Briones vs. Miguel

An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother, and the father’s recognition of the child entitles him to support and visitorial rights but not custody; custody may be denied the mother only upon a showing of her unfitness or other compelling cause. Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, allowing a child over ten to choose which parent to live with, applies only to legitimate children of parents who were married but are separated by decree or de facto.

Joey D. Briones and Loreta P. Miguel are the biological parents of Michael Kevin Pineda, who was born outside a valid marriage and is therefore an illegitimate child. Both acknowledge the child. Loreta later married a Japanese national and worked in Japan, while the child at various times resided in the Philippines with petitioner and his parents. The dispute concerns parental authority and custody under the Family Code, particularly Article 176 and Article 213, and the applicability of Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Joey D. Briones and Loreta P. Miguel are the biological parents of Michael Kevin Pineda, who was born in Japan on September 17, 1996. The child was born outside a valid marriage, and both parents acknowledge him as their son. Loreta later married a Japanese national and resided and worked in Japan. According to petitioner, on November 4, 1998, he caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. In school year 2000-2001, petitioner enrolled the child at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course. Petitioner’s retired parents, who were receiving monthly pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child.

On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to petitioner’s house in Caloocan City on the pretext of visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring him to SM Department Store for recreation. They promised to return him in the afternoon, and petitioner agreed. The respondents did not bring him back as promised. Petitioner went several times to Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao City, but was informed that the child was with the latter’s mother at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there, Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda was with her daughter at Tuguegarao City. Petitioner sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and bring him back, but all his efforts were futile.

Respondent Loreta P. Miguel denied petitioner’s allegation that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines, stating that she was the one who brought him there pursuant to their agreement. She likewise denied that Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took the child from petitioner or the latter’s parents. She averred that she was the one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from petitioner when she returned to the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and consented. She alleged that sometime in October 2001, petitioner was deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was found to have violated or committed an infraction of the laws of Japan. She further stated that since petitioner arrived in the Philippines, he had not been gainfully employed. According to her, custody of the child was entrusted to petitioner’s parents while they were both working in Japan. She added that even before custody of the child was given to petitioner’s parents, she had already been living separately from petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until his deportation.

Loreta also stated that her marriage to a Japanese national was for the purpose of availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to pursue her work so she could send money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She stated that she had no intention of staying permanently in Japan, as she had been returning to the Philippines every six months or as often as she could. At present, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is studying. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and had spent trouble and expense in instituting the legal action for custody, but it found no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother. The Supreme Court likewise noted that there was no showing at all that Loreta was unfit to take charge of the child.

• Custody During Mother’s Absence: Petitioner maintained that as the biological father, he should have custody of the minor whenever Loreta leaves for Japan and during the period that she stays there; he sought joint custody, with the mother having custody when she is in the country and the father having custody when she is abroad.
• Mother’s Residence Abroad: Petitioner argued that Loreta is not always in the country and that when she is abroad, she cannot take care of their child; he asserted that she lives most of the time in Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001, granting to her sister temporary custody over the minor.
• Hold Departure: While the habeas petition was pending before the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order alleging that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his mother and her Japanese husband.

• Agreement and Consent: Respondent Loreta P. Miguel denied petitioner’s allegation that he brought their child to the Philippines, stating that she was the one who brought him there pursuant to their agreement; she likewise denied that Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel took the child, averring that she took Michael Kevin Pineda from petitioner when she returned to the Philippines and that petitioner readily agreed and consented.
• Petitioner’s Deportation and Unemployment: Loreta alleged that sometime in October 2001, petitioner was deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was found to have violated or committed an infraction of the laws of Japan, and that since his arrival in the Philippines, he had not been gainfully employed.
• Custody Entrusted to Paternal Grandparents: She stated that custody of the child was entrusted to petitioner’s parents while both parents were working in Japan, and that even before custody was given to petitioner’s parents, she had already been living separately from petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until his deportation.
• Marriage to a Japanese National: She stated that her marriage to a Japanese national was for the purpose of availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to pursue her work so she could send money regularly to her son in the Philippines, and that she had no intention of staying permanently in Japan as she returned to the Philippines every six months or as often as she could.
• Prayer for Custody: Loreta prayed that custody of her minor child be given to her, invoking Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

• Custody of Illegitimate Child: Whether the natural father may be denied custody and parental care of his illegitimate child in the absence of the mother who is abroad, or whether custody should be awarded to the mother.
• Visitorial Rights: Whether the illegitimate father is entitled to visitorial rights over the minor.
• Applicability of Section 6, Rule 99: Whether Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing a child over ten years of age to choose which parent to live with, applies where the parents were never married.

• Custody of Illegitimate Child: No. The petition was denied, and custody was affirmed to the mother. Under Article 176 of the Family Code, an illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother, and the father’s recognition does not confer custody; only the mother’s unfitness or other compelling cause justifies deprivation.
• Visitorial Rights: Yes. The Court of Appeals’ grant of visitorial rights to petitioner was affirmed, consistent with the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children.
• Applicability of Section 6, Rule 99: No. Section 6, Rule 99 contemplates parents married to each other but separated by legal separation or de facto; it does not apply where the parents were never married. The portion allowing the child at ten to choose a parent was deleted for lack of legal basis.

• Custody of Illegitimate Child: Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with the Code. This rule applies regardless of whether the father admits paternity. The Family Code eliminated the Civil Code distinctions between natural and spurious illegitimate children; all children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. Michael is a natural child under the old terminology but illegitimate under the Family Code, as there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth, and both acknowledge that he is their son. Pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Loreta, notwithstanding petitioner’s recognition. David vs. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers on the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. The putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child, in which case the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent. Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him and to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right and may not even renounce or transfer it except in cases authorized by law. Article 213 of the Family Code provides that, generally, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. Only the most compelling reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else. Grounds previously considered ample justification include neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease. Bearing in mind the welfare and best interest of the minor as the controlling factor, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the child to Loreta, as there was no showing at all that she was unfit to take charge of him. The child was also already with his mother in Japan, where he was studying, rendering petitioner’s argument moot.
• Visitorial Rights: The Court affirmed the visitorial right granted by the Court of Appeals to petitioner. In Silva vs. Court of Appeals, the Court sustained the visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave, or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
• Applicability of Section 6, Rule 99: The Court of Appeals erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de facto. In the present case, it was established that petitioner and Loreta were never married. Hence, that portion of the Court of Appeals Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to live with upon reaching ten years of age was deleted for lack of legal basis, but without disregarding petitioner’s obligation to support the child.

• Sole Parental Authority of the Mother Over an Illegitimate Child — Under Article 176 of the Family Code, an illegitimate child is under the parental authority of the mother and is entitled to support. The father’s recognition of the child may be a ground for support but not custody; only if the mother defaults may the father assume custody and authority. Applied: Michael was illegitimate; Loreta had sole parental authority; custody was properly awarded to her.
• Best Interest of the Child and Compelling Reasons to Deprive the Mother of Custody — The welfare and best interest of the minor is the controlling factor. Generally, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother except when the court finds cause. Only the most compelling reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness, justify deprivation of parental authority and award of custody to another. Grounds considered ample include neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease. Applied: no showing was made that Loreta was unfit.
• Visitorial Rights of an Illegitimate Father — An illegitimate father may be granted visitorial rights over his child, consistent with the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right may be sustained even when the parents are estranged, absent any real, grave, or imminent threat to the child’s well-being. Applied: the Court of Appeals’ grant of visitorial rights to petitioner was affirmed.
• Limited Application of Section 6, Rule 99 — Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing a child over ten years of age to choose which parent to live with, contemplates parents who are married to each other but separated by a decree of legal separation or living separately de facto. It does not apply where the parents were never married. Applied: the Court of Appeals disposition allowing the child to choose at ten was deleted.
• Elimination of Distinctions Among Illegitimate Children — The Family Code eliminated the Civil Code distinctions between natural and spurious illegitimate children; all children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate unless the law gives them legitimate status. The concept of a natural child remains important only for purposes of legitimation. Applied: Michael was a natural child under the old terminology but illegitimate under the Family Code, so Article 176 governed.

• "An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care." — This states the core ratio: custody of an illegitimate child belongs to the mother absent imperative cause showing unfitness.
• "Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that “illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity." — This defines the statutory basis for the mother’s sole parental authority and explains that the father’s recognition does not alter it.
• "David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor." — This is the canonical formulation of the father’s limited rights and the default condition for his assumption of custody.
• "However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to live with is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child." — This explains the modification of the CA decision and the limited scope of Section 6, Rule 99.

• David vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 82, 86, November 16, 1995 — Relied upon for the rule that recognition of an illegitimate child by the father may be a ground for support but not custody, and that only if the mother defaults may the father assume custody and authority.
• Silva vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 604, 609, July 17, 1997 — Followed in affirming the visitorial right of an illegitimate father over his children, grounded on the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children.
• Mossesgeld vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 464, 468, December 23, 1998 — Cited for the rule that an illegitimate child is under the mother’s parental authority regardless of the father’s admission of paternity, and for the possibility that a putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child, making the child legitimate of the adoptive parent.
• Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 661, 668, March 29, 1996; Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson, 133 Phil. 884, 895, August 30, 1968 — Cited for the principle that only the most compelling reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness, justify depriving her of parental authority and awarding custody to another.
• Bondagjy vs. Bondagjy, 371 SCRA 642, 653, December 7, 2001 — Cited alongside Silva vs. Court of Appeals on the visitorial right of an illegitimate father.

• Article 176, Family Code — Provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support. Applied: Michael was illegitimate; parental authority resided in Loreta, notwithstanding petitioner’s recognition.
• Article 213, Family Code — Provides that generally no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. Applied: the Court considered the mother’s right to custody and required compelling reasons to separate the child from her.
• Article 220, Family Code — Cited for the mother’s right to keep the child in her company. Applied: Loreta, having sole parental authority, was entitled to keep Michael in her company.
• Articles 210, Family Code — Provides that parental authority may not be renounced or transferred except in cases authorized by law. Applied: Loreta could not be deprived of parental authority absent legal cause.
• Section 6, Rule 99, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Allows a child over ten years of age to choose which parent to live with. Held inapplicable because it contemplates parents married to each other but separated by legal separation or de facto; petitioner and Loreta were never married.
• Article 54, Family Code — Provides exceptions under which children conceived or born before a final judgment of annulment or absolute nullity under Article 36, or of a subsequent marriage under Article 53, are considered legitimate. Applied: mentioned to explain that all children outside a valid marriage are illegitimate unless covered by these exceptions.
• Article 165, Family Code — Provides that all children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate unless the law gives them legitimate status. Applied: Michael was illegitimate.
• Article 177, Family Code — Provides that the concept of a natural child is important only for purposes of legitimation. Applied: Michael, though a natural child under the old classification, remained illegitimate under the Family Code.
• Article 185, Family Code — Allows a putative father to adopt his own illegitimate child, in which case the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent. Applied: noted as an option for petitioner but not a basis for custody in this case.
• Article II, Section 12, 1987 Constitution — Recognizes the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Applied: cited in support of the illegitimate father’s visitorial rights.

Justices Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona concurred. Justice Carpio Morales was on leave.