Borillo vs. Court of Appeals

An appellate court is without jurisdiction to review and reverse a judgment as to a party who did not appeal, and a private document that is patently ambiguous as to its subject matter, or unsigned and internally inconsistent, cannot establish a transfer of ownership. The judgment as to the non-appealing defendant became final beyond the period to appeal; the alleged deeds of sale failed both the requirement of proof of due execution and authenticity for private writings and the rule barring parol evidence to supply a description.

The parcels in controversy are unregistered ricelands, cornlands, and pastureland situated at Bugbuguis, Quillat, Langiden, Abra, so that ownership had to be established through tax declarations and proof of possession rather than through Torrens certificates of title. Esperanza Borillo was the widow of Elpidio Borillo, and the private respondent Catalina Borillo was Elpidio's sister; the other original defendant, Marcos Borillo, was Elpidio's brother. Parcels (a), (b), (c), and (d) had been declared for taxation in Elpidio's name in 1948, while parcels (e) and (f) were inherited by Elpidio and his siblings Marcos, Catalina, Aurelia, and Rosita from their father Venancio Borillo, Elpidio holding a one-fifth pro-indiviso share.

Esperanza Borillo, for herself and on behalf of her children, brought suit over several unregistered parcels of land in Bugbuguis, Quillat, Langiden, Abra. Four parcels — described in the complaint as parcels (a), (b), (c), and (d), consisting of riceland, pastureland, and cornland — had been declared in 1948 in the name of her late husband, Elpidio Borillo, under Tax Declaration Nos. 0731, 0732, 0733, and 0734. Two other parcels — parcels (e) and (f), also unregistered — had been inherited by Elpidio, his brother Marcos, and his sisters Catalina, Aurelia, and Rosita from their father Venancio Borillo, with Elpidio holding a one-fifth pro-indiviso share.

According to the petitioner, Elpidio had been in peaceful, public, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the four parcels in the concept of owner even before his marriage to Esperanza and until his death in 1970. After his death, Esperanza continued to possess and cultivate the parcels and enjoy their fruits until sometime in 1971–1972, when Catalina and Marcos forcibly and unlawfully dispossessed her. Despite repeated demands, they refused to return the property. In 1974, new tax declarations — Nos. 6319, 6320, 6321, and 6322 — were issued in Esperanza's name for parcels (a) through (d). Elpidio's one-fifth pro-indiviso share in parcels (e) and (f) was allegedly taken by Catalina sometime in 1971, and she likewise refused to return it to the petitioner and her children as Elpidio's heirs.

Catalina answered that parcels (a), (c), and (d) had been sold to her by Elpidio in 1935, while Marcos claimed that parcel (b) had been sold to him by Elpidio sometime in 1937, both before Elpidio's marriage to the petitioner. Although they did not declare these parcels for taxation in their own names, they asserted that they immediately took possession and occupied the same as owners, and Catalina claimed to have paid the realty taxes on parcels (a), (c), and (d) since 1948. She explained her failure to secure tax declarations in her name during Elpidio's lifetime by saying that she trusted him as her brother and that he had assured her she could transfer the title to herself anytime. She further claimed that after the Second World War, Elpidio and Rosita sold to her their respective undivided shares in parcels (e) and (f).

At trial, Catalina relied heavily on Exhibit "3," a private document purporting to show that Elpidio sold to her all his property for P40.00, and Exhibit "4," which she claimed to be a deed of sale of parcels (a), (c), and (d) allegedly executed by Elpidio in 1935. Marcos claimed that the deed of sale evidencing the sale to him of parcel (b) was lost during the Second World War. Both sides claimed actual possession, and Catalina and Marcos claimed possession for more than thirty years. Patricia and Melencio Borillo moved to withdraw as co-plaintiffs, asserting that they had not authorized their inclusion and that Catalina was the true owner.

The trial court found that the plaintiffs' claim of ownership over the four parcels was preponderantly established by the 1948 tax declarations in Elpidio's name, which remained uncancelled for twenty-nine years and which the defendants never attempted to cancel during Elpidio's lifetime or immediately after his death, attempting to declare the lands in their own names only in 1977 after the complaint was filed. It found that Elpidio had actual possession during his lifetime until his death, as testified to by Esperanza and by Clemente Llaneza, an uninterested witness, and that the defendants' claim of actual possession since before the war was belied by the tax declarations and Llaneza's testimony. The trial court held Exhibit "3," an acknowledgment receipt dated May 12, 1946, to be a mere receipt evidencing a loan of P40.00 because it mentioned no property sold, and held Exhibit "4" unreliable because it was undated and unsigned, bore only a cross over Elpidio's written name although he knew how to write, was not signed by him, and, though purportedly executed in 1935, incorporated Tax Declaration Nos. 0731, 0732, and 0734 issued only in 1948.

The Court of Appeals found the preponderance of evidence to tilt heavily in favor of Catalina, concluding that she had been in possession in the concept of owner of parcels (a), (c), and (d) since her purchase long before the war, cultivating the same, paying real estate taxes, and later declaring them in her name, and that Marcos had acquired parcel (b) from Elpidio since 1938. It gave weight to the testimony of Melecio Borillo, Esperanza's son, who withdrew as party plaintiff and testified that he knew from his father that the property had been sold to Catalina. It held that uninterrupted, adverse, open possession for thirty years under Article 1137 of the Civil Code upheld the defendants' right over the property, and it accepted explanations for the deficiencies in Exhibits "3" and "4," theorizing that Exhibit "4" must have been executed on or before 1948 as a confirmation of the prior sale.

• Speculation and Misapprehension of Facts: Petitioner asked the Court to review the respondent Court's findings of fact and to reverse its decision on the ground that the same was based solely on "speculation, surmise and conjecture," and that it committed a "misapprehension of facts."

• Jurisdiction Over a Non-Appealing Defendant: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's judgment insofar as it concerned defendant Marcos Borillo, who did not appeal from the decision.
• Proof of the Alleged Sales and Ownership: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court and ruling that private respondent Catalina Borillo is the owner of parcels (a), (c), and (d) and of Elpidio Borillo's one-fifth pro-indiviso share in parcels (e) and (f).

• Jurisdiction Over a Non-Appealing Defendant: Yes. The Court of Appeals committed a grave error in reversing the trial court's judgment as to Marcos Borillo, who did not appeal; as against him the decision had long become final, and beyond the period to appeal a judgment is no longer within the scope of the power of review of any court.
• Proof of the Alleged Sales and Ownership: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Catalina Borillo owned parcels (a), (c), and (d) and Elpidio's one-fifth share in parcels (e) and (f), because Exhibits "3" and "4" were private documents whose due execution and authenticity were not proven and which, in any event, did not satisfactorily establish the alleged transfers of title.

• Jurisdiction Over a Non-Appealing Defendant: The trial court's decision was appealed only by Catalina Borillo; her co-defendant Marcos Borillo did not appeal. As against Marcos, and particularly with respect to parcel (b), the decision had long become final, and the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to review the same. Beyond the period to appeal, a judgment is no longer within the scope of the power of review of any court. The appeal interposed by Catalina did not benefit Marcos because she had nothing to do with parcel (b), and the defense in respect thereto was exclusive to him.

• Proof of the Alleged Sales and Ownership: The fact that parcels (a), (c), and (d) were originally owned by Elpidio Borillo was not disputed; Catalina claimed to have derived title from him through a sale in 1935, so the question was whether Elpidio in fact sold the parcels to her. To substantiate her claim she presented Exhibits "3" and "4." Exhibit "3," dated May 12, 1946, was a mere acknowledgment receipt of a loan of P40.00, mentioning no property sold and not acknowledged before a notary public. Exhibit "4" was an undated and unsigned document written in lead pencil on simple grade paper, with no witnesses, not acknowledged before a notary public, and bearing only a cross over the written name of Elpidio Borillo, who was proven to know how to write and sign his name; although purportedly executed in 1935, it mentioned Tax Declaration Nos. 0731, 0732, 0733, and 0734 issued in 1948 in Elpidio's name, and Catalina herself testified that she had no knowledge of its contents. Both exhibits being private documents, their due execution and authenticity had to be proven under Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, then in force, either by anyone who saw the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the maker's handwriting, or by a subscribing witness. No one who saw the execution was presented, there were no subscribing witnesses, and the due execution of the exhibits as deeds of sale was not satisfactorily proven; they could not be received in evidence. Even assuming admissibility, they did not prove the transfers: Exhibit "3" made no mention of any property sold and suffered from a patent, not merely intrinsic, ambiguity, so the respondent Court erred in giving credence to testimonies offered to cure it, in disregard of the parol evidence rule then embodied in Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Before parol evidence may be admitted to identify, explain, or define the subject matter of a writing, the writing must itself contain a description sufficient to serve as a foundation for such evidence; parol evidence is not admissible to identify the property where the description is so vague as to amount to no description at all, and is not permitted to supply a description but only to apply it. As to Exhibit "4," the Court agreed with the trial court that it could not have been prepared in 1935 because it referred to tax declarations issued in 1948, thirteen years later; the respondent Court's theory that it must have been executed on or before 1948 as a confirmation of the prior sale was purely conjectural, and absent any evidence that it was signed by Elpidio, the document did not proceed from any legitimate source and could easily be fabricated. The conclusion was inevitable that Elpidio Borillo did not sell and alienate parcels (a), (c), and (d) to Catalina. As to parcels (e) and (f), Catalina presented no deed of sale in her favor. She could not seek refuge in acquisitive prescription, which requires public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for ten years in ordinary prescription or thirty years in extraordinary prescription; the trial court found that Elpidio had actual, peaceful, and continuous possession during his lifetime and until his death, and the respondent Court's contrary finding was not supported by impelling, compelling, or cogent reason. The trial court's findings of fact were entitled to the highest respect, the trial court being in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses by their demeanor on the stand, and the authorities cited by the respondent Court on the probative value of tax declarations in fact favored the petitioner: while tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership, they are prima facie evidence of possession, and here Elpidio during his lifetime, and the petitioner after his death, secured and were issued tax declarations for the parcels and were in fact in possession thereof.

• Finality of Judgment and Jurisdiction Over a Non-Appealing Party — A judgment becomes final as to a party who does not appeal, and once the period to appeal has lapsed, the judgment is no longer within the scope of the power of review of any court. The appeal of one defendant does not benefit a co-defendant where the latter has an independent and exclusive defense to a distinct portion of the property. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing the trial court's judgment as to Marcos Borillo, who did not appeal and whose defense to parcel (b) was exclusive to him.

• Proof of Private Documents — Before a private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing witness (then Section 21, Rule 132; now Section 20). The Court applied this rule to exclude Exhibits "3" and "4," since no one saw their execution, there were no subscribing witnesses, and the genuineness of Elpidio's handwriting was not established.

• Parol Evidence Rule and Patent Ambiguity — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, the writing is considered as containing all such terms, and no evidence of the terms other than the contents of the writing may be admitted, except where a mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in issue by the pleadings or where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. Before parol evidence may be admitted to identify, explain, or define the subject matter of a writing, the writing must itself contain a description sufficient to serve as a foundation for such evidence; parol evidence is not admissible to identify the property where the description is so vague as to amount to no description at all, and is not permitted to supply a description but only to apply it. A patent ambiguity cannot be cured by averment. The Court applied this to Exhibit "3," which mentioned no property sold, and held that the respondent Court erred in crediting testimonial evidence to cure the defect.

• Tax Declarations as Prima Facie Evidence of Possession — Tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership; they are only prima facie evidence of possession. However, when considered with actual possession of the property, they constitute evidence of great weight in support of a claim of title by prescription. The Court applied this to hold that the 1948 tax declarations in Elpidio's name, coupled with his actual possession, supported the petitioner's claim, and that the respondent Court's citation of authorities on the probative value of tax declarations in fact favored the petitioner.

• Acquisitive Prescription — Acquisitive prescription of dominion requires public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for ten years in the case of ordinary prescription and thirty years in the case of extraordinary prescription (Articles 1118, 1134, and 1137, Civil Code). The Court held that Catalina could not invoke prescription because the trial court found that Elpidio had actual, peaceful, and continuous possession during his lifetime and until his death.

• Great Weight Accorded to Trial Court Findings of Fact — The conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons, because trial courts have more opportunity and facilities to examine factual matters and are in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses by their demeanor on the stand. The Court found no impelling, compelling, or cogent reason to overturn the trial court's findings.

• "As against him, and more particularly with respect to parcel (b), the decision has long become final and the respondent Court is without jurisdiction to review the same." — This states the ratio decidendi on the jurisdictional error of the Court of Appeals in disturbing a judgment as to a defendant who did not appeal.

• "Parol evidence is not admissible to identify the property where the description thereof is so vague as to amount to no description at all. In other words, parol evidence is not permitted to supply a description, but only to apply it." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the limit on parol evidence in the face of a patent ambiguity, applied to exclude testimonial evidence offered to cure Exhibit "3."

• "while tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership, they are prima facie evidence of possession." — This states the settled probative weight of tax declarations, which the Court used to uphold the trial court's finding of Elpidio's possession and ownership.

• "Acquisitive prescription of dominion requires that there be public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for a period of ten (10) years, in case of ordinary prescription, and thirty (30) years, in case of extraordinary prescription." — This sets out the requisites of acquisitive prescription invoked by the private respondent and rejected by the Court.

• Layda vs. Legaspi, 39 Phil. 83 [1918]; Valdez vs. Ocumen, 106 Phil. 929 [1960]; Ramirez vs. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981]; Abad vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 817 [1987] — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that a judgment becomes final as to a party who does not appeal and is beyond the scope of appellate review.
• Pan Realty Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 564 [1988]; Rizo vs. Solano, 197 SCRA 711 [1991] — Cited for the proposition that beyond the period to appeal, a judgment is no longer within the power of review of any court.
• Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713 [1990] — Quoted for the rule that the trial court's conclusions and findings of fact are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed absent strong and cogent reasons.
• Bunag vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 299 [1988], citing Nolan vs. Salas, 7 Phil. 1 [1906]; U.S. vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil. 215 [1915]; Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil. 148 [1917] — Cited for the requirement that the due execution and authenticity of a private document be proven before it may be received in evidence.
• Evangelista vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 562 — Cited for the rule that tax declarations and tax receipts are not evidence of ownership but only prima facie evidence of possession.
• Elumbaring vs. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384 — Cited for the rule that where the holder of land presents a deed of conveyance in his favor, the declaration of ownership and tax receipts may be used to prove good faith in occupying and possessing the property.
• Viernes vs. Agpaoa, 41 Phil. 286 — Cited for the rule that tax receipts, while not proving title, when considered with actual possession, constitute evidence of great weight in support of a claim of title by prescription.
• Parcotillo vs. Parcotillo, 12 SCRA 435, 440 — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the rule that uninterrupted, adverse, open possession for thirty years regardless of title or good faith upholds the possessor's right over the property; the Supreme Court rejected its application on the facts.

• Section 21, Rule 132, Rules of Court (now Section 20) — Governs proof of private writings: before a private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing witness. Applied to exclude Exhibits "3" and "4," whose due execution and authenticity were not satisfactorily proven.
• Section 7, Rule 130, Rules of Court (now Section 9) — The parol evidence rule: when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all such terms, and no evidence of the terms other than the contents of the writing may be admitted, except where a mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in issue by the pleadings or where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. Applied to bar testimonial evidence offered to cure the patent ambiguity in Exhibit "3."
• Article 1118, Civil Code — Defines possession in the concept of owner as a requisite of acquisitive prescription; applied to reject Catalina's claim of prescription.
• Article 1134, Civil Code — Provides for ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten years; cited in setting out the requisites of prescription.
• Article 1137, Civil Code — Provides for extraordinary acquisitive prescription of thirty years; cited by the Court of Appeals and addressed by the Supreme Court in rejecting the prescription claim.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.