Borja vs. Mendoza

An arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal prosecution; a conviction rendered without the accused having been arraigned is void for violation of procedural due process and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and trial in absentia under the Constitution may proceed only after arraignment.

Manuel Borja was accused of slight physical injuries before the City Court of Cebu, Branch I, presided by respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining. After one postponement due to his failure to appear, the case was reset for hearing. On the scheduled date, Borja again failed to appear. Without conducting an arraignment, Judge Senining proceeded with trial in absentia, received the prosecution’s evidence, and thereafter promulgated a decision finding Borja guilty and sentencing him to twenty days of arresto menor. Borja appealed to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, presided by respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza. Without notice or an opportunity to submit a memorandum, Judge Mendoza affirmed the City Court’s decision. Borja then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to the total absence of arraignment and the denial of his constitutional rights.

• The Criminal Charge: Petitioner Manuel Borja was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the City Court of Cebu, Branch I, presided by respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining.

• Proceedings Before the City Court: The case was initially postponed due to Borja’s failure to appear. When it was reset to December 14, 1973, Borja again failed to appear, although his bondsmen were notified. Without Borja having been arraigned at any prior stage, and without counsel appearing on his behalf, Judge Senining allowed the prosecution to present its evidence nonetheless, invoking Letter of Instruction No. 40. Only the offended party testified, and three documents were offered in evidence. The prosecution then rested, and the court set the promulgation of decision on December 28, 1973. On that date, Judge Senining rendered a decision finding Borja guilty and sentencing him to serve twenty days of arresto menor. The records showed no arraignment and no representation by counsel.

• Appeal to the Court of First Instance: Borja appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, presided by respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza. Before the CFI, Borja specifically raised as error the absence of arraignment and cited jurisprudence, commentaries, and the rules. Despite this, Judge Mendoza rendered a decision on November 16, 1976 affirming the City Court’s judgment, without giving notice to Borja or requiring him to submit a memorandum.

• Petition for Certiorari: Borja filed a petition for certiorari directly with the Supreme Court, arguing that the failure to arraign him violated his constitutional right to procedural due process, specifically the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and the right to be heard by himself and counsel. The Solicitor General, who was required to comment, fully agreed that the procedural defect was so grave as to render void the decisions of both the City Court and the CFI. The comment was treated as an answer, and the case was submitted for decision.

• Violation of Due Process and Right to Arraignment: Petitioner argued that he was never arraigned, in violation of the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process under Article IV, Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution, and his rights under Section 19 thereof to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and to be heard by himself and counsel. The absence of arraignment, he maintained, rendered the entire proceeding void.

• Invalidity of Trial in Absentia and Lack of Notice on Appeal: Petitioner contended that the trial in absentia conducted without prior arraignment was invalid, and that the CFI’s affirmance of the conviction, rendered without notice to him or an opportunity to submit a memorandum, compounded the denial of due process. The appeal, he insisted, did not cure the original jurisdictional defect.

• Concurrence of the Solicitor General: The Solicitor General, representing the respondent judges, agreed entirely with petitioner. The comment stated that the absence of an arraignment is a fatal defect; that the constitutional provision allowing trial in absentia requires that it be held “after arraignment”; and that the appeal to the CFI did not cure the defect, as the lack of arraignment can be raised at any time. No contrary argument was advanced by the respondents.

• Arraignment as Due Process Requirement: Whether the failure to arraign the accused before trial and conviction violates procedural due process and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

• Validity of Trial in Absentia Without Prior Arraignment: Whether a trial in absentia conducted without the accused having been arraigned is valid under Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973 Constitution, which allows trial to proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused “after arraignment.”

• Curative Effect of Appeal: Whether the appeal to the Court of First Instance cured the defect arising from the total absence of arraignment.

• Arraignment as Due Process Requirement: The conviction was void. Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal prosecution; it is the means by which the accused is brought into court and notified of the cause he must meet. Procedural due process demands that an accused be informed of the charge and given the opportunity to be heard. The duty to arraign is an affirmative obligation of the court, which must act on its own volition unless waived. Because Borja was never arraigned, he was denied the constitutional rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and to be heard by himself and counsel.

• Validity of Trial in Absentia Without Prior Arraignment: The trial in absentia was invalid. Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution explicitly requires that trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused only “after arraignment.” Since no arraignment had taken place, the constitutional exception did not apply. Conducting the trial in Borja’s absence, without counsel and without any prior arraignment, further violated his right to be heard.

• Curative Effect of Appeal: The appeal to the CFI did not possess any curative effect. The absence of arraignment is a defect that may be raised at any time, as it strikes at the very foundation of due process and the court’s jurisdiction to render judgment. The CFI’s affirmance of the void judgment, without addressing the fundamental defect, was itself invalid.

• Doctrine of Arraignment as an Indispensable Requirement — Arraignment is the formal means of bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the charge he must meet; it is an indispensable requirement in any criminal prosecution. The court has an affirmative duty, on its own motion, to inform the accused of his rights at arraignment, unless such rights are waived. A conviction rendered without arraignment is void for lack of due process. (Citing United States v. Binayoh, 35 Phil. 23 [1916] and People v. Castillo, 76 Phil. 72 [1946]).

• Trial in Absentia Requires Prior Arraignment — Under the constitutional provision that “after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified,” the indispensable prerequisite is that the trial in absentia takes place only after arraignment. Without arraignment, the exception cannot be invoked, and any trial conducted in the absence of the accused is void.

• Right to Counsel as Component of Fair Hearing — The right to be heard includes the right to be heard by counsel. A criminal trial conducted without giving the accused an opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel is a denial of the constitutional right; such right may be waived, but the waiver must be express or clearly implied. (People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752 [1950]; Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 [1949]).

• “Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal prosecution.” — The Solicitor General’s formulation, adopted by the Court, highlighting the non-waivable, jurisdictional character of the step in the absence of an express waiver.

• “An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means ‘for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to meet …’” — The Court’s explanation of the fundamental purpose of arraignment, quoting People v. Castillo.

• “In the arraignment the court must act of its own volition… No such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are rights which he must assert himself.” — From United States v. Binayoh, emphasizing the court’s affirmative, non-delegable duty to arraign.

• “In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.” — From People v. Holgado, underscoring the inseparable connection between the right to counsel and a fair trial.

• United States v. Binayoh, 35 Phil. 23 (1916) — A leading case on arraignment, holding that the court has an affirmative duty to arraign the accused and inform him of his rights on its own motion. The Court relied on this to underscore that the absence of arraignment is not a mere procedural lapse but a violation of a mandatory duty.

• People v. Castillo, 76 Phil. 72 (1946) — Identified due process with the requirement that an accused be heard in a court of competent jurisdiction under orderly processes of law, after notice and opportunity to be heard. The Court adopted its definition to explain why arraignment is indispensable.

• Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 (1949) — Affirmed that it is the constitutional right of an accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced, and that this right is inviolate. Cited to support the rule that conviction without the accused being heard is void.

• People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752 (1950) — Established that in criminal cases, there can be no fair hearing unless the accused is given an opportunity to be heard by counsel, as even the most intelligent layman may lack the skill to defend himself. Applied to show that proceeding without counsel for the accused violated due process.

• Article IV, Section 17, 1973 Constitution — “No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.” The Court held that the failure to arraign petitioner denied him the basic guarantee of procedural due process.

• Article IV, Section 19, 1973 Constitution — Provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent, shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, and to meet the witnesses face to face. The provision also states: “However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.” The Court ruled that this exception is unavailing where the accused had not been arraigned; the language “after arraignment” makes arraignment a condition precedent to trial in absentia.

Justices Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Fernandez concurred. Justice Concepcion Jr. was on leave.