Borja, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

A petition to declare a failure of election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code lies only when the election was not held, was suspended before the hour fixed for closing, or resulted in a failure to elect—meaning nobody was elected—and is neither a pre-proclamation controversy nor an election case; allegations of fraud, violence, terrorism, disenfranchisement, flying voters, or unqualified board members to overturn a municipal mayoral proclamation constitute an election protest within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC under Section 251.

Borja and Capco were candidates for Mayor of Pateros in the May 8, 1995 elections. The controversy implicated the COMELEC’s constitutional authority under Article IX-C, Section 3 to sit en banc or in divisions, and the statutory distinction between a failure-of-election petition under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code and an election contest for municipal office under Section 251.

During the May 8, 1995 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr. and Jose T. Capco, Jr. vied for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Pateros. Capco won by a margin of 6,330 votes, was consequently proclaimed, and has since been serving as Mayor of Pateros. Borja alleged lack of notice of the date and time of canvass, fraud, violence, terrorism, and analogous causes, such as disenfranchisement of voters, presence of flying voters, and unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors. On those allegations, he filed before the COMELEC a petition to declare a failure of election and to nullify the canvass and proclamation made by the Pateros Board of Canvassers.

The COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition in its resolution dated May 25, 1995. It concluded that the grounds relied upon by Borja were warranted only in an election contest. It declared that force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, and other analogous causes are merely the causes which may give rise to the grounds to declare a failure of elections. Those grounds include (a) no election held on the designated election date; (b) suspension of election before the hour fixed by law for the closing of voting; and (c) election in any polling place resulted in a failure to elect. None of those circumstances was present in Borja’s petition.

Aggrieved, Borja elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, arguing the same matters while claiming that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the May 25, 1995 resolution. He averred that the COMELEC en banc did not have the power to hear and decide the merits of the petition at first instance because, under Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution, all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

• COMELEC En Banc Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that under Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution, all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be heard and decided in division, and only motions for reconsideration of decisions are decided by the Commission en banc; therefore, the COMELEC en banc had no power to hear and decide at first instance his petition to declare a failure of election.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner claimed that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned resolution dated May 25, 1995.
• Failure-of-Election Grounds: Petitioner alleged lack of notice of the date and time of canvass, fraud, violence, terrorism, and analogous causes such as disenfranchisement of voters, presence of flying voters, and unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors as grounds to declare a failure of election and nullify the canvass and proclamation.

• Nature of the Petition: The COMELEC concluded that the grounds relied upon by Borja were warranted only in an election contest, not in a petition to declare a failure of election and nullify a proclamation.
• Absence of Failure-of-Election Grounds: The COMELEC declared that force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, and other analogous causes are merely causes which may give rise to the grounds to declare a failure of elections, and that the actual grounds—no election held on the designated date, suspension of election before the closing of voting, or election in any polling place resulting in a failure to elect—were not present in Borja’s petition.

• COMELEC En Banc Authority: Whether the COMELEC en banc has the authority to hear and decide at the first instance a petition seeking to declare a failure of election without the benefit of prior notice and hearing.
• Classification of the Petition: Whether a petition to declare a failure of election qualifies as an election case or a pre-proclamation controversy that must be heard and decided by a COMELEC division under Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution.
• Failure of Election vs. Election Contest: Whether Borja’s petition alleged circumstances sufficient to declare a failure of election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code or instead constituted an election protest over a municipal office within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under Section 251.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Borja’s petition.
• Due Process: Whether Borja was denied due process by the COMELEC’s dismissal of his petition without prior notice and hearing.

• COMELEC En Banc Authority: No. The COMELEC en banc is not the proper first-instance tribunal for an election protest over a municipal office; such contest falls within the RTC’s exclusive original jurisdiction under Section 251, with COMELEC exercising only appellate jurisdiction under Article IX-C, Section 2(2). In any event, Article IX-C, Section 3 requires election cases to be heard in division, with the en banc resolving only motions for reconsideration.
• Classification of the Petition: Neither. A petition to declare a failure of election is neither a pre-proclamation controversy under Section 5(h), Rule 1 of the Revised COMELEC Rules nor an election case.
• Failure of Election vs. Election Contest: No failure of election. Section 6 requires that the election was not held, was suspended before closing, or resulted in a failure to elect; none was present. The allegations were proper only in an election contest.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The COMELEC applied the clear provisions of law in dismissing the petition.
• Due Process: No. The COMELEC en banc’s review and evaluation of the petition was tantamount to a fair hearing; if any party was aggrieved by the lack of notice and hearing, it was Capco, whose arguments were never ventilated.

• COMELEC En Banc Authority: Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution provides that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions and that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be heard and decided in division, with motions for reconsideration decided by the Commission en banc. The threshold question was whether a petition to declare a failure of election is an election case or a pre-proclamation controversy. The Court determined that it is neither. Consequently, the petition was not a matter that the COMELEC en banc could adjudicate on the merits as an election case; rather, it was a simple election protest over an elective municipal position. Section 251 of the Omnibus Election Code vests exclusive original jurisdiction over such contests in the appropriate Regional Trial Court, while Article IX-C, Section 2(2) gives the COMELEC only appellate jurisdiction over municipal election contests decided by trial courts. The COMELEC therefore had no choice but to dismiss the petition for being deficient in form and filed before the wrong tribunal. No grave abuse of discretion attended that dismissal.
• Classification of the Petition: A petition to declare a failure of election is neither a pre-proclamation controversy as classified under Section 5(h), Rule 1 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure nor an election case. The Court distinguished a failure-of-election petition from an election contest. Capco had been duly elected and proclaimed as Mayor of Pateros, and such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity. To destroy that presumption, Borja had to convincingly show that Capco’s victory was procured through extra-legal means. Borja’s allegations—lack of notice of the date and time of canvass; fraud, violence, terrorism, and analogous causes; disenfranchisement of voters; presence of flying voters; and unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors—were proper only in an election contest, not in a petition to declare a failure of election and to nullify a proclamation. Thus, the petition did not qualify as an election case or pre-proclamation controversy.
• Failure of Election vs. Election Contest: Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, reiterated in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Revised COMELEC Rules, allows the COMELEC to call for the holding or continuation of an election by reason of failure of election only when the election is not held, is suspended, or results in a failure to elect. The phrase “failure to elect” must be understood in its literal sense, which is “nobody was elected.” None of these circumstances was present in Borja’s petition. At best, the grounds he cited were simply events which give rise to the three consequences just mentioned. In reality, his petition was nothing but a simple election protest involving an elective municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate Regional Trial Court. The COMELEC, in turn, exercises appellate jurisdiction over the trial court’s decision pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The COMELEC cannot be said to have committed abuse of discretion, let alone grave abuse thereof, in dismissing Borja’s petition. It applied the clear provisions of the law. For having done so, it deserved, not condemnation, but commendation.
• Due Process: Borja could not claim that he was denied due process because when the COMELEC en banc reviewed and evaluated his petition, the same was tantamount to a fair “hearing” of his case. The fact that Capco was not even ordered to rebut the allegations therein certainly did not deprive Borja of his day in court. If anybody was aggrieved by the alleged lack of notice and hearing, it was Capco, whose arguments were never ventilated. If Capco remained complacent, it was because the COMELEC’s actuation was favorable to him.

• Failure of Election under Section 6, Omnibus Election Code — A failure of election may be declared only if, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of voting, or after voting and during preparation, transmission, custody, or canvass of election returns results in a failure to elect, and the failure or suspension affects the result. The COMELEC may, on verified petition and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not later than thirty days after cessation of the cause. The phrase “failure to elect” means “nobody was elected.” In this case, none of the requisites was present; Borja’s allegations were merely causes that could give rise to those consequences, not the consequences themselves.
• COMELEC En Banc and Division Jurisdiction — Under Article IX-C, Section 3, the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions; all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be heard and decided in division, and only motions for reconsideration of decisions are decided by the Commission en banc. The Court applied this by first determining whether a failure-of-election petition is an election case or pre-proclamation controversy; it held it is neither, so the petition was not a matter for a COMELEC division at first instance, and the en banc properly dismissed it as an election protest filed before the wrong tribunal.
• Election Contest for Municipal Offices — Under Section 251 of the Omnibus Election Code, a sworn petition contesting the election of a municipal officer shall be filed with the proper Regional Trial Court by any candidate who duly filed a certificate of candidacy and was voted for the same office, within ten days after proclamation. The COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction over the trial court’s decision under Article IX-C, Section 2(2). The Court applied this by characterizing Borja’s petition as a simple election protest over the mayoralty of Pateros, not a failure-of-election petition, and thus within the RTC’s exclusive original jurisdiction.
• Presumption of Regularity of Proclamation — A proclamation of a duly elected candidate enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity. To destroy the presumption, the losing candidate must convincingly show that the opponent’s victory was procured through extra-legal means. The Court applied this in noting Capco was duly elected and proclaimed as Mayor of Pateros, and Borja’s allegations of fraud, violence, terrorism, disenfranchisement, flying voters, and unqualified board members were proper only in an election contest.
• Due Process in COMELEC Review — The COMELEC en banc’s review and evaluation of a petition may be tantamount to a fair hearing, such that the petitioner cannot claim denial of due process from the absence of prior notice and hearing. In this case, the Court held Borja was not denied due process; if any party was aggrieved by the lack of notice and hearing, it was Capco, whose arguments were never ventilated.

• "A petition to declare a failure of election is neither a pre-proclamation controversy as classified under Section 5(h), Rule 1 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure, nor an election case." — This is the Court’s core classification of the petition, distinguishing it from matters that must be heard by a COMELEC division or that fall within COMELEC’s original jurisdiction.
• "In other words, the COMELEC can call for the holding or continuation of election by reason of failure of election only when the election is not held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect. The latter phrase, in turn, must be understood in its literal sense, which is "nobody was elected."" — This passage defines the narrow scope of a failure-of-election petition under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code and supplies the ratio for rejecting Borja’s allegations.
• "In reality, Borja’s petition was nothing but a simple election protest involving an elective municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate Regional Trial Court." — This states the dispositive jurisdictional characterization: the petition belonged to the RTC as an election protest, not to the COMELEC en banc as a failure-of-election petition.
• "Nor can Borja claim that he was denied due process because when the COMELEC en banc reviewed and evaluated his petition, the same was tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case." — This rejects the due process objection and explains that the COMELEC’s review sufficed as a fair hearing.

• Ong, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 221 SCRA 475 (1993) — Cited for the rule that if a case raises pre-proclamation issues, the COMELEC sitting en banc has no original jurisdiction, and the case should be remanded to the COMELEC to be referred to any of its Divisions for proper disposition.
• Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections, 212 SCRA 309 (1992) — Cited together with Ong in support of the constitutional rule on COMELEC en banc and division jurisdiction over election cases and pre-proclamation controversies.
• Bince, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 218 SCRA 782 (1993) — Cited for the principle that a proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity.

• Article IX-C, Section 3, Constitution — Provides that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions and that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be heard and decided in division, with motions for reconsideration decided by the Commission en banc. The Court used this provision to frame the threshold issue and to hold that the petition was not an election case or pre-proclamation controversy requiring division adjudication.
• Article IX-C, Section 2(2), Constitution — Grants the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications of elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction. The Court applied this to confirm that COMELEC’s role over municipal election contests is appellate, not original.
• Section 6, Omnibus Election Code — Defines failure of election and authorizes the COMELEC, on verified petition and after due notice and hearing, to call for the holding or continuation of the election when the election was not held, suspended, or resulted in a failure to elect. The Court held none of these circumstances was present in Borja’s petition.
• Section 251, Omnibus Election Code — Requires a sworn petition contesting the election of a municipal officer to be filed with the proper Regional Trial Court within ten days after proclamation. The Court applied this to hold that Borja’s petition was in reality an election protest within the RTC’s exclusive original jurisdiction.
• Section 5(h), Rule 1, Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Classifies pre-proclamation controversies. The Court cited it to hold that a petition to declare a failure of election is not a pre-proclamation controversy.
• Section 2, Rule 26, Revised COMELEC Rules — Reiterates the failure-of-election provisions of Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The Court cited it in analyzing the requisites for a failure-of-election petition.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Hermosisima, Jr., J., on leave.