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Brown vs. The Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company

The complaint for damages was dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. George E. Brown sued the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company after his horse and calesa collided with the company's street car on Calle Concepcion at about 11 o'clock at night. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon the merits, and the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the clear weight of evidence—particularly the testimony of disinterested witnesses and the damage on the side of the car—showed the horse became frightened while the cochero tried to pass a garbage cart and dashed into the side of the car. Brown's theory that the motorman negligently failed to stop was rejected because the events occurred almost instantly and the car had already passed the front of the calesa.

Primary Holding

A street railway company is not liable for damages arising from a collision where the clear weight of evidence shows that the injury was caused by the plaintiff's frightened horse dashing into the side of the street car, rather than by any negligent act or omission of the motorman.

Background

George E. Brown owned the horse and calesa involved in the incident, and the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company operated the street car that figured in the collision. The action sought damages for injury to Brown's horse and calesa arising from a collision between his horse-drawn rig and the company's street car on Calle Concepcion. The text supplies no further statutory, regulatory, or historical backdrop.

History

  1. Plaintiff filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover damages for injury to his horse and calesa resulting from a collision with defendant's street car.

  2. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge A. S. Crossfield presiding, after trial dismissed the complaint upon the merits, without costs.

  3. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.

  4. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court below, without special finding as to costs.

Facts

At about 11 o'clock at night, the horse and calesa owned by Brown were being driven along the left side of Calle Concepcion toward Bagumbayan in a direction substantially west. About the time they reached the Y.M.C.A. building, a street car belonging to the defendant company turned into Concepcion from Bagumbayan and proceeded east along Concepcion toward Marcelino. There were two street-car tracks on Concepcion, an east-bound track and a west-bound track. The street car was passing along the east-bound track toward Marcelino, while the calesa was proceeding west toward Bagumbayan between the west-bound track and the curb of the street. Between the calesa and the east-bound track lay the part of the street between the curb and the west-bound track, reserved for vehicles, and the west-bound track itself; before a collision between the calesa and a car on the east-bound track would be possible, the calesa would have to cross both.

The testimony was conflicting in the extreme. Mariano Alejo, the cochero driving the calesa, testified that at about 11 o'clock at night he was driving west along the south side of Calle Concepcion; that on arriving opposite the Y.M.C.A. building he overtook two refuse carts traveling in the same direction, the head one covered with a white tarpaulin; that he turned out and passed one cart; that in attempting to pass the other the horse got scared at the tarpaulin flapping in the wind and reared; and that the horse reared and shied just as the car rounded from Bagumbayan into Concepcion. He said the horse went backwards and forwards across the street for a long time and did not like to pass the cart; that the street car was going fast; that while the horse was misbehaving he tried to get off the rig and get hold of the horse by the reins but it was impossible because the horse was afraid and did not want to go ahead; that when the street car got near he shouted to the motorman to stop several times because his horse was frightened and would not go ahead; that the motorman did not stop; that the street car struck the calesa on the right-hand side; that when struck the horse was facing the left-hand side of the street; that the calesa was struck first on the shaft; that the horse was cut on the right-hand leg; and that the horse had a bad habit, especially at night, when he would get vicious and scared, and was full of life. On cross-examination he testified that Strawn, the American occupant of the calesa, told him during the evening to go slow with the horse and be careful because he was acting badly; that the street car was far away when he was trying to pass the bull-cart and he thought he would have plenty of time to pass before the street car reached him; that the first thing the horse did was to dash across the street car track to the right; that the first thing that struck him was the footboard on the right-hand side of the car; that the portion of the car which struck him was the footboard just at the head of the car in the center; that the right-hand corner of the car struck one of his shafts; that one of his shafts struck the footboard and for that reason the calesa tumbled down; and that at the moment the shaft struck the footboard the horse passed by. He denied having stated to Mr. Lurison in the presence of Mr. Bradley, after the accident, that his horse shied at a bull-cart and that in endeavoring to restrain him he pulled the wrong rein and thereby ran into the street car.

Cipriano Nocum, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that on the night in question he was the driver of the cart which the cochero sought to pass; that the two carts were about twenty varas apart; that his cart was in the lead; that when he first observed the horse and calesa the horse was rearing and did not want to go ahead but wanted to go backwards; that the cochero was crying out to the motorman to stop the street car; that the street car was going very fast; that it was a dark and cloudy night; that the horse did not stand steady but went backwards and forwards; that in going backwards it crossed the street about three times; that the right-hand front corner of the car struck first; and that the car ran about three brazas before it was stopped by the motorman. On cross-examination he testified that the first thing the horse did was to back somewhat and rear up; that as soon as he saw the white tarpaulin he went backwards from side to side; that he went first to the left side; that the cochero succeeded in pulling him to the left side of the street; that he was facing always the left-hand side of the street; and that he did not cross the street. He clarified that by going backwards and forwards he meant the cochero could not keep the horse in the same place; that the horse would go backwards about four brazas and then rear up again; that the cochero was holding the reins and trying to bring the horse to the left-hand side so as to pass, and the horse started to rear but always on the left-hand side; that the horse was just on the track nearest the Y.M.C.A. building; that the going backwards of the calesa and the coming of the street car happened at the same time; that the footboard of the street car struck the wheel of the calesa, specifically the front part of the wheel; that if the calesa had not backed into the street car it must have been going ahead; and that the horse backed into the front of the street car, the calesa struck the right-hand corner of the street car, and the car struck the calesa on the right-hand side. He did not hear the driver of the cart behind shout to the driver of the calesa to go ahead. He also testified that the horse started to rear about five minutes before the calesa collided with the street car; that the horse reared and went backwards and forwards for five minutes before the collision; that the car was going very fast down the street; and that it was not going so fast but the motorman could not stop it in a distance of three brazas after the collision occurred.

Francisco David, another witness for the plaintiff, testified that he was the driver of the cart proceeding along the street in the rear of the calesa; that the cart in front of him was about nine brazas distant; that the street car was going very fast and the cochero of the calesa was shouting to the motorman to stop; that the motorman did not stop the car; and that at the time he shouted he was on the street car track on which the street car was coming. On cross-examination he testified that the horse was very much frightened and ran upon the track on which the street car was coming and stood there and collided with the street car, and that he told the cochero to go ahead because he was backing into his cart. The Court observed that the statements of the plaintiff's witnesses were so confused and jumbled that it was impossible to discover just how the accident really occurred; that David's testimony was entirely different from Nocum's, and Nocum's was in many essential particulars different from Alejo's.

The defense witnesses gave a clearer account. Leander W. Strawn, an American and chief of the property division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, was, aside from the cochero, the sole occupant of the calesa. Although subpoenaed as a witness for the plaintiff, he was not called by the plaintiff but was presented by the defense. He testified that on coming down the left-hand side of Calle Concepcion the horse evidently shied, causing him to awake from a doze; that "the first thing I knew the horse commenced to rear, and when he reared he hit the street car, hitting it probably about two seats down, and then there was a rebound and he came back again, and then the calesa and the horse were thrown over. The calesa also hit the street car, but I don't know what part of it hit the car"; that the street was wide enough so that the cart could go right up against the curb; and that "We were passing between the cart and the street car, or trying to, when the horse begun to rear." He said the horse struck the street car; that the time from the horse's commencing to rear until it struck the street car might have been ten or twenty seconds; that he was watching the horse to see whether they would hit the car and it looked as if they would miss it, so he did not jump. On cross-examination he said he could not say exactly when the horse first shied and would not say that it shied at the white tarpaulin because he was not watching and was half asleep when the horse shied and went across the street car track, which woke him. He said the calesa went back far enough to miss the street car apparently and had room to pass between the street car and the bull cart; it went back far enough so that it did not appear to him that the street car was going to hit them. On redirect examination he said there would have been the whole space from the right-hand side of the street car track and the curb in which to pass; that the horse was far enough past the street car so that when he reared he hit his feet about the second or third seat down the street car; that the horse had cleared the street car when he reared, but he would not say what the action of the horse had been before that; that what first attracted his attention was the fact of the horse rearing, and when he reared the street car was right onto them, but had the horse not reared they could have gotten through probably; and that he did not hear the cochero say anything before the collision or shout to the motorman to stop, because he was half asleep and did not pay attention until the jolting of the rig awakened him.

H. E. Schiffbauer, house surgeon at St. Paul's Hospital, testified that at the time of the collision he was on the north side of Concepcion about the Y.M.C.A. building and noticed the street car just as it was rounding into Concepcion from Bagumbayan. He was walking on Calle Concepcion toward Calle Bagumbayan and watching the car when he noticed a calesa coming in the opposite direction; that the front end of the calesa passed the front end of the street car, and a few seconds afterwards he heard a crash; that the street car was stopped and the calesa upturned, the horse injured on the right hind leg, and the occupant standing by. This happened just opposite the Y.M.C.A. building, a little toward the Calle San Marcelino side. When he first noticed the horse and calesa they were ahead of the car going in the opposite direction; the calesa was about two street car lengths ahead of the car; the horse was going along peaceably and seemingly the cochero had the horse under perfect control. He estimated the car was going eight to ten miles an hour; apparently the motorman had the street car under perfect control; the front end of the calesa went by the street car and then crashed in; there was plenty of room in which to get around, everything was going along nicely, and there was plenty of room for everybody, although he did not notice the exact distance of the space between the calesa and the curb.

Modesto Medina, the motorman, testified that he had been working for the company about one year prior to the accident; that the car was coming from the Rotonda and going to Santa Ana; that upon turning into Calle Concepcion from Calle Bagumbayan near the City Hall he saw a carretela coming and rang the bell, continuing to ring it until he had a speed of five points; that when he was near the Y.M.C.A. building he saw a calesa coming, following a bull cart; that the bull cart was on Calle Concepcion in front of the Division Hospital and the Y.M.C.A. building, on his right near the sidewalk; that the calesa was following the bull cart and was also near the sidewalk immediately behind the bull cart; that his car was about two brazas from the bull cart when he first saw it; that when the calesa was about to come into the same line as the bull cart the horse turned to the right and collided with his car; that up to the time the horse turned out toward the street car he had not been rearing at all but was running, just following the bull cart; that the calesa had already cleared the front of his car when he struck him; that the calesa struck the car at the second hand grab; that the wheel of the calesa went between the footboard of the street car and the body of the car, and the brass work was broken there; that three hand grabs were broken off; that when the calesa struck him he stopped and reversed, and after reversing ran about half the length of the car before stopping. A photograph shown to him indicated that the calesa went over to the right-hand side, and for that reason the collision took place. On cross-examination he insisted that the driver of the calesa was the one who collided with him; that he was going five points; that very fast was nine points but that night he was going five points; and that he remembered going only five points because the superintendent had instructed that after 8:30 o'clock at night the speed should be only five points, and running more than five points after half past 8 would violate the rules.

The cochero said that after the collision he went to the hospital and did not return to the scene of the accident again that night. He was contradicted by the witnesses Bradley and Lurison. Both testified that after they had taken the cochero to the hospital and returned to the scene to clear up the wreck, the cochero returned there and they had a conversation with him. Lurison testified that he saw the cochero coming up the street, asked him what he was doing back and why he was not at the hospital, and the cochero said he felt pretty good and came back to get things together. When asked for a statement regarding the accident, the cochero said he was driving along behind a bull cart, his horse shied, and when the horse shied he did not know exactly what happened, but one rein got caught under the shaft and when he wanted to pull he pulled the wrong rein and pulled the horse into the car. Bradley and Lurison also testified that the front of the calesa had struck the street car on the side; that three of the grab handles were knocked off; that the first grab handle on the side of the car was not touched, but beginning with the second one, two or three were broken loose from the car; and that the second grab handle is about four feet from the front of the car.

The Court found almost perfect agreement between the motorman, Strawn, and Schiffbauer. From their evidence it was clear that everything relating to the accident, from beginning to end, happened almost instantly. The collision occurred thus: the cochero sought to pass the garbage cart just about the time the street car reached a point opposite the cart; there was plenty of room, there being between the garbage cart and the street car that portion of the street between the garbage cart and the west-bound track and the west-bound track itself; as the cochero urged the horse around the end of the garbage cart it became frightened at the white tarpaulin and, rearing, leaped sideways away from the cart and toward the street car; before anything could be done to restrain him he had dashed across the west-bound track and leaped head foremost into the side of the car. The allegation that the car struck the calesa heads-on or nearly so was unsupported except by the jumbled testimony of the cochero and the drivers of the garbage carts, and their evidence was nullified by the clear and forceful testimony of disinterested witnesses and by the condition of the street car after the accident. Strawn and Schiffbauer were in perfect accord that nothing occurred to attract attention prior to the attempt of the cochero to turn out and pass the garbage cart, at which time the street car was nearly opposite the cart; that up to that moment the horse was going along quietly, under perfect control, exhibiting no symptoms of fright or unsteadiness; and that it was only when passing the cart that he became unmanageable, at the very moment the street car was about to reach a point alongside the garbage cart. The Court considered it possible that in coming alongside the cart the horse not only reared but hesitated about going forward or even backed slightly, but certain that the unusual activities of the horse were very limited prior to the collision. All subsequent events sprang from the attempt of the driver to force the horse past the garbage cart; the animal, becoming greatly frightened at the tarpaulin, dashed head foremost into the side of the car. The Court found incredible the testimony that the horse ran backwards and forwards across the street in front of the street car for five minutes or several times, because Strawn, who was awakened from a doze by the rearing of the horse the instant before the collision, would not have remained dozing if the horse had been rearing and plunging and the cochero shouting, and because Schiffbauer, at the very point where the accident occurred, would have seen and heard it. The condition of the car also refuted the plaintiff's witnesses: the front end of the cart had passed the horse and calesa before the collision; examination disclosed that the horse or calesa had struck the side of the car at least four feet from the front right-hand corner; from that point toward the rear several grab handles were broken off; no damage was done to the end or corner; the first grab handle was intact; and the only marks and injuries were on the side several feet from the front and corner. Strawn's testimony indicated that the horse rather than the calesa struck the car first; that the horse reared and leaped against the car, striking it with his feet about two or three seats down; that there was then a rebound, the horse having probably been thrown away from the car by the force of the impact, thus turning the rear end of the calesa toward the car and bringing it into contact with it. The Court likewise found incredible that the cochero called to the motorman to stop: two witnesses for the plaintiff, the cochero and the driver of one bull cart, testified that he called; the driver of the other bull cart did not hear it; Strawn, within two feet of the cochero, did not hear any such outcry; Schiffbauer, on the sidewalk at the place where the accident occurred, stated that no such thing happened; and the motorman asserted that he saw and heard nothing out of the ordinary until the very moment when he came opposite the garbage cart, when the horse just turning out from behind the same reared and leaped into the side of his car. On cross-examination the motorman insisted that it was the calesa that struck the car and not the car that struck the calesa.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Negligence of the Motorman: Plaintiff argued that the motorman, having for a distance of 25 rods or more seen an unmanageable horse running backwards and forwards across the track, should have stopped the car before reaching the danger point; continuing at full speed regardless of the probability of a collision made him negligent and the company responsible for the results.
  • Cause of Collision: Plaintiff's evidence maintained that the street car struck the calesa head-on or nearly so, and that the cochero shouted to the motorman to stop before the collision.

Issues

  • Negligence of the Motorman: Whether the motorman was negligent in failing to stop the street car before the collision after allegedly seeing an unmanageable horse on the track.
  • Proximate Cause: Whether the collision was caused by the street car striking the calesa or by the frightened horse dashing into the side of the street car.
  • Weight of Evidence: Whether the trial court's dismissal of the complaint upon the merits is supported by the clear weight of the evidence.

Ruling

  • Negligence of the Motorman: No. The motorman was not shown negligent; the clear weight of evidence showed the horse's sudden fright and leap into the side of the car occurred almost instantly and without prior warning.
  • Proximate Cause: The collision was caused by the frightened horse dashing into the side of the street car, not by the street car striking the calesa head-on.
  • Weight of Evidence: Yes. The dismissal upon the merits was affirmed, the judgment being supported by the clear weight of the evidence.

Ruling Rationale

  • Negligence of the Motorman: The plaintiff's theory of negligence was untenable because the facts supporting it were disproved by the clear weight of the evidence. The motorman, Strawn, and Schiffbauer were in almost perfect agreement that everything happened almost instantly. The cochero sought to pass the garbage cart just as the street car reached a point opposite it; the horse became frightened at the white tarpaulin, reared, leaped sideways toward the street car, dashed across the west-bound track, and leaped head foremost into the side of the car. Strawn and Schiffbauer testified that the horse was going quietly and under perfect control until the attempt to pass the garbage cart, and that nothing attracted attention before that moment. The motorman testified he was going only five points, in accordance with company rules after 8:30 p.m., and had the car under control. The claim that the cochero shouted to the motorman to stop was found incredible because Strawn, Schiffbauer, and the motorman did not hear it. Thus, no negligent failure to stop was established.
  • Proximate Cause: The physical condition of the car corroborated the defense version. The horse or calesa struck the side of the car at least four feet from the front right-hand corner; several grab handles from the second onward were broken off; the first grab handle was intact; and no damage was done to the end or corner. This showed that the front of the calesa had already passed the car before the collision and that the horse struck the side. Strawn testified that the horse struck first, then rebounded, turning the rear of the calesa into the car. The plaintiff's witnesses were confused, jumbled, and contradicted one another, and their testimony was nullified by disinterested witnesses and the physical evidence. The proximate cause was therefore the horse's fright and dash into the car, not any act of the street car.
  • Weight of Evidence: The trial court's dismissal upon the merits was supported by the clear weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court gave weight to the disinterested testimony of Strawn and Schiffbauer and to the condition of the street car, which refuted the plaintiff's claim that the car ran into the calesa. The conflicting and interested testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses did not overcome that evidence. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Doctrines

  • Negligence and Proximate Cause in Collision Cases — Liability for damages arising from a collision depends on establishing negligence as the proximate cause of the injury. Where the evidence shows that the plaintiff's horse became frightened, reared, and dashed into the side of the defendant's street car, and the motorman had no prior warning and operated the car without negligence, the defendant is not liable. The Court applied this by rejecting the plaintiff's theory that the motorman should have stopped before the collision.
  • Weight and Credibility of Evidence — In reviewing a judgment after trial, the Supreme Court may rely on the clear weight of the evidence, giving due regard to disinterested testimony and physical evidence that corroborate one version of events. Conflicting, confused, and interested testimony may be rejected. The Court applied this by crediting Strawn, Schiffbauer, and the motorman, and by relying on the condition of the car.
  • No Duty to Stop Where Danger Arises Suddenly and Without Prior Warning — A motorman is not negligent for failing to stop before a collision when the horse's unusual movement and leap into the car occurred almost instantly and the motorman saw nothing out of the ordinary until that moment. The Court applied this by finding that the horse was under control until the attempt to pass the garbage cart and that the collision happened almost instantly.

Key Excerpts

  • "The theory of negligence presented by the arguments of plaintiff's counsel is that the motorman having for a distance of 25 rods or more seen an unmanageable horse running backwards and forwards across the track upon which the street car was running ought to have stopped his car before reaching the danger point, and that not having done so but having continued on his course at full speed regardless of the probability of a collision, he was guilty of negligence and the company was responsible for the results thereof. As we have already said, this theory is untenable as the facts presented to support it are disproved by the clear weight of the evidence." — This passage states the plaintiff's negligence theory and the Court's ratio for rejecting it: the factual premise was disproved by the clear weight of the evidence.
  • "From their evidence it is clear to us that everything relating to the accident, from the beginning to the end, happened almost instantly." — This finding underpins the conclusion that the motorman had no meaningful opportunity to avoid the collision and was not negligent.
  • "The condition of the car after the accident completely and in every detail corroborates this testimony. An examination of the car disclosed that the horse or calesa had struck the side of the car at least four feet from the front right hand corner; that from that point on toward the rear of the car several grab handles, that is, the handles which are seized by passengers in entering and leaving the car, were broken off by the force of the collision. No damage was done to the end of the car or to the corner. The first grab handle was intact." — This passage explains the physical evidence that the Court used to determine the point of impact and to reject the claim that the street car struck the calesa head-on.
  • "We are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below is supported by the clear weight of the evidence and should be and is hereby affirmed, without special finding as to costs." — This is the dispositive holding affirming the dismissal of the complaint.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Trent, JJ.