Brasales vs. Borja

When disciplining court personnel who are not judges or justices, the prevailing legal framework is Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; however, if its retroactive application would prejudice the respondent—by increasing the gravity of the offense or imposing a higher penalty—the civil service rules in effect at the time the offense was committed shall govern. A clerk of court who approves leave applications without prior written delegation from the presiding judge violates reasonable office rules and regulations, a light offense under the 2011 RRACCS punishable by reprimand for a first offense of that classification.

Judge Marlo C. Brasales, Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, charged Maxima Z. Borja, Clerk of Court IV of the same court, with Abuse of Authority and Malfeasance. Borja had signed the March 2017 leave applications of Court Stenographer II Rachel N. Dadivas without Judge Brasales’s authority. Under Administrative Circular No. 08-2017, applications for leave of lower court personnel must bear the recommendation for approval or disapproval of the Presiding Judge or, alternatively, of the Clerk of Court when delegated in writing by the Presiding Judge. Borja had received no such delegation. The incident led to an administrative proceeding that ultimately required the Court to determine the proper classification of the offense and the applicable disciplinary rules for court personnel below the rank of judge or justice.

• The Signing of Leave Applications: On April 7, 2017, Court Stenographer II Rachel N. Dadivas discovered that her two leave applications dated March 24 and 27, 2017 had not been signed by Judge Brasales. To avoid delays in the release of salaries for all office staff, she asked Clerk of Court IV Maxima Z. Borja to sign another set of leave applications for March 2017. Borja initially refused but eventually acceded to Dadivas’s plea and signed the applications.

• The Charge and Borja’s Explanation: Judge Brasales issued a Memorandum dated May 2, 2017, charging Borja with Abuse of Authority and Malfeasance. The Memorandum alleged that Borja had defied both the judge’s verbal instruction and Administrative Circular No. 08-2017, which requires that applications for leave of lower court personnel bear the recommendation for approval or disapproval of the Presiding Judge or of the Clerk of Court only when delegated in writing by the Presiding Judge. Borja, in her explanation and subsequent comment, asked for understanding and humanitarian consideration. She cited her heavy workload as the Clerk of Court of a single-sala station, claimed she had received A.C. No. 08-2017 only on March 8, 2017 and may have overlooked it, and maintained that her act was a mere error of judgment without intent to violate any rule. She emphasized that she first refused to sign and only relented after Dadivas explained that unapproved leave applications would withhold the employees’ salaries.

• OCA Findings: The OCA determined that Borja knew she lacked authority—she had initially directed that the applications be sent to Judge Brasales for signature and initially refused to sign. The fear of salary delay did not justify her act because Norala, South Cotabato, where the judge was stationed, was only an hour away. Nevertheless, the OCA found no deliberate intent to defy the judge or overstep authority; the infraction was a lapse in judgment. The OCA concluded that Borja violated reasonable office rules and regulations, a light offense under Section 50(F)(3), Rule 10 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, and recommended a 30-day suspension in view of a previous offense of Simple Neglect of Duty for which Borja had been fined P5,000.00 in an earlier judicial and financial audit case.

• Unauthorized Approval of Leave Applications: Complainant Judge Brasales maintained that Borja committed Abuse of Authority and Malfeasance by signing Rachel Dadivas’s leave applications without the written delegation required under A.C. No. 08-2017, thereby defying his verbal instructions and the circular.

• Violation of Administrative Circular: Complainant insisted that Borja’s act squarely contravened the mandatory approval procedure set forth in A.C. No. 08-2017, which allows the Clerk of Court to act on leave applications only upon prior written authorization from the Presiding Judge.

• Humanitarian Consideration and Workload: Borja invoked humanitarian consideration, pointing to the volume of her duties as Clerk of Court of a single-sala station, which allegedly caused her to occasionally forget the limits of her authority.

• Lack of Intent and Error of Judgment: She argued that her act was a mere error of judgment committed without any intention to violate the law or defy Judge Brasales. She claimed she had only received a copy of A.C. No. 08-2017 on March 8, 2017, had not fully grasped the new guidelines, and was unaware that her accommodation of Dadivas’s request constituted an infraction.

• Justification by Salary Delay: Borja stressed that she initially refused to sign and relented only after Dadivas explained that unapproved leave applications would delay the submission of daily time records and, consequently, the payment of salaries for all office staff.

• Violation of A.C. No. 08-2017: Whether Borja’s act of signing Rachel Dadivas’s leave applications without prior written delegation from Judge Brasales constituted a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.

• Applicable Rule on Discipline: Whether the penalty for Borja’s infraction should be determined under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court (as amended to cover personnel of the judiciary) or under the 2011 Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which were in effect at the time the offense was committed.

• Consideration of Previous Offense: Whether Borja’s prior administrative infraction of Simple Neglect of Duty should be treated as a first offense such that the present infraction warrants the penalty for a second offense, or should otherwise operate as an aggravating circumstance.

• Violation of A.C. No. 08-2017: Borja’s conduct violated reasonable office rules and regulations. A.C. No. 08-2017 is explicit that the Clerk of Court may approve leave applications only with prior written authorization from the Presiding Judge. It was undisputed that no such delegation existed. Borja’s excuses—her heavy workload and late receipt of the circular—were rejected. The approval requirement in A.C. No. 08-2017 was lifted verbatim from an earlier circular, A.C. No. 08-2009, which had been in force since 2009; thus, Borja was already expected to know the rule even before receiving a copy of A.C. No. 08-2017. Unawareness of a circular is not an excuse for non-compliance, and as a Clerk of Court, Borja was a role model for all employees under her supervision, held to the highest standard of accountability.

• Applicable Rule on Discipline: The penalty was governed by the 2011 RRACCS, not by the amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Although Rule 140 now covers all personnel of the judiciary and classifies violations of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars as less serious charges punishable by suspension of one to three months or a fine, applying it retroactively to Borja would be prejudicial because it would increase the gravity of her offense from a light offense to a less serious charge and impose a heavier penalty. The incident occurred on April 7, 2017, before Rule 140 was amended to include court personnel (October 2, 2018). Following the principle in Dela Rama v. De Leon that penal provisions in administrative discipline should not be applied retroactively if unfavorable to the respondent, the Court applied the 2011 RRACCS, which was the civil service rules in force at the time of the infraction. Under Section 46(F)(3) of the 2011 RRACCS, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations is a light offense punishable by reprimand for the first offense, suspension of one to thirty days for the second, and dismissal for the third.

• Consideration of Previous Offense: Borja’s previous administrative case for Simple Neglect of Duty, for which she was fined P5,000.00, was not treated as a “first offense” that would elevate the penalty to that of a second offense. Under the 2011 RRACCS, the successive-offense rule applies only when the previous infraction is of the same nature or classification in terms of gravity. The prior offense of Simple Neglect of Duty and the present offense of violating reasonable office rules were not similarly classified, making the prior infraction inoperative for purposes of escalating the penalty. Nor did it serve as an aggravating circumstance. Consequently, the penalty was reprimand—a straight penalty unaffected by any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

• Primacy of the Supreme Court’s Administrative Supervision — Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution vests the Supreme Court with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel. Only the Court may set the parameters governing the discipline of judiciary employees. Neither the Civil Service Commission nor other bodies may supplant this power.

• Applicable Legal Framework for Disciplining Court Personnel — Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC and subsequent issuances, now governs the discipline of all judiciary personnel, including those who are not judges or justices. However, when the amendment took effect after the commission of the offense and its retroactive application would prejudice the respondent—by increasing the gravity of the charge or imposing a higher penalty—the Court applies the civil service rules in effect at the time the offense was committed. This judicial policy parallels the principle in criminal law that penal statutes shall have retroactive effect only if favorable to the accused (Article 22, Revised Penal Code).

• Unawareness of a Circular Is Not an Excuse — Every court employee is expected to comply with Supreme Court administrative circulars. Ignorance or belated receipt of a circular does not excuse non-compliance, especially when the circular restates pre-existing rules.

• Clerk of Court as Role Model — A Clerk of Court is regarded as a role model for all employees under her supervision and must, at all times, be accountable to the public. Any conduct, act, or omission that diminishes public faith in the judiciary is not tolerated.

• Successive-Offense Rule under the RRACCS — Under the 2011 RRACCS, a prior administrative infraction is counted as a “first offense” for purposes of imposing the penalty for a second or third offense only when the previous infraction is of the same classification in terms of gravity (grave, less grave, light) and of similar nature. A dissimilar prior infraction neither escalates the penalty nor serves as an aggravating circumstance.

• “Unawareness of a circular is not an excuse for non‑compliance.” — Reiterated as a settled principle, dismissing Borja’s claim that she had overlooked A.C. No. 08-2017.

• “A clerk of court is regarded as a role model for all court employees under her supervision, and must, at all times, be accountable to the public for all her actions. Any conduct, act, or omission that violates the norm of public accountability, or diminishes, or tends to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary will not be tolerated, condoned, or countenanced.”

• “The power of supervision over all judiciary personnel is exclusively vested in the Court.” — Emphasizing the constitutional basis for the exclusive authority to set disciplinary parameters.

• On retroactive application of Rule 140: “We will apply Rule 140 of the Rules in disciplining court personnel who are not judges or justices since it is the prevailing legal framework. The exception is when its application will be prejudicial, or will work injustice to the court employee, i.e., the gravity of the offense will be increased, or a higher penalty for violation will be imposed. In such instance, the civil service rules, which is the framework of rules prevailing at the time of the commission of the offense, will apply.”

• Boston Finance and Investment Corp. v. Gonzalez, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520, October 9, 2018 — Established the distinction between Rule 140 (for judges and justices) and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, and held that civil service rules apply to court personnel via the CCCP; relied upon to explain the subsequent expansion of Rule 140 to cover all judiciary personnel.

• Dela Rama v. De Leon, A.M. No. P-14-3240, March 2, 2021 — Applied the principle that penal provisions in administrative rules should not be given retroactive effect if unfavorable to the respondent, forming the basis for applying the 2011 RRACCS instead of amended Rule 140 to Borja.

• Office of the Administrative Services (OAS)-OCA v. Calacal, 619 Phil. 1 (2009); Noynay-Arlos v. Conag, 465 Phil. 849 (2004) — Cited for the rule that ignorance of a circular does not excuse non-compliance.

• Concerned Employees of the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan v. Paguio-Bacani, 611 Phil. 630 (2009); Contreras v. Monge, 617 Phil. 30 (2009) — Cited for the standard that court personnel, especially Clerks of Court, are expected to be role models and uphold public accountability.

• In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit in MTC in Cities, Koronadal City, 496 Phil. 814 (2005) — The prior case where Borja was fined P5,000.00 for Simple Neglect of Duty; its dissimilar classification to the present offense precluded its use as a first offense for penalty escalation.

• Administrative Circular No. 08-2017 (February 2, 2017) — Required that applications for leave of absence of lower court personnel bear the recommendation for approval or disapproval of the Presiding Judge, or of the Clerk of Court only when delegated by the Presiding Judge in writing. Borja’s act of signing without written delegation directly violated this circular.

• Administrative Circular No. 08-2009 (February 3, 2009) — The earlier circular from which the operative approval provision was lifted verbatim, demonstrating that the rule had been in force long before A.C. No. 08-2017 was issued, thus undercutting Borja’s defense of belated receipt.

• Article VIII, Section 6, 1987 Constitution — Grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof; the constitutional anchor for the Court’s exclusive disciplinary authority over judiciary employees.

• Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC (October 2, 2018) and July 7, 2020 amendment — Extended the coverage of Rule 140 to include officials and employees of the Judiciary; classifies violations of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars as less serious charges (Section 23) punishable by suspension of one to three months or a fine of not less than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00 (now P35,000.00 to P100,000.00 under A.M. No. 21-03-17-SC). Not applied retroactively because doing so would prejudice the respondent.

• Section 46(F)(3), 2011 Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (CSC Resolution No. 1101502) — Classifies violation of reasonable office rules and regulations as a light offense punishable by reprimand for the first offense, suspension of one to thirty days for the second offense, and dismissal for the third offense; applied as the penalty framework.

• Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect if favorable to the accused; applied by analogy in administrative discipline to justify the non-retroactivity of a more stringent rule.

Perlas-Bernabe (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, Rosario, and J. Lopez (designated additional member per Special Order No. 2822). All concurred.