Buklod Nang Magbubukid Sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. vs. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.

A parcel of land validly reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural use prior to June 15, 1988, the effectivity date of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, is exempt from CARP coverage. The operative fact that places a parcel of land beyond the ambit of the CARL is its valid reclassification from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL, not by how or whose authority it was reclassified. A municipal council's approval of a subdivision application through an ordinance, pursuant to the zoning power granted under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, is understood to include approval of the reclassification of the land from agricultural to the intended non-agricultural use.

The respondent E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON) is a corporation that acquired the subject property in 1965 from the Manila Golf and Country Club for the purpose of developing it into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes." The property consists of several parcels of unirrigated land totaling 303.38545 hectares, part of a larger 372-hectare expanse in Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. The Municipality of Dasmariñas enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1 on July 13, 1971, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2264 (the Local Autonomy Act), providing subdivision regulations. The property was mortgaged to the Overseas Bank of Manila, which was under liquidation during the material period, causing delays in the subdivision project's implementation. Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect on June 15, 1988, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition, and distribution.

The subject property consists of several parcels of unirrigated land totaling 303.38545 hectares, part of a larger 372-hectare expanse in Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. Originally owned by the Manila Golf and Country Club, the property was acquired by EMRASON in 1965 for the purpose of developing it into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes." In 1971, the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, acting pursuant to Republic Act No. 2264 (the Local Autonomy Act), enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, entitled "An Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof."

In May 1972, EMRASON applied for authority to convert and develop its 372-hectare property into a residential subdivision, attaching detailed development plans and proposals from Bancom Development Corporation and San Miguel Corporation. Acting on the application, the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas passed Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A on July 9, 1972, approving the application for subdivision. The ordinance contained two resolutions: the first approved the application for subdivision of the 372-hectare area named "Traveller's Life Homes," and the second required that the municipal ordinance regarding subdivision regulations be strictly followed by the subdivision. EMRASON subsequently paid the fees, dues, and licenses needed to proceed with property development. However, the actual implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay because the property was mortgaged to the Overseas Bank of Manila, which was under liquidation during the material period.

On June 15, 1988, Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL) took effect. On September 23, 1988, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas addressed a letter to EMRASON clarifying that the municipality had approved the development of the property into residential, industrial, commercial, and golf course projects, and that this conversion conformed with the approved Development Plan of the Municipality. Meanwhile, the government planned to convert the tenanted neighboring property of the National Development Company (NDC) into an industrial estate through a joint venture with Marubeni Corporation. Because the NDC property was insufficient for both the industrial project and the commitment to provide tenant-farmers with three hectares each, the DAR was tasked with acquiring additional lands from nearby areas and earmarked EMRASON's property for this purpose.

On August 29, 1990, DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong sent the first of four batches of notices of acquisition covering 303.38545 hectares of EMRASON's property, each drawing protest from EMRASON. EMRASON filed petitions with the DARAB Region IV to nullify the first three sets of notices, docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92. The Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator directed the DAR Region IV to conduct a hearing to determine whether the property was covered by CARP. On August 28, 1992, the DAR Region IV Legal Division Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat rendered a decision declaring all the notices of acquisition null and void, observing that the property was exempt from CARP pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, which clarified that lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP. On September 3, 1992, the DAR Region IV Regional Director motu proprio elevated the case to the Office of the Agrarian Reform Secretary, disagreeing with the Hearing Officer's decision. On January 6, 1993, DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao issued an order affirming the notices of acquisition and directing DAR field officials to pursue coverage under RA 6657.

EMRASON appealed to the Office of the President, where the recourse was docketed as O.P. Case No. 5461. On February 7, 1996, the OP, through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, dismissed EMRASON's appeal, holding that the property had remained agricultural in classification and therefore fell within CARP coverage, based on EMRASON's failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Municipal Ordinances Nos. 1 and 29-A, failure to comply with Administrative Order No. 152, and certifications from the HSRC and HLURB that the property was agricultural. EMRASON's motion for reconsideration was denied on May 14, 1996. EMRASON then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40950. The Court of Appeals issued a TRO on July 3, 1996, and later granted a writ of preliminary injunction on September 30, 1996, after EMRASON posted a P500,000.00 bond. Buklod, on behalf of alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries, filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion seeking to intervene, to dissolve the injunction for alleged violation of Section 55 of the CARL, and to dismiss EMRASON's petition for being the wrong remedy.

On March 26, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision allowing Buklod's intervention but ruling in favor of EMRASON, holding that the subject property was already converted/classified as residential by the Municipality of Dasmariñas prior to the effectivity of the CARL. The appellate court reasoned that the absence of a general subdivision plan was of no moment, that the requirement of Section 16(a) of Ordinance No. 1 related to approval of the final plat rather than the conversion itself, that EMRASON could not be made to bear the consequences of the Municipal Council's non-compliance with Administrative Order No. 152, and that the DAR/MAR guidelines under Memorandum Circular No. 11-79 were promulgated only in 1979, after the conversion was already a fait accompli. The appellate court also observed that the subject property had never been devoted to agricultural activity and was more suitable for non-agricultural purposes, being situated at the heart of the CALABARZON adjacent to industrial and commercial complexes. The Court of Appeals further justified the preliminary injunction, finding that Section 55 of the CARL was inapplicable because the DAR Secretary was not acting as an agency of the PARC. Buklod and DAR filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, both denied by the Court of Appeals on November 24, 1997.

• Invalidity of the Municipal Ordinance: Buklod argued that the municipal ordinance invoked by EMRASON as conversion of the property, enacted on July 9, 1972, is impotent because the ordinance imposed conditions which EMRASON never complied with; no compliance means no conversion.
• Prior Land Reform Laws: Buklod argued that at the time the alleged ordinance was enacted, a land reform law (R.A. 3844) was already in effect granting security of tenure to farmers, so a landowner cannot arbitrarily convert agricultural land without complying with legal requirements.
• Supremacy of Land Reform Laws: Buklod argued that a mere municipal ordinance cannot negate land reform rights granted to farmers by legislative enactment under R.A. 3844 and subsequent laws, as land reform law, being social legislation, is paramount.
• Constitutional Mandate: Buklod argued that land reform is a constitutional mandate for the benefit of landless farmers, so land reform law should be construed and applied to attain the legislative intent of relieving farmers from poverty and bondage.
• Improper Injunction: Buklod argued that the Court of Appeals issued a restraining order/injunction against the clear prohibition in Section 55 of the CARL and departed from the usual course of procedure by refusing to grant the petitioner farmers a hearing despite the procedure prescribed by R.A. 7902.
• Lack of Authority to Reclassify: DAR argued that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Municipality of Dasmariñas was authorized under the Local Autonomy Act to classify and/or reclassify lands, since what was conferred was only zoning authority, rendering the exercise thereof ultra vires.
• Non-Compliance with Requirements: DAR argued that even assuming the authority to reclassify existed, Ordinance No. 29-A was not valid because it failed to comply with Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, Section 16(a) of Ordinance No. 1, and Administrative Order No. 152, which required review and approval by the National Planning Commission, and subsequent review by the HSRC/HLURB.
• Inapplicability of Natalia Realty: DAR argued that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the Natalia Realty case because the lands therein were converted by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, not by a municipal ordinance.
• One-Year Conversion Period: Buklod contended that EMRASON failed to comply with Section 36 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, which provided that conversion should be implemented within one year, otherwise the conversion is deemed in bad faith.
• Estoppel: Buklod pointed out that the subject property is still declared as "agricultural" for real estate tax purposes, and EMRASON is now estopped from insisting that the property is actually "residential."

• Validity of Reclassification: EMRASON echoed the Court of Appeals' ruling that the subject property is exempt from CARP because it had already been reclassified as residential with the approval of Ordinance No. 29-A on July 9, 1972, citing Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co., where the Court ruled that a municipal council is empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959.
• Exercise of Police Power: EMRASON avowed that the Municipality of Dasmariñas could validly zone and reclassify the subject property in the exercise of its police power to safeguard the health, safety, peace, good order, and general welfare of the people, citing Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals that "once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail."
• Non-Retroactivity of HSRC Authority: EMRASON argued that Executive Order No. 648, conferring upon the HSRC the power to review and approve zoning ordinances, was issued only on February 7, 1981, and could not be applied retroactively without impairing vested rights.
• Permissive NPC Consultation: EMRASON disputed the absolute necessity of submitting Ordinance No. 29-A to the NPC for approval, arguing that the word "may" in Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act made such review merely permissive.
• Distinction Between Reclassification and Development: EMRASON reasoned that since the property was already reclassified as residential, it did not have to immediately undertake actual development, as reclassification and/or conversion are different from implementation of the conversion.
• Applicability of Natalia Realty: EMRASON was resolute that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the Natalia Realty case since both have similar facts, the only difference being that the former involves a presidential fiat while the latter concerns a legislative fiat.
• Lack of Farmer-Tenants: EMRASON denied that the Buklod members are farmer-tenants of the subject property, noting that the property is unirrigated and not devoted to agricultural activity, and that the Buklod members were still undergoing screening and had not established vested rights.
• Belated Issues: EMRASON urged the Court not to consider issues belatedly raised by Buklod, which were first raised in its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.
• Inapplicability of Section 55: EMRASON defended the preliminary injunction, arguing that Section 55 of the CARL only prohibits injunctions against the PARC or its duly authorized agencies, and the DAR Secretary was acting in his quasi-judicial capacity as department head.

• Validity of Reclassification: Whether the subject property was validly reclassified from agricultural to residential by Resolution No. 29-A of the Municipality of Dasmariñas dated July 9, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, thereby exempting it from CARP coverage.
• Authority to Reclassify: Whether the Municipality of Dasmariñas was authorized under the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to reclassify agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses, or whether such power was exclusively vested in the National Legislature.
• Compliance with Requirements: Whether Resolution No. 29-A was invalid for failure to comply with the requirements of Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, Section 16(a) of Ordinance No. 1, Administrative Order No. 152, and subsequent review by the HSRC/HLURB.
• Applicability of Natalia Realty: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the ruling in Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform to the present case despite the factual dissimilarity in the mode of reclassification.
• Propriety of Preliminary Injunction: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in violation of Section 55 of the CARL.
• Belatedly Raised Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider the issues raised by Buklod for the first time in its Motion for Reconsideration.

• Validity of Reclassification: Yes. Resolution No. 29-A is a valid ordinance which, upon its approval on July 9, 1972, immediately effected the zoning and reclassifying of the subject property for residential use, and the property is therefore exempt from CARP coverage.
• Authority to Reclassify: Yes. The power to reclassify agricultural lands was within the zoning power delegated to city and municipal boards and councils under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, and Section 20 of the Local Government Code of 1991 only articulated a power that had previously been implied or inferred.
• Compliance with Requirements: Yes. Resolution No. 29-A need not comply with the requirements insisted upon by DAR and Buklod, as consultation with the NPC was merely permissive, the final plat review was distinct from the subdivision application approval, and the HSRC/HLURB review could not be applied retroactively.
• Applicability of Natalia Realty: Yes. The operative fact that places a parcel of land beyond the ambit of the CARL is its valid reclassification from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988, not by how or whose authority it was reclassified.
• Propriety of Preliminary Injunction: Moot. Any objection against the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction had been rendered moot and academic when the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on March 26, 1997, which made the injunction permanent.
• Belatedly Raised Issues: No. The Court of Appeals did not err in refusing to consider the issues raised by Buklod for the first time in its Motion for Reconsideration, as no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its consideration.

• Validity of Reclassification: The Court held that Section 3(c) of the CARL provides that a parcel of land reclassified for non-agricultural uses prior to June 15, 1988 shall no longer be considered agricultural land subject to CARP. Resolution No. 29-A, approved on July 9, 1972, contained two resolutions: the first categorically and unconditionally approved the application for subdivision covering the subject property, and the second required that the municipal ordinance regarding subdivision regulations be strictly followed by the subdivision. The second resolution already referred to a "subdivision," supporting the immediately executory nature of the first resolution. As a consequence of such approval, the subject property was immediately deemed zoned and reclassified as residential. The Court noted that although the parties referred to Resolution No. 29-A as an ordinance, this was not completely inaccurate, citing Ortigas & Co. that the law does not restrict the exercise of the zoning power through an ordinance, and a resolution is a regulatory measure within the intendment of the word "regulation."

• Authority to Reclassify: The Court rejected DAR and Buklod's argument that zoning is merely the regulation of land use based on the existing character of the property, and that zoning is a lesser power compared to reclassification. The Court explained that by virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of needs. To limit zoning to the existing character of the property would completely negate the power of the local legislature to plan land use. The Court reasoned that when city and municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an area as residential, commercial, or industrial zone, pursuant to Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, they were at the same time reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural use. The approval of a subdivision application through an ordinance should already be understood to include approval of the reclassification of the land from agricultural to the intended non-agricultural use; otherwise, the approval would serve no practical effect. The Court also noted that Section 9 of the Public Land Act, cited by DAR and Buklod, was immaterial because it applies only to lands of the public domain, not to privately owned property. The Court further held that the regulation of land use through zoning and reclassification is an exercise of police power, which may be inferred from the creation of the municipal corporation, citing Binay vs. Domingo.

• Compliance with Requirements: The Court held that Resolution No. 29-A need not comply with the requirements insisted upon by DAR and Buklod. First, the consultation with the NPC under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act was merely permissive, as indicated by the word "may," which is directory and permissive only. The only two mandatory requirements were that the ordinance be adopted by the city or municipal board or council and approved by the mayor, both of which were complied with. Second, Section 16(a) of Ordinance No. 1 referred to the final plat of the subdivision, which must be distinguished from the application for subdivision; the review of the final plat called for technical expertise and was a separate matter from the approval of the subdivision application. Third, Administrative Order No. 152 was directed to city and municipal boards and councils, not to EMRASON, and it would be contrary to fair play to make EMRASON bear the consequences of non-compliance by public officials. The Court also applied the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. Fourth, Resolution No. 29-A need not be subjected to review by the HSRC/HLURB because it was approved on July 9, 1972, when the HSRC did not yet exist; the earliest predecessor, the Task Force on Human Settlements, was created on September 19, 1973, and the HSRC was established only on February 7, 1981. Neither the Ministry of Human Settlements nor the HSRC could exercise its power of review retroactively absent an express provision, as laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.

• Applicability of Natalia Realty: The Court held that the difference in the mode of reclassification — presidential proclamation in Natalia Realty versus local ordinance in the present case — does not preclude the application of the ruling. The operative fact that places a parcel of land beyond the ambit of the CARL is its valid reclassification from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, not by how or whose authority it was reclassified. The Court also cited Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, which recognized the power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands through a zoning ordinance, and Junto vs. Garilao, which declared that lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before June 15, 1988 are outside the coverage of the CARL and no longer need any conversion clearance from the DAR. The Court further addressed the 1981 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmariñas, which placed the subject property within an agricultural zone, holding that the property retained its residential classification because Section 17 of the ordinance provided that rights that have vested before its effectivity shall not be impaired. EMRASON acquired the vested right to use and develop the subject property as a residential subdivision on July 9, 1972, and such right cannot be impaired by the subsequent enactment of the 1981 ordinance.

• Propriety of Preliminary Injunction: The Court held that any objection by Buklod against the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction had been rendered moot and academic when the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on March 26, 1997, which made the injunction permanent. Citing Kho vs. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the decision rendered on the merits of the main case. The merit of the main case having been determined in favor of the applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to have any force and effect.

• Belatedly Raised Issues: The Court refused to take cognizance of the issues raised by Buklod for the first time in its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its consideration. The Court noted that Buklod did not allege that its case falls under any of the exceptions to this rule. Even when considered on the merits, the Court found the belatedly raised issues to be without merit. The Court rejected Buklod's argument that there was a one-year period to implement the conversion, noting that the amended Section 36(1) of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, in effect at the time Resolution No. 29-A was enacted, no longer contained the one-year time frame. Moreover, Section 36(1) would apply only if the land was subject of an agricultural leasehold, a fact not established in the proceedings below. The Court also rejected Buklod's invocation of vested rights under prior agrarian reform laws, as Buklod failed to prove that its members qualify as agricultural lessees or farm workers. The Court further held that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying Buklod's motion for a hearing, as the factual matters raised by Buklod would change the factual legal complexion of the case and were within the primary jurisdiction of the DAR under Section 50 of the CARL.

• Zoning as Reclassification — Zoning is the governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones, based on present and future projections of needs. When a city or municipal council approves an ordinance delineating an area as residential, commercial, or industrial zone pursuant to Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, it is at the same time reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural use. The approval of a subdivision application through an ordinance is understood to include approval of the reclassification of the land from agricultural to the intended non-agricultural use; otherwise, the approval would serve no practical effect.

• CARP Exemption for Lands Reclassified Before June 15, 1988 — Under Section 3(c) of the CARL, agricultural land subject to CARP is "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." A parcel of land validly reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural use prior to June 15, 1988, the effectivity date of the CARL, is exempt from CARP coverage. The operative fact is the valid reclassification, not the mode or authority by which it was done.

• Vested Rights Doctrine — A vested right is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law" or "some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy." The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. While protection of vested rights is not absolute and must yield to the exercise of police power, a subsequent zoning ordinance that expressly commits to honor rights that had already vested under previous ordinances cannot impair such rights.

• Non-Retroactivity of Laws — A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." Thus, the HSRC's power to review and approve zoning ordinances, conferred only in 1981, could not be applied retroactively to a reclassification effected in 1972.

• Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal — No issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its consideration. An issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel. Exceptions exist for lack of jurisdiction, plain error, jurisprudential developments, and matters of public policy, but the party raising the issue must allege and argue that its case falls under these exceptions.

• "The operative fact that places a parcel of land beyond the ambit of the CARL is its valid reclassification from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, not by how or whose authority it was reclassified." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that the mode of reclassification is immaterial to CARP exemption as long as the reclassification was valid and occurred before the CARL's effectivity.

• "It may, therefore, be reasonably presumed that when city and municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an area or district in their cities or municipalities as residential, commercial, or industrial zone, pursuant to the power granted to them under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, they were, at the same time, reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the implementation of and compliance with their zoning ordinances." — This passage articulates the Court's interpretation of the zoning power under the Local Autonomy Act, holding that zoning includes the power to reclassify agricultural lands.

• "The approval by city and municipal boards and councils of an application for subdivision through an ordinance should already be understood to include approval of the reclassification of the land, covered by said application, from agricultural to the intended non-agricultural use. Otherwise, the approval of the subdivision application would serve no practical effect." — This passage establishes the presumption that approval of a subdivision application includes reclassification of the land, a key principle applied to hold that Resolution No. 29-A validly reclassified the subject property.

• "A tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. A property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone." — This passage, quoted from Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals, establishes that tax declarations classifying the property as agricultural cannot prevail over the reclassification effected by Resolution No. 29-A.

• Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, 225 SCRA 278 (1993) — Controlling precedent. The Court applied this case to hold that lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL are outside the coverage of the CARP. The Court held that the difference in the mode of reclassification (presidential proclamation versus local ordinance) does not preclude the application of the ruling.

• Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co., 183 Phil. 176 (1979) — Followed. The Court cited this case to hold that a municipal council is empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, and that the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance; a resolution is a regulatory measure within the intendment of the word "regulation."

• Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 554 (1994) — Followed. The Court quoted this case for the principle that "once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail," and that a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes.

• Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 473 Phil. 64 (2004) — Followed. The Court cited this case to recognize the power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands through a zoning ordinance, and that the power of the local government to reclassify lands is not subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

• Junto vs. Garilao, 503 Phil. 154 (2005) — Followed. The Court cited this case for the declaration that lands already classified and identified as commercial, industrial, or residential before June 15, 1988 are outside the coverage of the CARL and no longer need any conversion clearance from the DAR.

• Binay vs. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508 (1991) — Followed. The Court cited this case to explain that police power need not always be expressly delegated to municipal corporations; it may also be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation.

• Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, 453 Phil. 373 (2003) — Followed. The Court cited this case to define and distinguish reclassification from conversion, holding that reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses as embodied in the land use plan.

• Ayog vs. Cusi, Jr., 204 Phil. 126 (1982) — Followed. The Court cited this case to expound on the concept of vested rights and their protection against impairment by subsequent legislation.

• Kho vs. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 410 (2002) — Followed. The Court cited this case to hold that the issuance of a final injunction renders any question on the preliminary injunctive order moot and academic.

• Office of the Ombudsman vs. Sison, 612 SCRA 702 (2010) — Followed. The Court cited this case to expound on the rules on intervention, holding that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

• Section 3(c), Chapter I, Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) — Defines agricultural land as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." The Court applied this provision to hold that the subject property, having been reclassified as residential, is not agricultural land subject to CARP.

• Section 4, Chapter II, Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) — Defines the scope of the CARP as covering "all public and private agricultural lands." The Court applied this provision in conjunction with Section 3(c) to determine that the subject property falls outside CARP coverage.

• Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act of 1959) — Authorizes Municipal Boards or City Councils and Municipal Councils to "adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations" for their respective cities and municipalities, subject to the approval of the mayor. The Court interpreted this provision as the source of the municipal council's power to reclassify agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses.

• Section 20, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Provides for the reclassification of lands by cities and municipalities through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after public hearing. The Court held that this provision only articulates a power of local legislatures which had previously been implied or inferred under the Local Autonomy Act.

• Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) — Provides for the classification of lands of the public domain. The Court held this provision immaterial to the present case because the subject property is privately owned and no longer part of the public domain.

• Section 55, Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) — Prohibits courts from issuing restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction against the PARC or its duly authorized agencies. The Court held this provision inapplicable because the DAR Secretary was acting in his quasi-judicial capacity as department head, not as an agency of the PARC.

• Section 50, Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) — Vests the DAR with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters. The Court applied this provision to hold that the factual matters raised by Buklod were within the primary jurisdiction of the DAR.

• Section 36(1), Republic Act No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code), as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 (Code of Agrarian Reforms) — Provides for the grounds for dispossession of an agricultural lessee, including conversion of the landholding to non-agricultural purposes. The Court held that the amended provision no longer contained the one-year time frame for conversion and would apply only if the land was subject of an agricultural leasehold, a fact not established in the proceedings below.

• Section 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Provides the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The Court applied this presumption to hold that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, public officers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly and legally.

• Article 4, Civil Code — Provides that "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." The Court applied this provision to hold that the HSRC's power of review could not be applied retroactively to the 1972 reclassification.

• Justice Velasco, Jr. (Acting Chairperson)
• Justice Del Castillo
• Justice Perez
• Justice Mendoza

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided case text.