Bravo, Jr. vs. Borja

An accused charged with a capital offense is entitled to bail as a matter of right where his minority has been established without objection, because the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority precludes imposition of the death penalty and thus eliminates the constitutional rationale for denying bail. The capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, not by the penalty actually imposable in view of attendant circumstances; however, where minority is undisputed, the accused cannot be sentenced to death, and the constitutional guaranty of bail is not withheld.

Petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr. was a 16-year-old detained in the Naga City jail, charged with murder for the killing of Ramon Abiog before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (Criminal Case No. 83-184). Respondent Melecio B. Borja was the presiding judge. The constitutional framework governing bail is Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution, which provides that all persons shall be bailable before conviction except those charged with capital offenses where evidence of guilt is strong. The Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) contains provisions on the care of youthful offenders, including Article 191, which addresses the custody of minors held for trial.

Petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr. was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City for the killing of Ramon Abiog (Criminal Case No. 83-184). After his arrest, he was detained in the city jail of Naga. He filed a motion for bail on two grounds: first, that the evidence against him was not strong because prosecution witness Ferdinand del Rosario had retracted his prior statement naming petitioner as the assailant; and second, that he was a minor of 16 years, entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which would render the murder charge non-capital as to him.

During the bail hearing, the retracting witness del Rosario was presented by petitioner but made another turnabout, this time testifying against petitioner. Respondent Judge Melecio B. Borja denied the motion for bail, finding the evidence of petitioner's guilt strong and his minority unproved. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, alleging that his minority had been proved by his birth certificate—showing he was born on February 26, 1967—attached to the memorandum supporting his motion for bail, that the prosecution had never challenged his minority, and that the offense charged was non-capital as to him because even if convicted he could not be sentenced to death on account of his minority. A duly certified copy of the birth certificate was again attached. The Fiscal opposed the motion solely on the ground that the evidence of guilt was strong, but did not contest petitioner's minority. By order dated September 21, 1983, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner then filed a motion praying that he be placed in the care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and Development (MSSD) pursuant to Article 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. On September 22, 1983, respondent Judge denied this motion for lack of merit, explaining later that Article 191 was inapplicable because it could be invoked only where the minor was charged with a bailable offense, as gleaned from the phrase "if unable to furnish bail." On the same date, the NBI Regional Office at Naga City submitted a report—copy furnished the City Fiscal of Naga—finding that it was prosecution witness Ferdinand del Rosario, and not petitioner, who had killed the deceased. When the case was called for hearing on October 19, 1983, the defense orally moved to reset the trial to give the Fiscal time to study the NBI report, but the motion was denied as dilatory. On November 2, 1983, petitioner unilaterally filed a formal Motion for Reinvestigation; it does not appear what action the court took, nor that the City Fiscal moved to reinvestigate.

• Evidence of Guilt Not Strong: Petitioner argued that the evidence against him was not strong because prosecution witness Ferdinand del Rosario had retracted his prior statement naming petitioner as the assailant.
• Minority Renders Offense Non-Capital: Petitioner maintained that as a minor of 16 years, he was entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, reducing the penalty by one degree and making the murder charge non-capital, since the death penalty could not be imposed on him even if convicted.
• Minority Established: Petitioner argued that his minority was proved by his birth certificate—showing he was born on February 26, 1967—attached to his motions, and that the prosecution never challenged this averment.
• Entitlement to MSSD Custody: Petitioner contended that under Article 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603, he should be placed in the care and custody of the MSSD pending trial.
• Reinvestigation: Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus compelling respondent Judge to remand the case to the City Fiscal for reinvestigation in light of the NBI report finding del Rosario, not petitioner, responsible for the killing.

• Evidence of Guilt Strong: The Fiscal opposed bail on the ground that the evidence of petitioner's guilt was strong, though the Fiscal did not contest petitioner's minority.
• Article 191 Inapplicable: Respondent Judge argued that Article 191 of PD No. 603 was inapplicable because it could be invoked only where the minor was charged with a bailable offense, as indicated by the phrase "if unable to furnish bail."
• Minority Not Proved: Respondent Judge claimed petitioner had not proved his minority, refusing to take cognizance of the unchallenged birth certificate because it was not formally offered in evidence.

• Right to Bail: Whether petitioner, a minor of 16 charged with murder, is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
• MSSD Custody: Whether petitioner is entitled to be placed in the care and custody of the MSSD under Article 191 of PD No. 603 pending trial.
• Reinvestigation: Whether respondent Judge may be compelled by mandamus to remand the case to the City Fiscal for reinvestigation.

• Right to Bail: Yes. Petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right because his unchallenged minority precludes the death penalty, eliminating the constitutional rationale for withholding bail in capital cases.
• MSSD Custody: Rendered moot. Since petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right, it is unnecessary to decide whether he is entitled to MSSD custody under Article 191 of PD No. 603.
• Reinvestigation: No. The plea for reinvestigation must be addressed to the City Fiscal, who has direction and control of criminal prosecution; the proper recourse against an unjustified refusal is an appeal to the Minister of Justice.

• Right to Bail: The Constitution provides that all persons shall be bailable before conviction except those charged with capital offenses where evidence of guilt is strong. Under Section 5 of Rule 114, a capital offense is one which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the bail application, may be punished by death; the capital nature of an offense is thus determined by the penalty prescribed by law, not the penalty actually imposable in view of modifying circumstances. Petitioner's submission—that the test should be the penalty actually imposable—was rejected, because it would require consideration not only of evidence of the crime's commission but also of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, necessitating a complete trial and defeating the purpose of bail. Nevertheless, where minority has been established without objection, the accused, if convicted, would receive the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, effectively ruling out the death penalty. The Constitution withholds the bail guaranty from one facing a probable death sentence because of the particularly strong temptation to flee; that reason does not hold where the accused is a minor who by law cannot be sentenced to death. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding petitioner's unchallenged minority, evidenced by a certified copy of his birth certificate attached to his motions. Under Rule 133, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, when a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions; the birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion and was already part of the record, making a formal offer in evidence a needless formality.

• MSSD Custody: Because petitioner was found entitled to bail as a matter of right, resolution of whether Article 191 of PD No. 603 entitles him to MSSD custody was rendered unnecessary.

• Reinvestigation: The plea for reinvestigation must be addressed to the City Fiscal of Naga, who has direction and control of the criminal prosecution and who is the primary official called upon to evaluate the evidence, ascertain the existence of a prima facie case, and determine who should be criminally indicted. In case of unjustified refusal by the City Fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation, the proper recourse is to appeal to the Minister of Justice, who exercises control and supervision over fiscals. Mandamus against the trial judge to compel reinvestigation was therefore improper.

• Capital Offense Defined — A capital offense is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, may be punished by death (Section 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, not by the penalty actually imposable in view of attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this rule to reject petitioner's argument that his minority rendered the offense non-capital, while nevertheless granting bail on the alternative ground that the constitutional rationale for denying bail—heightened temptation to flee a probable death sentence—does not apply to a minor who cannot be sentenced to death.

• Right to Bail of a Minor Charged with a Capital Offense — Where the accused's minority has been established without objection, so that the death penalty cannot be imposed even upon conviction, the accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right despite being charged with a capital offense, because the constitutional reason for withholding bail in such cases no longer obtains.

• Evidence on Motion — Under Rule 133, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, when a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the parties. Documents properly filed in support of a motion become part of the record, and a formal offer in evidence is not required; a judge's refusal to consider such documents constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

• "It is clear from this provision that the capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, with reference to which it is relatively easy to ascertain whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong." — This passage articulates the rule that the capital character of an offense is gauged by the penalty prescribed by law, not the penalty actually imposable, and is central to the Court's analysis of the bail issue.

• "The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is accused of a capital offense where the evidence of guilt is strong. The obvious reason is that one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee. This reason does not hold where the accused has been established without objection to be a minor who by law cannot be sentenced to death." — This is the ratio decidendi for granting bail to the minor: the constitutional rationale for the capital-offense exception to the right to bail is inapplicable when the death penalty cannot be imposed.

• "To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the judge would be just about ready to render a decision in the case." — This passage explains why the test for capital offense cannot be the penalty actually imposable, as doing so would defeat the purpose of bail by requiring a full trial on the merits.

• Article IV, Section 18, 1973 Constitution — Provides that all persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties before conviction. The Court interpreted the constitutional exception as inapplicable where the accused, being an undisputed minor, cannot be sentenced to death.

• Section 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Defines a capital offense as one which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, may be punished by death. The Court used this provision to establish that the capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, not the penalty actually imposable.

• Article 68, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a minor under 18 but over 15 years of age is entitled to a penalty reduction of one degree. Petitioner invoked this provision to argue that the murder charge was non-capital as to him; the Court rejected the argument as a test for capital offense but relied on the same principle to conclude that the death penalty could not be imposed.

• Article 191, Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) — Governs the care of youthful offenders held for examination or trial, providing for commitment to the Department of Social Welfare or a detention home. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve its applicability because petitioner was entitled to bail as a matter of right.

• Rule 133, Section 7, Rules of Court — Authorizes courts to hear motions based on facts not appearing of record through affidavits or depositions. The Court applied this provision to hold that petitioner's birth certificate, attached to his motions, was part of the record and need not be formally offered in evidence.

Teehankee (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, and Alampay, JJ., concurred. Melencio-Herrera, J., concurred in the result.