Brodeth and Onal vs. People of the Philippines and Villegas

In criminal prosecutions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, territorial jurisdiction must be established by competent proof, not merely by allegation in the complaint or information; where the prosecution fails to prove that the check was issued, delivered, or deposited in the venue where the case was filed, the court must dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, notwithstanding that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 constitute transitory or continuing crimes that may be tried in any place where an essential element occurred.

Land & Sea Resources Phils., Inc. (L&S Resources) contracted with Vill Integrated Transport Corporation (Vill Integrated) for the use of equipment and tugboats. L&S Resources made partial payments using checks drawn against Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. Two checks issued by petitioners Raffy Brodeth and Rolan B. Onal, officers of L&S Resources, were subsequently dishonored for "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF)." Vill Integrated's Operations Manager, Abraham G. Villegas, filed a criminal complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, alleging that the checks were issued in that city.

• The Transaction: Vill Integrated Transport Corporation provided equipment and tugboats to Land & Sea Resources Phils., Inc. (L&S Resources) pursuant to service contracts. L&S Resources made partial payments but failed to fully settle its obligations.
• The Subject Checks: Petitioners Raffy Brodeth and Rolan B. Onal, officers of L&S Resources, issued two Metrobank checks payable to Vill Integrated: (a) Check No. 2700111415 dated 31 August 1999 for ₱140,000.00; and (b) Check No. 2700111416 dated 5 September 1999 for ₱123,600.00.
• Dishonor: Upon presentment, both checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF)."
• Demand: Vill Integrated sent demand letters dated 9 October 1999 and 3 May 2000 requiring settlement of the account and redemption of the dishonored checks, but L&S Resources failed to comply.
• Defense: Petitioners claimed that the checks were issued as guarantees for the obligations of Noli Dela Cerna, not as payment for L&S Resources' debt, and alleged that the amounts had been settled through staggered cash payments, fuel oil, and food for the crew, though they could not produce receipts. They also contended that the checks were issued in Makati City, where L&S Resources maintained its principal place of business, and not in Manila.
• Prosecution Evidence: The prosecution relied primarily on the affidavit-complaint of Abraham G. Villegas, Operations Manager of Vill Integrated, who alleged that the checks were issued in Manila. However, during cross-examination, Villegas admitted that he was not involved in dealing with customers, was not privy to the contractual negotiations, and was not present when the checks were issued. He also admitted that Vill Integrated's practice was to collect payments from clients at their respective offices.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: Petitioners argued that the MeTC of Manila lacked territorial jurisdiction because the prosecution failed to prove that the subject checks were issued in Manila. The allegation in Villegas' affidavit that the checks were issued in Manila constituted hearsay, as Villegas had no firsthand knowledge of the transaction and admitted he was not involved in dealing with clients or contract negotiations.
• Presumption of Knowledge: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals erroneously affirmed the application of the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds when the prosecution failed to present evidence showing that petitioners, as corporate officers, could be charged with knowledge of corporate funds.
• Reasonable Doubt: Petitioners maintained that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, arguing that they issued the checks in good faith as guarantees and that the defense of payment was not properly considered.

• Continuing Crime: Respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are transitory or continuing crimes that may be filed in any place where the check was issued, delivered, or dishonored. Relying on Rigor v. People, the OSG contended that the place of deposit is distinct from the place of issue, and that the MeTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction because the complaint-affidavit alleged issuance in Manila.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Respondent maintained that the dishonor was sufficiently established by the "DAIF" stamps on the checks and that petitioners' admission of receipt of demand letters established their knowledge of the dishonor. The OSG also argued that the defense of payment was properly rejected for lack of documentary evidence.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila had territorial jurisdiction over the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 when the prosecution failed to prove that the checks were issued, delivered, or deposited in Manila.
• Presumption of Knowledge: Whether the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was properly applied against petitioners as corporate officers.
• Proof of Guilt: Whether the prosecution proved petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Territorial Jurisdiction: The MeTC of Manila lacked territorial jurisdiction. While violations of B.P. Blg. 22 constitute transitory or continuing crimes that may be tried in any municipality where an essential ingredient occurred (issuance, delivery, or deposit/dishonor), the prosecution failed to prove that any of these acts took place in Manila. The allegation in the affidavit-complaint that the checks were issued in Manila was unsubstantiated hearsay, given that Villegas admitted he had no personal knowledge of the transaction and was not present during the issuance. Moreover, evidence showed that Vill Integrated collected payments at clients' offices, and L&S Resources was located in Makati, making it improbable that the checks were issued in Manila. In criminal cases, venue must be proven, not merely alleged.
• Presumption of Knowledge: The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the remaining issues in light of the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
• Proof of Guilt: The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the remaining issues in light of the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

• Transitory or Continuing Crimes in B.P. Blg. 22: Violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that the acts material and essential to their consummation may occur in different municipalities. Jurisdiction to try such cases lies in any court of the municipality or territory where any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place—specifically where the check was drawn, issued, delivered, or deposited/dishonored.
• Territorial Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases: The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. However, if the evidence adduced during trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court must dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. Venue in criminal cases must be established by competent proof, not merely by allegation; an allegation is not equivalent to evidence and cannot justify criminal liability.
• Hearsay in Jurisdictional Allegations: Allegations regarding the place where an offense was committed constitute inadmissible hearsay if made by a person who was not privy to the transaction and lacked personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the issuance or delivery of the instrument.

• "In criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the crime or offense was committed must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally liable. To stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not be made equivalent to proof."
• "A careful review of the rulings of the lower courts would show that the only piece of evidence they considered connecting the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC is the affidavit-complaint of Villegas. In this affidavit, the allegation that the subject checks were issued in Manila was mentioned only once even though the circumstances behind the issuance of the checks were referred to a couple of times."
• "Moreover, the phrase 'in Manila' only appeared in the ninth paragraph of Villegas' affidavit where the elements of the offense were already being summarized. Looking at the affidavit itself already casts some doubt as to where the subject checks were really issued."

• Isip v. People, 552 Phil. 786 (2007): Cited for the principle that territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or information, and that if evidence shows the offense was committed elsewhere, the court must dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
• Morillo v. People, 775 Phil. 192 (2015): Distinguished and clarified; the Court explained that while Morillo acknowledged that checks were issued and delivered at a specific bank while deposited elsewhere, this did not establish that the place of deposit cannot exercise jurisdiction. The case reaffirmed that B.P. Blg. 22 violations are transitory crimes.
• Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals: Cited as squarely applicable; held that the court where the check was deposited and presented for encashment has jurisdiction over B.P. Blg. 22 cases.
• Rigor v. People: Discussed to clarify that the place of issue and delivery, not merely the place of deposit, establishes jurisdiction, but did not hold that the place of deposit is excluded as a proper venue.
• Yalong v. People: Cited for the principle that B.P. Blg. 22 violations are transitory crimes and that jurisdiction lies where any essential act occurred.

• Section 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law): Defines the offense of making or drawing and issuing a check knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds or credit, and the check is subsequently dishonored.
• Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court: Provides that the place where the offense was committed determines the venue of the criminal action.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Lucas P. Bersamin, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (On Leave), and Alexander G. Gesmundo (On Leave).