Bote vs. San Pedro Cineplex Properties Corporation

Where both parties in a forcible entry case claim possession under Torrens titles traceable to the same mother title and the court has not determined whose certificate actually covers the disputed property, the case must be remanded for a geodetic survey and determination of title coverage before possession may be awarded to the proper party.

San Pedro Cineplex Properties Corporation, a corporation leasing a bus terminal in Barangay Landayan, San Pedro, Laguna, and Virgilio Bote, claiming through his wife as the sole heir of Manuel Humada Eñano, asserted competing claims over land in the same barangay. The dispute was initiated as a forcible entry complaint under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Both sides trace their respective Torrens titles to the same mother title, OCT No. 217, which had been subdivided multiple times.

San Pedro Cineplex Properties Corporation owned several contiguous parcels of land in Barangay Landayan, San Pedro, Laguna, with a total area of 74,847 sq.m., covered by TCT Nos. 309608, 309609 and 309610. It purchased the land from La Paz Housing in 1994 and had been leasing the premises to De la Rosa Transit, which operated a bus terminal therein. Virgilio Bote, for his part, claimed that the land in question was covered by TCT No. T-35050 and registered in the name of his late father-in-law, Manuel Humada Eñano, whose sole heir was Bote’s wife, Jennifer Eñano-Bote.

According to respondent, its peaceful and uninterrupted possession was disrupted in June 2006 when Bote, through violence and intimidation, entered the premises, brought in heavy machineries, and built a makeshift structure. Bote, on the other hand, asserted that in June 2006 he brought machineries into the premises intending to develop the same in view of the commercialization of Barangay Landayan. He likewise claimed that the Eñanos were in possession of the land through a caretaker who had been living there since 1965, when Manuel purchased the property—then covered by TCT No. 19832—from Gliceria Kasubuan. Bote further argued that because the property was the subject of a pending ejectment case, respondent could not have been in possession of the property. On June 21, 2006, respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry in the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 2.

After inspecting the disputed premises and evaluating the pleadings and evidence, the MTC found that the land was originally part of a property covered by OCT No. 217 registered in the name of Gliceria Kasubuan. Kasubuan sold the property to spouses Antonio Sibulo and Rosario Islan, who were issued TCT No. 31852. When the property was subdivided pursuant to a judicial order, TCT No. 31852 was cancelled and TCT Nos. 42530 and 42531 were issued in its place. Over the years, the former Kasubuan property was sold and subdivided several times. In 1990, La Paz Housing purchased three contiguous lots, with a total area of 74,847 sq.m., which were part of the Kasubuan property; it built concrete structures and installed security guards within the premises. In 1994, it sold the parcels to respondent. Respondent, the present registered owner, had been leasing out the property to De la Rosa Transit, which operated a bus terminal within the premises. The MTC concluded that respondent had been in peaceful and continuous possession of the property in question since 1994.

Bote assailed the MTC decision in the RTC, insisting that Manuel purchased the land covered by TCT No. 19832—which, like respondent’s certificates, could be traced back to OCT No. 217—from Kasubuan in 1965 and that the transaction was recorded in the primary book of entries in the Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. He added that the Eñanos had caretakers living on the land and had been paying real estate taxes thereon since 1966, thus enjoying continuous and uninterrupted possession.

Both petitioner and respondent asserted ownership and possession of the land in question and presented their respective Torrens titles as evidence. The MTC found that respondent’s certificates of title could be traced back to OCT No. 217, but it did not make any finding on whether those certificates in fact covered the disputed property.

• Prior Possession: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondent proved its prior possession of the disputed land; the Eñanos had continuous and uninterrupted possession through caretakers since 1965 and had paid real estate taxes since 1966.
• Title and Registration: Petitioner maintained that the land was covered by TCT No. T-35050 in the name of Manuel Humada Eñano, whose sole heir was his wife; Manuel purchased the property, then covered by TCT No. 19832, from Gliceria Kasubuan in 1965, and the transaction was recorded in the primary book of entries in the Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
• Pending Ejectment Case: Petitioner asserted that because the property was the subject of a pending ejectment case, respondent could not have been in possession of the property.

• Ownership and Prior Possession: Respondent asserted that it owned the properties under TCT Nos. 309608, 309609 and 309610, purchased them from La Paz Housing in 1994, and had been leasing them to De la Rosa Transit; it was in peaceful and continuous possession since 1994 until petitioner entered the premises in June 2006.
• Preponderance of Evidence: Respondent insisted before the Court of Appeals that it proved by preponderance of evidence its prior possession of the property.

• Prior Possession and Title Coverage: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondent proved its prior possession of the disputed land.
• Determination of Whose Title Covers the Property: Whether the MTC properly awarded possession without determining whose certificate(s) of title actually cover the disputed property.

• Prior Possession and Title Coverage: Remand is required. The finding of prior possession cannot be sustained as a basis for awarding possession because the MTC did not determine whose Torrens title actually covered the disputed property; the person with Torrens title is entitled to possession.
• Determination of Whose Title Covers the Property: No. The MTC merely relied on the parties’ allegations that their certificates covered the land; a geodetic survey was needed to determine the metes and bounds and whose title actually covered the disputed property.

• Prior Possession and Title Coverage: The MTC found that respondent’s certificates of title could be traced back to OCT No. 217, but it did not make any finding on whether those certificates in fact covered the disputed property. Considering the vastness of the land covered by OCT No. 217 and the fact that it had been subdivided many times over the years, petitioner and respondent might possibly be claiming distinct, albeit contiguous, properties, which could be a situation of mistaking another’s property as one’s own. Settled is the rule that the person who has a Torrens title over the land is entitled to possession thereof. However, because the MTC did not determine whose title actually covered the disputed property, the possession award could not stand without further proceedings.
• Determination of Whose Title Covers the Property: The MTC merely depended on the allegations of the parties that their respective certificates cover the land in question. It did not determine whose title actually covers the disputed property. A geodetic survey to determine the metes and bounds of the lots covered by the respective titles of the parties could have solved the matter. The case was therefore remanded to the MTC for further proceedings, particularly to determine whose certificate(s) of title actually cover the disputed property and thereafter to grant possession to the proper party.

• Torrens Title as Basis for Possession — The person who has a Torrens title over land is entitled to possession thereof. The Court cited this as the governing rule but found it could not be applied until the MTC determined whose Torrens title actually covered the disputed property.
• Necessity of Determining Title Coverage Before Awarding Possession in Forcible Entry — Where both parties claim possession under Torrens titles traceable to a common mother title that has been subdivided many times, the court must determine whose certificate actually covers the disputed property. Failure to do so, and mere reliance on the parties’ allegations, requires remand for further proceedings, including a geodetic survey to determine metes and bounds.
• Geodetic Survey as a Means to Resolve Overlapping Title Claims — A geodetic survey to determine the metes and bounds of the lots covered by the parties’ respective titles may be used to resolve whether they are claiming the same or distinct, albeit contiguous, properties. The Court suggested this as the appropriate proceeding on remand.

• "Settled is the rule that the person who has a Torrens title over the land is entitled to possession thereof." — This states the controlling rule on possession under a Torrens title, which the Court applied but found insufficient to resolve the case without a prior determination of whose title covered the disputed property.
• "The MTC merely depended on the allegations of the parties that their respective certificates cover the land in question. However, it did not determine whose title actually covers the disputed property." — This identifies the procedural and factual deficiency that required remand, because the MTC awarded possession without resolving the threshold title-coverage issue.
• "Considering the vastness of the land covered by OCT No. 217 and the fact that it had been subdivided many times over the years, petitioner and respondent might possibly be claiming distinct, albeit contiguous, properties. This can actually be a situation of mistaking another’s property as one’s own." — This explains why a geodetic survey was necessary and why the parties’ claims could involve different parcels rather than the same disputed land.
• "WHEREFORE, the case is hereby REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 2 for further proceedings, particularly to determine whose certificate(s) of title actually cover the disputed property and thereafter, to grant possession to the proper party." — This is the dispositive portion, directing the MTC to resolve title coverage before awarding possession.

• Arambulo vs. Gungab, G.R. No. 156581, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 640, 649-650 — Cited by the Court as authority for the rule that the person who has a Torrens title over the land is entitled to possession thereof; the Court relied on this principle but found it inapplicable until the title coverage issue was resolved.

• Rule 70, Rules of Court — The forcible entry complaint was filed under this rule; the case originated as a forcible entry action in the MTC.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Petitioner’s recourse to the Supreme Court was filed under this rule.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC under this rule, but the RTC decided it as an appeal.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the Chief Justice’s certification that the conclusions in the resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion.

Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Antonio T. Carpio, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, and Lucas P. Bersamin.