Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals

An applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title must prove that the land is alienable public land, and possession and occupation of the land prior to its classification as alienable or disposable cannot ripen into a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.

The petitioner, James R. Bracewell, sought judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, over parcels of land in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. The land was originally acquired in 1908 by Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., from the Dalandan and Jimenez families. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, on grounds including that the subject land is part of the public domain. The case was transferred from the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, where it was docketed as Land Registration Case No. M-77.

Sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired parcels of land in Las Piñas, Metro Manila from the Dalandan and Jimenez families, and corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in her name. On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the petitioner's name, cancelling the previous ones issued to Maria Cailles.

On September 19, 1963, the petitioner filed an action for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, docketed as L.R.C. Case No. 4328. On February 21, 1964, the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the application on the grounds that neither the petitioner nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor had they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at least thirty years prior to the application, and that the subject land is part of the public domain. The registration proceedings were suspended on account of an action filed by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles, which was finally disposed of by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 51263, where the rights of Maria Cailles were upheld over those of the oppositor Leonardo.

On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were forwarded to the Makati Regional Trial Court, docketed as Land Registration Case No. M-77. The Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition on July 22, 1985, adding the grounds of failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time and that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for. On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the petitioner's application. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on June 29, 1992 reversed and set aside the lower court's Order, and denied the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on September 30, 1992.

The petitioner asserted his right of title under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership since 1908. The respondents, on the other hand, maintained that since the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972, the petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963, nor was the requisite thirty years possession met. The Bureau of Forest Development's First Indorsement dated August 20, 1986 stated that the subject areas fall within the Alienable or Disposable Land under Project No. 13-A of Las Piñas, certified and declared as such on March 27, 1972 as per Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141 per LC Map 2623.

• Commencement of the Thirty-Year Period: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the thirty-year period mandated under Section 48(b) should commence only on March 27, 1972, in accordance with the classification made by the Bureau of Forestry in its First Indorsement dated August 20, 1986.
• Classification of the Land: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in drawing the conclusion and inference that prior to the declaration by the Bureau of Forestry on March 27, 1972, the parcels of land sought to be registered were part of the forest land or forest reserves.
• Vested Rights: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the vested rights of the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest who had occupied the land since 1908.

• Alienability of the Land: Respondents argued that since the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972, the petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963, nor was the requisite thirty years possession met.
• Inalienable Land Not Subject to Confirmation: Respondents maintained that the subject land was part of the inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain prior to March 27, 1972, and thus could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title.

• Alienability of the Land: Whether the petitioner proved that the subject parcels of land are alienable or disposable public land, as required for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
• Effect of Possession Prior to Classification: Whether the petitioner's possession and occupation of the land since 1908, prior to its classification as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972, can be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title.
• Vested Rights: Whether the petitioner acquired vested rights over the subject land by virtue of his and his predecessors-in-interest's possession since 1908.

• Alienability of the Land: No. The petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. It was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972.
• Effect of Possession Prior to Classification: No. Even granting that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
• Vested Rights: No. The petitioner failed to show proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order recognizes private or vested rights under which his case may fall. The Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development contains no indication of such exemption.

• Alienability of the Land: The Court applied the requisites laid down in Republic vs. Doldol, which require that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. The Court found that the petitioner failed to prove the first requisite. The government conclusively showed that the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972, as per the First Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development dated August 20, 1986, which stated that the subject areas fall within the Alienable or Disposable Land under Project No. 13-A of Las Piñas, certified and declared as such on March 27, 1972 as per Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141 per LC Map 2623.
• Effect of Possession Prior to Classification: The Court held that prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or indisposable, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition. The rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
• Vested Rights: The Court found no proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order recognizes private or vested rights under which the petitioner's case may fall. The only record is the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development, from which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned. Having found the petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for confirmation of imperfect title, the Court saw no need to discuss the other errors raised in the petition.

• Regalian Doctrine — All lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
• Requisites for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title — Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. When these conditions are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
• Inalienable Land Not Subject to Confirmation — There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition. The rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

• "Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the applicant's failure to prove the alienability of the land is fatal to his application for confirmation of imperfect title.
• "The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain." — This passage defines the controlling doctrine that possession of inalienable public land cannot ripen into registrable title.
• "Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable." — This passage articulates the principle that classification of land as alienable or disposable is a prerequisite to confirmation of imperfect title.

• Republic vs. Doldol, G.R. No. 132963, 295 SCRA 359 [1998] — Controlling precedent laying down the requisites to acquire title to public land under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, including the requirement that the applicant must prove the land is alienable public land.
• Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94524, 295 SCRA 296 [1998] — Followed, applying the Regalian doctrine and holding that a homestead patent issued over land that was part of the inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain is void ab initio.
• Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81961, 172 SCRA 455 [1989] — Cited for the proposition that there can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable.
• Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 73974, 244 SCRA 537 [1995] — Cited for the rule that in the absence of classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition.
• Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50464, 181 SCRA 443 [1990] — Cited for the rule that the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect.

• Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141 — The Public Land Act provision governing judicial confirmation of imperfect title, requiring open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application. The Court applied this provision to require proof that the land is alienable public land.
• Republic Act No. 1942 — The statute that superseded the original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, providing for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
• Presidential Decree No. 1073 — The decree that amended Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, approved on January 25, 1977, changing the prescriptive period to possession since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concurred.