Bringas vs. Hernando

A probate court's order directing an estate administrator to account for income from realty he personally uses is valid and enforceable against that administrator, even where the same writ of execution was declared void as against the heirs of a deceased co-administrator who were never parties to the probate proceedings. The protection of L-27526, which voided the writ of execution only "insofar as the heirs of Virgilio Valera or his estate are concerned," cannot be extended to Celso Valera, who was alive, was a party to the intestate proceedings, and had lost his right to appeal the order against him.

Francisco Valera died on March 10, 1945, unmarried and without known compulsory heirs at the time. His brothers Virgilio and Celso Valera filed the first case with the Court of First Instance of Abra after World War II — a verified petition for administration of Francisco's intestate estate (Causa Civil No. 1). Virgilio was appointed special administrator and, apart from administering estate properties and collecting their fruits, also collected insurance and war damage payments on behalf of the estate. Upon Virgilio's death in March 1961, Celso took over as administrator. Adoracion Valera Bringas had intervened in the intestate proceedings as early as 1952, claiming the status of an acknowledged natural child of Francisco. After the CFI of Abra declared her as such in Civil Case No. 374 — a declaration later affirmed by the Supreme Court — Adoracion assumed the role of administratrix on April 4, 1964. Neither Virgilio nor Celso had filed any inventory or rendered any accounting of the estate's properties, fruits, or war damage payments during the nineteen years that had elapsed.

Francisco Valera died on March 10, 1945, unmarried and without known compulsory heirs at the time. On September 29, 1945, his brothers Celso Valera, as petitioner, and Virgilio Valera, as counsel, filed a verified petition for administration of Francisco's intestate estate with the Court of First Instance of Abra — the first case filed in that court after World War II. Virgilio was appointed special administrator and, in addition to administering the estate's properties and gathering its fruits, collected insurance and war damage payments on behalf of the estate, including payments for the estate's interest in the Valera ancestral residence. Upon Virgilio's death in March 1961, Celso took over as administrator. Neither Virgilio nor Celso filed any inventory or rendered any accounting of the estate's properties during the nineteen years that elapsed.

Adoracion Valera Bringas had intervened in the intestate proceedings as early as 1952, claiming continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child of Francisco. After the CFI of Abra declared her as such in Civil Case No. 374 — a declaration later affirmed when a resolution of the Court of Appeals was elevated to the Supreme Court — Adoracion took over as administratrix of her father's estate on April 4, 1964. Among her first acts was to amass the estate and file an inventory. One of the estate's properties was Francisco's interest in the Valera ancestral residence.

On July 10, 1964, the probate court, acting on Adoracion's petition, ordered Virgilio and Celso to pay ₱100.00 a month plus interest from April 1945 as rentals representing Francisco's share in the use of the ancestral residence. Celso Valera and the heirs of Virgilio Valera had affixed their conformity to the amended inventory filed by Adoracion, which included the property for which the rentals were ordered. A writ of execution was issued on April 15, 1966 implementing the July 10, 1964 order. An auction sale was held on April 3, 1967, and the properties subject of the instant petition were delivered to Adoracion, she being the only bidder.

Meanwhile, the heirs of Virgilio Valera filed G.R. No. L-27526 (Vda. de Valera vs. Ofilada) seeking to set aside the orders and writ of execution insofar as the heirs or estate of Virgilio were concerned. The Supreme Court ruled that the probate court erred in adjudging the money liabilities of the late Virgilio Valera and enforcing them against his properties without hearing the legal representative of his estate. The writ of execution, the sheriff's sale, and the related orders were declared void "insofar as the heirs of Virgilio Valera or his estate are concerned," without prejudice to Adoracion's right to institute the proper action against the administrator of Virgilio's estate. Celso Valera was a party to that petition, but the decision set aside the order and writ only as to Virgilio's heirs — not as to Celso, who was alive and properly proceeded against.

Celso Valera subsequently lost his right to appeal the order and writ of execution against his properties. The Court of Appeals dismissed his petition for mandamus to compel approval of his appeal, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for lack of merit in Celso Valera vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-26560). Celso then filed Civil Case No. 481 with the CFI of Abra to declare the writ of execution null and void, which the trial court dismissed. In Celso Valera vs. Domingo Banez (G.R. No. L-27886, 116 SCRA 648), the Supreme Court denied the prayer for injunction to stop the sheriff's sale, making clear that the order directing Celso to pay rentals had already become final and that his appeal was unmeritorious and frivolous. Multiple further petitions by Celso were dismissed for lack of merit.

The heirs of Celso Valera thereafter filed Civil Case No. 1044 with the CFI of Abra, seeking restoration of Celso's properties sold at public auction. Judge Hernando denied Adoracion's motion to dismiss, rendered judgment on the pleadings on January 11, 1980, ordering Adoracion to return the properties to the heirs of Virgilio and Celso Valera, and issued a writ of execution on January 17, 1980 — before the judgment was received by Adoracion and before it became final. The judgment on the pleadings was rendered only on oral motion, notwithstanding that Adoracion had been required to file opposition and the private respondents had been required to put their motion in writing with a written offer of evidence. Judge Hernando designated his interpreter as acting clerk of court to issue the writ, as the regular clerk of court would not have issued it. On September 24, 1986, the Supreme Court affirmed Judge Hernando's judgment on the pleadings and order of execution, applying the benefits of L-27526 also to the heirs of Celso Valera. Adoracion filed the present motion for reconsideration.

• Bar by Prior Judgment: Petitioner maintained that Civil Case No. 1044 had already been dismissed and that the dismissal was based on prior judgments from the Supreme Court, rendering Judge Hernando's order denying the motion to dismiss, the judgment on the pleadings, and the order of execution null and void.
• Void Orders: Petitioner argued that the order of Judge Hernando which denied her motion to dismiss, the judgment on the pleadings, and the order of execution, all issued in Civil Case No. 1044, were null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
• Improper Extension of L-27526: Petitioner contended that the benefits of the decision in L-27526, which voided the writ of execution only as to the heirs of Virgilio Valera, could not validly be extended to the heirs of Celso Valera, who was alive and properly proceeded against in the probate proceedings.
• Developed Properties: Petitioner stated that she had invested her own and her husband's lifetime earnings to improve the properties delivered to her pursuant to final court orders, building an air-conditioned hotel and planting hundreds of fruit-bearing mango trees, and that it would be a travesty of justice to take away what the courts had ordered delivered to her more than twelve years earlier.

• Void Writ as Basis for Return: Respondents, as heirs of Celso Valera, filed Civil Case No. 1044 on the theory that a void order produces no effect, and that since the Supreme Court in L-27526 declared the writ of execution and sheriff's sale void, the properties obtained by Adoracion thereunder must necessarily be returned.
• Judgment on the Pleadings Proper: Respondents argued that since the basis upon which the properties were obtained was null and void, there was no more dispute to speak of, and judgment on the pleadings was in order.

• Bar by Prior Judgment: Whether Civil Case No. 1044 is barred by prior judgments, given the multiple cases previously decided by the Supreme Court involving the same subject matter and orders.
• Probate Court Jurisdiction over Celso: Whether the probate court had jurisdiction over Celso Valera such that the order directing him to pay rentals was valid and enforceable against him, notwithstanding the voiding of the writ of execution as to the heirs of Virgilio Valera in L-27526.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether Judge Hernando's judgment on the pleadings and writ of execution were void for grave abuse of discretion, considering they were issued on oral motion and the writ was issued before the judgment became final.

• Bar by Prior Judgment: Yes. The issues sought to be revived in Civil Case No. 1044 had long been resolved squarely on their merits, and the cause of action was barred by prior judgment.
• Probate Court Jurisdiction over Celso: Yes. The probate court had jurisdiction over Celso Valera, who was alive and was both petitioner and administrator in the intestate proceedings; the benefits of L-27526, which voided the writ only as to Virgilio's heirs, could not be extended to Celso.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The judgment on the pleadings and writ of execution were null and void, having been rendered on oral motion and the writ issued before the judgment became final, constituting grave abuse of discretion.

• Bar by Prior Judgment: The records sustained the argument that Civil Case No. 1044 was merely a rehash and reiteration of many cases long terminated, filed against Adoracion by Celso Valera and Wencesla Valera, et al., and also by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. Among the cases long final were CA-G.R. No. 37751 (denied for lack of merit), G.R. No. L-26560 (dismissed for lack of merit), G.R. No. L-27886 (decided on September 21, 1982), G.R. No. L-29896 (dismissed for lack of merit), G.R. No. L-35292 (dismissed for lack of merit), and Adm. Matter No. P-159. The Supreme Court had already declared in Celso Valera vs. Domingo Banez (L-27886) that the order directing Celso to pay rentals had become final and that his appeal was unmeritorious and frivolous. A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. Judge Hernando therefore had no jurisdiction to issue the orders questioned in the petition.

• Probate Court Jurisdiction over Celso: A distinction had to be drawn between the heirs of Virgilio Valera, who were not parties in the intestate proceedings, and Celso Valera, who was alive and was not only the petitioner but also an administrator in said proceedings. The Court ruled in Vda. de Valera vs. Judge Ofilada that the probate court had no jurisdiction over the heirs of Virgilio Valera, but the same could not be said for Celso. Judge Hernando's ruling that since the heirs of Virgilio could not be made liable, Celso was also not liable, was fallacious. Celso was alive and properly proceeded against. He had lost his right to appeal the order and writ of execution against his properties, as the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition for mandamus and the Supreme Court denied his petition for lack of merit. Section 4 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court provides that if the executor or administrator uses or occupies any part of the real estate, he shall account for it as agreed upon or as adjusted by the court, whose determination shall be final. The probate court correctly ordered Celso to pay rentals for his admitted use of real property owned by Francisco's estate.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The judgment on the pleadings rendered by Judge Hernando was issued only on oral motion, notwithstanding that the private respondents had been required to put their motion in writing with a written offer of evidence and for Adoracion to file her opposition. The order of execution dated January 17, 1980 was issued even before the January 11, 1980 judgment on the pleadings was received by Adoracion and before the judgment had become final. Judge Hernando had to designate his interpreter as acting clerk of court to issue a manifestly improper writ of execution which the regular clerk of court would not have issued. While the petition was pending before the Supreme Court, Judge Hernando attempted to pre-empt the Court's action by issuing orders to implement the writ, necessitating a hurried injunction. The Court noted that Judge Hernando was not reappointed in the judicial reorganization of 1983 because of his undesirable record and many administrative cases. On the ground of bar by prior judgment and grave abuse of discretion, the questioned decision and orders were declared null and void.

• Bar by Prior Judgment (Res Judicata) — A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. The doctrine applies where the issues sought to be revived have already been resolved squarely on their merits in prior proceedings, even if the subsequent case is framed under a different form of action.

• Probate Court Jurisdiction over Estate Administrator — Under Section 4 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court, if the executor or administrator uses or occupies any part of the real estate belonging to the estate, he shall account for the income therefrom as may be agreed upon or as adjusted by the court. The probate court's determination in this respect is final. A probate court has jurisdiction over a living administrator who is a party to the proceedings, and orders directed at such administrator are valid and enforceable, even where the same orders are void as against the heirs of a deceased co-administrator who were never parties to the probate proceedings.

• Void Orders — Limited Effect — A decision voiding a writ of execution "insofar as the heirs of Virgilio Valera or his estate are concerned" does not benefit a co-respondent who was alive and properly proceeded against. The protection of such a decision cannot be extended to parties not within its scope, particularly where such party had lost the right to appeal the order against him.

• "Judge Hernando's ruling that since the heirs of Virgilio could not be made liable for the misappropriations on Francisco's estate, it follows that Celso was also not liable, is fallacious. Celso was alive and was properly proceeded against." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi distinguishing the heirs of Virgilio, who were not parties to the probate proceedings, from Celso, who was alive and subject to the probate court's jurisdiction.

• "A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated." — This is the canonical formulation of the bar by prior judgment principle as applied in this case, originally quoted from the Court's earlier decision in Celso Valera vs. Domingo Banez (L-27886).

• "On the ground of bar by prior judgment and grave abuse of discretion in the promulgation of the judgment on the pleadings and the order and writ of execution, we rule that the questioned decision and order of the respondent Judge are null and void." — This is the dispositive rationale of the resolution, stating the twin grounds for nullifying Judge Hernando's orders.

• Vda. de Valera vs. Judge Ofilada, G.R. No. L-27526, 59 SCRA 96 — Controlling precedent. The Supreme Court declared the writ of execution, sheriff's sale, and related orders void only "insofar as the heirs of Virgilio Valera or his estate are concerned," without prejudice to Adoracion's right to file proper claims against the administrator of Virgilio's estate. The Court in the present resolution held that this decision could not be extended to benefit Celso Valera, who was alive and properly proceeded against.

• Celso Valera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-26560, November 7, 1966 — Followed. The Supreme Court dismissed Celso's petition for certiorari for being late and for lack of merit, sustaining the Court of Appeals' ruling that Celso had lost his right to appeal the order to pay rentals and the writ of execution.

• Celso Valera vs. Domingo Banez, et al., G.R. No. L-27886, 116 SCRA 648 — Followed. The Supreme Court denied the prayer for injunction to stop the sheriff's sale, holding that the order directing Celso to pay rentals had become final and that the appeal was unmeritorious and frivolous. The Court also applied the principle that a party cannot escape the operation of res judicata by varying the form of action.

• Celso Valera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35292, August 25, 1972 — Followed. The Supreme Court denied Celso's petition for lack of merit, sustaining the Court of Appeals' ruling that Celso could no longer assail the validity of the order of execution against him and that any ruling in favor of Virgilio's heirs would not benefit Celso, who had slept on his rights.

• Valera vs. Sheriff Belarmino, Adm. Matter No. P-159, 62 SCRA 374 — Followed. The Supreme Court sustained the writ of possession issued against the heirs of Celso Valera and declined to look with favor upon a party who makes a mockery of court orders by adopting a hostile and belligerent attitude towards their execution.

• Section 4, Rule 85, Rules of Court — Provides that if the executor or administrator uses or occupies any part of the real estate belonging to the estate, he shall account for the income as agreed upon between him and the parties interested, or as adjusted by the court with their assent; and if the parties do not agree, the court's determination shall be final. Applied to uphold the probate court's order directing Celso Valera to pay ₱100.00 monthly rentals for his admitted use of real property owned by Francisco's estate.

Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concurred.

• Paras, J. — The dissenting justice argued that the motion for reconsideration should be denied, maintaining that res judicata does not apply because the cited prior cases were not resolutions on the merits but were dismissed on procedural grounds such as being filed beyond the reglementary period, and involved different parties or different causes of action. The dissent emphasized that the requisites of res judicata — final judgment, jurisdiction, judgment on the merits, and identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action — were not satisfied. The dissent further argued that since the Supreme Court in L-27526 declared the July 10, 1964 order void, "it does not exist in the eyes of the law" and all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless, so that the properties obtained under the void writ must necessarily be returned, making judgment on the pleadings proper in Civil Case No. 1044. The dissent also noted that the motion for judgment on the pleadings need not be in writing under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, and that the court may entertain an oral motion in its discretion.