributes of ownership, even without actual physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times.
• Force in forcible entry — In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war; the act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the presence of an unidentified man forbidding respondent from entering the subject property constitutes force contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• Provisional determination of ownership in ejectment — The determination of ownership in an ejectment case is not final; it is only a provisional determination for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of possession. It would not bar or prejudice a separate action between the same parties involving the quieting of title to the subject property.

• "In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. The one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case, defining the sole issue in ejectment cases and the rule on prior physical possession.
• "For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right." — This passage defines the concept of possession in the eyes of the law, which does not require continuous physical occupation of every part of the property.
• "In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property which is all that is necessary and sufficient to show that the action is based on the provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court." — This passage, quoted from Bañes v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines, defines what constitutes force in forcible entry cases.
• "The words 'by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth' include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom." — This passage, quoted from David v. Cordova, provides the broad interpretation of the means of deprivation in forcible entry cases.

• Bañes vs. Lutheran Church in the Philippines, G.R. No. 142308, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 13 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that the act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, which is all that is necessary and sufficient to show that the action is based on Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• David vs. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 384 — Cited for the broad interpretation of the words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth," which include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom.
• Somodio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82680, August 15, 1994, 235 SCRA 307 — Cited for the rule that in ejectment cases, the one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself, and that this rule holds regardless of the character of a party's possession, provided he has priority of time.
• Habagat Grill vs. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., G.R. No. 155110, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 653 — Cited for the proposition that one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times to be considered in possession, and that possession can be acquired by material occupation or by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by proper acts and legal formalities.
• Quizon vs. Juan, G.R. No. 171442, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 601 — Cited for the same propositions on possession and for the examples of juridical acts that give the force of acts of possession.
• Dela Rosa vs. Carlos, G.R. No. 147549, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 226 — Cited for the rule that visiting the property on weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession, and that the fact of residence somewhere else does not result in loss of possession.
• Morales, et al. vs. Yañez, 98 Phil. 677 (1956) — Cited for the rule that respondent's right to the property was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their father's death, and that as heir, respondent had the right to the possession of the property as one of the attributes of ownership.
• Booc vs. Five Star Marketing Co., Inc., G.R. No. 157806, November 22, 2007, 538 SCRA 42 — Cited for the rule that the determination of ownership in an ejectment case is not final and is only a provisional determination for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of possession.
• Badillo vs. Tayag, G.R. Nos. 143976 and 145846, April 3, 2003, 400 SCRA 494 — Cited for the rule that the reasonable amount of rent could not be determined by mere judicial notice but by supporting evidence.
• Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118325, January 29, 1997, 267 SCRA 158 — Cited for the rule that where attorney's fees are granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Provides that a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth may bring an action for forcible entry within one year after such unlawful deprivation. The Court applied this provision in holding that the presence of an unidentified man forbidding respondent from entering the subject property constitutes force contemplated by this section.
• Article 484, Civil Code — Defines co-ownership as existing whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. The Court applied this provision in holding that as a consequence of co-ownership, respondent, as one of the surviving co-owners, may be subrogated to the rights of the deceased co-owner, which includes the right to the administration and management of the subject property.

• Ynares-Santiago, J.
• Chico-Nazario, J.
• Brion, J.
• Peralta, J.