Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

Acts of forcible abduction, carnal knowledge against a woman's will, and a subsequent promise to marry made to escape criminal liability, followed by renunciation of that promise after cohabitation, constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs under Article 21 of the Civil Code, entitling the injured party to moral and exemplary damages, notwithstanding that a simple breach of promise to marry is not independently actionable and that the criminal complaint was dismissed at the preliminary investigation stage.

Petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo were sweethearts who had quarreled approximately two weeks before September 8, 1973. The dispute arose from sharply divergent accounts of what transpired on that date and the twenty-one days that followed. Private respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of promise to marry against petitioner and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. A prior criminal complaint for forcible abduction with rape had been filed with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office but was dismissed at the preliminary investigation stage by mere resolution of the fiscal.

Petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo were sweethearts who had quarreled approximately two weeks before September 8, 1973. On that afternoon, the parties' accounts diverge sharply. According to private respondent, while she was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios canteen for a snack, petitioner approached her in a car driven by an unidentified male companion and invited her to take merienda at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila, which she accepted, believing in his sincerity. She rode in the car, taking the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. sat to her right. Upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City, the car turned abruptly right; when she protested, the two men threatened her, saying they were ready to die and would bump the car against a post if she persisted. The car proceeded to a motel, where private respondent was pulled and dragged from the car against her will. Despite her struggles, she was overpowered by the two men and brought inside the hotel, where Bunag, Jr. forced her to lie down and had carnal knowledge of her against her will, his companion holding her feet and removing her undergarment before leaving. Bunag, Jr. threatened to summon his companion back if she did not surrender, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her by force.

After the assault, private respondent asked to go home, but Bunag, Jr. refused, stating he would only release her after they were married and that he intended to marry her. They took a taxi to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother, in Pamplona, Las Piñas, arriving at 9:30 in the evening. At about ten o'clock that same night, Conrado Bunag, Sr., petitioner's father, arrived and assured private respondent that the following day she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor to apply for a marriage license. On September 10, 1973, both parties filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. They then returned to the house of Juana de Leon and lived together as husband and wife from September 8 to September 29, 1973. On September 29, 1973, Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating private respondent and compelling her to return to her parents on October 3, 1973. On October 1, 1973, after leaving private respondent, Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license. Private respondent's uncle, Vivencio Bansagan, corroborated her account, testifying that upon locating her at the house of Juana de Leon, he met Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare, the children are here already. Let us settle the matter and have them married."

Petitioner and his father presented a different version. They denied that Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped private respondent, claiming instead that the couple had earlier planned to elope and get married due to the opposition of Bunag, Sr. to their relationship, a fact known to their friends, including Architect Chito Rodriguez. On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met private respondent and her officemate named Lydia near the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome had snacks at the hospital canteen, after which Ramos took Lydia home, leaving the couple alone. According to Bunag, Jr., they took a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels, which were fully booked, and finally obtained a room at the Holiday Hotel, where he registered using his real name and residence certificate number. Three hours later, they checked out and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, where they stayed until September 19, 1973. Bunag, Jr. claimed that bitter disagreements over money and threats to his life prompted him to break off their plan to marry. Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juana de Leon or having promised marriage, stating he had phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda three times between the evening of September 8 and September 9, 1973, inquiring about his son's whereabouts, and only learned of the couple's elopement late in the afternoon of September 9 from his mother, Candida Gawaran.

The trial court, whose factual findings were adopted and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, credited private respondent's version, finding that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped her, that the defendants promised she would be wed to Bunag, Jr., and that damages were warranted for the breach of that promise. The trial court ordered Bunag, Jr. to pay ₱80,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱20,000.00 as temperate damages, and ₱10,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs of suit, while absolving Conrado Bunag, Sr. from liability.

• Misapprehension of Facts: Petitioner contended that both the trial and appellate courts failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies, and incidents supporting his defense, resulting in a misapprehension of facts violative of the law on preparation of judgment. He maintained that there was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but only a simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and that the agreement to marry had been sufficiently proven by the testimonies of witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in court.
• Erroneous Application of Law and Jurisprudence: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that there was forcible abduction with rape rather than a simple elopement and agreement to marry, and in awarding excessive damages.
• Prior Dismissal of Criminal Complaint: Petitioner belabored the fact that damages were awarded on the basis of a finding that he was guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the criminal complaint filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.

• Review of Factual Findings: Whether the Supreme Court should review and re-evaluate the factual findings of the Court of Appeals in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Actionability of Breach of Promise to Marry: Whether the award of damages is proper where the case involves a breach of promise to marry, given that such breach per se is not actionable under civil law.
• Effect of Criminal Complaint Dismissal: Whether the dismissal of the criminal complaint for forcible abduction with rape at the preliminary investigation stage bars or extinguishes the civil action for damages based on the same acts.

• Review of Factual Findings: No. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Supreme Court; only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and no exception to this rule was shown to apply.
• Actionability of Breach of Promise to Marry: Yes. While a simple breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se, the acts of forcible abduction, rape, and a subsequent promise to marry made to escape criminal liability, followed by renunciation after cohabitation, constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs under Article 21 of the Civil Code, warranting moral and exemplary damages.
• Effect of Criminal Complaint Dismissal: No. The dismissal of the criminal complaint by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage did not extinguish the civil action, as there was no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist.

• Review of Factual Findings: The issue raised by petitioner — whether there was forcible abduction with rape or merely a simple elopement and agreement to marry — primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact, turning on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence. The well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate provides that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law imputed to the Court of Appeals; it is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh evidence anew. Absent a showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the record or so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand. The case revealed no feature falling within any recognized exception warranting review of the CA's factual findings.

• Actionability of Breach of Promise to Marry: While a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable in this jurisdiction, save for the right to recover money or property advanced upon the faith of such promise, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Under Article 21, in relation to paragraph 10 of Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy gaps in the statutes that leave victims of moral wrongs helpless. The acts of petitioner — forcibly abducting private respondent, having carnal knowledge of her against her will, promising to marry her to escape criminal liability, and then reneging on that promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days — irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions warranting the award of moral and exemplary damages pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10 of Article 2219, and Articles 2229 and 2234 of the Civil Code.

• Effect of Criminal Complaint Dismissal: The basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Criminal liability gives rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In this case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage; there was no declaration in a final judgment that the underlying fact did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not affect private respondent's right to institute a civil action arising from the offense. The two proceedings are not between the same parties, and different rules govern the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence: in a criminal action, guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action, preponderance of evidence suffices. It is not necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense can be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.

• Conclusiveness of Court of Appeals' Factual Findings — Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Exceptions exist where the findings are totally devoid of support in the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. The Court applied this doctrine by refusing to re-evaluate the evidence on whether forcible abduction with rape occurred, holding that the issue was factual and the CA's findings were conclusive.

• Non-Actionability of Breach of Promise to Marry Per Se — An action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. A breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. The Court recognized this rule but distinguished the case at bar, where the breach was accompanied by forcible abduction and rape.

• Article 21 of the Civil Code — Acts Contrary to Morals, Good Customs, or Public Policy — Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy gaps in the statutes that leave victims of moral wrongs helpless and to provide adequate legal remedy for moral wrongs impossible to specifically provide for in statutes. The Court applied Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10 of Article 2219, holding that the combination of forcible abduction, rape, a promise to marry to escape criminal liability, and subsequent renunciation after cohabitation constitutes acts contrary to morals and good customs.

• Extinction of Penal Action Does Not Extinguish Civil Action — The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. A dismissal at the preliminary investigation stage by mere resolution of the fiscal does not constitute such a declaration and does not extinguish the civil action. The Court applied this principle to hold that the fiscal's dismissal of the criminal complaint for forcible abduction with rape did not bar the civil action for damages.

• Different Standards of Proof in Criminal and Civil Proceedings — In a criminal action, the State must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence. The two proceedings are not between the same parties. The Court relied on this distinction to explain why the dismissal of the criminal complaint did not preclude a finding of liability in the civil action.

• "However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages." — This passage articulates the doctrinal bridge between the non-actionability of breach of promise to marry per se and the availability of damages under Article 21 for acts contrary to morals and good customs, forming the core ratio decidendi of the case.

• "Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs." — This passage applies Article 21 to the specific facts, defining the combination of acts that elevates the case beyond a mere breach of promise to marry into actionable conduct contrary to morals and good customs.

• "Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." — This formulation states the rule governing the survival of civil actions despite dismissal of criminal proceedings, a principle frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the independence of civil liability.

• "Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes." — This passage explains the legislative purpose behind Article 21, commonly cited to justify its broad remedial application.

• De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866 (1933) — Established the rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law, apart from recovery of money or property advanced upon the faith of such promise. Followed as the baseline rule from which the Court distinguished the present case.

• Ford vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 21 (1990) — Cited for the proposition that under Article 21, in relation to Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Followed as authority for awarding damages under Article 21.

• Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 (1989) — Cited for the legislative purpose of Article 21, adopted to remedy gaps in statutes that leave victims of moral wrongs helpless. Followed as supporting rationale.

• Rillon vs. Rillon, 107 Phil. 783 (1960) — Held that it is not necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense can be instituted and prosecuted. Followed as direct authority for the independence of the civil action.

• Calalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 514 (1991) — Cited for the fundamental postulate that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and that criminal liability gives rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the felonious act results in damage or injury. Followed as foundational principle.

• Morales vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 391 (1991) — Cited for the rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Supreme Court, and that the Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. Followed as authority for denying review of factual findings.

• Ocampo vs. Jenkins, 14 Phil. 681 (1909) — Cited for the distinction that different rules govern the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. Followed as supporting authority.

• Faraon vs. Prieta, 24 SCRA 582 (1968) — Cited in connection with Section 2(b), Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, regarding the extinction of civil liability. Followed as supporting authority.

• Article 21, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage done. Applied as the primary basis for awarding moral damages, the Court finding that petitioner's acts of forcible abduction, rape, and breach of promise to marry made to escape criminal liability constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs.

• Article 2219, Civil Code of the Philippines (paragraphs 3 and 10) — Enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be recovered, including (3) seduction, abduction, rape, and other lascivious acts, and (10) acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. Applied in relation to Article 21 to authorize the award of moral damages.

• Articles 2229 and 2234, Civil Code of the Philippines — Govern the award of exemplary or corrective damages. Applied to justify the award of exemplary damages in addition to moral damages.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, limiting review to questions of law. Applied to confine the Court's jurisdiction to errors of law, with the CA's factual findings deemed conclusive.

• Section 2(b), Rule 111, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. Applied to hold that the fiscal's dismissal of the criminal complaint at the preliminary investigation stage did not extinguish the civil action.

Narvasa, C.J. and Padilla, J., concurred. Nocon, J., took no part.