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Borbon vs. Court of Appeals

The petition was denied. Antonio Borbon, an incompetent represented by his brother as guardian ad litem, sought reconveyance of property allegedly sold without his consent. The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance on the ground of prescription, and Borbon appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief within the extended period, and later denied the motion to admit the belatedly filed brief. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the Court of Appeals did not act with grave abuse of discretion because the delay of 159 days was inexcusable and attributable to counsel's gross negligence.

Primary Holding

The Court of Appeals does not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing an appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief within the extended period when the delay is inexcusable and attributable to counsel's gross negligence. The appellate court's dismissal pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is proper where the appellant fails to file the brief despite repeated extensions and offers no valid explanation for the failure.

Background

Antonio Borbon was declared incompetent by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in 1957, suffering from chronic schizophrenia, with the Philippine National Bank appointed as his guardian. He owned a 277-square meter lot in Makati City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 49221. The CFI later declared him competent and terminated the guardianship in 1957, with the order annotated on his title in 1958. Thereafter, he sold one-half of his lot to Mariano Sitay, who subsequently subdivided and sold portions to the respondents.

History

  1. RTC, Branch 145, Makati City, Sept. 24, 1997 — granted Amparo Investment Corp.'s motion to dismiss the complaint for reconveyance on the ground of prescription.

  2. Court of Appeals, Dec. 9, 1998 — dismissed the appeal for failure of plaintiff-appellant to file his brief within the extended period, pursuant to Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

  3. Court of Appeals, Mar. 9, 1999 — denied petitioner's motion to admit brief, holding that the order of dismissal had become final and executory.

  4. Supreme Court, Dec. 9, 2004 — denied the petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

Facts

Antonio Borbon, petitioner, was declared incompetent by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Sp. Proc. No. 924 on January 29, 1957, having been found to be suffering from chronic schizophrenia. The Philippine National Bank was appointed as his guardian. At that time, he owned a 277-square meter lot in Makati City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 49221 issued on January 29, 1957. On September 19, 1957, the CFI issued an Order declaring petitioner competent and terminating PNB's guardianship over him, which Order was annotated on his title on July 7, 1958. On the same day, he sold one-half of his lot to Mariano Sitay.

On February 7, 1978, Mariano had his one-half portion subdivided into two lots: Lot 8-A and Lot 8-B. He sold Lot 8-A to respondent Renato Sitay, who mortgaged the same to respondent Amparo Investment Corporation. Later, Mariano also sold his remaining lot, Lot 8-B, to respondent Ernesto Catindig.

On May 23, 1997, petitioner, through his brother Candido Borbon, filed a complaint for reconveyance of property with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 145, Makati City, against spouses Renato and Princesita Sitay, Amparo Investment Corporation, and Ernesto Catindig, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1135. Petitioner alleged that the contracts of sale and mortgage of the subject property were all void because of lack of consent on his part, as he was then suffering from acute schizophrenia. On June 9, 1997, the trial court appointed Candido Borbon as petitioner's guardian ad litem.

Amparo Investment Corporation filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of sufficient cause of action and prescription. The trial court granted the motion, holding that the action for reconveyance had prescribed. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57392. On May 11, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the Court of Appeals' Order requiring him to file the appellant's brief within forty-five days from notice, giving him until June 25, 1998 to file. On June 23, July 24, and August 15, 1998, petitioner filed separate motions for extension, totaling 60 days. On September 22, 1998, the Court of Appeals allowed appellant to file his brief until September 7, 1998.

On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure of plaintiff-appellant to file his brief within the extended period, considering the appeal abandoned pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration. On February 16, 1999, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion to admit the brief attached thereto, which was late by 159 days from September 7, 1998. On March 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the motion, noting that the resolution of dismissal had become final and executory. Atty. Rogelio Padilla, managing partner of the law firm handling the case, manifested that the failure of Atty. Samuel Marquez, the assigned lawyer, to submit the brief was due to "the great burden of guilt that Atty. Marquez was carrying over the death of his wife – that rendered him confused and debilitated from performing his work as a lawyer."

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief seasonably.

Arguments of the Respondents

N/A — The decision does not recount the respondents' specific arguments before the Supreme Court.

Issues

  • Dismissal of Appeal: Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal for petitioner's failure to file the appellant's brief seasonably.

Ruling

  • Dismissal of Appeal: No. The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal, as the petitioner's delay of 159 days in filing the appellant's brief was inexcusable and attributable to counsel's gross negligence.

Ruling Rationale

  • Dismissal of Appeal: The Court of Appeals, upon petitioner's timely motion, allowed him to file the appellant's brief up to September 7, 1998, but he filed the same only on February 2, 1999, or after a lapse of 159 days. The Court frowned upon lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestation of their failure. The Court found no good reason why Atty. Marquez failed to transfer the case to another lawyer in the same office, nor why the partners therein did not properly supervise and monitor his work. The delay was, by any standard, simply inexcusable. The Court cited Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda, or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Citing Galen vs. Paguirigan, the Court held that a failure to file a brief for a client constitutes inexcusable negligence on the part of the lawyer. The Court concluded that petitioner's counsel failed to exercise due diligence in protecting the interest of his client, and his lack of devotion to duty was so gross and palpable as to warrant disciplinary action.

Doctrines

  • Dismissal of appeal for failure to file brief — Under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal may be dismissed for failure of the appellant to file his brief within the period prescribed by the rules. The Court applied this rule where the appellant failed to file his brief within the extended period, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal as abandoned.

  • Counsel's negligence as ground for disciplinary action — A lawyer's failure to file a brief for his client constitutes inexcusable negligence, warranting disciplinary action. The Court applied this doctrine where counsel failed to file the appellant's brief despite repeated extensions, failed to transfer the case to another lawyer, and offered only a personal tragedy as explanation.

Key Excerpts

  • "We frown upon lawyer's practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply let the period lapse without submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestation of their failure." — This passage articulates the Court's disapproval of dilatory practices by counsel and supports the dismissal of the appeal.

  • "We fail to see any good reason why Atty. Marquez failed to transfer the case to another lawyer in the same office. We likewise fail to understand why the partners therein did not properly supervise and monitor the work of Atty. Marquez. Indeed, the delay is, by any standard, simply inexcusable." — This passage states the Court's finding that the delay was inexcusable, forming the basis for affirming the dismissal.

  • "An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part." — This quotation from Galen vs. Paguirigan defines the standard of diligence required of counsel and the consequence of failing to file a brief.

Precedents Cited

  • Galen vs. Paguirigan, Adm. Case No. 5558, March 7, 2002, 378 SCRA 527 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that a lawyer's failure to file a brief for his client constitutes inexcusable negligence warranting disciplinary action.

  • Edrial vs. Quilat-Quilat, G.R. No. 133625, September 6, 2000, 339 SCRA 760 — Cited in support of the Court's disapproval of lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking extensions and letting the period lapse without submitting pleadings.

  • Achacoso vs. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 424 (1973) — Cited in support of the Court's position on the inexcusable delay in filing pleadings.

  • Casals vs. Cusi, Jr., 52 SCRA 58 (1973) — Cited in support of the Court's position on the inexcusable delay in filing pleadings.

Provisions

  • Section 1(e), Rule 50, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides for the dismissal of an appeal for failure of the appellant to file his brief within the period prescribed by the rules. The Court applied this provision in affirming the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the appeal.

  • Section 3, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides the period of ordinary appeal, which shall be taken within fifteen days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The Court cited this provision in the context of the appeal procedure.

  • Section 7, Rule 44, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Imposes the duty of the appellant to file his brief within forty-five days from receipt of notice of the clerk that all the evidence are attached to the record. The Court cited this provision as the basis for the appellant's duty to file the brief.

  • Rule 12.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda, or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. The Court cited this rule in finding counsel's conduct inexcusable.

  • Canon 18, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. The Court cited this canon in assessing counsel's failure to protect the client's interest.

  • Canon 19, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law. The Court cited this canon in assessing counsel's conduct.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Panganiban, J. (Chairman), Carpio Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concurred. Corona, J., was on leave.

Notable Dissenting Opinions

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the decision.