Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC

The governing principle is that for the three-term limit for elective local officials to apply, two conditions must concur: the local official must have been elected three consecutive times to the same position, and the local official must have fully served three consecutive terms. Service in an office by automatic succession by operation of law, rather than by election, does not count as a term served for purposes of computing the three-term limit under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code.

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988, for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, upon the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja, Capco became mayor by operation of law and served the remainder of the term until June 30, 1992. Capco was then elected mayor in the May 11, 1992 elections for a term ending June 30, 1995, and was reelected on May 8, 1995, for a term ending June 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja Jr., also a mayoral candidate, sought Capco's disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998, rendering him ineligible for another term.

• Nature of Action: Petition for Certiorari to set aside a COMELEC resolution and declare a mayoral candidate disqualified under the three-term limit rule.

• Parties:

  • Petitioner: Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., a candidate for mayor of Pateros.
  • Respondents: Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr., the incumbent mayor and candidate for reelection.

• Factual Sequence: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988, for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja, died. By operation of law, Capco succeeded to the mayorship and served the unexpired term ending June 30, 1992. Capco was subsequently elected mayor in the May 11, 1992 elections for a three-year term ending June 30, 1995. He was reelected on May 8, 1995, for another three-year term ending June 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor for the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner, a rival candidate, sought his disqualification. After the COMELEC En Banc declared Capco eligible, he won the election with 16,558 votes against petitioner's 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected.

• Petitioner maintained that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from September 2, 1989, to June 30, 1992, should be considered service for one full term. Because Capco thereafter served two more terms as mayor, petitioner argued that Capco had served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code.
• Petitioner argued that the manner of assuming office—succession versus election—is irrelevant because the constitutional purpose of the provision is to prevent the monopolization of political power.
• Petitioner contended that, by analogy to Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, which bars a Vice-President who succeeds as President and serves for more than four years from being elected to the same office, a vice-mayor who succeeds to the mayorship should likewise be considered to have served a full term.

• Respondent countered that the three-term limitation in both the Constitution and the Local Government Code refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected, making no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected.
• Respondent argued that because he was not elected to the position of mayor in the January 18, 1988 local elections but succeeded to the office by operation of law, serving the unexpired term of his predecessor, such succession should not be counted as one term for purposes of computing the three-term limitation.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues: Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of computing the three-term limit under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive: The Court ruled that a vice-mayor who succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law does not serve a term for purposes of the three-term limit. The Court based its ruling on textual analysis and the constitutional framers' intent. Textually, Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution bars officials from serving more than three consecutive terms and provides that voluntary renunciation of office does not interrupt the continuity of service for the full term "for which he was elected." The phrase "for which he was elected" implies that the term served must be one originating from an election, not from automatic succession. Historically, the Constitutional Commission debates reveal a dual policy: preventing the accumulation of power and preserving the people's freedom of choice. Counting succession as a term would unduly restrict the electorate's right to choose their officials. The Court distinguished the case of a Representative who succeeds another, noting that a Representative is elected to fill a vacancy, whereas a vice-mayor succeeds by operation of law. The Court also rejected the analogy to the Vice-President succeeding the President, holding that the absence of a similar explicit succession-based disqualification provision in Article X, Section 8 underscores the constitutional intent to count only terms to which one was elected for local officials. Furthermore, a vice-mayor has distinct powers and functions, and his assumption of the mayorship is more a matter of chance than design, unlike a Vice-President who is elected primarily to succeed the President.

• Three-Term Limit Doctrine for Local Elective Officials — For the constitutional and statutory disqualification of having served three consecutive terms to apply, two conditions must concur: (1) the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times to the same position, and (2) the local official has fully served three consecutive terms. Service by automatic succession by operation of law, rather than by election, does not count as a term served. Voluntary renunciation of office is not considered an interruption in the continuity of service only if the term is one for which the official was elected; thus, a successor who resigns before the term expires does not complete the predecessor's term for purposes of the limit.

• "The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply."
• "The first sentence speaks of 'the term of office of elective local officials' and bars 'such official[s]' from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that 'voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.' The term served must therefore be one 'for which [the official concerned] was elected.'"

• U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) — Cited to support the fundamental tenet of representative democracy that the people should be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them, reinforcing the policy of preserving the electorate's freedom of choice.

• Art. X, §8, 1987 Constitution — Provides the three-term limit for elective local officials and states that voluntary renunciation of office does not interrupt the continuity of service for the full term for which the official was elected. The Court interpreted the phrase "for which he was elected" to mean that service by succession does not count toward the limit.
• §43(b), R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Restates the constitutional provision on term limits. The Court applied the same interpretation requiring election to the position for the term to be counted.
• Art. VII, §4, 1987 Constitution — Provides for presidential succession and ineligibility rules for a Vice-President who serves more than four years as President. The Court distinguished this provision, noting the absence of a similar specific rule for local officials implies that succession does not count toward the local term limit.
• §44(a), R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Provides for the vice-mayor's succession to the mayorship by operation of law. The Court used this to distinguish the vice-mayor's succession from a Representative's succession, which requires a special election.
• §445, R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Enumerates the powers of the vice-mayor as presiding officer of the sangguniang bayan and appointing authority thereof. The Court cited this to show that a vice-mayor has distinct functions, and assuming the mayorship is only one incidental function, unlike the Vice-President whose primary purpose is succession.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ.