Buenaventura vs. Republic of the Philippines

Possession of alienable and disposable public land for at least thirty years, even if commenced after June 12, 1945, converts the land into private property and entitles the possessor to registration of title under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529).

The petitioners, Angelita F. Buenaventura and Preciosa F. Buenaventura, are the heirs of spouses Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores, from whom they acquired the subject property. The case involves an original registration proceeding under the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529), which governs who may apply for registration of title to land. The property was classified as alienable and disposable public land per a DENR certification, and the dispute centers on whether the petitioners' possession, which commenced after June 12, 1945, can support registration.

The petitioners, Angelita F. Buenaventura and Preciosa F. Buenaventura, are the heirs of spouses Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores, from whom they acquired the subject property. The property was acquired by the spouses from the Heirs of Lazaro de Leon, namely Aurelio de Leon and his sister Rodencia Sta. Agueda, even before World War II, but the corresponding Deed of Sale was executed only on 30 January 1948. After the execution of the Deed of Sale, the spouses transferred the tax declaration to their name, cancelling T.D. No. 5492 and issuing T.D. No. 6103 in their name.

In 1978, the spouses transferred the subject property, together with an adjacent property previously acquired from Mariano Pascual, to their children, including the petitioners. A new tax declaration (T.D. No. A-004-05698) was issued in the children's names.

On 5 June 2000, the petitioners filed an Application for Registration of Title before the RTC of Parañaque City over the subject property, described as Cadastral Lot No. 5001-B, Csd-007604-000176-D, Parañaque Cadastre, located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City, with an area of 3,520.92 square meters. They alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest acquired title through inheritance, transfer, and possession as owners since time immemorial and/or within the period provided by law. The trial court found the application sufficient in form and substance, set the case for hearing, and directed the service and publication of notice pursuant to Section 23 of P.D. 1529.

On 27 September 2001, when the case was called for hearing, no interested party appeared other than the petitioners. General default was declared except for the Republic, and the case was referred to a commissioner who received the petitioners' evidence in chief. The petitioners presented five witnesses — Aniceta C. Capiral, Engr. Teofilo R. La Guardia, Atty. Reginald L. Hernandez, Ricardo H. Lopez, and petitioner Angelita — to establish their open, continuous, and exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over 50 years, and to prove the alienable and disposable character of the property. They also presented documentary evidence, including tax declarations from 1948 to 2001, a certification from the Office of the City Treasurer of Parañaque that realty taxes had been duly paid, and a DENR certification dated 29 October 2001 stating that the property was within the Alienable and Disposable Land per L.C. Map 2623, Project No. 25 of Parañaque per Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141 dated 3 January 1968.

On 29 October 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the application for registration, confirming and ordering the registration of the property in the names of the petitioners and their siblings, free from all liens and encumbrances. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the petitioners failed to prove continuous, open, exclusive, and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest and by themselves. On 23 August 2004, the CA reversed the RTC order and declared the property public land. The CA ruled that the petitioners failed to show possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529, and that the testimonial evidence was insufficient because the witnesses merely testified on their familiarity with the subject property. The CA acknowledged that the petitioners' possession could be reckoned from 1948, the year of the Deed of Sale, but found no evidence of possession since 12 June 1945. The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 25 January 2005.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the trial court's decision for lack of substantial evidence, since the records clearly show the existence of sufficient evidence to sustain the finding that they established possession in the manner and for the period required by law — open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
• Declaration as Public Land: Petitioners argued that the appellate court gravely erred in declaring the subject property public land despite their proof by clear and convincing evidence of possession for more than 30 years, which vested title by operation of law based on the period provided under the prevailing land registration and property laws.

• Failure to Prove Possession: The Republic argued that the petitioners failed to prove continuous, open, exclusive, and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest and by themselves, and that the trial court therefore erred in granting the application for registration.
• Non-Alienable Character: The Republic argued that the petitioners' own evidence tended to show that the subject property was not alienable and disposable because it was a salt bed and a fishpond, and under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, except for agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

• Substantial Evidence: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the trial court's decision confirming petitioners' title over the subject property for not being supported by substantial evidence as required by law.
• Declaration as Public Land: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subject property as public land and ignoring petitioners' evidence of over 50 years' possession in the concept of an owner and completely unmolested by any adverse claim.

• Substantial Evidence: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the trial court's decision, as the evidence on record sufficiently established the petitioners' possession in the manner and for the period required by law. The exceptions to the conclusiveness of appellate factual findings applied because the CA's findings were contrary to those of the trial court and premised on the supposed absence of evidence contradicted by the record.
• Declaration as Public Land: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring the property public land, because the petitioners' 32-year possession of alienable and disposable land, from 1968 to 2000, vested ownership by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 and Article 1137 of the Civil Code.

• Substantial Evidence: The Court acknowledged the general rule that it is not a trier of facts and that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding. However, two recognized exceptions applied: (1) when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court; and (2) when the findings of fact of the appellate court are premised on the supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by the evidence on record. The CA ruled that the testimonial evidence was insufficient because the witnesses merely testified on their familiarity with the subject property, but the records showed that the petitioners presented documentary evidence including tax declarations from 1948 to 2001, certifications of realty tax payments, and a DENR certification of the property's alienable and disposable character. The CA itself acknowledged that the petitioners' possession could be reckoned from 1948, the only basis for its reversal being the insufficiency of evidence of possession prior to 12 June 1945.

• Declaration as Public Land: The Court held that the DENR certification dated 29 October 2001 was sufficient to establish the alienable and disposable character of the property, enjoying a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. The Republic presented no evidence to refute the certification, and the alienable and disposable character was established by 3 January 1968 at the latest. The Court agreed with the CA that possession since 12 June 1945 was not proven, since the property was acquired only on 30 January 1948 and no evidence of the prior owners' possession was presented. However, this was not an insurmountable bar. Under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529, those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription may apply for registration. Citing Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that possession of alienable and disposable land for 30 years or more, even if commenced after 12 June 1945, allows registration. The petitioners possessed the property for 32 years, from 1968 to 2000, in an open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious manner in the concept of an owner. Tax declarations and realty tax payments, coupled with actual possession, constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription. The evidence was uncontroverted, and the witnesses uniformly testified that the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were the sole claimants of the property.

• Regalian Doctrine — All lands of the public domain belong to the State, and all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The Court applied this doctrine by noting that the presumption is not conclusive and can be rebutted by the applicant's presentation of incontrovertible evidence showing that the land is alienable and disposable. The DENR certification was sufficient to rebut the presumption.
• Prescription as a Mode of Acquiring Ownership — Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, ownership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or good faith. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the petitioners' 32-year possession of the alienable and disposable land, from 1968 to 2000, converted the land into private property and vested ownership by prescription.
• Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 — Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under existing laws may apply for registration. The Court applied this provision by holding that it allows registration even when possession of alienable and disposable land commenced only after 12 June 1945, provided the possession has been open, continuous, and exclusive for 30 years or more.
• Tax Declarations as Indicia of Possession — Tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, but they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property not in his actual or constructive possession. When coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.

• "Any period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto." — Quoted from Republic vs. Herbieto, this passage establishes that possession prior to classification as alienable and disposable cannot ripen into ownership, and was used by the Court to reckon the petitioners' possession from 1968.
• "It becomes crystal clear from the aforesaid ruling of the Court that even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced only after 12 June 1945, application for registration of the said property is still possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which speaks of prescription." — This passage articulates the controlling rule that Section 14(2) permits registration through prescription even when possession commenced after 12 June 1945.
• "As a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession." — This passage explains the evidentiary weight of tax declarations and realty tax payments in establishing possession in the concept of an owner.
• "It would be the height of injustice if petitioners' registration of title over the said property will de denied solely on that ground." — This passage expresses the Court's rationale for allowing registration despite the failure to prove possession since 12 June 1945.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005 — Controlling precedent establishing that Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 allows registration of alienable and disposable lands even when possession commenced after 12 June 1945, provided the possession has been for 30 years or more.
• Republic vs. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005 — Followed for the rule that possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and excluded from the computation of the period of possession.
• Cabuay, Jr. vs. Malvar, G.R. No. 123780, 24 September 2002 — Cited for the rule that properties classified as alienable and disposable may be converted into private property by open, continuous, and exclusive possession of at least 30 years.
• Heirs of Simplicio Santiago vs. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, G.R. No. 151440, 17 June 2003 — Cited for the rule that tax declarations and realty tax payments are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.
• Heirs of Flores Restar vs. Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon, G.R. No. 161720, 22 November 2005 — Cited for the rule that tax declarations and receipts, when coupled with actual possession, constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.

• Section 14(1), Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) — Provides that those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, or earlier, may apply for registration. The Court found that the petitioners failed to satisfy this provision because their possession commenced only in 1948.
• Section 14(2), Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) — Provides that those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under existing laws may apply for registration. The Court applied this provision to allow the petitioners' registration based on their 32-year possession.
• Article 1106, Civil Code — Provides that by prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. Cited as the basis for prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership.
• Article 1113, Civil Code — Provides that all things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided, and that property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. Cited to show that alienable and disposable lands are susceptible of prescription.
• Article 1137, Civil Code — Provides that ownership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or good faith. Applied to the petitioners' 32-year possession.
• Section 2, Article XII, Constitution — Provides that except for agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Cited by the Republic to argue that the property, being a salt bed and fishpond, was not alienable and disposable.
• Section 23, Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) — Provides for the notice of initial hearing, publication, mailing, and posting requirements in land registration proceedings. The trial court directed service and publication of the notice pursuant to this provision.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (on leave), and Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.