Bunye vs. Escareal

Preventive suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory once a valid information for violation of that Act is pending in court; it is not a penalty and does not violate the presumption of innocence, and the accused’s admissions do not dispense with the prosecution’s need to prepare its case free from interference.

Respondents are the Associate Justices of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides for the suspension of any public officer against whom a criminal prosecution under a valid information under that Act is pending in court. The petitioners are the municipal mayor, vice-mayor, and incumbent councilors or members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Ignacio R. Bunye, Jaime D. Fresnedi, Lucio B. Constantino, Nolasco L. Diaz, Rufino J. Joaquin, Roger S. Smith, Alejandro L. Martinez, and Roman E. Niefes were the municipal mayor, vice-mayor, and incumbent councilors or members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The information charged them, together with other public officers, with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. It alleged that on or about August 1988 in Muntinlupa, the accused, while in the performance of their official functions, in conspiracy with one another and taking advantage of their official positions, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enacted Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 on August 1, 1988, and on the basis thereof forcibly took possession of the new Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa, and thereafter took over the operation and management of the public market starting August 19, 1988.

The information further alleged that there was a valid and subsisting lease contract executed on September 2, 1985 for a term of 25 years between the Municipality of Muntinlupa, represented by former Municipal Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr., and Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod and mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (Kilusang Magtitinda), a cooperative represented by its General Manager Amado G. Perez. It also alleged that the takeover was made despite warnings from COA Chairman Domingo and MMC Governor Cruz that appropriate legal steps be taken by the MMC toward the rescission or annulment of the contract to protect the Government’s interest and that the case be studied further to preclude possible damages or financial liabilities.

The information alleged that the forcible takeover caused undue injury to the cooperative members and gave the Municipal Government, and in effect the accused themselves, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their official functions through evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. It stated that the cooperative members had introduced improvements, including the construction of the “KBS” building, RR Section-Phases I and II, and asphalting of the roads surrounding the market place, and that the cooperative had invested Thirteen Million Four Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P13,479,900.00) in connection therewith, which had been deposited in trust to the Municipal Government; in consideration thereof, the cooperative was extended the long-term lease to manage and operate the public market and to pay a monthly rental of P35,000.00 only.

On the motion of the Public Prosecutor, and over the opposition of the accused, the Sandiganbayan issued on May 11, 1993 a resolution suspending them pendente lite from public office pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the order of suspension, but their effort was fruitless. They then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC, praying for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to stay the implementation of the assailed order or resolution. The SC did not grant the temporary restraining order prayed for and ordered the public respondents to comment on the petition.

• No Risk of Tampering Because of Admissions: Petitioners argued that preventive suspension was unjustified or unnecessary because they had repeatedly admitted in no less than four pleadings filed in related proceedings and found in the records that they committed the acts constituting the offense charged—enacting and approving Kapasiyahan Blg. 45 and wresting the management and operation of the new public market in Alabang from the Cooperative and transferring it to the Municipality of Muntinlupa—so the fear that they might tamper with the records of that transaction had no validity.
• Purely Legal Issue: Petitioners argued that the proceedings before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan involved no factual issue but only the legal question of whether the cancellation of the Cooperative’s subsisting lease contract over the Municipal Public Market was justified by public interest or general welfare; since no testimonial or documentary evidence was needed, nothing could be compromised or hampered by their remaining in office, and any apprehension that they might intimidate or coerce prospective witnesses or tamper with office records was “more imaginary than real.”
• Ganzon Objective of Suspension: Petitioners invoked Ganzon vs. CA, 200 SCRA 271, 272, that the sole objective of an administrative suspension is “to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the records and other evidence” and “to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official”; since no such reason for their suspension existed, the order should be set aside as a grave abuse of the court’s discretion.
• Paralysis of the Municipal Government: Petitioners asserted that their preventive suspension would “sow havoc and confusion in the government of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, to the certain shattering of the peace and order thereat”; without a mayor, vice-mayor, and six councilors, the local government would be paralyzed, and with only eight members of the Sangguniang Bayan remaining, the designation of two to take over the offices of mayor and vice-mayor would leave the Sangguniang Bayan without a quorum.

• Prosecution Needs Opportunity to Prepare: The Solicitor General countered that it is not for petitioners to say that their admissions are all the evidence the prosecution will need to hold up its case; the prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure nonintervention and noninterference for ninety straight days from petitioners’ camp.

• Preventive Suspension Under Section 13: Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly ordered petitioners’ preventive suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 despite their admissions and their claim that the proceedings involved only a legal issue.
• Paralysis of Local Government: Whether the preventive suspension should be set aside because it would leave the Municipality of Muntinlupa without a mayor, vice-mayor, and six councilors and paralyze the local government.

• Preventive Suspension Under Section 13: Yes. Section 13 of RA 3019 provides that a public officer against whom a valid information under the Act is pending shall be suspended from office; the SC held the suspension mandatory and found no grave abuse of discretion.
• Paralysis of Local Government: No. The fear of paralysis is remote; eight councilors remain, and the President or the Secretary of Interior and Local Government can fill the temporarily vacant positions under the Local Government Code.

• Preventive Suspension Under Section 13: Section 13 of RA 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that accused public officials “shall be suspended from office” while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. In Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, the SC ruled that such preventive suspension is mandatory; there are no ifs and buts about it. The SC also cited People vs. Albano, G.R. Nos. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511, and People vs. CA, 135 SCRA 372, for the rule that suspension under Section 13 is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined and is not a penalty. The petitioners’ admissions did not remove the basis for suspension: the Solicitor General correctly replied that it is not for petitioners to say their admissions are all the evidence the prosecution will need; the prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions ensuring nonintervention and noninterference for ninety straight days from petitioners’ camp. Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion.
• Paralysis of Local Government: The fear that the municipal government of Muntinlupa would be paralyzed for ninety days when petitioners are preventively suspended is remote. There will still remain eight councilors who can meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, will know how to deal with the problem of filling the temporarily vacant positions of mayor, vice-mayor, and six councilors in accordance with the Local Government Code, RA 7160, as cited in Samad vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 107854 and Samad vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 108642, July 16, 1993, and Sanchez vs. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454.

• Mandatory preventive suspension under Section 13, RA 3019 — Once a valid information for violation of RA 3019 or bribery under the Revised Penal Code is pending in court, the public officer shall be suspended from office; the suspension is mandatory and not a penalty. Applied: the Sandiganbayan’s suspension of petitioners was upheld; their admissions did not defeat the mandatory character.
• Purpose of preventive suspension — Preventive suspension aims to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation with influence and authority over possible witnesses or keeping off records and other evidence, and to assist prosecutors in firming up a case against an erring local official. Applied: the prosecution must be allowed to gather and prepare facts for trial under noninterference for ninety days.
• Admissions do not dispense with prosecution’s preparation — The accused cannot decide that their admissions are all the evidence the prosecution needs; the prosecution is entitled to gather and prepare facts for trial free from interference. Applied: petitioners’ repeated admissions did not make suspension unnecessary.
• Preventive suspension is not a penalty — It does not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence because it is not a penalty; it is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined. Applied: the SC upheld the suspension notwithstanding the constitutional objection discussed in the quoted ruling.
• Paralysis of local government is not a bar where vacancies can be filled — The fear of local government paralysis is remote where enough councilors remain to meet and the President or the Secretary of Interior and Local Government can fill temporary vacancies under the Local Government Code. Applied: suspension was upheld despite the absence of the mayor, vice-mayor, and six councilors.

• “Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public officials "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court.” — The SC reads Section 13 as mandatory once a valid information is pending.
• “In Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, this Court ruled that such preventive suspension is mandatory; there are no ifs and buts about it.” — The SC treats preventive suspension as mandatory, not discretionary.
• “The prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure nonintervention and noninterference for ninety (90) straight days from petitioners' camp” — The SC adopts the Solicitor General’s answer to the argument that petitioners’ admissions removed the need for suspension.
• “The fear of the petitioners that the municipal government of Muntinlupa will be paralyzed for ninety (90) days when they (petitioners) are preventively suspended, is remote.” — The SC rejects the paralysis argument.

• Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426 — Controlling precedent, followed: preventive suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory.
• People vs. Albano, G.R. Nos. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511 — Cited in the quoted ruling for the rule that suspension upon filing of a valid information is mandatory.
• People vs. CA, 135 SCRA 372 — Cited for the rule that preventive suspension is not a penalty and is mandatory once the validity of the information is determined.
• Samad vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 107854 and Samad vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 108642, July 16, 1993 — Cited on the President’s or the Secretary of Interior and Local Government’s authority to fill temporarily vacant local positions under the Local Government Code.
• Sanchez vs. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454 — Cited with Samad on filling temporary vacancies in local government.

• Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under the Act or under the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court shall be suspended from office; if convicted by final judgment, he loses all retirement or gratuity benefits, but if acquitted, he is entitled to reinstatement and to salaries and benefits he failed to receive during suspension unless administrative proceedings have been filed. Applied: the Sandiganbayan suspended petitioners pendente lite, and the SC upheld the suspension as mandatory.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — The information charged petitioners with violation of this provision by enacting Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 and taking over the Alabang public market, causing undue injury to cooperative members and giving unwarranted benefits through evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Applied: this was the criminal charge pending before the Sandiganbayan that triggered Section 13.
• Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Cited for filling the temporarily vacant positions of mayor, vice-mayor, and six councilors. Applied: the SC held the President or the Secretary of Interior and Local Government could deal with the vacancies under this Code, making the fear of paralysis remote.